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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 stages	 an	 encounter	 between	 laughter	 and	 care,	 seeking	 to	
reimagine	their	ethical	capacities	and	potentials.	Through	engaging	with	non-
representational	theories,	it	loosens	existing	normative	moral	frameworks	for	
both	laughter	and	care,	instead	affording	attention	to	what	actually	happens	
when	 they	 emerge	 and	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 one	 another.	 Drawing	 on	
extensive	ethnographic	engagements,	working	in	nursing	care	homes	 in	the	
UK,	it	thus	offers	a	means	of	approaching	both	laughter	and	care	as	practised,	
affective	and	ethical	multiplicities	that	often	act	in	ways	that	exceed	discursive	
and	representational	understandings	of	them.	Through	this,	it	argues	that	we	
need	to	address	both	laughter	and	care	as	refrains,	capable	of	materialising	
and	 affecting	 in	 a	 multitude	 of	 different	 ways,	 and	 therefore	 capable	 of	
enacting	a	plurality	of	potential	ethical	relations.	As	such,	the	thesis	presents	
neither	 a	 unified	 understanding	 of	 laughter	 with	 care,	 nor	 a	 prescriptive	
ethical	framework	through	which	to	judge	them.	Instead,	it	develops	a	series	
of	 more	 fragmented	 and	 uncertain	 ethical	 approaches	 through	 which,	 it	
argues,	we	might	foster	a	sense	of	generosity,	kindness	and	response-ability	
towards	the	often	complex,	messy	and	imperfect	ways	in	which	laughter	and	
care	happen,	separately	and	together.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
To	Janice,		
Whose	capacity	to	approach	laughter	with	care,	and	to	care	with	laughter,	not	
only	inspired	this	thesis,	but	continues	to	transform	the	world	for	the	better	
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Preface	and	acknowledgements	
The	origins	of	this	thesis	can	be	traced	back	to	a	conversation	that	I	had	with	
Janice	 Connolly	 in	 October	 2013.	 Janice	 is	 an	 actress,	 comedian	 and	 social	
justice	campaigner	and	I	had	attended	a	talk	that	she	had	given	at	the	Midlands	
Arts	Centre	the	week	prior	which	discussed	a	project	she	had	 led	 involving	
comedy	courses	in	care	homes.	She	very	kindly	agreed	to	meet	with	me	and	
discuss	 potential	 ideas	 for	 a	 PhD	 project	 around	 the	 same	 themes.	 I	 don’t	
remember	exactly	what	we	discussed	in	that	meeting,	but	I	came	away	with	a	
number	of	ideas	and	inspirations.	The	project	proposed	in	the	end	was	not	just	
about	laughter	and	care	homes	but	slowly	it	has	returned	that	way.		
I	met	Janice	several	more	times	after	that	meeting,	travelling	to	events	with	
her,	and	running	into	her	at	yet	more.	Janice	has	a	very	distinctive	laugh,	and	
an	even	more	distinctive	capacity	to	care.	Her	ability	to	combine	the	two	and	
generate	real	changes	in	people’s	lives,	not	only	remains	the	exemplar	of	what	
an	approach	to	laughter	with	care	such	as	the	one	I	have	tried	to	convey	in	this	
thesis	can	offer,	but	also	exposes	the	limits	of	academic	work	itself	–	for	the	
thesis	will	never	be	able	to	achieve	what	Janice	has.		
Sadly,	the	demands	of	completing	the	thesis	mean	that	I	have	lost	touch	with	
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Janice	somewhat,	yet	the	memory	of	her	laughter	has	become	something	of	a	
refrain	 as	 I	 have	 plotted	 out	 its	 ideas.	 As	 such,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 begin	 my	
acknowledgements	by	thanking	Janice,	not	only	for	the	time	that	she	gave	to	
me	a	number	of	years	ago	but	for	the	continued	inspiration	that	she	provides	
to	 myself	 and	 others.	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 dedicate	 this	 thesis	 to	 her	 for	 that	
reason.	
There	are	a	significant	number	of	other	people	who	must	be	thanked	for	all	
their	help,	 support,	 care	and	 laughter	 throughout	 this	project,	not	 least	 the	
AHRC	Midlands	Three	Cities	DTC	who	funded	it.	The	list	that	follows	is	a	long	
one,	so	apologies	in	advance.	
My	most	sincere	gratitude	goes	to	my	supervisors:	Pat	Noxolo	and	Ben	Taylor.	
I	 could	 never	 have	 gotten	 through	 this	 process	 without	 your	 generosity,	
wisdom,	critique,	encouragement,	and	unwavering	 faith.	Together	you	have	
managed	to	guide	and	direct	me	when	I	needed	it,	but	you	have	also	let	me	do	
it	my	way	–	something	for	which	I	am	truly	grateful.	I	think	we	can	all	let	out	a	
collective	sigh	of	relief	that	there	are	no	more	forms	to	be	filled	in!	
I	 must	 also	 offer	 whole-hearted	 thanks	 to	 the	 staff,	 residents,	 and	 family	
members	of	both	care	homes,	who	so	willingly	welcomed	me	into	their	lives,	
homes	 and	 workplaces.	 Similarly,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 the	 casts	 of	 both	
theatre	groups	 for	 taking	me	on	a	 journey	that	 I	will	never	 forget,	even	 if	 it	
hasn’t	featured	so	heavily	in	the	thesis	itself.	The	research	would	never	have	
happened	if	it	weren’t	for	ENRICH’s	involvement.	In	particular,	my	gratitude	
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goes	to	Mary,	Fawn,	and	Sandra	who	took	a	chance	on	a	strange	project	about	
laughter.	
I	 consider	 myself	 immensely	 lucky	 to	 have	 been	 surrounded	 by	 so	 many	
amazing	 people	 in	 GEES.	 With	 the	 usual	 apologies	 for	 anyone	 who	 I	
accidentally	miss	off	 the	 list,	 I	would	 like	 to	 thank	Adam,	Dave,	Dominique,	
Eric,	Irina,	Jessica,	Jo,	John,	Julian,	Lloyd,	Matthew,	Natasha,	Paul,	Peter,	Rosie,	
Sara,	 Sophie,	 Steve	and	of	 course	Gretchel!	 for	all	 their	 interest,	 advice	and	
guidance	 at	 various	 points.	 A	 bigger	 thank	 you	 must	 go	 to	 the	 collective	
population	of	Office	225,	past	and	present:	Adi;	Alex;	Amy;	Arooj;	Arshad;	Bin;	
Bobby;	 Charles;	 Chloe;	 Collins;	 Deyala;	 Ellie;	 Elly;	 Emmah;	 Faye;	 Helen;	
Hikmah;	Husna;	 Janna;	Kaz;	Naeema;	Stuart;	Tessa;	Thom;	Tom;	Upuli;	 and	
Yiting	–	together,	you	have	made	coming	to	work	every	day	not	only	easier,	
but	an	absolute	pleasure.	
Three	people	are	missing	from	this	list	because	they	have	offered	more	than	I	
could	have	ever	asked	for	or	expected.	Jon:	you	have	not	only	been	an	excellent	
Academic	Advisor,	but	you	have	become	a	real	mentor	and	a	true	friend	(and	
the	best	guide	to	Berlin	toilets	anyone	could	want).	Katie:	for	all	the	coffees,	
cakes	and	breaks,	but	mostly	for	being	willing	to	listen	to	me	talk	through	it...	
again	–	safe	 to	say	I	 think	I	really	have	worked	out	 the	structure	now!	And	
Colin:	 for	 all	 the	 phone	 calls,	 support,	 advice,	 puns	 and	many,	many	more	
phone	calls.	
Beyond	 the	 department,	 I	 have	 been	 supported	 by	 a	 number	 of	 friends,	 of	
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which	there	are	far	too	many	to	name	here.	Instead,	I	simply	say	thanks	to	all,	
but	offer	 special	 thanks	 to:	Meg	 (for	being	a	 constant	source	of	 energy	and	
letting	me	help	with	“figure	6”	so	often);	Sam	(for	making	sure	life	didn’t	ever	
get	too	serious,	and	“winning	the	race”);	and	to	Ollie	(for	always	being	there	to	
remind	me	that	there	is	more	to	life	than	a	PhD);	and	to	all	three	of	you	(for	all	
the	ice-cream).	
My	 PhD	 experience	 has	 been	 significantly	 enriched	 by	 a	 number	 of	 post-
graduates	from	other	universities,	many	of	whom	I	have	met	through	the	RGS-
IBG	Postgraduate	 Forum.	Again,	 I	will	 offer	 only	 special	 thanks	 to	my	new	
writing	 partners	 Rich	 and	 Diana;	 and	 to	 Adam	 and	 Maddy,	 both	 of	 whom	
always	manage	to	make	a	conference	that	bit	better.	
Elements	of	 Chapters	 2	 and	 6	 have	 been	 published	 as	 Emmerson	P	 (2017)	
“Thinking	 laughter	 beyond	 humour:	 atmospheric	 refrains	 and	 ethical	
indeterminacies	in	spaces	of	care.”	Environment	and	Planning	A	49(9):	2082–
2098;	and	a	revised	version	of	Chapter	7	has	been	published	as	Emmerson	P	
(2018)	“From	coping	 to	 carrying	on:	 a	pragmatic	 laughter	between	 life	 and	
death.”	Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers,	1–14	–	many	thanks	
must	 be	 offered	 to	 the	 respective	 reviews	 and	 editors	 for	 their	 helpful	
suggestions	and	comments.		
My	parents	and	brother	Chris,	have	been	a	consistent	source	of	support,	as	
have	Andrew,	Katie	and	Hugo.	I	appreciate	all	of	your	encouragement,	efforts	
to	understand	what	it	is	that	I	do,	why	I	keep	getting	stuck,	and	willingness	to	
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help	in	whatever	ways	you	can!	
Finally,	 having	 started	 these	 acknowledgements	 with	 thanks	 to	 one	 truly	
amazing	woman,	I	would	like	to	end	them	by	giving	the	biggest	thanks	of	all	to	
another.	 To	Becky,	 the	 one	 person	who	 is	 probably	more	 pleased	 that	 this	
thesis	 is	 finished	 than	 I	 am,	 I	 really	 can’t	 thank	 you	 enough	 for	 also	 doing	
everything	the	others	have,	and	so	much	more!	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
When	embarking	on	a	research	project,	start	not	with	the	institutional	
tyranny	of	what	relevance,	what	impact,	what	goal	your	queries	might	
yield.	 Instead,	 begin	 in	 the	 middle	 by	 not	 knowing	 …	 disorientate	
enquiry,	disrupt	questions	and	muddle	the	field.	
(Gerlach	and	Jellis,	2015:	141)	
1.1	|	Setting	scenes	
At	some	point	during	2016,	the	UK’s	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC)	visited	
and	reported	on	a	nursing	care	home.	The	visit	was	a	follow	up	to	a	previous	
visit	and	as	such	covered	only	two	aspects	of	the	service.	The	first	related	to	
the	 staff’s	 training	 and	 procedural	 needs,	 with	 the	 inspectors	 approving	 of	
some	positive	changes	made	to	the	structures	and	procedures	around	safety.	
The	other	question	covered	by	the	inspection	asked	of	the	home:	‘Is	the	service	
caring?’	The	report	gives	the	following	answer:	
A	person	said,	“The	staff	are	friendly,	caring	and	nice”.	Another	person	
said,	“They	[staff]	are	more	friends	than	staff,	they'll	do	anything	for	you”.	
A	 relative	 said,	 “The	 staff	 are	 kind	 and	 friendly”.	 Our	 observations	on	
arrival	to	the	home	were	that	while	staff	were	rushing	around	supporting	
people	 to	 get	 up	 and	 have	 their	 breakfast,	 they	 were	 unable	 to	
demonstrate	whether	they	were	kind	and	caring.	We	saw	people	in	the	
lounge	who	were	left	alone,	some	people	were	sleeping	or	just	left	to	look	
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around	aimlessly	in	the	lounge	with	no	interaction.	On	the	afternoon,	we	
observed	staff	spending	time	with	people	showing	them	kindness	and	
compassion.	Staff	were	observed	stopping	and	spending	time	interacting	
with	people,	checking	how	they	were	in	a	way	that	showed	they	cared.	
Having	a	laugh	with	people	and	showing	how	kind	and	friendly	they	were.	
We	saw	that	people	were	as	a	result	comfortable	and	relaxed	around	the	
staff.	(CQC	Report	[anonymised],	2016:	np,	emphasis	my	own)	
This	statement	from	an	official	report	provides	texture	and	tone	for	the	kinds	
of	scenarios	that	this	thesis	attends	to:	moments	in	which	laughter	and	care	
come	into	contact;	points	where	they	rub	up	against,	and	affect,	one	another;	
instances	 of	 absence,	 presence	 and	 co-presence	 between	 the	 two	 entities;	
events	 that	 produce	 smoothness,	 friction,	 contrast,	 stickiness,	 and	 change;	
situations	in	which	both	laughter	and	care	become	meaningful	separately	and	
together;	 circumstances	 through	 which	 we	 come	 to	 understand	 their	
significance,	and	their	worth.	The	thesis	questions	the	kinds	of	logics	that	help	
to	inform	judgements	about	laughter	as	either	a	caring	activity	or	not,	offers	
alternative	ways	of	approaching	them,	and	thinks	about	how	these	different	
ways	of	approaching	the	question	can	shape	our	attitudes	towards	 laughter	
with	care.	In	this	sense,	the	thesis	attends	to	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care,	
focussing	on	the	circumstances	through	which	their	ethical	potentials	emerge	
and	can	be	apprehended.	In	this	sense,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	not	to	question	
whether	the	judgement	of	laughter	with	care,	such	as	those	in	this	report	are	
‘right’,	but	rather	to	think	through	the	multiple	ways	through	which	we	might	
approach	this	question	in	the	first	place.	
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This	statement	from	an	official	report	provides	texture	and	tone	for	the	kinds	
of	 scenarios	 that	 this	 thesis	 attends	 to	 in	 another	 way,	 however,	 through	
providing	an	insight	into	the	specific	places	that	it	discusses	in	experimenting	
with	these	wider	questions.	Indeed,	informing	the	thinking	within	the	thesis	is	
an	engagement	with	nursing	care	homes	in	the	UK.	It	is,	therefore,	a	scene	that	
I	know	to	be	very	recognisable;	a	scene	that	I	would	suggest	occurs	in	some	
form	or	another	in	all	care	homes.	As	such,	the	quote	above	serves	to	further	
contextualise	 the	 particular	 issues	 at	 stake,	 specifically	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
laughter	becomes	entangled	within	ideas	of	what	ought	and	ought	not	to	be	
involved	in	the	work	of	care,	and	the	implications	this	has	on	understandings	
of	care	workers’	relationships	with	the	people	they	care	for,	and	therefore	the	
quality	of	the	care	they	provide.		
This	statement	from	an	official	report	also	provides	texture	and	tone	for	the	
kinds	of	scenarios	that	this	thesis	attends	to	in	one	further,	more	specific,	way:	
the	home	being	reported	on	is,	in	fact,	one	that	features	directly	in	this	thesis	
itself,	under	the	pseudonym	of	Winterbourne	Care	Home.	It	is	one	of	two	care	
homes	that	I	worked	in	as	part	of	the	ethnographic	research	that	informs	this	
thesis,	 which	 is	 therefore	 full	 of	 similar	 scenes	 and	 scenarios.	 That	 said,	
unbounded	from	the	need	to	make	a	clear,	official	judgement,	the	scenarios	I	
try	 to	 present	 are	 capable	 of	 offering	 somewhat	 more	 generosity	 to	 the	
particular	circumstances	that	surround	scenes	 like	this	and	the	bodies	who	
take	part	in	them.	As	such,	whilst	I	do	not	wish	to	challenge	the	nature	of	the	
findings	in	this	official	report	directly,	my	hope	is	that	through	the	renewed	
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approach	 I	 develop	 in	 this	 thesis	 –	 an	 approach	 capable	 of	 recognising	 the	
complex,	 entangled,	 and	 often	 troublesome	 nature	 of	 the	 worlds	 in	 which	
laughter	bursts	–	a	wider	sense	of	care,	generosity	and	understanding	might	
be	afforded	to	all	 involved	within	these	kinds	of	scenarios,	even	when	what	
they	present	is	somewhat	imperfect.	
1.2	|	Beginning	in	the	middle:	laughter,	care,	ethics	
As	both	 its	 title	and	this	opening	section	suggests,	 therefore,	at	 its	broadest	
level,	this	thesis	sets	out	to	re-imagine	the	ways	in	which	we	might	think	about	
the	ethics	of	laughter	and	care.	Although	there	already	are	significant	bodies	
of	literature	that	attend	to	the	ethics	of	both	laughter	and	care	separately,	the	
thesis	 looks	 to	 do	 more	 than	 just	 combine	 these	 theoretical	 approaches,	
instead	staging	an	encounter	that	holds	the	two	 in	relation	to,	or	 ‘with’	one	
another	(Critchley,	1999;	Nancy,	2000),	and	thus	generate	an	ethical	approach	
that	 is	conceptually	distinctive	and	situated	 in	its	nature.	Although	I	outline	
the	 details	 of	 this	 approach,	 and	 how	 it	 serves	 to	 augment	 existing	
engagements	with	laughter,	care	and	ethics,	within	and	beyond	geography	in	
Chapter	2,	it’s	important	to	note	that	these	ways	of	thinking,	moving	and	being,	
were	not	generated	in	an	abstract	space,	but	rather	emerged	out	of	a	particular	
set	of	trajectories	and	circumstances	within	the	middle	of	the	project	itself.	In	
many	respects,	therefore,	it’s	important	to	tell	this	story	(to	open	the	black	box	
as	it	were)	in	order	to	allow	a	reader	to	better	understand	how	and	why	this	
thesis	and	the	ideas	it	presents,	take	the	particular	forms	that	they	do.	
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Although	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 Preface,	 this	 thesis	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 a	
particular	 conversation	with	 Janice	 Connolly	 about	 the	 role	 of	 comedy	 and	
laughter	within	care	homes,	 it’s	 important	 to	note	that	 in	 the	time	between	
that	conversation	and	the	point	at	which	the	project	was	actually	proposed	to	
the	funding	body,	its	aims	had	migrated.	The	project	proposed	at	that	time	was	
about	 the	emotional	and	affective	geographies	of	 laughter	 in	 the	workplace,	
focussing	 on	 what	 Linda	 McDowell	 (2009)	 terms	 ‘high-touch’	 labour,	 and	
seeking	to	better	understand	laughter	as	a	form	of	emotional/affective	labour	
(Hochschild,	1983).	
Central	 to	 this	 original	 proposal	 was	 the	 idea	 that	 laughter	 could	 be	
analytically	 distinguished	 from	 other	 socio-linguistic	 markers,	 such	 as	
humour,	 funniness	 and	 joking	 (Noxolo,	 forthcoming;	 Parvulescu,	 2010;	
Provine,	2004)	and	that	doing	so	might	open	up	new	ways	of	understanding	
its	 (often-paradoxical)	 position	 within	 social	 life.	 Indeed,	 this	 central	
proposition	has	remained	somewhat	consistent,	and	still	sits	at	the	core	of	this	
thesis,	 in	 which	 I	 address	 laughter	 specifically	 as	 a	 semi-instinctive,	
communicative,	embodied	response,	that	most	often	has	an	audible	or	visual	
element	(Provine,	2001)	and	sometimes	has	a	discernible	cause,	but	not	always	
(Macpherson,	2008).	Crucially,	attending	to	laughter	in	this	manner	suggests	
it	as	having	a	multiple,	mutable,	or	‘nomadic’	(Braidotti,	2011)	relation	with	
human	 subjects	 –	 simultaneously	 situated,	 distributed	 and	 relational	 (Mol,	
2008a)	–	and	therefore	positions	it	not	only	as	something	that	a	subject	does	
to	another	subject,	but	also	as	a	‘thing’	in	its	own	right	(Thrift,	2008),	capable	
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of	 ‘doing’,	 or	 ‘undoing’,	 subjects	 in	 return	 (J	Katz,	1999)	often	 in	 somewhat	
unexpected	ways.	
In	setting	out	to	research	the	roles	of	laughter	in	high-touch	labour,	therefore,	
I	had	identified	three	potential	case	study	sites	in	which	laughter	might	play	
different	roles:	call-centres;	comedy	clubs;	and	inspired	by	my	conversation	
with	Janice,	care	homes.	For	reasons	that	I	can’t	fully	recall	anymore,	I	decided	
that	the	care	home	should	be	the	first	research	site	out	of	these	three.	This	is	
therefore	how	and	when	 ideas	of	 ‘care’	 entered	 into	relation	with	 laughter.	
Given	 the	 residual	 focus	 on	 work	 at	 that	 point,	 however,	 my	 initial	
understandings	of	these	relationships	were	relatively	singular	in	comparison	
to	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 laughter-care	 relations	 that	 feature	 in	 its	 final	 form.	
Indeed,	I	was	looking	to	understanding	these	relationships	through	normative	
conceptions	of	caring	as	labour	(McDowell,	2009)	particularly	as	it	takes	place	
in	the	‘formal’	spaces	of	care	provision	in	nursing	homes	(Milligan	and	Wiles,	
2010).	Again,	there	is	a	level	of	continuity	here,	in	the	sense	that	much	of	this	
thesis	 does	 still	 engage	 with	 care	 through	 these	 ‘conventional’	
understandings:	seeing	it	as	a	style	of	engagement	with	another	that	is	either	
imbued	with	a	distinct	emotionality	of	affectivity	(caring	about	another),	or	
involves	 a	 practical	 level	 of	 assistance	 (caring	 for	 another)	 and	 often	 both	
(Conradson,	2011);	which	is	directed	from	a	care-giver	towards	a	resident	–
seeking	to	understand	how	laughter	interplays	with	these.	
My	 engagements	with	 care	 homes,	 however,	 also	 served	 to	 complicate	 and	
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expand	 these	 conceptions	 of	 care	 somewhat.	 Indeed,	 it	 became	 quickly	
apparent	 that	 the	 relationships	and	 formal	practices	between	care	workers	
and	residents	of	the	care	home	were	not	the	only	locations	of	care.	Similarly,	a	
multiplicity	of	other	people	also	clearly	cared	for	and	about	others,	including	
family	members	and	 residents	 themselves,	meaning	 the	 things	 that	became	
matters	of	care	were	also	multiple	and	diffuse.	In	other	words,	care	was	not	
just	directed	towards	residents	but	also:	staff	members;	family	members;	the	
care	home	as	a	building	and	as	an	institution;	a	number	of	‘external’	bodies	and	
situations;	and	of	course,	towards	‘the	self’.	Moreover,	the	ways	in	which	care	
is	‘practised’,	the	‘emotional’	states	it	involves,	and	the	ethico-political	means	
that	it	seeks	to	achieve	can	be	very	different	from	one	another	–	depending	in	
part	on	 the	 situation	 that	 is	being	addressed,	who	 is	 addressing	 it,	 and	 the	
particular	 circumstances	 in	which	 they	 are	 caring.	 It	 is	 also	 because	 of	 the	
particular	 complexity	 of	 care	 and	 its	 interactions	 with	 laughter	 that	 I	
eventually	shifted	the	thesis’	focus	from	work	and	workplaces,	to	care	and	care	
homes	more	specifically.	
Ultimately,	therefore,	despite	my	engagement	with	care	in	this	thesis	largely	
taking	place	in	the	formal	spaces	of	nursing	care	homes,	I	have	moved	towards	
a	more	expansive	and	 less	normative	conception	of	 it	 (Puig	de	 la	Bellacasa,	
2017;	Raghuram,	2016).	Broadly	speaking	therefore,	 the	conception	of	care	
that	frames	this	thesis	is	based	on	Joan	Tronto	and	Bernice	Fisher’s	 ‘generic	
definition’	of	care	as:	“a	species	activity	that	includes	everything	that	we	do	to	
maintain,	continue,	and	repair	our	‘world’	so	that	we	can	live	in	it	as	well	as	
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possible.	That	world	includes	our	bodies,	our	selves,	and	our	environment,	all	
of	which	we	seek	to	interweave	in	a	complex,	life-sustaining	web”	(1990:	40,	
emphasis	in	original;	see	also	Tronto	1993:103).	This	definition	thus	allows	an	
expanded	sense	of	the	agencies	that	are	involved	in	care	(as	everything	that	
we	 do)	 that	 can	 extend	 past	 conceptions	 based	 in	 culturally	 specific	 and	
anthropocentric	 frameworks	 (Bartos,	 2018;	 Raghuram,	 2016),	 instead	
opening	 space	 for	 recognition	 of	 both	 the	 multiple	 ways	 in	 which	 the	
maintenance,	 continuation	 and	 repair	 of	 worlds	 can	 take	 place	 in	 a	 given	
context,	and	of	the	ways	in	which	the	elements	of	these	worlds	can	interweave	
together	or	indeed	break	apart	in	the	act	of	care	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	2017).	
It	is	thus	through	the	gradual	experimentation	with	the	ways	in	which	laughter	
interacts	with	this	version	of	care	that	this	thesis	has	emerged.	In	it,	I	approach	
both	laughter	and	care	as	multiplicities	and	seek	to	hold	them	in	tension	with	
one	 another.	 Experimenting	 in	 such	 ways	 thus	 opens	 up	 new	 ways	 of	
understanding	them,	particularly	around	ideas	of	politics	and	ethics.	Although	
these	 issues	 are	 obviously	 interrelated,	my	 interest	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	
more	 concerned	with	 the	 latter,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 a	 clear	 connection	with	
ideas	of	‘ethics	of	care’	(Tronto,	1993)	but	also	because,	whilst	the	politics	of	
laughter	has	been	widely	addressed	(e.g.	Brigstocke,	2011;	Dodds	and	Kirby,	
2012;	 Ridanpää,	 2014b),	 the	ways	 in	which	 its	 ethics	 are	 understood	 have	
remained	relatively	unchallenged	and	unchanged	over	the	last	century	or	so.	
In	 everyday	 language,	 ethics	 has	 two	 meanings:	 first,	 as	 a	 set	 of	 moral	
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principles	that	guide	people’s	actions	and	behaviours;	and	second,	as	the	field	
of	academic	inquiry	concerned	with	understanding	and	evaluating	the	nature	
of	these	moral	principles	(Popke,	2010;	Smith,	1997b).	Although	echoing	this	
double	position,	 the	understanding	of	ethics	and	the	ethical	adopted	 in	this	
thesis	 is	 somewhat	 different	 in	 that	 it	moves	away	 from	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘moral	
principles’	as	the	foundation	of	ethicality,	instead	suggesting	that	the	ethical	
might	be	better	understood	as	a	way	of	understanding	the	consequences	of	
any	 change	 to	 forms	 of	 relationality	 between	 two	 or	more	 bodies,	 be	 they	
human	 or	 otherwise	 (see	 Barad,	 2007).	 The	 ethical	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 an	
‘emergent’	form,	one	that	can	be	enacted	(McCormack,	2005),	experimented	
with	(Darling,	2010),	and	cultivated	(Thrift,	2004c),	but	whose	exact	forms	can	
never	be	known	in	advance	(McCormack,	2003).	As	Deleuze	writes:	“you	do	
not	know	beforehand	what	a	body	or	a	mind	can	do,	in	a	given	encounter,	a	
given	arrangement,	a	given	combination”	(Deleuze,	1993:	627	in	Popke,	2009:	
83).	As	such,	a	sensibility	towards	the	ethical	is	developed	in	this	thesis	which	
looks	to	productively	resist	normative	theorisation	and	the	universality	that	
comes	with	it	(in	line	with	the	understandings	of	laughter	and	care	outlined	
above),	in	favour	of	multiple,	partial	understandings	of	their	ethical	forms	and	
relations.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	a	sensibility	 that	 is	less	engaged	with	questions	of	
responsibility,	 and	 more	 concerned	 with	 ideas	 of	 response-ability,	 and	
particularly	how	we	might	negotiate	the	unexpected,	unintended	and	messy	
relational	forms	that	are	often	generated	through	both	laughter	and	care.		
Central	 to	 this	 project,	 therefore,	 is	 a	 commitment	 to	 engaging	 with	 the	
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plurality	of	ethical	relations,	obligations,	commitments,	tensions,	frictions	and	
imperfections	that	emerge	from	being	in-common	with	others	(Popke,	2009,	
2010;	 Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	 2017).	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 acts	 as	 a	 response	 to	
Bergson’s	call,	not	just	to	proclaim	the	multiple,	but	to	actively	work	with/in	
it,	 embedding	 multiplicity	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 thinking	 and	 being	 in	 the	 world	
(Deleuze	 and	 Parnet,	 1987:	 16).	 In	 producing	 an	 account	 of	 these	
multiplicities,	 therefore,	 I	 deploy	 geographical	 thinking	 as	 a	 mode	 of	
attunement	 that	 is	 contextually	 sensitive	 to	 the	 situated	 nature	 of	 the	
spacetimes	in	which	laughter	and	care	take	place	(McCormack,	2013).	More	
specifically	however,	the	thesis	is	framed	through	a	broad	engagement	with	
non-representational	theories	(Anderson,	2009b;	Thrift,	2008)	which	not	only	
offer	a	particular	style	of	thinking,	mode	of	address,	and	somewhat	speculative	
ethos,	that	I	argue	is	perfectly	situated	to	engage	with	the	understandings	of	
laughter	 and	 care	 set	out	 above,	 but	 have	 actively	 served	 to	 produce	 them	
throughout	the	story	of	the	project	as	it	is	told	here.	As	such,	the	next	section	
will	briefly	outline	non-representational	theories	as	an	approach	and	how	this	
serves	to	shape	the	thinking	and	writing	that	follows	in	this	thesis.	
1.3	|	Non-representational	theories	
Originally	formulated	during	the	1990s	by	Nigel	Thrift	(see	Thrift,	1996,	1997,	
1999,	 2000)	 non-representational	 theory	 has	 developed	 into	 a	 broad	 and	
diverse	approach	to	geographic	enquiry,	touching	upon	almost	every	aspect	of	
the	 discipline.	 Non-representational	 theory	 not	 only	 draws	 on	 a	 diverse	
lineage	 of	 post-structural	 and	 phenomenological	 scholarship:	most	 notably	
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Deleuze	and	Guattari	(e.g.	Dewsbury,	2003;	McCormack,	2003;	Thrift,	2004a),	
but	 also	 Heidegger	 and	 Merleau-Ponty	 (Wylie,	 2005,	 2006),	 Foucault	
(Anderson,	 2012,	 2014),	 Bataille	 (Romanillos,	 2011),	 Badiou	 (Dewsbury,	
2007),	Brian	Massumi	(2002),	and	Jean	Luc	Nancy	(Simpson,	2009,	2015);	but	
its	 ideas	 and	modes	 of	 address	 have	 also	 drawn	 parallels	with	 other	 post-
structuralist	philosophical	projects	such	as:	new	materialism	(Bennett,	2010);	
nomadic	 theory	 (Braidotti,	 2011);	 posthumanism	 (Barad,	 2007;	 Haraway,	
2016);	post-phenomenology	 (see	Ash	and	Simpson,	2016);	 and	other	 ‘post-
Deleuzian’	 feminist	 projects	 (Grosz,	 1994,	 2004,	 2005).	 In	 this	 sense,	 Ben	
Anderson	 (2009b)	 suggests	 the	 plural	 ‘non-representational	 theories’	 as	 a	
better	 name,	 which	 given	 that	 I	 draw	 across	 these	 various	 theoretical	
frameworks,	is	a	practice	that	I	have	also	adopted	here.		
Although	there	are	subtle	differences	between	these	variegated	perspectives,	
at	the	core	of	all	non-representational	theories	is	a	fundamental	critique	of	the	
primacy	 of	 representation,	 as	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 and	 knowing	 the	 world	
(Cadman,	2009).	Instead,	non-representational	theories	suggest	that	a	more	
embodied	 and	 performative	 style	 of	 geographical	 inquiry	 might	 be	 better	
suited	to	engage	with	and	animate	experiences	of	everyday	life	(Thrift,	2003;	
Thrift	 and	 Dewsbury,	 2000).	 This	 is	 not	 to	 completely	 disavow	 the	 role	 of	
representations,	 but	 instead	 to	 challenge	 the	 power	 or	 ‘truth’	 of	
representations	 (Anderson	 and	Harrison,	 2010).	 As	Dewsbury	 et	 al.	 (2002:	
438)	 argue:	 in	 non-representational	 theories,	 “representations	 are	
apprehended	as	performative	 in	 themselves;	as	doings.	The	point	here	 is	 to	
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redirect	 attention	 from	 the	 posited	 meaning	 towards	 the	 material	
compositions	 and	 conduct	 of	 representations.”	 In	 this	 sense,	 non-
representational	theories	seek	not	to	simply	re-present	the	world	but	rather	
to	 animate	 the	ways	 in	which	 ordinary	 everyday	 events	 both	 generate	 and	
relate	 to	 wider	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 worlds	 (Berlant,	 2011;	
Dewsbury,	2000;	Dewsbury	et	al.,	2002;	Stewart,	2007;	Vannini,	2015),	paying	
close	attention	to	the	hybrid	(Whatmore	1999),	distributed	(Simpson	2017)	
and	relational	(Ahmed	2004)	processes	within	which	bodies	are	enmeshed,	
and	through	which	thought,	action	and	feeling	come	into	being	(McCormack	
2008b).	As	Thrift	(2008:	2)	suggests,	in	somewhat	simpler	terms,	they	seek	to	
attend	to	“the	geography	of	what	happens	…	a	work	of	description	of	the	bare	
bones	of	actual	occasions”.	
Although	not	a	theory	of	the	body	per	se.	(McCormack,	2008b)	questions	about	
bodies	and	embodiment	are	somewhat	central	to	non-representational	styles	
of	 thought	 (see	Anderson,	2006,	2012;	Bissell,	 2009;	Braidotti,	 1994,	2011,	
Colls,	 2007,	 2012;	 Dewsbury,	 2000;	 Harrison,	 2008;	 McCormack,	 2013;	
Saldanha,	2010;	Simpson,	2008;	Thrift,	2004b;	Thrift	and	Dewsbury,	2000).	
Guiding	 these	 engagements	 are	 a	 series	 of	 claims	 about	 the	 nature	 of	
embodiment,	 summarized	 by	 McCormack	 (2008b:	 1824)	 as	 follows:	 (1)	
humans	do	not	always	consciously	reflect	on	signs,	symbols	and	other	forms	
of	representation	when	they	act	in	the	world;	(2)	thinking	is	not	necessarily	a	
case	 of	 manipulating	 ‘picture-like	 representations’	 –	 there	 are	 other	 more	
embodied	 forms	of	 thought	such	as	habit	and	 intuition;	(3)	 intelligence	 is	a	
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shared	 and	 relational	 process	 which	 involves	 a	 range	 of	 human	 and	 non-
human	 actors;	 (4)	 emotionality	 and	 affectivity	 are	 key	 elements	 of	 spatial	
experience.		
In	 this	 sense,	 non-representational	 theories	 share	 a	 set	 of	 trajectories	with	
feminist	theories	in	that	they	look	to	emphasise	the	notion	that	‘body’,	‘mind’,	
and	‘world’	are	interconnected,	rather	than	separate	entities	(Callard,	1998;	
Grosz,	 1994;	 Longhurst,	 1995,	 2001;	 Rose,	 1993),	 and	 that	 bodies	 are	
relationally	produced	through	their	encounters	with	both	other	bodies	and	the	
worlds	 they	 inhabit	 (Ahmed,	 1998;	 Butler,	 1993;	 Colls,	 2012;	 Nash,	 2000).	
Beyond	 this	 however,	 non-representational	 theories	 tend	 towards	 an	
expanded	 notion	 of	 “bodies”	 in	 their	 relative	 lack	 of	 distinction	 between	
human	and	non-human	bodies	 (Thrift,	2003),	 through	devising	 the	 ‘human’	
body	 as	 always	 cut	 through	 with	 more-than-human	 elements	 and	 forces	
(Anderson,	2014;	Andrews,	2017;	Grosz,	2004;	Simpson,	2017)	and	therefore	
seeking	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 various	 agencies	 of	 both	 these	 hybrids	
(Whatmore,	 1997),	 and	 other	 non-human	 matters	 (Barad,	 2003;	 Bennett,	
2005).		
Given	this	‘fundamental	critique’	of	representation	and	the	understanding	of	
bodies	 it	 has	 generated,	 perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 non-representational	
theories	 have	 themselves	 not	 gone	 without	 critique.	 Some	 scholars,	 for	
instance,	have	argued	that	they	tend	towards	a	treatment	of	representation	in	
an	almost	caricatured	manner	(Cresswell,	2006),	degrading	the	 liveliness	of	
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already	 existing	 attention	 to	 the	 cultural	 politics	 of	 identity	 and	 textual	
meaning	 (Lorimer,	 2005;	 see	 also	 Philo,	 2012).	 Others	 have	 questioned	
whether	 it	really	 is	possible	 to	provide	accounts	of	 the	world	that	are	truly	
non-representational,	 given	 that	 no	matter	 how	 the	 researcher	 goes	 about	
collecting	and	analysing	data	they	will	have	to	represent	 it	in	some	manner	
(Andrews,	2017).	Perhaps	the	more	significant	lines	of	critique	however,	have	
emerged	around	whether	focus	on	the	non-representational	serves	to	negate	
the	 power	 and	 prevalence	 of	 representations	 within	 (subaltern)	 identity	
politics	 (Bondi,	 2005;	 Nash,	 2000;	 Nayak,	 2010;	 Thien,	 2005),	 and	 thus	
whether	 they	 lack	engagement	with	 social,	 cultural	 and	 spatial	 context	 and	
power	which	have	traditionally	been	deployed	to	complicate	universal	claims	
about	bodies	and	knowledges	(Tolia-Kelly,	2006).		
In	 response	 to	 these	 critiques	Lorimer	 (2008:	556)	has	suggested	a	shift	 in	
language,	to	‘more-than-representational’	theories,	within	which	he	suggests	
the	 ‘non-representational’	 might	 prove	 supplementary,	 providing	 “a	
background	hum,	asking	questions	of	style,	form,	technique	and	methods,	and	
ushering	 in	 experimental	 kinds	of	 response”.	 Similarly,	 Rachel	 Colls	 (2012)	
argues,	from	a	feminist	perspective,	that	non-representational	theories	might	
be	 best	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 series	 of	 ‘tactical	 suggestions’	 that	 can	 be	 either	
foregrounded	or	backgrounded	depending	on	the	political,	ethical,	ontological	
or	 epistemological	 context	 in	which	 the	 research	 project	 and	 researcher(s)	
find	themselves.		
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These	critiques	need	to	be	taken	seriously,	and	it	is	in	part	because	of	them	
that	I	have	ended	up	engaging	more	thoroughly	with	care.	Yet	in	this	thesis,	I	
do	 still	 continue	 to	 foreground	 non-representational	 theories.	 Indeed,	
although	 somewhat	 undeniably	 representations	 are	 important	 to	
understanding	 both	 laughter	 and	 care,	 the	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 there	 are	
significant	 opportunities	 afforded	 by	 attention	 to	 non-representational	 in	
adding	 to	 these	understandings	 in	a	productive	manner.	This	 is	on	 the	one	
hand	about,	recognising	the	ways	in	which	hums,	styles,	forms	and	techniques	
already	mediate	our	engagements	with	representations	of	laughter	and	care,	
and	thus	become	key	ways	through	which	we	apprehend	their	place	in	relation	
to	one	another.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	non-representational	theories	also	
allow	for	a	framing	of	elements	of	experience	such	as	instinct,	intuition,	and	
indeed,	 emotions	 such	 as	 laughter	 or	 those	 involved	 in	 care,	 not	 just	 as	
cosmetic	consequences	of	wider	representational	systems,	but	rather	as	active	
and	forceful	drivers	of	change	to	the	relations	between	people	and	the	spaces	
in	which	they	inhabit	(Dewsbury	2003).	Furthermore,	at	a	broader	register,	
non-representational	theories	also	offer	huge	potential	(if	not	always	realised)	
for	engaging	with	ideas	of	ethics	in	a	manner	that	is	more	attentive	to	the	non-
normative	 aspects	 of	 the	 world	 (Barnett,	 2011)	 and	 the	 multiplicity	 of	
potential	 ethical	 relations	 that	 can	 emerge	 from	 a	 given	 encounter	
(McCormack,	 2003),	 something	 that	 is	 absolutely	 vital	 for	 understanding	
laughter	and	care,	both	separately	and	together.	
As	such,	in	framing	my	approach	to	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care	throughout	
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this	 thesis,	 I	 draw	 on	 a	 number	 of	 different	 concepts	 from	 non-
representational	 theories.	 Most	 obvious	 are	 engagements	 with	 ideas	 of	
practice	and	affect,	which	cut	across	both	non-representational	theories	and	
the	thesis	as	a	whole	(Andrews,	2017);	as	well	as	a	reworked	understanding	
of	subjectivities	(see	Simpson,	2017;	Wylie,	2010).	Alongside	this,	I	also	deploy	
more	‘specialist’	concepts,	such	as	‘atmospheres’,	 ‘folds’,	 ‘excess’,	 ‘creativity’,	
and	 ‘intentionality’	 in	 order	 to	 unpack	 the	 material-affective	 workings	 of	
laughter	with	 care	 in	 individual	 chapters	and	sections	of	 the	 thesis.	Cutting	
across	these	approaches	however	it	is	the	concept	of	‘the	refrain’	(Deleuze	and	
Guattari,	 1988;	 McCormack,	 2013;	 Stengers,	 2008;	 Stewart,	 2010)	 that	
perhaps	does	the	most	work	in	holding	together	the	multiple	and	contingent	
ethical	 possibilities	 afforded	 by	 laughter,	 care	 and	 laughter	 with	 care.	 As	
McCormack	(2013:	7–8)	describes:		
[T]he	 refrain	 names	 the	 durational	 mattering	 of	 which	 affective	
spacetimes	are	composed.	Refrains	have	a	territorializing	function:	that	
is,	they	draw	out	and	draw	together	blocks	of	spacetime	from	the	chaos	
of	 the	 world,	 generating	 certain	 expressive	 consistency	 through	 the	
repetition	 of	 practices,	 techniques	 and	 habits	 …	While	 qualified	 by	 a	
certain	spatiotemporal	consistency,	refrains	are	radically	open:	that	is	to	
say,	 while	 they	 may	 be	 repetitive,	 refrains	 are	 always	 potentially	
generative	 of	 difference,	 producing	 lines	 of	 thinking,	 feeling,	 and	
perceiving	that	may	allow	one	to	wander	beyond	the	familiar	
The	 thesis	 as	 a	whole,	 therefore,	 approaches	 laughter	 and	 care	 as	 refrains:	
repeatedly	emerging	and	generating	particular	territories,	but	also	remaining	
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‘open’	and	‘indeterminate’,	always	capable	of	producing	different	affects	and	
effects.	 In	other	words,	 ‘the	refrain’	allows	for	an	understanding	of	laughter	
and	 care	 as	 discernible	 entities	 –	 always	 recognisably	 themselves	 –	whilst	
holding	onto	the	sense	that	the	ways	in	which	they	materialise	and	affect	at	
different	moments,	can	be	radically	different.	This,	in	turn,	serves	to	open	up	a	
non-normative	 space	 through	 which	 we	 can	 think	 about	 their	 ethical	
potentials	 as	 always	multiple:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 just	 because	 laughter	 or	 care	
appear	to	emerge	in	a	similar	manner,	situation	or	circumstance	repeatedly,	
does	 not	 necessarily	 foreclose	 the	 possibilities	 that	 their	 outcomes	 can	 be	
different,	 uncanny,	 or	 unfamiliar.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 demands	 a	 style	 of	 ethical	
thinking	that	holds	the	question	of	laughter	with	care	also	as	a	refrain:	one	that	
needs	to	be	engaged	with	repeatedly,	attending	both	to	the	specificities	of	its	
territorialisation	in	the	moment,	and	to	the	multiple	angles	and	orientations	
through	 and	 from	 which	 these	 territorialisations	 might	 be	 experienced	
differently	(Ahmed,	2010).	 In	 this	sense,	 the	thesis	moves	 firmly	away	from	
universal	 and	 prescriptive	 claims	 about	 the	 ethics	 of	 laughter	 with	 care,	
instead	 arguing	 for	 more	 multiple,	 situated	 and	 speculative	 approaches,	
together	which	might	enable	a	more	generous	engagement	with	the	ethics	of	
what	(actually)	happens	(Thrift	2008)	during	the	burst	of	laughter.	
1.4	|	Chapter	outlines	
The	 idea	 of	 the	 refrain	 thus	 forms	 an	 (often	 implicit)	 framing	 for	 the	
discussions	of	laughter,	care	and	ethics	in	this	thesis	as	a	whole.	This	can	be	
seen	 to	 occur	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 through	 its	 descriptive	 engagement	 with	
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numerous	 different	 moments	 of	 laughter	 and	 care,	 the	 thesis	 as	 a	 whole	
provides	a	sense	of	the	multiple	of	ways	in	which	both	laughter	and	care	can	
emerge,	the	kinds	of	spacetimes	they	territorialise,	and	the	plurality	of	ethical	
encounters	that	are	enacted	through	their	taking	place.	Second,	organised	as	a	
series	 of	 entangled	 essays,	 each	 chapter	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 refrain,	
approaching	 similar	 questions	 and	 moments	 of	 laughter	 with	 care	 from	
different	theoretical	angles,	which	in	turn	serve	to	express	the	multiplicity	of	
ethical	potentialities	 that	 emerge	 through	differently	 situated	engagements,	
de-	 and	 re-territorialising	 them	 in	 different	 ways.	 As	 such,	 although	 each	
chapter	 is	capable	of	standing	alone	 in	some	respects,	 they	can	be	read	and	
understood	in	a	deeper	manner	when	approached	as	a	whole.	
Chapter	2,	for	instance,	opens	the	discussion	by	drawing	together	the	various	
theoretical	 frameworks	used	 in	this	 thesis	 in	order	to	set	out	 the	expanded	
ethical	terrain	through	which	the	discussion	moves.	It	does	so	through	staging	
an	encounter	of	sorts,	between	literatures	on	ethics	within	human	geography	
and	literatures	around	laughter:	generating	a	dialogical	account	which	allows	
both	sets	of	literature	to	be	advanced.	More	specifically	it	offers	a	critique	of	
normative	theories	as	a	way	of	thinking	about	laughter	and	instead	poses	both	
engagements	with	non-representational	theories	and	ideas	of	care	in	turn	as	a	
means	of	mediating	the	problematics,	and	multiplying	the	possibilities	of	the	
ethical.	Finally,	it	returns	to	the	idea	of	the	refrain	as	set	out	here,	posing	this	
as	a	key	epistemological	vehicle	through	which	we	might	remain	open	to	the	
plurality	and	multiplicity	of	ethical	forms	that	can	emerge	from	interactions	
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between	 laughter	 and	 care	 rather	 than	 trying	 to	 force	 them	 into	 singular,	
universal	conceptions.	
Chapter	 3	 follows	 this	 by	 shifting	 concern	 onto	 the	 specific	 approaches	
adopted	 in	 this	 thesis,	 thinking	more	 specifically	about	 care	homes	and	my	
place	within	them.	Although	framed	as	a	‘methodology’	it	seeks	to	interweave	
discussions	about	my	specific	actions	together	with	contextual	details	about	
nursing	 care	 homes	 spaces.	 It	 discusses	 key	 literatures	 around	 fieldwork,	
ethnography,	analysis	and	ethics	and	relates	these	to	my	own	actions	during	
the	research	process,	non-representational	theories,	and	the	specific	sites	in	
which	the	research	took	place.	Towards	the	end	of	the	chapter,	I	turn	to	the	
idea	of	writing,	discussing	the	problematics	of	representing	some	of	the	ideas	
in	this	thesis,	and	the	approaches	that	were	taken	to	negotiate	this.		
Chapter	4	forms	the	first	empirical	chapter	of	the	thesis.	It	experiments	with	
different	ways	of	thinking	about	laughter	and	reflects	on	the	kinds	of	ethical	
judgements	that	these	engender.	Its	empirical	focus	centres	around	a	series	of	
events	in	which	encounters	with	laughter	produced	conflicting	feelings	in	my	
body,	and	thus	discusses	my	attempts	to	come	to	terms	with	this.	It	frames	this	
discussion	through	engaging	with	different	ways	of	listening,	particularly	as	
set	out	by	 Jean	Luc	Nancy	(2007).	 In	 this	sense,	 its	primary	concern	is	with	
laughter	rather	than	care	although	its	latter	sections	again	point	towards	the	
need	 to	 listen	 to	 (and	 therefore	 think	about)	 laughter	with	 care	 in	 context-
specific	ways	(see	Tronto	1993).	
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Chapter	 5	 builds	 on	 this	 through	 engagement	 with	 the	 ‘doing’	 subjects	 of	
laughter	and	care.	At	its	most	general,	it	looks	to	unpack	the	various	ways	in	
which	laughter	is	practised	alongside	care	work	within	nursing	care	homes,	
noting	the	various	ways	in	which	it	is	used	to	maintain,	continue	and	repair	
forms	of	sociality	between	people.	Rather	than	frame	this	discussion	in	terms	
of	a	singular	moral	subject	who	practices	laughter	with	care,	however,	it	draws	
on	 Deleuze’s	 (1988a,	 1993)	 conceptions	 of	 ‘the	 fold’	 and	 Nixon’s	 (2017)	
discussions	of	this	in	relation	to	laughter	to	frame	the	subject	of	laughter	along	
three	interconnected	axes:	the	individual;	the	collective;	and	the	institutional.	
Making	 such	 a	 move	 thus	 serves	 to	 displace	 the	 subject	 as	 such	 as	 the	
foundational	‘location’	of	ethics	and	instead	attend	more	clearly	to	the	ethics	
of	foldings	themselves,	framing	this	in	terms	of	what	these	practices	can	do.	
Chapter	6	shifts	focus	away	from	the	subject	yet	further	through	approaching	
laughter	as	an	ethical	 force	 in	 its	own	right.	Drawing	on	 literatures	around	
affective	atmospheres	(Anderson,	2014),	it	positions	laughter	as	an	affective-
material	phenomenon	with	 creative	 capacities	 to	 change	 the	nature	of	 care	
spaces	 and	 relations	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 exceeds	 human	 intentionality	 (see	
Hughes,	2016).	Crucially,	the	excessive	spatialities	of	laughter’s	atmospheres	
point	towards	their	capacities	to	affect	bodies	differently	depending	on	those	
bodies’	circumstances	and	situations.	This,	therefore,	adds	further	complexity	
to	the	ways	in	which	we	think	about	laughter’s	ethical	relations	with	care	and	
suggests	a	need	for	engagements	that	are	more	generous	to	the	multiplicities	
contained	within	the	singularity	of	each	event	of	laughter	(Nancy,	2000).	
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Chapter	 7	 begins	 to	 draw	 these	 trajectories	 together	 somewhat	 through	
exploring	the	relationship	between	laughter,	life	and	death.	Given	that	death	
is	a	relatively	ordinary	occurrence	within	care	homes	it	is	often	encountered	
through	bursts	of	laughter,	in	much	the	same	way	that	the	rest	of	the	thesis	
outlines.	 Where	 most	 scholars	 position	 the	 relation	 between	 laughter	 and	
death	 in	 terms	 of	 coping,	 the	 chapter	 seeks	 a	 more	 affirmative	 account,	
positioning	 it	 instead	 as	 a	means	 of	 carrying	 on:	 a	 taking	 of	 our	 emotions	
forward	with	us	and	folding	them	into	our	sense	of	self	rather	than	pushing	
them	 away.	 Through	 this,	 I	 thus	 argue	 that	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 is	
deployed	 around	death	 are	 suggestive	 of	 a	wider	 form	of	 vitally	 pragmatic	
politico-ethic	 for	 care,	 whereby	 carers	 often	 work	 towards	 the	 “as	well	 as	
possible”	(Tronto,	1993:	103)	rather	than	grand,	idealistic	political	visions.	
The	ethos	of	the	thesis	as	a	whole	is	one	of	opening	up	possibilities,	rather	than	
trying	 to	 contain	 them	within	 specific	 analytical	 or	 ethical	 frameworks.	 As	
such,	although	the	Conclusion	does	offer	a	summary	of	what	has	been	said,	it	
works	through	another	exemplar,	 taken	from	the	day	after	 the	UK’s	vote	to	
leave	the	European	Union,	and	uses	this	to	suggest	ways	in	which	the	ideas	in	
this	 thesis	might	 be	 productively	 taken	 forward,	morphed,	 and	 repurposed	
along	the	same	three	lines	with	which	I	have	begun:	laughter,	care	and	ethics.	
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Chapter	2:	Ethical	refrains	for	approaching	
laughter	with	care1	
We	always	make	too	much	of	laughter,	we	overload	it	with	meaning	or	
nonsense,	 we	 take	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 tears	 or	 to	 the	 revelation	 of	
nothingness...	Let’s	not	make	too	much	of	it.	If	possible,	let’s	let	it	present-
lose-itself	
(Nancy,	1993:	368)	
We	need	to	start	from	laughter,	rather	than	the	joke.	And	then	we	will	be	
able	to	see	that	we	do	not	need	to	stifle	our	laughter	just	because	the	joke	
is	sexist	
(Parvulescu	2010:	118,	emphasis	mine)	
2.1	|	Introduction	
Having	 set	 out	 the	 ‘story’	 about	 how	 this	 thesis	 and	 its	 engagement	 with	
laughter,	care	and	ethics	emerged	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	chapter	looks	
to	engage	more	specifically	with	the	various	theoretical	works	that	surround	
these	concepts,	and	thus	set	out	the	conceptual	terrain	within	which	the	thesis	
looks	 to	 approach	 laughter	 with	 care.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 chapter	 has	 two	
																																																								
1	 Elements	 of	 this	 chapter	 have	 been	published	 in	a	 revised	 form	as:	 Emmerson	P	 (2017)	
Thinking	 laughter	 beyond	 humour:	 atmospheric	 refrains	 and	 ethical	 indeterminacies	 in	
spaces	of	care.	Environment	and	Planning	A	49(9):	2082–2098.	
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primary	 aims.	 First,	 it	 acts	 as	 a	 literature	 review	 for	 the	 thesis	 as	 a	whole,	
setting	out	the	main	bodies	of	literature	and	conceptual	ideas	within	which	the	
thesis	is	both	situated	and	makes	its	contribution.	Second,	and	perhaps	more	
significantly,	the	chapter	looks	to	unsettle	and	expand	both	conventional	and	
academic	understandings	of	laughter,	care	and	ethics,	suggesting	new	ways	of	
thinking,	 acting	 and	 knowing	 the	 worlds	 in	 which	 we	 live.	 Together	 these	
suggestions	 thus	 provide	 the	 base	 for	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows	 in	 later	
chapters,	and	thus	the	contributions	of	the	thesis	as	a	whole.	
Of	 the	 three	 concepts,	 laughter,	 care	 and	 ethics,	 the	 chapter	 engages	 with	
laughter	 most	 prominently,	 seeking	 to	 augment	 and	 advance	 the	 ways	 in	
which	we	might	 consider	 laughter’s	 ethics	 in	 two	 key	ways.	 First,	 through	
drawing	 on	 non-representational	 styles	 of	 ethical	 thinking,	 I	 look	 to	 afford	
more	 attention	 onto	 laughter	 itself	 rather	 than	 analysing	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
jokes,	 humour	 or	 scenarios	 that	 precede	 it	 (see	 also	 Parvulescu,	 2010)	 –	
opening	up	an	expanded	ethical	 terrain	 in	which	we	might	move	and	 think	
about	 laughter’s	 affective/ethical	 capacities	 (McCormack,	 2003).	 Second,	 in	
looking	to	abate	some	of	the	critiques	of	non-representational	ethics	for	failing	
to	engage	with	the	plurality	that	emerges	from	being	‘in-common’	with	others	
(Olson,	2017;	Popke,	2009),	I	turn	to	an	expanded,	non-normative,	conception	
of	care	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017;	Raghuram,	2016)	which	I	argue	allows	a	
way	of	thinking	through	laughter’s	multiple	ethical	potentials	in	terms	of	its	
capacities	to	“maintain,	continue	and	repair	our	‘worlds’	so	that	we	can	live	in	
them	as	well	as	possible”	(Tronto,	1993:	103)	without	necessarily	needing	to	
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prescribe	what	 these	practices	ought	 to	 look	and	feel	 like,	or	 towards	what	
ends	they	should	be	directed.	Surrounding	this	narrative	on	laughter	is	a	wider	
movement	in	ethics	themselves,	whereby	I	push	back	against	the	‘hegemonic’	
trajectories	that	have	emerged	from	the	so-called	‘moral	turn’	(Smith,	1997b)	
which	have	pushed	for	increased	engagement	with	normativity	and	universal	
critique	 (Olson	 and	 Sayer,	 2009;	 Sayer,	 2000;	 Sayer	 and	 Storper,	 1997).	
Instead,	 I	 suggest	 a	 much	 more	 fragmented	 understanding	 of	 ethics	 as	 a	
‘refrain’	 (Deleuze	 and	 Guattari,	 1988;	 McCormack,	 2013)	 capable	 of	
territorialising	 in	 different	ways	 at	different	moments,	 for	 different	 people.	
Such	 an	 approach	 belies	 universal	 understandings	 of	 ethics	 and	 instead	
demands	 more	 multiple,	 speculative	 and	 situated	 engagements,	 which	
therefore	sets	up	the	ethos	out	of	which	the	later	chapters	emerge.		
The	 chapter’s	 arguments	 are	 thus	 organised	 across	 five	 sections.	 The	 first	
outlines	 the	 key	 literatures	 and	 debates	 in	 geographical	 ethics,	 focussing	
particularly	on	normativity	and	 justice	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	 ‘moral	 turn’.	The	
second	 section	 turns	 explicitly	 to	 laughter’s	 ethics,	 again	 discussing	 key	
literatures,	 debates	 and	 approaches	 –	 although	 suggesting	 that	 these	
approaches	are	lacking	somewhat	in	their	focus	on	laughter	itself.	The	third	
section	 thus	 looks	 to	 enact	 a	 “(re)turn	 to	 laughter”	 (Parvulescu,	 2010:	 3)	
through	engaging	with	non-representational	theories,	reframing	both	laughter	
and	its	ethics	in	terms	of	their	multiple	affective-material	capacities.	As	noted	
above,	however,	this	brings	forth	questions	about	how	these	affective-material	
approaches	 might	 be	 used	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 in-commonness	 of	
Chapter	2:	Ethical	refrains	for	approaching	laughter	with	care	
25	
laughter,	 society	 and	 indeed	 Being	 (Nancy,	 2000),	 with	 the	 fourth	 section	
addressing	 these	 questions	 through	 engagements	 with	 care	 at	 both	 an	
empirical	and	at	ontological-ethical	registers.	Care	here	is	again	treated	as	a	
plural	entity	which,	when	held	in	contact	with	laughter’s	plurality,	serves	to	
multiply	both	of	their	ethical	potentials	yet	further.	As	such,	the	final	section	
outlines	the	‘refrain’	in	more	detail,	suggesting	how	it	might	be	used	to	further	
understand	 laughter,	 care	 and	 ethics	 in	worlds	 of	multiplicity	 and	pointing	
towards	the	ways	in	which	this	territorialises	throughout	the	rest	of	the	thesis.	
2.2	|	Ethics	and	geography	
Over	the	last	two	decades	or	so,	attention	has	increasingly	been	afforded	to	
ethical	 issues	within	a	wide	range	of	geographical	processes	(Popke,	2010).	
These	 engagements	 have	 raised	 key	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 ‘our’	
collective	 obligations	 and	 responsibilities	 to	 ensure	 that	 “decent	 and	
sustainable”	 forms	of	 life	can	be	afforded	to	all	 those	who	 inhabit	 the	Earth	
(Smith,	2004:	197),	whether	they	be	human	or	otherwise	(Ginn,	2014;	Olson,	
2017;	Pitt,	2018;	Whatmore,	2006).	Similarly,	questions	have	also	been	raised	
about	the	relationship	between	ethics	and	various	ontological,	epistemological	
and	 political	 frameworks,	 and	 how	 these	 affect	 the	 nature	 of	 judgements	
around	ethics	and	morals,	with	various	debates	emerging	around	the	merits	
and	 effectiveness	 of	 each	 in	 terms	of	 understanding	 and	 engaging	with	 the	
ethics	of	 different	 systems,	 processes	 and	 phenomenon	 (e.g.	 Barnett,	 2014;	
Dekeyser	 and	 Garrett,	 2018;	 Popke,	 2006;	 Raghuram,	 2016;	 Yusoff,	 2013).	
Together,	these	accounts	have	thus	generated	“a	more	careful	consideration	of	
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just	what	a	‘decent	form	of	life’	can	and	should	look	like,	and	how	we	might	
collectively	organise	our	communities,	our	institutions,	and	our	political	forms	
in	such	a	way	as	to	bring	it	about”	(Popke,	2010:	242).	
There	is	some	level	of	debate	and	open	interpretation	amongst	geographers	as	
to	exactly	what	the	concepts	of	morality	and	ethics	mean,	with	some	arguing	
that	they	can	be	used	interchangeably	(e.g.	Smith,	1997b).	For	me,	however,	
distinguishing	between	the	two	terms	opens	up	a	wider	conceptual	vocabulary	
through	 which	 to	 discuss	 and	 differentiate	 the	 components	 within	 and	
between	 various	 modes	 of	 ethical	 thinking.	 As	 such,	 in	 broad	 terms,	 I	 use	
morals	and	morality	to	denote	an	implicit,	evaluative	framework	against	which	
people	make	 judgements	 about	 theirs	 or	 other’s	 actions	 and	 the	 nature	 or	
outcome	of	particular	situations,	often	along	the	lines	of	good	and	bad.	Morals	
in	this	sense	can	be	individual	or	collective,	they	can	be	fixed	or	mutable,	they	
can	be	cognitively	reasoned	or	implicitly	felt	as	a	‘gut	reaction’	(Barnett,	2014;	
Olson,	2016).	Yet	morals	are	always	both	subjective	and	singular	in	that	they	
tend	towards	a	specific	(normative)	judgement.	Ethics,	on	the	other	hand,	for	
me,	denotes	a	broader	engagement	with	the	relations	that	are	produced	from	
actions,	 behaviours,	 and	 situations,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 changes	 to	
these	relations.	Ethics	in	this	sense	is	not	a	specific	framework	of	judgement,	
but	rather	an	open	field	of	inquiry	that	seeks	to	understand	the	effects	of	these	
changes	to	relation,	without	subsuming	them	to	ideas	of	conscious	choice	(see	
Barad,	2007).	This	distinction,	therefore,	poses	a	dualism	between	morals	as	
an	explicitly	human	phenomenon,	whereas	ethics,	although	involving	humans,	
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also	extend	beyond	this,	interweaving	human	and	more-than-human	agencies	
together	 (Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	 2017).	 Although	 these	 distinctions	 are	
contestable	in	themselves,	they	allow	a	means	of	articulating	both	the	various	
movements	 and	 debates	 that	 have	 occurred	 around	 morals/ethics	 in	
geography	and	subsequently	where	my	contributions	sit	in	relation	to	this.	
Although	geographers	have	engaged	with	questions	of	the	ethical	and	moral	
since	 at	 least	 the	writings	 of	 Kant	 (Popke,	 2010),	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	
issues	are	addressed	and	understood	in	contemporary	human	geography	have	
largely	emerged	in	relation	to	the	so-called	‘moral	turn’	proclaimed	by	Smith	
in	the	mid-1990s	(Smith,	1997b).	For	Smith,	the	moral	turn	was	intended	as	a	
means	 of	 capturing	 and	 codifying	 an	 existing	 turn	 towards	 questions	 of	
morality	 in	geography,	with	 the	 intention	of	making	 them	more	 relevant	 to	
both	the	post-/modern	world,	and	to	ethical	philosophies	more	generally	(see	
also	 Barnett	 and	 Land,	 2007).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 moral	 turn	 has	 its	 own	
intellectual	 specificity,	 emerging	 in	 reaction	 to	 engagements	 with	 ethics	
through	 postmodern	 theoretical	 frameworks	 –	 which	 tended	 towards	 an	
unsettling	of	ethical	relations	and	the	development	of	a	plurality	of	projects	for	
social	change	rather	than	a	unifying	ethic	(Popke,	2010:	248).	Key	proponents	
of	 the	 ‘moral	 turn’	 thus	 looked	 to	 counter	 this	 through	 generating	 broader	
frameworks	 for	social	and	spatial	 justice,	couched	 in	(often	Marxist)	critical	
thought	 (see	 Proctor	 and	 Smith,	 1999;	 Sayer,	 2000;	 Smith,	 1997a,	 1997b,	
1999,	 2001,	 2004).	 As	 David	 Harvey	 (1989:	 328)	 argues,	 postmodernity	
means:	 “the	 confidence	 in	 the	 association	 between	 scientific	 and	 moral	
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judgements	has	collapsed	…	ephemerality	and	fragmentation	take	place	over	
eternal	truths	and	unified	politics.”	
Perhaps	the	strongest	conceptual	position	to	emerge	from	the	moral	turn	has	
been	 a	 “reawakening	 of	 normative	 theory”	 (Sayer	 and	 Storper,	 1997:	 14)	
through	which	it	is	argued	that	ideas	of	morals,	ethics	and	the	‘good’	can	be	
engaged	with,	not	just	as	implicitly	meaningful,	but	in	a	rational	manner	that	
explicitly	justifies	their	worth	through	argumentation.	This	is	therefore	seen	
to	 provide	 a	 stronger	 base	 for	 critical	 thought	 and	 engagements	with	 how	
ethics/morals	 differ	 across	 space	 and	 time	 (Olson	 and	 Sayer,	 2009;	 Sayer,	
2000).	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 the	 relevance	 of	 geographical	 thinking	 for	 moral	
philosophy	that	was	put	at	stake	in	this	call,	with	Robert	Sack	arguing	both	that	
geography	is	the	“foundation	of	moral	judgment”	and	that	morality	“must	be	
set	and	justified	by	us	in	places	as	inhabitants	of	a	world”	(Sack,	1997:	8,	cited	
in	Jacobs,	2010:	13).	
Although	 this	 normative	 imperative	 is	 something	 that	 has	 been	 broadly	
(although	 not	 universally)	 accepted	 across	 the	 discipline	 (Popke,	 2010),	
debates	have	emerged	around	how	normativity	and	ideas	of	‘good’	themselves	
might	be	approached	(Bridge,	2000).	Jane	Jacobs	(2010)	for	instance	notes	two	
distinct	modes	 of	 approaching	morals:	 ‘normative	moralities’	 and	 ‘charting	
everyday	moralities’.	The	 former	seeks	 the	promotion	of	 “ethical	principles	
that	ought	to	be	realized	in	an	otherwise	imperfect	world”	whereas	the	latter	
sees	 the	moral	 as	 emerging	 from	 and	 enforcing	 particular	 styles	 of	 power	
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(Barnett,	2014:	151).	The	former	approach	can	be	seen	most	clearly	in	work	
that	 engages	 with	 ‘The	 Right	 to	 the	 City’	 (Harvey,	 2008;	 McCann,	 2002;	
Mitchell,	2003;	Purcell,	2002),	or	‘just	cities’	(Fainstein,	2014;	Marcuse	et	al.,	
2009),	but	also	within	engagements	with	environmental	justice	(e.g.	Walker,	
2009),	 and	 through	 more	 recent	 (re-)engagements	 with	 Anarchism	 in	
geography	(e.g.	Gibson,	2014;	Springer,	2012).	‘Charting	everyday	moralities’	
is	 perhaps	 more	 prevalent	 within	 engagements	 with	 more	 intimate	 and	
embodied	 issues,	 such	 as:	 sexuality	 (e.g.	 Hubbard,	 2000);	 body	 image	 (e.g.	
Colls,	2004);	home	and	family	life	(Blunt	and	Varley,	2004;	Valentine,	2001);	
the	workplace	(McDowell	et	al.,	2005);	and	around	lifestyle	practices,	such	as	
Veganism	(Gillespie	and	Collard,	2015).	
Overlapping	with	 these	 distinctions	 in	 approach,	 questions	 have	 also	 been	
raised	about	the	ontological	foundations	through	which	we	might	consider	the	
normative	and	 its	 implications	 for	 thinking	about	ethics	 in	geography.	Most	
notably	in	this	regard	have	been	movements	away	from	a	“particular	model	of	
moral	selfhood”	according	to	which	“people	are	implicated	in	their	actions	by	
reference	to	a	linear	chain	of	relations	between	free	will,	knowledge,	voluntary	
action,	causality,	responsibility	and	blame”	(Barnett	et	al.,	2005:	25).	Instead,	
attempts	have	been	made	to	foreground	understandings	of	the	moral/ethical	
subject	 as	 constituted	 by	 and	 through	 its	 relations	with	o/Others	 (Cutchin,	
2002;	 Jones,	 2000;	 Massey,	 2004;	 Popke,	 2003).	 This	 shift	 in	 ontological	
framing	 thus	 serves	 to	 move	 the	 ethical	 imperative	 from	 one	 based	 on	
“incontrovertible	 facts	 of	 sameness”	 (see	 Popke,	 2010:	 249),	 onto	
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intersubjective	 notions	 of	 ethics,	 often	 couched	 within	 understandings	 of	
‘society’,	 ‘community’	 or	 ‘in-commonness’.	 These	 ethics	 re-engage	 with	
postmodern/post-structuralist	thought	(see	Popke,	2003,	2004;	Slater,	1997;	
Valentine,	2003;	Welch	and	Panelli,	2007;	Whatmore,	1997)	through	holding	
onto	the	implicit	differences	between	people,	places,	organisations,	and	politics	
(Popke,	2007).	This,	in	turn,	involves	a	“relocation	of	the	normative	reference	
point	for	critique	to	the	conditions	of	social	interaction”	(Barnett,	2014:	156,	
emphasis	mine)	rather	than	the	details	of	those	interactions,	and	thus	a	shift	
in	critical	attention	away	from	trying	to	set	out	and	evaluate	 judgements	of	
morality	and	 instead	onto	questions	of	our	 ‘responsibilities’	 towards	others	
(Lawson,	2007;	Massey,	2004;	Noxolo	et	al.,	2012;	Popke,	2007,	2009).	
Perhaps	 the	 best	 cited	 examples	 of	 these	 relational	 ethics	 emerge	 from	
engagements	with	ethical	consumption	(Barnett	et	al.,	2005;	Barnett	and	Land,	
2007;	Clarke,	2008;	Hughes	and	Reimer,	2004),	with	Barnett	et	al.	(2005)	in	
particular	looking	to	rethink	the	idea	that	ethics	of	consumption	is	rooted	in	
consumers’	moral	choices,	instead	arguing	that	the	ethics	of	consumption	are	
embedded	 in	 a	 constellation	 of	 relationships	 between	 consumers,	 supply	
chains,	 brands,	 manufacturers,	 places,	 political	 systems	 and	 so	 on	 –	 what	
Freidberg	 (2004)	 describes	 as	 ‘an	 ethical	 complex’	 –	 and	 involving	 non-
rational	 ‘choice’	 structures	 such	 as	 necessity,	 habit	 and	 emotions.	 Similar	
arguments	have	thus	been	made	in	relation	to	a	whole	host	of	commodities	
and	their	production-consumption	processes,	most	notably	in	relation	to	food	
(Cook,	 2004;	 Cook	 and	 Harrison,	 2007;	 Eden	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Goodman	 et	 al.,	
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2010),	but	also	flowers	(Hale	and	Opondo,	2005),	furniture	(Reimer	and	Leslie,	
2004)	 and	 fashion	 (Crewe,	 2004;	 Gregson	 and	 Beale,	 2004).	 Beyond	
consumption/consumerism,	 relational-ethics	 have	 also	 been	 drawn	 on	 to	
engage	 with	 a	 number	 of	 other	 ethical	 issues	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 scales,	
including:	development	and	post/colonial	relations	(Corbridge,	1998;	Noxolo	
et	al.,	2012);	health	and	social	care	provision	and	restructuring	(Gleeson	and	
Kearns,	2001;	Milligan	and	Wiles,	2010);	 the	ethics	of	education	spaces	and	
delivery	(Kraftl,	2006;	Watkins,	2011);	and	more-than-human	relations	(Ginn,	
2014;	Whatmore,	1997,	2006)	often	in	relation	to	environmental	degradation	
or	climate	change	(Boykoff,	2008;	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2010).	Together	these	
accounts,	 therefore,	 articulate	 a	 sense	 that	 ‘justice’	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	
through	collective	endeavour,	thus	reframing	the	concept	of	responsibility	as	a	
“collective	 practice”	 which	 “is	 distributed	 across	 complex	 networks	 of	
causality	and	agency	…	and	[involves]	issues	of	power,	privilege,	interest	and	
capacity	for	action,	as	well	as	spatial	relation”	(Barnett,	2011:	251–252;	see	
also	Young,	2004,	2007).	
It	is	thus	through	these	versions	of	relational	ethics	that	this	thesis	looks	to	
approach	the	ethics	of	laughter.	In	doing	so,	however,	it	draws	more	firmly	on	
two	 further	 significant	 conceptual	 positions	 have	 emerged	 in	 geographic-
ethical	theory:	ethics	of	care	and	non-representational	ethics,	each	of	which	
have	 sought	 to	 rethink	 the	 normative	 frameworks	 for	 ethics	 in	 geography.	
Ethics	of	care,	for	instance,	have	suggested	that	ideas	of	justice	might	be	better	
replaced	 with	 ideas	 of	 care	 as	 the	 normative	 foundation	 for	 moral/ethical	
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theorising	 (see	Tronto,	1993).	Feminist	 care	ethics	 in	 this	 sense	 frame	care	
“not	so	much	an	activity	as	a	way	of	relating	to	others”	(McEwan	and	Goodman,	
2010):	one	that	is	fundamental	to	all	existence,	if	often	marginalised	(Lawson,	
2009).	Unlike	justice,	which	frames	morality,	ethics	and	responsibility	in	terms	
of	 rationalised	 notions	 of	 ‘right’	 or	 ‘wrong’	 (Gilligan,	 1982),	 ideas	 of	 care	
suggest	that	people	are	always	engaged	in	overlapping	sets	of	responsibilities,	
many	of	which	are	contradictory,	and	therefore	ethical	questions	should	be	
addressed	 through	 “context-sensitive	 and	 emotionally-engaged	 moral	
deliberation	 than	 by	 the	 application	 of	 schematic	 [universal]	 reasoning”	
(Bowden,	 2000:	 44).	 Also	 pushing	 back	 against	 universalism,	 non-
representational	theories	have	sought	to	challenge	the	normative	as	the	basis	
for	 ethics	 altogether,	 instead	 seeing	 ethics	 as	 something	 that	 is	 ‘enacted’	
(McCormack,	 2005),	 arising	 from	 the	 “unfolding	 of	 events”	 (Darling,	 2010:	
241).	Non-representational	theories	in	this	sense	offer	up	more	of	an	‘ethos’	
than	an	ethics	per	se.	that	is	“attentive	to	the	nature	of	our	bodily	encounters,	
without	seeking	to	submit	them	to	an	a	priori	set	of	rules	or	moral	judgments”	
(Popke,	2009:	82).	In	other	words,	borrowing	Thrift’s	(2008:	8)	phrasing,	we	
might	suggest	non-representational	ethics	as	the	‘ethics	of	what	happens’.	
I	 will	 elaborate	 further	 on	 these	 two	 approaches	 as	 the	 chapter	 develops,	
drawing	 more	 explicitly	 on	 their	 ideas	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 the	 specific	
approach	to	laughter’s	ethics	that	this	thesis	adopts.	In	doing	so,	I	also	seek	to	
advance	the	ways	in	which	we	might	imagine	non-representational	care	ethics,	
building	on	already	existing	relations	between	the	two	at	both	conceptual	and	
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empirical	registers	(Conradson,	2003b;	Darling,	2010;	Popke,	2006;	Puig	de	la	
Bellacasa,	2017;	Thrift,	2005).	Crucially,	reimagining	laughter	in	this	manner	
requires	 something	 of	 a	 fundamental	 rethinking	 of	 the	 ontological,	
epistemological	 and	ethical	 foundations	 through	which	 laughter	has	 largely	
been	 approached	 in	 the	 social	 sciences	 and	humanities.	 These	 have	 largely	
been	framed	as	questions	of	its	causes,	rather	than	affording	attention	to	the	
kinds	 of	 ethical	 relations	 that	 laughter	 itself	 might	 engender	 (Parvulescu,	
2010).	As	such,	 in	setting	up	the	 foundation	 for	 this	renewed	approach,	 the	
next	 section	 briefly	 outlines	 these	 existing	 approaches	 to	 laughter	 and	
morality/ethics.	
2.3	|	Laughter	and	morality	
Although	a	relatively	recent	matter	of	concern	to	geographers,	laughter	 is	a	
phenomenon	 that	 has	 been	 of	 long-standing	 interest	 to	 a	 number	 of	
philosophers,	 sociologists,	 anthropologists,	 psychologists,	 medical	
researchers	and	performance	studies	scholars.	As	such,	there	is	now	a	large	
body	of	literature	and	theories	have	emerged	that	seek	to	understand	both	the	
causes	 of	 laughter	 and	 how	 it	 affects	 social	 forms	 and	 functioning.	 These	
theories	 of	 laughter	 are	 often	 intensely	moral	 in	 nature,	 evaluating	 acts	 of	
laughter	in	terms	of	normative	conceptions	of	what	is	‘good’,	‘proper’,	‘fair’	or	
‘virtuous’	 (Buckley,	 2005;	 Gantar,	 2005).	 Indeed,	 although	 the	 majority	 of	
thinking	about	laughter	has	emerged	since	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	
much	of	 this	work	 is	 grounded	 in	a	 longer	 (Western)	 intellectual	history	of	
conceptualising	 laughter	 (Elias,	 2017;	 Parvulescu,	 2010),	 which	 arguably	
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intersects	 with	 the	 development	 of	 moral	 philosophy	 itself	 (see	 Goldberg,	
1999),	 most	 notably	 in	 relation	 to	 what	 Elizabeth	 Olson	 (2016:	 831)	 has	
recently	described	as	the	most	prominent	debate	in	Western	thinking	about	
emotions	 and	 morality:	 “that	 which	 pits	 reason	 against	 emotion	 in	 the	
achievement	of	a	moral	life	or	moral	society.”	
As	 Simon	 Critchley	 (2002)	 notes,	 despite	 the	 vast	 array	 of	 literature	 and	
explanations	 of	 laughter,	 three	 theories	 prevail	 overwhelmingly:	 the	
superiority	theory;	the	incongruity	theory;	and	the	relief	or	release	theory.	Of	
these	 three	 theories,	 superiority	 theory	 is	 arguably	 the	 oldest,	 somewhat	
recognisable	within	the	writings	of	Plato,	Aristotle,	Quintilian	(ibid),	although	
modern	 conceptions	 emerge	most	 clearly	 from	Hobbes	 (1999:	 54–55)	who	
argues	“that	the	passion	of	laughter	is	nothing	else	but	a	sudden	glory	arising	
from	sudden	conception	of	some	eminency	in	ourselves,	by	comparison	with	
the	 infirmities	 of	 others	 or	 with	 our	 own	 formally”.	 Incongruity	 theory	
emerges	around	this	same	time,	through	the	work	of	Francis	Hutcheson	and	
the	1st	Earl	of	Shaftesbury	in	the	mid-eighteenth	century	(Billig,	2005),	but	is	
more	 often	 attributed	 to	 the	work	 of	 Kant,	 Schopenhauer	 and	Kierkegaard	
(Critchley,	 2002;	 Goldberg,	 1999).	 Incongruity	 theory	 argues	 that	 laughter	
emerges	from	the	coming	together	of	two	apparently	incompatible	elements	
into	 a	 single	 event	 –	with	 ‘the	 pun’	 being	 the	 exemplar	 of	 this	 idea	 (Billig,	
2005).	Release	theory	 is	relatively	new	in	these	terms,	emerging	during	the	
late	nineteenth	 century	 in	 the	wake	of	 increased	 scientific	 attention	on	 the	
physiology	 and	 psychology	 of	 bodies	with	 laughter	 seen	 to	 be	 caused	 by	 a	
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release	of	energy	from	the	body.	Although	originally	suggested	by	Spencer	as	
release	 of	 muscular	 tension,	 relief	 theory	 has	 now	 become	 somewhat	
synonymous	with	Freud’s	(1928,	1989)	writing	on	laughter,	humour	and	the	
unconscious,	whereby	laughter	is	seen	to	cause	pleasure	“because	it	allegedly	
economizes	upon	energy	that	would	ordinarily	be	used	to	contain	or	repress	
psychic	activity”	(Critchley,	2002:	3).	
Although	 these	 theories	 are	 primarily	 causal,	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	
essence	 of	 why	 laughter	 emerges,	 they	 hold	 within	 them	 implicit	 moral	
undertones	(see	Buckley,	2005;	Gantar,	2005;	Parvulescu,	2010).	This	is	most	
obvious	 in	 terms	of	 superiority	 theory	which	not	only	 suggests	 laughter	as	
expressing	feelings	of	moral	superiority,	but	is	also	rooted	explicitly	through	
Hobbes’	own	moral	theorising	(Goldberg,	1999),	and	particularly	his	desire	to	
suppress	 the	 passions	 (including	 laughter)	 in	 favour	 of	 more	 ‘reasonable’	
temperaments	(Billig,	2005).	Although	subtler,	this	similar	moral	impetus	can	
also	be	attached	to	 incongruity	 theory,	whereby	 laughter	 is	seen	to	express	
enjoyment	 when	 the	 rational	 emerges	 from	 the	 otherwise	 chaotic	 world	
(Goldberg	1999).	This	 imperative	can	be	read	clearly	 in	Kant	(1987)	whose	
judgements	on	laughter	continually	favour	those	with	the	‘required’	reasoning	
skills	 to	control	 their	engagements	with	 incongruities,	as	well	as	 those	with	
the	‘intelligence’	to	construct	them	(what	we	might	call	wit	–	see	Billig,	2005),	
over	those	who	 laugh	uncontrollably.	Similarly,	 in	relief	 theories,	 this	moral	
imperative	 becomes	 about	 controlling	 laughter	 in	 order	 to	 manage	
subconscious	 desires	 (Freud,	 1989)	 –	 learning	 to	 express	 laughter	 in	 the	
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correct	time	and	place	in	accordance	with	morality	and	manners.	Therefore,	
together	 these	 theoretical	 trajectories	 add	up	 to	what	Norbert	Elias	 (2017:	
284)	 terms	 the	 civilising	 of	 laughter	 which	 has	 both	 “pruned	 laughter	
increasingly	to	a	moderate	size”	as	well	as	increasingly	restricted	the	ways	in	
which	it	is	morally	acceptable	to	laugh	or	joke	(see	also	Bakhtin,	1984;	Gantar,	
2005;	Parvulescu,	2010).		
These	 theoretical	 precursors	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 give	 shape	 to	 contemporary	
understandings	of	laughter’s	ethics.	Indeed,	discussions	about	the	morality	of	
laughter	often	draw	on	Freud	as	a	foundation	of	their	own	moral	theories	(see	
for	 example	 Billig,	 2005;	 Buckley,	 2005;	 Critchley,	 2002).	 That	 said,	
sociological	conceptions	of	laughter	perhaps	more	commonly	frame	Bergson	
(1980)	as	their	starting	point,	positioning	him	as	the	first	‘modern’	theorist	of	
laughter	(Brigstocke,	2014;	Goldberg,	1999).		
Indeed,	 Bergson’s	 (1980)	 essay	 on	 laughter	 is	 arguably	 the	 first	 to	 affirm	
laughter	as	having	key	functions	in	social	life.	As	Stephen	Crocker	(2010:	78)	
writes,	 “Bergson’s	 thesis	 on	 laughter	 is	 beautifully	 simple:	 laughter	 is	 the	
recognition	of	our	failure	to	submit	life	to	mechanism”.	More	specifically,	for	
Bergson	(1980)	laughter	forms	a	means	of	correcting	“a	certain	automatism	
or	mechanical	inelasticity,	a	clumsiness	or	rigidity”,	whether	that	be	in	terms	
of	“bodily,	mental	or	character	deficiencies”	(Parvulescu,	2010:	86–87)	all	of	
which	Bergson	sees	as	ill-equipped	for	the	dexterity	required	of	modern	life	
(Buckley,	2005).	In	this	sense,	there	is,	again,	a	clear	morality	underpinning	
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Bergson’s	 (1980)	 understandings	 of	 laughter,	 albeit	 one	 which	 affirms	
laughter’s	 place	 in	 maintaining	 social	 manners	 and	 moral	 order	 (Crocker,	
2010;	Goldberg,	1999),	rather	than	seeking	to	repress	it.	Frank	Buckley	(2005)	
describes	this	as	a	‘positive’	thesis	of	laughter	and	morality,	whereby	it	frames	
laughter	 as	 crucial	 in	maintaining	 normative	 ideals,	 albeit	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	
ultimately	‘good’	for	society:	“he	[sic]	who	laughs	must	in	his	own	way	be	a	
moralist.	 Through	 their	 laughter,	 wit	 and	 listener	 reaffirm	 a	 shared	 vision	
about	how	life	should	be	lived	and	proclaim	that	the	butt	[object	of	laughter]	
is	guilty	of	a	comic	vice”	(Buckley,	2005:	10).	
Despite	the	‘positive’	nature	of	Bergson’s	(1980)	original	thesis,	his	ideas	have	
largely	 been	 drawn	 upon	 to	 suggest	 an	 association	 between	 laughter	 and	
morality	that	is	far	less	affirmative	(Gantar,	2005).	Perhaps	most	significant	in	
this	regard	is	Michael	Billig’s	(2005)	‘critical’	account	of	laughter,	which	begins	
with	the	premise	that	laughter	is	perhaps	the	most	influential,	insidious	and	
negative	 social	 force	 in	 contemporary	 life.	 Like	 Bergson,	 Billig	 connects	
laughter	 implicitly	 to	 ideas	 of	 ridicule,	 arguing	 that,	 regardless	 of	 the	
specificities	 of	 its	 specific	 causes,	 laughter	 always	 serves	 to	 construct	 its	
targets	as	Other,	abject	or	outside	of	the	norms	of	social	convention.	Indeed,	
this	is	true	for	Billig,	even	when	it	is	not	actually	present:	“for	the	possibility	of	
ridicule	ensures	that	members	of	society	routinely	comply	with	the	customs	
and	 habits	 of	 their	 social	milieu”	 (Billig,	 2005:	 3).	 In	 this	 sense,	 laughter	 is	
drawn	 into	 a	 parallel	 with	 ideas	 of	 power	 and	 normalisation:	 a	 means	 of	
disciplining	those	who	do	not	socially	conform.	As	Emily	Douglas	(2015:	146)	
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writes:	 “[l]aughter	 can	 reinforce	 norms	 of	 appearance,	 of	 disciplinary	
boundaries,	and	of	oppression.”	Billig’s	(2005)	thesis	is	therefore	a	version	of	
what	Buckley	(2005)	calls	the	normative	thesis	of	laughter,	differing	from	the	
positive	 thesis	 in	 that	 it	 suggests	 the	 power	 structures	 (superiorities)	
highlighted	 by	 laughter	 are	 genuine	 rather	 than	 assumed,	 and	 thus	 that	
laughter	actively	 serves	 to	 reinforce	 these	 rather	 than	 simply	acting	on	 the	
imagination	 of	 those	 taking	 part	 in	 it.	 This	 in	 turn	 changes	 the	 ontological	
nature	of	how	we	understand	laughter’s	ethics.	
Although,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section,	there	are	key	theorists	who	
have	 rallied	 against	 these	 moralised	 conceptualisations	 of	 laughter	 (e.g.	
Bataille,	2001;	Derrida,	1978;	Nancy,	1993),	broadly	speaking	it	is	these	two,	
post-Bergsonian	theses,	and	the	ways	they	have	been	associated	with	power,	
that	can	be	mapped	onto	most	contemporary	understandings	of	 laughter	 in	
both	 sociology	 and	 geography	 (see	 Ridanpää,	 2014a).	 In	 discussing	 school	
children’s	 laughter,	 for	 instance,	 Kehily	 and	 Nayak	 (1997:	 83)	 draw	 on	
normative	conceptions,	noting	that	“it	is	usually	those	with	most	power	in	the	
situation	who	tell	most	jokes”.	Similarly,	in	discussing	laughter	and	geopolitics,	
Colin	Flint	(2001)	argues	that	 the	capacity	 to	 laugh	 is	directly	connected	to	
confidence	 in	 one’s	 socioeconomic	 position	 held	 within	 the	 world,	 an	
‘arrogant’	laughter	of	winners	and	thus	one	not	as	easily	afforded	to	those	at	
the	margins.	 Elsewhere,	 Klaus	Dodds	 (2003,	 2010)	 argues	 that	 jokes	 about	
national	identities	often	caricature	other	nations	in	order	to	generate	feelings	
of	superiority,	thus	maintaining	geopolitical	power	structures	at	the	everyday	
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level	(see	also	Ridanpää,	2007).		
Alongside	 these	 engagements	 that	 see	 laughter	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 power,	
others	have	suggested	that	laughter	might	also	be	used	as	a	form	of	resistance	
(Douglas,	 2015).	 At	 its	 simplest,	 we	 might	 see	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘laughing	
upwards’	 (Amarasingam,	 2010):	 the	 challenging	 of	 hegemonic	 hierarchies	
through	ridiculing	those	who	are	 in	positions	of	power	themselves	(Davies,	
2007;	 Robinson	 and	 Smith-Lovin,	 2001).	 Billig	 (2005:	 192)	 also	 suggests	
another	 form	 of	 resistance	 through	 his	 concept	 of	 unlaughter:	 the	 active	
“display	of	not	laughing	when	laughing	might	otherwise	be	expected,	hoped	
for	or	demanded”	which	thus	challenges	the	norms	of	laughter	itself	(see	also	
Dodds	 and	 Kirby,	 2012).	 Most	 often,	 however,	 these	 modes	 of	 normative	
resistance	are	connected	to	ideas	of	transgression	(Douglas,	2015;	Foucault,	
1998)	 and	 satire	 (Stott,	 2005;	 Thorogood,	 2016),	 with	 Bakhtin’s	 (1984)	
accounts	of	medieval	carnival	arguably	being	most	 famous.	The	carnival	 for	
Bakhtin	 is	 positioned	 as	 a	 space	 in	 which	 social	 rules	 and	 norms	 can	 be	
suspended	and	hierarchies	can	be	turned	upside-down,	liberating	those	who	
take	part	in	it.	Laughter,	mockery,	ridicule	and	subversion	all	play	key	roles	in	
this	process	(Macpherson,	2008),	becoming	modes	of	challenging	oppressive	
powers	and	re-thinking	politics.	For	some,	the	‘carnivalesque’	has	thus	served	
as	 a	 key	 model	 for	 thinking	 about	 resistive	 laughter	 (Brigstocke,	 2014;	
Gregson	and	Crewe,	1997;	Grindon,	2004;	Shields,	1990;	Wills,	1989).	Others	
however	 have	 challenged	 its	 efficacy,	 arguing	 that	 it	 risks	 a	 turn	 to	
‘sentimental	popularism’	in	which	the	proximities	of	laughter	and	oppression	
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can	become	ignored	(Eagleton	2001,	cited	in	Macpherson,	2008)	and	thus	that	
laughter	acts	merely	as	a	kind	of	safety	valve	through	which	social	pressures	
and	tensions	are	released	leaving	social	hierarchies	intact	or	even	reinforced	
(Davies,	2007;	Grindon,	2004;	Mbembe,	2001).	
These	 understandings	 of	 laughter	 in	 terms	 of	 power	 have	 thus	 set	 up	 a	
normative	association	between	laughter	and	justice	(Gantar,	2005).	As	Hynes	
and	Sharpe	(2010:	45)	suggest:		
[i]f	 laughter	 serves	 to	 ridicule	 oppressive	 powers	 or	 galvanize	
marginalized	peoples,	then	it	is	judged	as	having	been	put	to	the	service	
of	 the	good.	Conversely,	 if	 laughter	signals	social	exclusion	or	political	
apathy,	then	it	is	said	to	have	been	used	for	malevolent	ends		
In	 taking	 a	 more	 relational	 approach,	 however,	 feminist	 and	 postcolonial	
scholars,	in	particular,	have	looked	to	add	further	nuance	to	understandings	of	
laughter.	 Sara	 Ahmed	 (2006,	 2010)	 for	 instance	 suggests	 that	 women	 and	
people	of	colour	are	often	‘required’	to	laugh	in	social	situations	and	that	this	
reinforces	norms	around	race	and	sexuality,	creating	ideals	such	as	the	‘happy	
housewife’	 or	 the	 ‘jolly’	 colonial	 subject	 (see	 also	 Fanon,	 2008).	 Similarly,	
Achille	Mbembe	(2001;	Mbembe	and	Roitman,	1995)	argues	that	postcolonial	
subjects	are	often	constructed	through	an	expectation	of	laughter	in	the	face	
of	horror,	which	serves	to	entwine	laughter’s	subjectivation	together	with	past	
and	present	 forces	of	 fear	and	oppression	 (see	also	Obadare,	2009).	Others	
have	 drawn	 on	 ideas	 of	 release	 to	 frame	 laughter	 as	 a	 coping	mechanism,	
suggesting	that	humour	and	laughter	can	form	a	cathartic	means	of	collectively	
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expressing	emotions,	helping	people	to	deal	with	adversity	(Crawley,	2004;	De	
Moor,	2005;	Sullivan,	2000;	Willems,	2011)	albeit	in	ways	that	are	similar	to	
the	‘safety	valve’	described	above	and	thus	often	reinforce	power	structures.	
These	relational	approaches	thus	look	to	shift	the	moral	imperative	away	from	
laughter’s	directionality	and	 instead	onto	a	distinction	between	 laughing	 at	
and	 laughing	 with,	 where	 the	 former	 is	 seen	 as	 less	moral	 than	 the	 latter	
(Davidson,	2001;	Gantar,	2005).	Working	 in	 this	vein,	a	number	of	scholars	
have	drawn	on	laughter’s	capacities	to	produce	and	mobilise	communities	of	
conviviality	 and	 solidarity	 between	 peoples	 (Finney,	 1994;	 Gouin,	 2004;	
Ridanpää,	2017;	Routledge,	2012),	arguing	that	it	acts	as	a	key	communicative	
device	to	(re)produce	group	affinities	(Davidson,	2001;	Delph-Janiurek,	2001),	
whereby	 “a	 sense	 of	 sameness	 [or	 being	 in-common]	 is	 realized	 through	
shared	 laughter”	 (Ridanpää,	 2014a:	 705).	 Discussions	 of	 laughter	 in	 the	
context	 of	 marginality	 often	 combine	 these	 approaches	 to	 give	 complex	
accounts	of	laughter’s	socialites.	Both	Teela	Sanders	(2004)	and	Randi	Nixon	
(2017)	for	instance	note	the	ways	in	which	sex	workers	use	laughing-together	
as	a	means	of	initiating	new	members	into	the	group,	and	distinguishing	sex-
workers	from	their	clients	(Sanders,	2004)	but	also	as	a	way	of	fostering	‘pride’	
in	 sex-workers	 at	 both	 individual	 and	 collective	 registers	 (Nixon,	 2017).	
Similarly,	 others	 have	 discussed	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 disabled	 people	 use	
laughter	 to	 (re)define	 their	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 able-bodied	 people,	
suggesting	that	laughter	forms	a	way	of	both	negotiating	their	dependence	on	
others	 and	 simultaneously	 asserting	 their	 independence	 from	 others	
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(Albrecht,	 1999;	 Macpherson	 2008).	 Writings	 on	 marginality	 thus	 pose	
challenges	to	understanding	laughter’s	ethics	through	opening	up	questions	of	
the	partiality	of	moral	judgements.	As	Albrecht	(1999:	72–73)	notes:		
What	is	humorous	and	accepted	by	disabled	people	in	their	inside	world	
may	 not	 be	 understood	 by	 people	 in	 the	 outside	world	…	What	 they	
accept	from	their	peers	they	may	not	tolerate	from	others	because	of	the	
perceived	intent	of	the	language	or	joke.	
As	such,	although	these	various	accounts	form	a	foundation	for	understanding	
the	ethics	of	laughter,	we	might	begin	to	question	the	basis	upon	which	these	
judgements	 are	 made.	 Indeed,	 what	 becomes	 clear	 when	 looking	 at	 these	
accounts	as	a	whole	is	that	laughter	has	no	clear	moral	status	(Macpherson,	
2008),	but	rather	becomes	moralised	through	the	ways	in	which	we	approach	
it:	what	we	consider	it	to	be	and	mean	(Buckley,	2005;	Elias,	2017).	Indeed,	we	
might	note,	as	Parvulescu	(2010:	3)	does,	that	most	of	these	theories	do	not	
actually	concern	themselves	with	laughter:	“[t]hey	conceive	of	it	as	a	response	
to	something	else,	and	it	is	this	something	else	that	they	are	after	–	the	comic,	
jokes,	 humour,	 the	 grotesque,	 the	 ridiculous,	 the	 ludicrous,	 etc.”	 In	 other	
words,	we	might	note	a	form	of	lexical	slippage	that	often	occurs	in	work	on	
laughter,	 whereby	 laughter	 and	 humour	 become	 synonymous,	 and	 thus	
discussions	of	‘laughter’	almost	always	equate	to	a	discussion	of	humour.	This,	
in	 turn,	 serves	 to	blur	 together	questions	of	 laughter’s	 causes	and	 laughter	
itself,	creating	a	disjuncture	between	normative	accounts	of	what	laughter	is	
assumed	to	do	(often	based	on	the	humour	that	precedes	it,	following	the	three	
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theories),	 and	 what	 it	 actually	 does	 at	 various	 moments.	 Ultimately,	 this	
generates	ambivalent	accounts	of	it	that	may	reflect	what	happens,	but	equally	
may	 not.	 Within	 all	 this,	 as	 Samuel	 Weber	 (1987:	 695)	 puts	 it,	 “laughter	
imposes	itself	as	the	ineluctable	problem.”	
In	seeking	to	negotiate	this	problematic,	therefore,	the	next	section	looks	to	
enact	 what	 Parvulescu	 (2010:	 3)	 describes	 as	 a	 ‘return	 to	 laughter’	 which	
seeks	 to	 augment	 these	 existing	 accounts	 through	 generating	 ways	 of	
understanding	 laughter’s	 ethics	 without	 reducing	 this	 understanding	 to	
normative	 judgements	 of	 its	 causes.	 Specifically,	 I	 draw	 on	 non-
representational	theories	and	the	approaches	to	ethics	that	emerge	from	them	
in	order	to	re-imagine	laughter	as	a	multiplicity	capable	of	acting	in	ways	that	
exceed	 both	 representational	 understandings	 of	 its	 causes	 and	 ideas	 of	
intentionality	or	directionality	(see	also	Hughes,	2016).	This	reimagining	thus	
moves	towards	an	approach	to	laughter’s	ethics	that	is	“responsive	as	much	to	
the	transformative	potential	of	the	event	as	to	the	subject	and	object	of	ethics”	
(McCormack,	2003:	500),	although	this,	in	turn,	opens	up	further	questions	for	
how	 we	 might	 hold	 this	 in	 tension	 with	 ideas	 of	 politics,	 context	 and	 the	
plurality	of	being-with-others	(Nancy,	2000;	Popke,	2009).	
2.4	|	Non-representational	laughter	
As	briefly	noted	above,	non-representational	theories	have	been	suggested	as	
offering	 “a	 different	 set	 of	 resources	 for	 considering	matters	 of	 ethics	 and	
responsibility”,	generating	accounts	that	are	“less	about	dour	denouncements	
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of	 injustice	 or	 sober	 analyses	 of	 normative	 principles,	 and	 more	 about	
enhancing,	and	celebrating,	our	immersion	in	Being”	(Popke,	2009:	81).	This	
set	of	resources	emerges	directly	from	the	ways	in	which	non-representational	
theories	 have	 sought	 to	 rethink	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	
foundations	 of	 geographical	 knowledges,	 moving	 past	
discursive/representational	accounts	of	experience	(Thrift,	2008)	and	instead	
paying	 attention	 to	 “how	 life	 takes	 shape	 and	 gains	 expression	 in	 shared	
experiences,	 everyday	 routines,	 fleeting	 encounters,	 embodied	movements,	
precognitive	 triggers,	 practical	 skills,	 affective	 intensities,	 enduring	 urges,	
unexceptional	 interactions	 and	sensuous	 dispositions”	 (Lorimer,	2005:	 84).	
Crucially,	 these	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 resources	 also	 provide	 a	
means	of	cutting	through	the	discursive	and	representational	ways	through	
which	 laughter	 has	 largely	 been	 approached	 in	 social	 sciences,	 and	 instead	
affording	more	sustained	attention	to	both	the	geography	and	ethics	of	‘what	
happens’	(Thrift,	2008)	during	moments	when	laughter	bursts	into	society	and	
space	 (Parvulescu,	 2010).	 In	 moving	 towards	 a	 discussion	 of	 ‘non-
representational	laughter’,	therefore,	it	is	useful	to	briefly	unpack	some	of	the	
‘tactical	suggestions’	(Dewsbury	et	al.	2002)	offered	by	non-representational	
theories	more	generally,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	they	have	
approached	ideas	of	embodiment	and	emotions,	and	the	ethical	implications	
that	emerge	from	this.	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 although	 the	 category	 of	 the	 subject	 has	
remained	 present	 in	 this	 thesis	 in	 some	 respects,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 non-
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representational	theories	have	looked	to	displace	subjects	“as	the	starting	and	
focal	points	 for	geographic	 investigations	of	people’s	 relationships	with	the	
world”	 (Simpson,	 2017:	 1).	 Instead,	 attention	 has	 been	 afforded	 to	 bodies	
themselves,	 usually	 guided	 by	 the	 Spinozist	 (ethical)	 question:	 ‘what	 can	 a	
body	do’	(e.g.	Anderson,	2006,	2012;	Grosz,	1994;	McCormack,	2002,	2008a)?	
As	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1988:	257)	write:	“[w]e	know	nothing	about	a	body	
until	we	know	what	it	can	do”.	The	question	of	what	bodies	can	do,	therefore,	
is	 answered	 in	 part	 through	 non-representational	 theories’	 interest	 in	
practice:	 which,	 in	 crude	 terms,	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 performances,	
movements,	habits	and	so	on,	that	bodies	physically	do	as	part	of	everyday	life	
(see	Simpson,	2010).	More	specifically,	Thrift	(2008:	8)	describes	practices	as	
“material	 bodies	 of	work	 or	 styles”	 and	 as	 “productive	 concatenations	 that	
have	been	constructed	out	of	all	manner	of	resources	and	which	provide	the	
basic	 intelligibility	 of	 the	 world.”	 Practices,	 in	 this	 sense,	 are	 conceptually	
positioned	 as	 a	 form	 of	 both	 thinking	 about,	 and	 relating	 to,	 the	 world	
(Dewsbury,	2012;	Simonsen,	2007;	Thrift,	2003),	and	have	been	used	to	think	
through	 a	whole	manner	 of	 embodied	 experiences,	 including:	 placemaking	
(Duff,	 2010),	 obsessive-compulsive	 disorders	 (Segrott	 and	 Doel,	 2004),	
listening	 to	and	making	music	 (Anderson,	2002;	Wang	 Jing,	2012),	dancing	
(Gil,	 2006;	 Nash,	 2000);	 yoga	 (Lea,	 2009),	 street	 performance	 (Simpson,	
2010),	and	care	(Atkinson	et	al.,	2011).	
Entwined	with	this	interest	in	practice,	and	perhaps	more	obviously	relevant	
to	 engagements	 with	 laughter,	 non-representational	 theories’	 have	 also	
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addressed	the	question	of	what	bodies	can	do	through	engagements	with	ideas	
of	 emotion,	 and	more	 specifically	 affect	 (Cadman,	 2009).	 Although	 affect	 is	
often	framed	as	an	equivalent	to	emotion,	non-representational	theories	have	
maintained	 that	 the	 “notion	 of	 affect	 is	 neither	 reducible	 to	 nor	
interchangeable	with	 emotion,	 although	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 implicated	 in	 the	
emotional	 sensibilities	 of	 experience”	 (McCormack,	 2003:	 495).	 Following	
Massumi	(2002:	28),	emotion	is	thus	seen	as	a	conscious	“sociolinguistic	fixing	
of	the	quality	of	an	experience”	which	gives	it	“function	and	meaning”,	whereas	
affect	can	be	seen	as	‘vague’	pre-conscious	and	pre-personal	intensities	which	
implicate	the	corporeal	materialities	of	(both	human	and	non-human)	bodies	
(see	also	Anderson,	2006;	McCormack,	2008a).	Put	in	another	way,	affect	and	
emotion	might	be	seen	“as	unmediated	sensation	and	conscious	recognition	
respectively”	(Simonsen,	2007:	176,	n.	4).	Drawing	on	the	same	Spinozan	root,	
affect	has	also	been	defined,	in	broader	terms,	by	Ben	Anderson	(2006:	735)	
as	 the	 “transpersonal	 capacity	which	a	body	has	 to	be	affected	 (through	an	
affection)	and	to	affect	(as	the	result	of	modifications)”.	Anderson’s	definition	
thus	 opens	 up	 space	 for	 thinking	 about	 how	 affective	 encounters	 might	
generate	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 corporeal	 responses	 (Anderson,	 2014),	 invariably	
transforming,	 or	 ‘moving’,	 bodies	 (human	 and	 non-human)	 in	 physical,	
emotional,	 kinaesthetic,	 imaginative,	 collective,	 aesthetic,	 social,	 cultural,	
political	or	ethical	ways	(McCormack,	2008b:	1823).	Crucially,	however,	affect	
is	always	a	relational	process:	“[b]eing	affected-affecting”	can	be	seen	as	“two	
sides	 of	 the	 same	 dynamic	 shift,	 or	 change	 in	 what	 a	 being	 is	 and	 does”	
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(Anderson,	2014:	78–79).	
These	engagements	with	practice	and	affect	have	thus	served	to	animate	non-
representational	understandings	of	ethics.	As	Popke	(2009)	notes,	on	the	one	
hand,	 this	 ethical	 impetus	 emerges	 as	 a	 search	 for	 practices	 that	 have	 the	
potential	 to	amplify	“corporeal	response-ability”	 to	events	and	other	people	
and	thus	enhance	our	“affective	capacity”	(Thrift,	2004b:	127,	128).	Through	
this	“everyday	moments	of	encounter	can	be	cultivated	to	build	an	ethics	of	
generosity	by	stimulating	affective	energy”	(Thrift,	2004c:	93).	In	this	manner,	
scholars	have	sought	to	rethink	the	ethical	potentials	of	a	number	of	everyday	
encounters	 (e.g.	 Adey	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Darling,	 2014;	 Kraftl	 and	 Horton,	 2007;	
Obrador-Pons,	2007;	Wilson,	2011).	On	the	other	hand,	drawing	more	directly	
on	 the	 philosophies	 of	 Spinoza	 (1970)	 and	 subsequently	 Deleuze	 (1988b,	
1990;	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari,	 1988),	 ethics	 can	 be	 conceptualised	 in	 non-
representational	 styles	 of	 thought	 as	 the	 ethological	 study	 of	 affects	
themselves	 (Braidotti,	 2011;	 Gatens,	 1996;	 Malabou,	 1996;	 see	 also	
McCormack,	2008a).	As	Moira	Gatens	(1996:	167)	explains:	“ethology	may	be	
understood	as	offering	an	ethics	of	the	molecular	–	a	micropolitics	concerned	
with	the	 ‘in-between’	of	subjects	with	that	which	passes	between	them	and	
which	manifests	the	range	of	possible	becomings.”	Crucially	this	second	style	
of	 ethics	 is	 resolutely	 non-normative:	 rather	 than	 judge	 an	 encounter	 as	
‘ethical’	 or	 ‘unethical’	 through	 normative	 ideas	 of	 morality,	 the	 impetus	 is	
instead	simply	to	attend	to	the	enhancement	or	restriction	of	a	body’s	power	
to	act,	regardless	of	what	form	this	power	takes,	and	towards	what	it	might	be	
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directed	(Braidotti,	2011;	Popke,	2009).	
It	 is	 also	 in	 this	 vein	 that	 a	 small	 but	 significant	 non-representational	
engagement	 with	 (the	 ethics	 of)	 humour	 and	 laughter	 has	 emerged.	 Often	
drawing	 on	 a	 similar	 conceptual	 base	 to	 the	 ‘relational’	 understandings	 of	
humour	described	above	(e.g.	Ahmed,	2006,	2010),	this	work	is	characterised	
largely	by	attempts	to	understand	the	(molecular)	movements	that	humour	
and	laughter	can	generate,	the	capacities	that	this	affords	to	different	bodies	
and	thus	the	complex	ways	in	which	power	is	mobilised	by	them	at	various	
scales	(e.g.	Bissell	et	al.,	2012;	Brigstocke,	2014;	Dittmer,	2013;	Sharpe	et	al.,	
2014;	Sharpe	and	Hynes,	2016).	Sharpe	et	al.	(2014),	for	instance,	discuss	the	
comedy	 performances	 of	 Stewart	 Lee,	 arguing	 that	 their	 aesthetics	 enable	
audiences	to	generate	new	‘affective	habits’	through	which	prejudices	might	
be	altered	and	made	less	certain.	Elsewhere,	Hynes	and	Sharpe	(2010)	note	
that	 humour	 affirms	 already	 existing	 desires	 and	 the	 social	 constructions	
through	which	they	are	made	into	moral	judgements.	Brigstocke	(2014:	85)	
similarly	 suggests	 humour	 as	 offering	 an	 “alternative	 cultural	 vehicle	 for	
making	 the	 limits	 of	 socio-biological	 life	 visible	 and	 felt	 at	 the	 affective	
registers	of	experience”.	Humour	and	laughter	are	thus	again	seen	as	a	means	
of	accessing	power	geometries	to	enforce	control	onto	bodies	in	subtle	ways	
(Bissell	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 to	 resist	 these	 structures	 through	 modes	 of	 creative	
interruption	 (Brigstocke,	 2014;	 Sharpe	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 or	 creating	 ‘sensuous	
solidarities’	 (Routledge,	 2012).	 In	 this	 sense,	 whilst	 these	 discussions	 do	
augment	 traditional	 accounts	 of	 humour,	 adding	 further	 ways	 of	
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conceptualising	 laughter’s	socio-ethical	 functions	–	as	a	 form	of	 affirmation	
(Hynes	et	al.,	2007;	Hynes	and	Sharpe,	2010)	or	‘violence’	(Brigstocke,	2014)	
for	 instance	 –	 they	 largely	 still	 fall	 under	 the	 category	 of	 scholarship	 that	
Parvulescu	 (2010)	 critiques:	 maintaining	 analytic	 focus	 on	 humour	 rather	
than	laughter,	meaning	the	two	often	become	conflated.	
Also	 engaging	with	 ideas	 of	 practice	 and	 affect,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	
however	 sought	 to	 be	more	precise	 in	 distinguishing	 between	 humour	 and	
laughter	(see	Bataille,	2001;	Derrida,	1978;	Macpherson,	2008;	Nancy,	1993).	
Hannah	Macpherson	(2008:	1083)	for	instance	notes	that:		
Humour,	while	not	necessarily	verbal,	tends	to	involve	the	intellect:	for	
example,	a	 ‘sense	of	humour’	is	thought	to	entail	the	ability	to	detect	a	
tension	 between	 expectation	 and	 actuality	 [incongruity	 theory]	 …	
Laughter	is	distinguishable	from	humour	as	laughter	is	also	a	muscular	
phenomenon	which	interrupts	breathing.		
Through	 this	 separation,	 Macpherson	 (2008:	 1084)	 thus	 moves	 towards	 a	
‘non-representational’	 approach	 to	 understanding	 laughter,	 arguing	 that	
laughter	“defies	the	limits	of	discourse	and	dislocates	our	sense	of	a	rational	
reflective	subject”.	Extending	Macpherson’s	argument	further,	Jason	Dittmer	
(2013:	499)	“crudely”	maps	humour	onto	the	“discursive”	and	laughter	onto	
the	 “affective”.	 It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 Dittmer’s	 distinction	 between	 ‘the	
discursive’	and	‘the	affective’	here	engages	with	one	particular	understanding	
of	affect,	arising	from	the	phenomenological	tradition,	“as	a	set	of	embodied	
practices	that	produce	visible	conduct	as	an	outer	lining”	(Thrift,	2004a:	60),	
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or	what	 Jack	Katz	 (1999)	describes	 in	 terms	of	 the	doing	 of	 emotions.	This	
version	 of	 affect	 therefore	 essentially	 frames	 laughter	 as	 a	 corporeal	
(sub/semi-conscious)	 response	 to	 an	 external	 (humorous)	 stimulus.	 It	 is	
perhaps	 for	 this	 reason	 that	Dittmer	 (2013)	ultimately	argues	 that	humour	
and	 laughter	 cannot	 be	 teased	 apart,	 and	 thus	 returns	 to	 analyses	 based	
around	the	three	theories	of	laughter	outlined	above,	albeit	augmenting	them	
through	the	language	of	affect.		
Unlike	Dittmer,	Macpherson	(2008:	1083)	remains	adamant	that	some	form	of	
separation	between	humour	and	laughter	is	possible:	“laughter	is	not	always	
the	 response	 of	 a	 conscious	 reflective	 and	 controlled	 subject	 and	 at	 times	
laughter	has	no	clear	basis	in	humour	–	we	may	laugh	and	not	know	precisely	
why”.	Similarly,	whilst	laughter	may	correspond	with	the	discursive	formation	
of	a	joke,	Macpherson	notes	that	it	may	also	be	embedded	within	the	wider	
histories	and	circumstances	of	the	situation,	meaning	laughter’s	intensity	can	
easily	exceed	the	apparent	funniness	of	the	joke.	This	distinction	thus	draws	
further	parallels	with	the	writings	of	Georges	Bataille	(2001)	who	argues	that	
we	 cannot	 know	 the	 causes	 of	 laughter	 because	 it	 emerges	 from	 the	
‘unknowable’	 itself,	 and	 therefore	 trying	 to	 understand	 it	 through	 humour	
transforms	 it	 into	 something	 different.	 In	 other	words,	 there	 is	no	 point	 in	
attending	to	laughter	through	humour	because	that	would	require	a	mode	of	
representational	 ‘knowledge’	 that	 cannot	 be	 applied	 to	 laughter	 (see	 also	
Parvulescu,	2010).	This	disjuncture	between	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	
the	 ‘causes’	 of	 laughter	 and	 its	 actual	 emergence	 thus	 serves	 to	 challenge	
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ethical	 understandings	 of	 it	 based	 on	 normative	 ideas	 of	 a	 ‘subject’	 whose	
morality	 is	 constituted	 through	 the	 process	 of	 laughing	 at	 something	 and	
instead	 places	 the	 ethical	 (or	 ethological)	 imperative	 onto	 the	 moment	 of	
laughter	 itself	 “as	an	event	of	 the	body,	which	transforms	us	 in	spite	of	our	
ideals	 and	will”	 (Hynes	and	Sharpe,	2010:	45).	 Jean	Luc	Nancy	 (1993:	384)	
describes	a	similar	idea	in	terms	of	the	subject’s	coming	to	presence	through	
laughter:	 “It	 is	 thus	 that	presence	 laughs:	 it	 laughs	at	 coming	 into	presence	
without	 intention	 and	 consequently	 without	 presentation	 other	 than	 its	
coming”.		
This	capacity	of	laughter	to	create	subjects	through	affect	is	thus	suggestive	of	
what	Massumi	 (1996,	2002)	describes	as	 the	 ‘autonomy	of	 affect’,	whereby	
“[a]ffect	is	autonomous	to	the	degree	to	which	it	escapes	confinement	in	the	
particular	 body	 whose	 vitality,	 or	 potential	 for	 interaction,	 it	 is”	 which	
Massumi	goes	on	to	argue	“is	why	all	emotion	is	more	or	less	disorientating”	
(Massumi,	 1996:	 96).	 Jack	 Katz	 (1999)	 also	 describes	 this	 quality	 through	
noting	that	we	not	only	do	emotions,	but	they	also	do	us	in	return	(sometimes	
‘doing	us	 in’,	or	 ‘doing	us	over’).	 In	 terms	of	 laughter	 this	can	be	seen	most	
obviously	 through	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 embodied	 capacities	 are	 not	 only	
mobilised	 to	 produce	 laughter	 but	 are	 also	 mobilised	 by	 it	 in	 turn,	 often	
unintentionally	changing	its	relations	with	the	world	(see	also	Hughes,	2016;	
Nixon,	2017).	In	laughter	for	instance:	the	diaphragm	rhythmically	contracts,	
the	 neck	 elongates	 and	 the	mouth	 opens	 (Cixous,	1976;	 Parvulescu,	2010);	
bellies,	breasts,	arms,	legs	and	heads	shake	(Bakhtin,	1984;	Mbembe,	2001);	
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electric	 currents	 run	 through	 nerves	 and	 brain	 synapses,	 hormones	 and	
endorphins	 flush	 through	 our	 veins	 and	 muscles	 (Rokade,	 2011);	 air	
molecules	move	 as	 a	 sound	 is	 projected	 outwards	 from	 the	 body	 (Provine,	
1996,	2004).	As	we	have	seen	already,	however,	laughter	does	not	only	move	
bodies	materially,	but	also	 in	a	variety	of	emotional,	 intellectual,	social,	and	
political	ways	(Parvulescu,	2010).	It	can	generate	feelings	of	embarrassment,	
discomfort,	 alienation,	 joy,	 surprise,	 and	 so	on	 (J	Katz,	1999)	which	 in	 turn	
reveal,	and	sometimes	change,	what	we	think	about	the	world	and	our	place	
within	 it	 (Emmerson,	 2016)and	 therefore	 disrupt	 or	 reinforce	 particular	
power	structures	and	cultural	‘norms’	(Ahmed,	2006,	2010;	Douglas,	2015).	
Perhaps	more	significantly	 in	 terms	of	 laughter’s	ethics,	however,	we	might	
also	 note	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	 autonomy	manifests	 through	 interactions	
between	 different	 bodies	 (see	 also	McCormack,	 2003).	 In	 other	words,	 we	
might	 note	 that	 although	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 is	 experienced	 is	
mediated	to	some	respects	through	particular	cultural	and	historical	modes	of	
relation,	there	is	also	always	a	level	of	‘manoeuvrability’	in	terms	of	the	exact	
ways	in	which	it	can	register	in	specific	bodies	at	a	given	moment	(Anderson,	
2014).	“While	our	own	laughter	may	coincide	with	another’s	laughter	it	may	
not	always	correspond	with	the	purpose,	object,	or	effect	of	another	person’s	
laughter”	(Macpherson,	2008:	1084).	Following	McCormack	(2003),	therefore,	
we	might	note	two	key	implications	for	how	we	think	about	laughter’s	ethics.	
The	first	is	that	all	moments	of	laughter	can	be	considered	to	contain	within	
them	multiple	 lines	of	ethical	potential.	In	other	words,	different	bodies	will	
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encounter	 affects	 in	 different	 ways,	 at	 different	 times,	 meaning	 the	 same	
affective-event	 may	 inspire	 very	 different	 feelings,	 emotions,	 actions	 and	
potentials	within	them	(Kraftl	and	Adey,	2008).	Connected	to	this,	the	second	
implication	is	a	need	to	move	away	from	talking	about	laughter	in	ways	that	
“make	assumptions	about	what	a	person	might	have	been	feeling”	in	laughter,	
or	why	they	laughed	the	way	they	did	(McCormack,	2003:	500),	which	project	
a	personal	(and	therefore	partial	and	situated)	judgement	onto	the	situation	
of	 another,	 generating	 moral	 or	 ethical	 evaluations	 based	 on	 the	 same	
assumed	rather	than	actual	premise.	Together	these	premises	thus	suggest	a	
need	 to	 reduce	 the	 emphasis	 on	 (human)	 ‘intentionality’	 within	 ethical	
evaluations	of	laughter	(see	also	Barad,	2007),	particularly	given	that	there	is	
no	way	of	knowing	the	actual	or	potential	outcomes	of	 laughter	 in	advance	
(McCormack,	2003).	
When	held	together,	therefore,	these	mediations	on	laughter	serve	to	augment	
existing	 ethical	 approaches	 to	 it	 through	 unsettling	 ideas	 of	 the	 laughing-
subject	as	the	location	of	moral	action	and	instead	emphasising	laughter	itself	
as	capable	of	enacting	multiple	lines	of	ethical	potential.	As	Parvulescu	(2010:	
118)	argues:	“[w]e	need	to	start	from	laughter,	rather	than	the	joke.”	Even	in	
starting	with	laughter,	however,	there	is	a	clear	need	to	recognise	that	laughter	
itself	is	not	a	singular	entity	but	rather	a	multiplicity.	Laughter,	for	instance,	
can	 be	 seen	 as	 something	 that	we	 do	 in	 lots	 of	 different	ways:	 consciously;	
unconsciously;	at	another;	with	another;	habitually;	out	of	politeness;	out	of	
pity;	out	of	care;	loudly;	softly;	silently	and	so	on.	Similarly,	laughter	can	be	
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seen	as	an	entity	in	its	own	right:	a	‘thing’	that	is	capable	of	acting	on	us	beyond	
our	control	(J	Katz,	1999).	Our	own	laughter,	for	instance,	can	affect	our	bodily	
movements,	 emotions,	 moods,	 social	 positioning	 and	 influence.	 Yet	
encountering	another’s	laughter	can	affect	us	in	these	ways	too,	even	if	that	is	
not	their	intention	when	they	laugh,	if	indeed	they	intend	to	laugh	at	all.	
Similarly,	we	might	reframe	laughter’s	relationship	with	the	(ethical/moral)	
subject	along	similar	lines	of	multiplicity:	simultaneously	situated,	dispersed	
and	relational	(see	Mol,	2008a).	Laughter	is	situated	because	it	is	located	in	a	
specific	body	and	often	at	particular	sites	of	that	body	–	notably	the	mouth	and	
guts.	Similarly,	it	is	also	always	located	in	relation	to	the	specific	spacetimes	of	
that	body:	the	room	it	is	in;	the	people	that	surround	it;	the	cultural	norms	of	
gender,	race,	sexuality	and	age	that	it	is	‘supposed’	to	uphold,	or	possibly	resist.	
Laughter	 is	 also	 dispersed,	 exceeding	 the	 control	 of	 the	 conscious	 body-
subject:	moving	parts	of	 the	body	 in	ways	that	are	not	 intended;	disrupting	
predictable	 and	 rational	 patterns	 of	 thought;	 offending,	 insulting	 and	
otherwise	affecting	other’s	bodies	 in	ways	that	may	not	be	 intended.	 In	this	
way,	 laughter	 is	 (at	 times)	 invested	 with	 its	 own	 (more-than-human)	
subjectivities.	 Finally,	 laughter	 is	 relational:	 connecting	 similarly	
situated/dispersed	 body-subjects	 to	 one	 another	 or	 pushing	 them	 apart;	
circulating	 within	 and	 between	 them,	 ‘sticking’	 to	 some	 and	 passing	 over	
others	 (Ahmed,	 2004);	 sometimes	 affecting,	 other	 times	 not,	 but	 always	
forming	 webs	 of	 sociality	 and	 inter-connection	 in	 some	 way	 or	 another	
(Haraway,	2016).		
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As	such,	where	non-representational	approaches	to	ethics	have	been	variously	
(although	far	 from	universally)	praised	 for	 their	engagements	with	the	 first	
two	of	these	subjective	positions	(Barnett,	2012;	Olson,	2016;	Popke,	2006),	
the	 latter	has	been	 suggested	as	an	area	 in	which	 the	non-representational	
ethos	might	be	yet	further	extended.	As	Popke	(2009:	84)	argues	for	instance:	
	If	there	is	a	lingering	ethical	challenge	in	such	work,	it	might	consist	in	
thinking	 through	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 fidelity	 to	 the	 event	 can	 be	
considered	 in	 any	 sense	 a	 shared	 commitment	 –	whether,	 that	 is,	 the	
immanent	ethics	on	offer	perhaps	emphasizes	individual	encounters	and	
experiences	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 more	 extensive	 vision	 of	 collective	
responsibility.”		
Similarly,	Olson	 (2017:	7)	has	more	 recently	noted	of	non-representational	
theories,	that		
When	 complemented	 by	 concepts	 of	 justice	 or	 care,	 they	 also	 point	
toward	new	responsibilities,	or	an	understanding	of	responsibilities	as	
also	emergent	from	shared	space,	and	therefore	not	things	that	can	be	
individualized	in	the	form	of	human	moral	agency.	
Of	these	two	concepts,	justice	and	care,	it	is	perhaps	the	latter	that	for	me	holds	
the	most	promise	for	expanding	non-representational	ethics	for	two	reasons.	
First,	 there	 has	 already	 been	 a	 sustained	 engagement	 between	 the	 two	 in	
empirical	 work	 (e.g.	 Andrews	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Cloke	 and	 Conradson,	 2018;	
Conradson,	2003a,	2003b,	2005,	Darling,	2010,	2011).	Second,	and	perhaps	
more	 significantly,	 ideas	 of	 care	 and	 non-representational	 ethics	 share	 a	
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conceptual	orientation	towards	interconnections,	generosity	and	kindness,	as	
noted	above	(see	Thrift,	2005).	As	such,	in	the	next	section,	I	will	explore	these	
ideas	further,	speculatively	engaging	with	the	ways	in	which	care	might	extend	
our	ethical	imaginations	of	laughter	yet	further.	
2.5	|	Thinking	with	care	
As	 introduced	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 ideas	 of	 care	 as	 a	 moral/ethical	
framework	emerged	from	a	series	of	feminist	thinkers	through	the	1980s	and	
1990s	(see	Fisher	and	Tronto,	1990;	Gilligan,	1982;	Noddings,	1984;	Tronto,	
1993)	and	has	been	adopted	widely	within	geography	as	a	way	of	challenging	
“the	 (arguably	masculine)	 emphasis	 on	 rights	 and	 obligations”	 and	 instead	
“stressing	 relationships	 with	 one	 another,	 the	 importance	 of	 context,	 and	
nurturing	 relationships”	 (Hay,	 2015:	 np).	 Often	 building	 on	 Joan	 Tronto’s	
(1993:	103)	definition	of	care	as	“a	species	activity	that	includes	everything	
that	we	do	to	maintain,	continue,	and	repair	our	‘world’	so	that	we	can	live	in	
it	 as	well	 as	 possible.	 That	world	 includes	 our	 bodies,	 our	 selves,	 and	 our	
environment,	all	of	which	we	seek	to	interweave	in	a	complex,	life-sustaining	
web”	(see	also	Fisher	and	Tronto,	1990:	40),	advocates	of	 this	kind	of	ethic	
have	 thus	argued	 that	 caring	activities	 should	be	placed	at	 the	 centre	of	 all	
social	 and	 political	 life	 (see	 Lawson,	 2007,	 2009),	 often	 in	 opposition	 to	
notions	of	liberal-democratic	political	theory	(Popke,	2006).		
This	is	not	to	say	that	a	clear	understanding	of	what	care	is	exists,	with	many	
suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 simultaneously:	 a	 practice,	 or	 work;	 an	
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emotional/affective	disposition	towards	others;	and	a	transformative	politico-
ethic	 (see	 Conradson,	 2011).	 Crucially,	 although	 these	 three	 elements	 are	
present	in	most	care,	they	“are	not	necessarily	equally	distributed	…	nor	do	
they	 sit	 together	 without	 tensions	 and	 contradictions,	 but	 they	 are	 held	
together	and	sometimes	challenge	each	other	in	the	idea	of	care”	(Puig	de	la	
Bellacasa,	2017:	5).	This	tryptic	understanding	of	care	as	practice/affect/ethic	
thus	opens	up	space	in	which	we	might	connect	it	to	the	non-representational	
approaches	outlined	in	the	previous	section	–	allowing	each	to	productively	
augment	the	other’s	style	of	ethical	theorising.	As	such,	the	discussion	in	this	
section	 looks	 to	 unpack	 these	 connections,	 using	 the	 various	 textures	 and	
tensions	surrounding	care	in	order	to	suggest	ways	in	which	we	might	extend	
out	considerations	of	(non-representational)	laughter’s	ethical	potentials	yet	
further,	 without	 foreclosing	 the	 exact	 forms	 these	 ethical	 potentials	 might	
take.	As	Maria	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017:	1)	argues	“while	ways	of	caring	can	
be	 identified,	 researched,	 and	 understood	 concretely	 and	 empirically,	 care	
remains	ambivalent	in	significance	and	ontology.”	
Geographic	engagements	with	care	have	largely	focussed	on	questions	of	who	
cares,	where	this	care	takes	place	and	how	it	shapes	spaces	and	societies	in	
turn?	In	part,	this	has	involved	highlighting	the	ways	in	which	care	work	and	
caring	responsibilities	are	disproportionately	taken	on	by	women,	people	of	
colour	and	migrant	workers	(Dyer	et	al.,	2008;	Lawson,	2007;	Milligan,	2000),	
and	 unpacking	 the	 effects	 this	 has	 on	 ideas	of	 gender	 and	 race	 (McDowell,	
2004,	2009;	McKie	et	al.,	2002).	Yet	it	has	also	been	about	how	these	factors	
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affect	transnational	and	local	economic	relations	(Dyer	et	al.,	2008;	Raghuram,	
2012).	Significant	attention	has	also	been	afforded	to	the	ways	in	which	the	
responsibilities	 for	 care	 provision	 are	 being	 both	 ‘de-institutionalised’	
(Milligan,	2000;	Parr,	2003)	and	‘down-loaded’	from	the	state	(Milligan	et	al.,	
2007;	Milligan	and	Wiles,	2010).	This	down-loading	has	shifted	the	‘burden’	of	
care	onto	communities	and	individuals,	and	into	‘new’	spaces,	such	as:	drop-in	
centres	 (Conradson,	 2003b;	 Darling,	 2011);	 community	 hubs	 (Andres	 and	
Round,	2015;	Parr	et	al.,	2004);	and	returning	it	to	the	home	(England,	2010;	
Williams,	2002)	–	thus	further	blurring	the	boundaries	between	‘formal’	and	
‘informal’	care	sectors	and	providers	(McEwan	and	Goodman,	2010;	McKie	et	
al.,	 2002;	 Twigg,	 2000).	 Attention	has	 also	 been	 paid	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	
particular	 spaces	of	 care	are	experienced,	often	drawing	on	Gesler’s	 (1992,	
2003)	 concept	of	 ‘therapeutic	 landscapes’,	with	geographers	 thus	exploring	
the	 roles	 that	 ‘nature’	 (Conradson,	2005;	Lea,	2008);	 the	built	 environment	
(Parr,	1999);	and	 institutional	settings	(Andrews	et	al.,	2005;	Disney,	2015)	
play	 in	 experiences	 of	 care.	 More	 recent	 engagements	 with	 non-
representational	 theories	have	 sought	 to	extend	 these	 ideas	 further	 though	
thinking	 about	 therapeutic	 or	 caring	 ‘assemblages’	 (Foley,	 2011,	 2014),	
suggesting	that	health	and	care	are	constituted	through	a	“more-than-human,	
assemblage	 of	 spaces,	 forces	 and	 bodies”	 (Duff,	 2014:	 x)	 each	 of	 which	
interweave	with	one	another.	
Although	these	questions	around	space	and	place	are	crucial	in	understanding	
care,	closer	connections	to	the	specific	themes	of	this	thesis	are	found	within	
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literatures	 around	 the	 embodied	 performance	 of	 care.	 Indeed,	 through	
drawing	 on	 ideas	 from	 emotional	 and	 affective	 geographies,	 a	 number	 of	
scholars	have	sought	to	further	understand	the	complex	ways	in	which	care	is	
performed	 and	 experienced	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 scales	 and	 scenarios,	 from	
intimate	 proximities	 (Maclaren,	 2014b),	 to	 engagements	 with	 distanced	
others	(Barnett	and	Land,	2007),	and	more	recently	in	terms	of	care	for	non-
human	bodies	(Gorman,	2017b,	2017c).	Others	have	sought	to	challenge	the	
“notion	that	care	is	a	warm	pleasant	affection	or	moralist	feel-good	attitude”	
(Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	 2017:	 2).	 Drawing	on	Hochschild’s	 (1983)	 concept	 of	
emotional	labour,	for	instance,	both	McDowell	(2009)	and	Dyer	et	al.	(2008)	
discuss	the	way	in	which	caring	serves	to	performatively	reproduce	idealised	
notions	of	emotional	femininity	(also	Wolkowitz,	2002).	Elsewhere	Julia	Twigg	
(2000)	discusses	the	kinds	of	emotional	ambivalence	that	are	both	produced,	
and	to	some	respects	required,	by	carers,	particularly	when	doing	‘dirty’	jobs	
such	 as	washing	 bodies	 and	 re-dressing	wounds.	 A	 number	 of	 others	 have	
similarly	 outlined	 the	 multitude	 of	 emotions	 and	 affections	 that	 care	 and	
caring	can	generate,	including	frustration,	dependence,	anger,	annoyance	and	
helplessness	(Andrews,	2017;	Hughes	et	al.,	2005).	As	Liz	Bondi	(2008:	250)	
notes,	therefore,	care	is	often	paradoxical:	it	“oppresses	and	inspires;	it	hurts	
and	it	nurtures;	it	demeans	and	it	fulfils;	it	enrages	and	it	moves;	it	evokes	love	
and	 it	 evokes	 hate.”	 Similarly,	 Conradson	 (2005)	 argues	 that	 care	 is	
constituted	by	a	‘jostling’	mixture	of	interactions	between	the	self	and	others	
which	serves	to	destabilise	the	notion	of	care	as	a	simple	relationship	between	
Chapter	2:	Ethical	refrains	for	approaching	laughter	with	care	
60	
‘self’	and	‘others’	and	frames	it	as	a	collective	and	relational	mode	of	becoming.	
More	 recent	 conceptual	work	 in	 geography	 has	 also	 sought	 to	 extend	 care	
beyond	 engagements	 with	 ‘women’s	 work’	 and	 ‘normative	 care	 settings’	
(Bartos,	2018;	Raghuram,	2016),	instead	framing	care	as	a	vital	force	holding	
together	collective	life	(Lawson,	2007;	Popke,	2010)	–	drawing	parallels	with	
Jean	Luc	Nancy’s	(2000)	work,	once	again,	particularly	in	terms	of	his	ideas	of	
Being	as	always	a	Being-with	(or	 ‘being-in-common’	–	see	Popke,	2010).	As	
Victoria	Lawson	(2007:	3)	writes,	care	should	be	understood	“not	as	a	separate	
kind	of	relation,	but	as	endemic	to	(potentially)	all	social	relations	that	matter	
…	care	is	embedded	in	all	of	our	encounters	and	interactions,	even	when	care	
is	 ignored.”	 In	 this	 sense,	 life	 is	 framed	 as	 a	 “shared	 accomplishment”	
(Conradson,	 2003b:	 503)	 in	 which	 obligations	 and	 responsibilities	 are	
distributed	 throughout	 a	 ‘web’	 of	 interconnected	 bodies	 (Popke,	 2006)	 –	
similar	 to	 Freidberg’s	 (2004)	 ‘ethical	 complex’.	 Indeed,	 although	 ‘smoothed	
out’	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity,	 it’s	worth	 noting	 in	 this	 sense	 that	many	of	 the	
discussions	around	relational	ethics	as	outlined	above	do	themselves	engage	
with	care	 in	 this	manner	(e.g.	Barnett,	2005;	Barnett	et	al.,	2005).	As	Popke	
(2006:	 510)	 notes	 for	 instance	 “ethical	 consumption	 can,	 in	 fact,	 shrink	
psychological	 distance,	 and	 thus	 establish	 a	 relational	 ethic	 of	 care	 toward	
human	and	nonhuman	actants	within	particular	commodity	chains.”	Similarly,	
through	 drawing	 the	work	 of	Nancy,	 JK	Gibson-Graham	 (2006:	 86)	 look	 to	
rethink	the	economy	as	a	form	of	 ‘being-in-common’	thus	positioning	it	as	a	
space	in	which	ethical	relations	of	care	and	cooperation	might	be	fostered.	
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Within	these	literatures,	a	small	body	of	work	has	also	engaged	with	ideas	of	
humour	and	laughter	in	relation	to	care.	Indeed,	laughter	is	often	framed	as	a	
form	of	coping	(De	Moor,	2005;	Sullivan,	2000),	with	Linda	McDowell	(2009)	
for	 instance	 arguing	 that	 humour	 and	 laughter	 help	 workers	 in	 the	 care	
industries	to	cope	with	‘dirty’	and	‘underpaid’	jobs	through	re-establishing	a	
sense	of	self-worth	and	subjective	autonomy.	McGregor	(2007:	802)	similarly	
notes	the	ways	in	which	Zimbabwean	care	workers	coming	to	work	in	care	in	
the	 UK	 joke	 together	 as	 a	 means	 of	 affirming	 their	 otherwise	 subjugated	
positions	 (e.g.	 talking	about	 “joining	 the	BBC”	–	 “British	Bottom	Cleaners”).	
Other	 accounts	 have	 drawn	 on	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	 generate	 forms	 of	
intimacy	 (Green,	 1998)	 and	 to	 reduce	 communicative	 distances	 (Davidson,	
2001),	in	order	to	frame	laughter	as	something	that	aids	the	provision	of	care	
directly	 through	establishing	 forms	of	connection	and	relationality	between	
carers	and	those	being	cared	for	(Dean	and	Major,	2008;	Leiber,	1986;	Mora-
Ripoll,	 2010).	 In	 a	 similar	 manner	 to	 that	 discussed	 with	 regards	 to	 sex	
workers	 above	 (see	 Nixon,	 2017;	 Sanders,	 2004),	 laughter	 has	 also	 been	
argued	 to	 generate	 ‘positive’	 forms	 of	 relationality	 and	 social	 cohesion	
between	 care	 workers	 themselves,	 with	 Dean	 and	 Greggory	 (2004:	 142)	
noting	 for	 instance	 that	 for	 nurses	 delivering	 palliative	 care:	 “[l]aughing	
together	created	cohesiveness	that	made	the	team	both	tighter	as	a	group	and	
better	able	to	thrive	in	difficult	circumstances.	This	experience	was	identified	
as	a	sense	of	community.”		
Approaching	laughter	with(in)	care,	therefore,	allows	for	an	expanded	ethical	
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conception	of	it	through	forcing	particular	attention	onto	the	ways	in	which	it	
interplays	with	ideas	of	being-in-common	with	one	another	(Popke,	2010).	On	
the	one	hand,	given	that	many	of	these	understandings	of	laughter	and	care	
draw	on	traditional	humour	theories,	we	can	augment	them	through	a	more	
sustained	 engagement	 with	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 itself	 affects	 the	
different	bodies	 involved	 in	care,	paying	particular	attention	to	the	kinds	of	
capacities	 and	 relations	 that	 are	 enhanced	 or	 diminished	 through	 its	
happening	(see	Braidotti,	2011;	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	1988).	As	McCormack	
(2003:	503)	notes,	in	this	conception,	the	ethical	“question	is	not	only	‘how	far	
can	 we	 care’	 but	 also	 becomes	 one	 of	 cultivating	 a	 commitment	 to	 those	
relations	that	may	increase	the	intensity	of	attachment	and	connectivity”	(see	
also	Darling,	2010).	On	the	other	hand,	however,	we	might	also	use	care	to	
augment	our	existing	non-representational	approaches	to	laughter,	whereby	
we	might	frame	ethical	questions	not	only	in	terms	of	how	laughter	increases	
or	diminishes	the	intensity	of	‘attachment	and	connectivity’	but	also	how	it	can	
work	to	“maintain,	continue	and	repair	our	‘world’	so	that	we	can	live	in	it	as	
well	as	possible”	(Tronto,	1993:	103).	To	my	mind,	 this	second	approach	 is	
perhaps	most	pertinent,	particularly	given	that	it	has	the	potential	to	maintain	
a	 more	 open	 understanding	 of	 ethics	 (of	 care),	 which	 does	 not	 rely	 on	
“normative	 assumptions	 about	 a	 universal	 paradigm	 of	 ‘good’	 care	 and	
legitimate	care-givers”	(Bartos,	2018:	67),	but	rather	is	more	attentive	to	the	
plurality	 of	 practices,	 emotions/affects	 and	 politico-ethical	 positions	 and	
subjectivities	 through	which	 laughter	 can	 enter	 into	 relations	with	 care	 in	
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different	 contexts	 and	 circumstances	 (see	 Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	 2017;	
Raghuram,	2016).	
This	commitment	to	a	more	open	engagement	with	care	is	one	that	is	present,	
in	some	respects,	throughout	the	literatures	cited	thus	far,	particularly	those	
which	have	sought	to	unsettle	ideas	of	care	as	a	particular	kind	of	 ‘women’s	
work’	 (Brown,	 2003;	 Lawson,	 2007)	 and	 as	 driven	 by	 particular	
emotional/affective	 dispositions	 (Bondi,	 2008;	 Tronto,	 1993).	 This	 line	 of	
thinking,	however,	has	been	intensified	more	recently	by	a	number	of	scholars	
who	have	sought	to	further	rethink	the	ontological	and	ethical	significance	of	
care	 through	 engaging	 with	 its	 happenings	 through	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 ‘non-
normative’	conceptual	and	empirical	contexts.	In	thinking	through	care	in	the	
Global	 South,	 for	 instance,	 Parvati	 Raghuram	 (2016)	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	
need	to	move	away	from	‘global’	conceptions	of	care	(ethics)	and	instead	pay	
attention	 to	the	plurality	of	ways	 in	which	 care	emerges	and	 takes	place	 in	
specific	localities.	In	other	words,	geographers	have,	for	the	most	part,		
simply	 drawn	 down	 on	 care	 ethics	 and	 applied	 it	 to	 their	 cases,	 not	
explored	how	this	care	ethics	may	be	variable	in	different	places.	They	
have	not	built	 care	ethics	back	up	 through	a	deliberate	and	 sustained	
engagement	with	their	empirical	research	(Raghuram,	2016:	524)	
In	a	somewhat	different	manner,	and	closer	to	the	conceptual	themes	of	this	
thesis,	Maria	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017)	engages	with	ethics	of	care	as	part	of	
human/scientific	relations	with	soil,	in	order	to	‘trouble’	the	idea	of	care	as	a	
purely	anthropogenic	activity.	Drawing	on	a	‘speculative’	ethical	position,	she	
Chapter	2:	Ethical	refrains	for	approaching	laughter	with	care	
64	
highlights	 various	 forms	 of	more-than-human	caring	 agencies,	 arguing	 that	
there	is	a	need	think	beyond	intentionality	as	a	requirement	for	care	and	ethics	
more	generally	(see	also	Barad,	2007;	Olson,	2017).		
In	this	sense,	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa’s	(2010,	2012,	2017)	speculative	ethics	not	
only	 connects	with	 the	ways	 in	which	 I	have	already	moved	 to	 think	about	
laughter	 through	 non-representational	 theories	 –	 as	 something	more-than-
human	and	thus	capable	of	acting	beyond	intentionality	(see	Hughes,	2016)	–	
but	also	provides	“an	enticement	to	probe	further	into	the	meanings	of	care	
for	thinking	and	living	with	more	than	human	[,	more	than	representational,]	
worlds”	 (Puig	de	 la	Bellacasa,	2017:	4).	 In	particular,	 two	related	questions	
emerge	from	this	way	of	thinking.	First,	“what	is	included	in	‘our’	world?”	(ibid:	
57);	or,	what	counts	as	a	legitimate	caring	agency?	Second,	in	what	direction(s)	
could	 these	 expanded	 agencies	 be	 considered:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	what	 politico-
ethical	forms	and	agencies	might	we	identify	as	care	and,	more	importantly,	
how	does	this	 identification	shape	the	ways	 in	which	we	might	 think	about	
laughter	with	care?	
In	terms	of	the	first	of	these	questions,	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017)	specifically	
mobilises	the	works	of	both	Bruno	Latour	(2004,	2005)	and	Donna	Haraway	
(1991,	1997,	2003,	2016)	 to	suggest	 that	 there	are	a	multitude	of	 (hidden)	
caring	relations	(such	as	city	maintenance	schemes)	that	when	identified	and	
examined,	highlight	the	(inter)dependence	between	actors/actants	(see	also	
Bennett,	 2004,	 2005).	 Crucially,	 she	 questions	 what	might	 happen	 if	 these	
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matters	are	framed,	not	simply	as	matters	of	‘fact’	or	‘concern’	(Latour,	2004),	
but	 rather	 as	matters	 of	 care:	 not	 through	 “a	 fixed	 explanatory	 vision	 or	 a	
normative	 stance	 (moral	 or	 epistemological)”	 but	 rather	 through	 “a	
speculative	commitment	to	think	about	how	things	could	be	different	if	they	
generated	care”	(Puig	de	 la	Bellacasa,	2017:	61).	There	are	certain	parallels	
here	 with	 work	 already	 existing	 in	 non-representational	 theories.	 Johnny	
Darling	(2010,	2011)	for	instance,	calls	for	more	experimental	approaches	to	
space	in	order	to	try	and	promote	care	whilst	still	recognising	the	plurality	of	
forms	 that	 this	 care	 might	 take.	 Also	 building	 on	 Latour,	 Thrift	 (2005)	
discusses	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 hatred,	 malice	 and	 ill-feeling	 emerge	 from	
cosmopolitan	city	assemblages,	contrasting	these	against	the	everyday	forms	
of	care	that	Latour	(2004)	speaks	of,	and	thus	suggesting	that	we	might	seek	
to	 develop	 “an	 affirmative	micro-politics	of	 productivity	which	 attempts	 to	
inject	more	kindness	and	compassion	into	everyday	interaction”	(Thrift,	2005:	
144).	Crucially,	Thrift	(2005:	145)	also	rejects	the	normative	impulse	of	‘care’	
as	kindness	or	similar,	suggesting	that	these	politics	are	“not	attempts	to	build	
utopian	realities	so	much	as	they	are	attempts	to	‘produce	ways	of	living	and	
models	 of	 action	 within	 the	 existing	 real’,	 thereby	 ‘learning	 to	 inhabit	 the	
world	in	a	better	way’	(Boudriaud	2002,	13).”		
These	attempts	to	loosen	the	bonds	of	what	counts	as	both	world	and	care	thus	
open	 up	 questions	 around	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 might	 (re)think	 its	
relationship	with	both	the	political	and	the	ethical	(see	Raghuram,	2016).	Here	
Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	focusses	her	attention	on	the	“as	well	as	possible”	within	
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Joan	Tronto’s	(1993:	103)	definition,	arguing	that	“it	points	to	how	the	‘ethics’	
in	an	ethics	of	care	cannot	be	about	a	realm	of	normative	moral	obligations	but	
rather	about	 thick,	 impure,	 involvement	 in	 the	world	where	the	question	of	
how	to	care	needs	to	be	posed”	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017:	6).	Furthermore,	
the	 “as	 well	 as	 possible”	 renders	 care	 as	 something	 that	 is	 not	 only	
ontologically	and	morally	ambivalent,	but	also	politically	ambivalent,	posing	
questions	about	who	decides	what	as	well	as	possible	might	mean	in	a	given	
moment,	and	thus	which	directions	and	forms	care	should	or	could	take	(see	
also	Mol,	2008b).	This	once	again	expands	the	question	of	what	counts	as	care	
through	opening	up	space	in	which	we	might	recognise	a	plurality	of	caring	
agencies	 and	 practices	 that	 centre	 around	 a	 series	 of	 politico-ethical	
motivations	that	might	not	in	themselves	appear	caring	in	its	normative	sense	
–	including	those	that	generate	conflict	or	seek	to	control	others	(see	Disney,	
2015;	 Schliehe,	 2015;	 Tait,	 2011).	 Ann	 Bartos	 (2018)	 illustrates	 this	 well	
through	 engaging	 with	 the	 various	 caring	 agencies	 involved	 in	 the	 “Brock	
Turner”	rape	case,	demonstrating	how	care	can	be	encapsulated	not	only	in	
terms	of	the	work	done	to	aid	the	victim	but	also	through	the	work	done	to	
maintain,	continue	and	repair	the	worlds	in	which	Turner	himself	inhabits	so	
that	he	may	live	in	them	as	well	as	possible.		
Together,	 therefore,	 these	 discussions	 around	 care	 open	 up	 a	 number	 of	
questions	for	how	we	might	augment	non-representational	ethics	of	laughter	
in	new	and	productive	ways,	posing	a	series	of	further	propositions	through	
which	we	might	consider	 laughter’s	relation	with	care	 itself.	First,	 they	give	
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space	for	a	consideration	of	laughter	as	something	that	is	capable	of	enacting	
(or	indeed	disrupting)	care	in	a	manner	that	exceeds	the	intentionality	of	the	
laugher	themselves	and	thus	enabling	a	further	displacement	of	the	(moral-
)subject	as	the	locus	for	ethical	thinking	(Simpson,	2017).	Second,	they	enable	
a	broader	 conception	of	 the	plurality	of	ways	 in	which	 care	might	manifest	
(emotionally,	practically	spatially,	politically	etc.)	which	provides	a	wider	set	
of	resources	for	thinking	about	the	myriad	of	ways	in	which	laughter	and	care	
might	affect	one	another,	 including	 in	ways	 that	might	be	occluded	at	 first.	
Third,	 they	open	up	a	wider	range	of	political	standpoints	within	which	we	
might	consider	laughter’s	engagements	with	care,	allowing	a	speculative	and	
somewhat	 generous	 mode	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	 (ethical)	 work	 that	
laughter	 is	 doing	 at	 a	 given	 moment	 –	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 might	 be	
maintaining,	 continuing	 and	 repairing	 worlds	 –	 allowing	 us	 to	 ‘value’	 it,	
without	 necessarily	 requiring	 that	we	 ‘agree’	 with	 it.	 Indeed,	 as	 Raghuram	
(2016:	526)	argues,	sometimes	“we	need	to	focus	on	uncomfortable	relations	
inherent	in	care	and	to	use	those	to	re-think	care	as	practice	and	ethics.”	
Ultimately	these	questions	suggest	a	need	for	both	a	more	multiple	and	a	more	
situated	approach	to	laughter	with	care:	one	that	is	capable	of	attention	to	both	
the	multiplicity	and	plurality	of	ethical	potentials	that	emerge	from	them	at	a	
given	 moment,	 without	 reverting	 to	 universal	 or	 normative	 ideas	 of	 what	
forms	these	engagements	‘ought’	to	take	(see	Nancy,	2003).	In	drawing	these	
ideas	together,	and	thinking	forward	to	the	rest	of	the	thesis	therefore,	the	final	
section	of	this	chapter	(re)turns	to	the	idea	of	the	‘refrain’	(McCormack,	2013)	
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posing	 this	 as	 a	 vital	 framework	 for	 experimenting	with,	 and	 enacting,	 this	
singular-plural	ethical	imagination	(Nancy,	2000).	
2.6	|	Ethical	refrains	for	worlds	of	multiplicity	
The	experience	of	 time	and	space	has	 changed,	 the	 confidence	 in	 the	
association	 between	 scientific	 and	 moral	 judgments	 has	 collapsed,	
aesthetics	 has	 triumphed	 over	 ethics	 as	 a	 prime	 focus	 of	 social	 and	
intellectual	 concern	 …	 ephemerality	 and	 fragmentation	 take	
precedence	over	eternal	truths	and	unified	politics	(Harvey,	1989:	328)	
When	David	Harvey	wrote	these	words	of	 the	postmodern	condition,	at	 the	
outset	of	geography’s	‘moral	turn’	(see	Smith,	1997b),	they	were	something	of	
a	lament:	harking	back	towards	a	moment	in	time	now/then	lost,	when,	as	he	
perceived	 it	 at	 least,	 there	 could	 have	 been	 a	 global,	 unified	 and	 universal	
struggle	towards	“a	decent	and	sustainable	form	of	life”	for	all	(see	also	Smith,	
2004).	 We	might	 well	 question	 the	 situated	 nature	 of	 Harvey’s	 version	 of	
events	here,	particularly	in	terms	of	who	sets	the	bounds	of	what	these	ethics	
might	and	ought	to	look	like,	how	‘eternal’	his	‘truths’	actually	are	and	indeed	
whether	there	ever	could	be	such	a	 thing	as	a	‘universal’	politics,	but	either	
way,	 he	 is	 right	 to	 note	 that	 postmodernism	has	 killed	 this	 vision.	 Instead,	
ideas	of	the	singularity	and	universality	of	the	world	have	been	replaced	by	
the	idea	of	many	different	worlds,	each	containing	many	different	people,	with	
many	 different	 experiences,	 ideas,	 politics,	 struggles,	 passions	 and	 cares:	
worlds	of	multiplicity,	in	which	‘ethics’	might	never	be	a	unified/ing	force	but	
rather	emerges	from	the	particular	contexts	and	circumstances	of	encounters,	
affording	them	a	multitude	of	possibilities	and	potentials	(McCormack,	2003).		
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It	 is	 thus	 within	 these	 worlds	 that	 I	 look	 to	 approach	 laughter	 with	 care,	
offering	 a	 series	 of	 tactical	 suggestions	 through	 which	 we	 might	 not	 only	
engage	with	their	worlds	of	multiplicity,	but	actively	use	these	worlds	to	frame	
both	 laughter	 and	 care	 as	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 multiplicities,	
unbounded	from	their	normative	assumptions,	and	therefore	hold	their	ethical	
potentials	as	always	contingent	and	emergent,	rather	than	pre-determined.	I	
have	 suggested	 the	 advantage	 to	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 belies	 a	
Panglossian	 account	 of	 laughter	 as	 a	 social	 ‘good’	 or	 ‘ill’	 (Buckley,	 2005):	
neither	 producing	 dour	 denouncements	 of	 its	 capacities	 to	 insult	 (Gantar,	
2005),	 ridicule	 (Billig,	2005),	or	subjugate	 (Eagleton,	1989);	nor	suggesting	
that	 it	 is	 actually	 ‘the	 best	 medicine’	 (Amarasingam,	 2010;	 Francis,	 1994;	
Provine,	 2004).	 Rather,	 such	 an	 approach	 seeks	 a	 more	 generous	 style	 of	
engagement	 that	 affirms	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	 “maintain,	 continue	 and	
repair	our	worlds	 so	 that	we	can	 live	 in	 them	as	well	 as	possible”	 (Tronto,	
1993:	 103)	whilst	 always	 remaining	 attentive	 to	 the	 sense	 that	 “as	well	 as	
possible”	may	not	mean	the	same	thing	to	everyone	involved,	or	affect	them	in	
the	same	way	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017).		
For	all	its	advantages,	however,	such	an	approach	also	makes	what	Maurice	
Blanchot	describes	as	a	“fragmentary	demand”	on	the	ontological	cum	ethical	
thinking	and	writing	that	it	envelops	(Blanchot,	2003,	cited	in	James,	2006):	
“the	demand	imposed	by	a	thinking	of	Being	in	which	any	possibility	of	unity	
and	identity	has	withdrawn,	and	where	the	multiple	demands	to	be	thought	
without	reference	to	any	overarching	unity	or	 totality”	(James,	2006:	3).	As	
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briefly	mentioned	 in	Chapter	1	therefore,	 in	attending	to	these	 fragmentary	
demands	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 and	 beyond,	 rather	 than	 seeking	 unity	 or	
totality	as	 suggested	by	Harvey	 (1989)	and	others	 (Olson	and	Sayer,	2009;	
Sayer	and	Storper,	1997;	Smith,	1997a),	 I	 follow	Derek	McCormack	 (2013),	
Kathleen	 Stewart	 (2010)	 and	 Isabelle	 Stengers	 (2008)	 in	 suggesting	 ‘the	
refrain’	 as	 a	 conceptual	 resource	 through	 which	 we	 might	 grasp	 at	 the	
specificities	of	these	fragments,	without	foreclosing	their	or	our	potential	to	be	
or	become	otherwise	(McCormack,	2013:	8).		
Everyday	understandings	of	the	refrain	position	it	as	a	rhythmically	repeated	
element	 of	 a	 song	 or	 poem,	 that	 has	 lyrical	 or	melodic	 consistency	 to	 it:	 a	
“talismanic	referent	point	 in	a	 song	or	 composition,	 a	repetition	 to	which	a	
tune	is	anchored,	and	often	the	cathartic	moment	of	vibratory	crescendo	and	
resonance	in	which	all	singers	and	instruments	enjoin”	(Gerlach,	2015:	282).	
Following	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1988),	however,	the	refrain	takes	on	another,	
only	 partially	 related,	 conception	 within	 non-representational	 theories.	 As	
McCormack	 (2013)	 and	 Stewart	 (2010)	 both	 note:	 a	 refrain	 can	 emerge	
around	anything	that	adds	structure	to	an	otherwise	chaotic	world,	scoring	it	
with	 intensity	 and	 attachment.	 These	 refrains	 may	 appear	 at	 consistent	
rhythmic	intervals	and	be	exactly	repeated,	yet	they	do	not	necessarily	have	to	
be	 this	way,	 sometimes	 occurring	 in	 slightly	 different	 forms	 and	 at	 uneven	
intervals.	 Indeed,	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 (1994:	 120)	 themselves	 describe	
refrains	 of	 colour,	 posture	 and	 architecture.	 Similarly,	 slogans	 (Anderson,	
2014;	Closs	Stephens,	2016),	maps	(Gerlach,	2015),	sports	commentary,	dance	
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and	other	rhythmic	movements	(McCormack,	2002,	2003,	2005,	2013),	and	
even	 the	arguments	of	human	geography	as	a	discipline	 (Gerlach	and	 Jellis,	
2015;	McCormack,	2010,	2012),	have	all	been	positioned	by	geographers	as	
refrains	capable	of	drawing	together	blocks	of	space-time,	and	marking	out	
some	consistency	within	an	otherwise	differentiating	world	(Stewart,	2010).	
Crucially,	 refrains	 are	 not	 simply	 aesthetic	 qualities	 but	 rather	 capture	 the	
(multiple)	 modes	 of	 ‘territorialisation’	 through	 which	 spacetimes	 are	
composed	 around	 specific,	 situated	 “practices,	 techniques	 and	 habits”	
(McCormack,	2013:	7)	such	as	the	ways	in	which	different	animals	use	many	
methods	(sounds,	smells	etc.)	to	mark	their	territories	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	
1988).	 Similarly,	 “the	 refrain	 is	 radically	 impersonal,	 or	 at	 least	more	 than	
human.	It	does	not	necessarily	originate	through	the	expression	of	some	inner	
psychological	impulse”	(McCormack,	2013:	8).	As	such,	refrains	should	(once	
again)	not	be	thought	of	as	predetermined,	but	rather	as	modes	of	 ‘valence’	
that	 can	 draw	 and	 hold	 multiplicities	 together,	 but	 can	 also	 interrupt	 the	
existing	 functionality	 of	 spacetimes,	 and	 the	 bodies	 that	 inhabit	 them,	
‘deterritorialising’	 them	 and	 ‘reterritorialising’	 them	 into	 different	 forms	
capable	 of	 doing	 different	 things	 (Dewsbury,	 2011).	 These	
de/reterritorialisations	 can	 themselves	 take	 a	 number	 of	 forms	 and	 be	
apprehended	in	different	ways	–	both	as	relatively	‘concrete’	spatial	entities	
such	 as	 ideas	 of	 ‘place’,	 and	 more	 ephemeral	 spatialities	 such	 as	 ‘affective	
atmospheres’	(Stewart,	2011).	Furthermore,	despite	the	refrain	not	being	“a	
strictly	 phenomenological	 concept”,	 as	McCormack	 (2013:	 8)	 notes,	 it	 “also	
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points	 to	 the	 affective	 consistency	 of	 what	 Guattari	 calls	 ‘existential	
territories’”	and	thus	also	suggests	that	subjectivity	is	another	way	in	which	
refrains	might	territorialise	(see	also	Guattari,	1995,	2000).	
My	contention,	therefore,	is	that	in	approaching	laughter	with	care,	we	might	
frame	 each	 concept	 as	 a	 refrain:	 repeated	 reference	 points	 around	 which	
bodies,	 experiences	and	spacetimes	 can	acquire	 resonance	 (Gerlach,	2015),	
yet	 are	always	also	 capable	of	 territorialising	 in	different	ways,	 at	different	
times.	 In	 terms	of	 laughter,	 for	 instance,	 the	refrain	offers	a	means	through	
which	we	can	grasp	the	multiplicity	and	the	indeterminacy	of	laughter,	as	well	
as	its	capacity	to	do	things	–	to	de/re/territorialise	bodies,	spaces,	modes	of	
relation	 and	 subjectivities	 –	 without	 necessarily	 determining	 what	 that	
something	might	be.	In	this	sense,	the	refrain	allows	us	to	think	through	the	
sense	that	laughter	sometimes	seems	to	territorialise	in	ways	that	match	the	
assumed	consequences	of	 its	 ‘causes’	yet	can	also	territorialise	 in	ways	that	
are	more	surprising:	mobilising	actions	and	affections	that	have	very	different	
trajectories	to	those	that	humour	theories	might	suggest.	In	a	similar	manner,	
we	might	note	the	multiplicity	of	ways	in	which	care	can	territorialise:	through	
a	plurality	of	different	practices;	as	a	plurality	of	emotions	and	affects;	and,	
indeed,	from	a	plurality	of	political	and	ethical	standpoints.	The	emergence	of	
care	 can	 also	 have	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 territorialised	 outcomes:	 enhancing	
capacities	and	generating	intimate	relations;	but	equally	capable	of	restricting	
or	controlling	bodies,	making	them	feel	helpless,	dependant	angry	or	upset.	
Indeed,	 as	 will	 become	 apparent,	 both	 laughter	 and	 care	 can	 arguably	
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territorialise	 in	multiple	 different	ways	 at	 the	 same	 time	 depending	 on	 the	
situations,	circumstances	and	orientations	from	which	they	are	encountered	
(see	Ahmed,	2006).	
	In	one	sense,	 therefore,	 this	 thesis	serves	 to	uncover	 the	multiple	different	
ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 and	 care	 territorialise	 and	 unpack	 the	 ethical	
potentials	 and	 implications	 of	 these	 different	 territorialisations.	 Indeed,	
although	the	refrain	 itself	 is	somewhat	 implicit	 in	 later	chapters,	 it	remains	
present,	through	discussions	of	‘enactment’	(Chapter	4),	folded	subjectivities	
(Chapter	 5),	 atmospheric	 territories	 (Chapter	 6),	 and	 (non)relationalities	
(Chapter	 7)2	 –	 each	 of	which	 generates	 particular	 styles	 of	 thinking	 about	
practice,	 affect	 and	 ethics	 (Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	 2017).	 Perhaps	 more	
significantly,	however,	 in	attending	to	the	territorialisations	of	 laughter	and	
care	together,	the	thesis	produces	another	more	complex	refrain	–	the	refrain	
of	laughter	with	care	–	through	which	the	‘individual’	multiplicities	of	laughter	
and	care,	and	their	possible	de/re/territorialisations,	fragment	and	multiply	
yet	 further.	 This	 further	 multiplication	 is,	 of	 course,	 also	 a	 further	
multiplication	of	their	ethical	potentials,	and	therefore	of	ethics	itself,	meaning	
an	almost	unlimited	combination	of	different	possibilities	and	potentials	can	
emerge	 from	 a	 given	 situation	 and	 thus	 further	 precludes	 any	 sense	 of	 a	
(universal)	 understanding	 of	 the	 ethics	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 in	 relation	 to	
																																																								
2	Although	I	have	ascribed	these	concepts	to	the	chapters	in	which	they	are	most	central,	in	
truth	they	all	permeate	throughout	each	chapter	to	more	or	less	of	an	extent	
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anything	 other	 than	 the	 specific	 singular-plurality	 of	 the	 circumstances	
through	which	laughter	and	care	take	place	(Nancy,	2000).	
In	following	this	fragmented	pathway	still	further,	therefore,	we	can	start	to	
realise	that	ethics	itself	must	also	be	understood	as	a	refrain:	a	particular	mode	
of	impersonal	territorialisation	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	1988)	which	allows	a	
consistency	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	we	 analyse,	 address	 and	 otherwise	 think	
about	situations,	yet	must	never	be	foreclosed	to	a	particular	set	of	normative	
principles	 and	 ideas.	 Indeed,	 we	might	well	 argue	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 ethics	
themselves	may	sometimes	“wander	beyond	the	familiar”	(McCormack,	2013:	
8).	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 I	 am	 only	 seeking	 to	 ‘approach’	 the	 ethics	 of	
laughter	with	care:	to	get	close	enough	to	suggest	ways	of	thinking	and	moving	
within	their	ethical	spaces	without	ever	suggesting	that	these	ways	of	thinking	
and	moving	are	the	only	ones	that	exist	or	that	we	might	deploy,	or	indeed	that	
the	 specific	 modes	 of	 orientation	 might	 be	 the	 only	 angle	 from	 which	 we	
approach.		
Indeed,	this	recognition	of	the	limits	of	approaching	refrains	is	what	guides	the	
structure	and	form	of	the	later	chapters	themselves,	which	can	be	seen	as	a	
series	of	different	approaches,	each	deploying	different	modes	of	abstraction	
in	order	to	‘experience’,	and	experiment	with,	different	ways	of	thinking	and	
knowing	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care	(McCormack,	2012).	Each	chapter	is	
thus	 situated	 differently	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 conceptual	 terrain	 and	modes	 of	
enquiry:	they	listen	(Chapter	4);	practice	(Chapter	5);	affect	(Chapter	6);	and	
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press	on	the	limits	of	life	(Chapter	7)	–	meaning	that	although	in	many	ways	
they	 address	 similar	 ethical	 questions	 and	 circumstances,	 the	 outcomes	 of	
these	 approaches	 and	 the	 ethical	 knowledges	 they	 produce	 are	 somewhat	
different	each	time.	That	said,	all	the	chapters	do	have	a	particular	situation	
in-common:	 taking	 place	 within	 a	 particular	 methodological	 framework	
(ethnography)	and	set	of	locations	(care	homes	in	the	UK)	which	both	serve	to	
bind	them	together	and	to	frame	the	kinds	of	ethics	that	emerge	from	them.	As	
such,	the	next	chapter	seeks	to	set	out	these	frameworks	and	the	specificities	
through	which	 I	 engaged	with	 them	–	 pointing	 towards	 the	ways	 in	which	
these	 serve	 to	 situate	 the	 partiality	 of	 the	 knowledges	 produced	 in	 later	
chapters	(Haraway,	1988;	Madge,	1993;	Mol,	2002;	Rose,	1997).	
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Chapter	3:	Situating	knowledges	
We	learn	to	be	worldly	 from	grappling	with,	rather	than	generalising	
from,	the	ordinary.	
(Haraway,	2008,	p.3;	cited	in	Wilson,	2017:	14)	
3.1	|	Introduction	
In	thinking	about	the	ethics	of	laughter,	the	previous	Chapter	argued	for	more	
situated	approaches	that	are	both	non-representational	and	imbued	with	care.	
In	doing	this,	I	argued	for	a	need	to	recognise	both	laughter	and	care	as	more-
than-human	forces	capable	of	affecting,	and	being	affected,	by	various	bodies	
in	different	ways	and	thus	to	attend	to	the	specifics	of	each	event	when	making	
ethical	 judgements	 (McCormack,	 2003).	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 a	 running	 argument	
throughout	the	thesis,	with	later	chapters	looking	to	apply	various	theoretical	
frameworks	 to	 events	 of	 laughter	 and	 care,	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 ethical	
accounts	in	such	a	manner.	These	later	chapters,	however,	are	also	framed	by	
another	wider	situation,	both	in	terms	of	the	places	in	which	they	happen	and	
the	ways	in	which	they	have	been	approached	by	me	as	a	researcher.	Arguably,	
none	of	this	is	particularly	novel.	The	fact	that	space	and	place	matter	in	terms	
of	constructing	the	forms,	functions	and,	crucially,	meanings	of	both	laughter	
and	care	is	widely	recognised.	Similarly,	the	claim	that	knowledges	are	always	
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partial,	and	situated	with	certain	sets	of	embodied	power-relations	(Clifford	
and	 Marcus,	 1986;	 Gregson	 and	 Rose,	 2000;	 Haraway,	 1988;	 Rose,	 1997)	
features	in	a	countless	array	of	geographic	and	social-science	books,	papers,	
chapters	and	theses.	Needless	to	say,	however,	these	things	do	still	matter,	and	
crucially	they	matter	in	different,	new	and	novel	ways,	whenever	a	researcher	
enters	the	field,	picks	up	a	pen,	or	opens	their	mouths	to	speak.	
As	such,	this	chapter	looks	not	to	make	these	claims	specifically,	but	to	unpack	
some	of	the	ways	in	which	they	matter	in	this	thesis,	and	crucially	to	set	out	
how	 I	 have	 negotiated	 them	 in	 constructing	 the	 knowledges,	 ideas,	 and	
judgments	that	follow.	This	chapter	thus	outlines	the	methodology	on	which	
the	claims	in	this	thesis	rest,	with	three	elements	to	this	methodology	being	of	
key	 importance:	 first,	 it	 involves	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 method	 –	 (non-
representational)	 ethnography;	 second,	 it	 involves	 specific	places	–	nursing	
care	homes	in	the	UK;	and	third	it	involves	myself	as	a	specific	researcher	with	
a	specific	set	of	embodied,	emotional,	ethical	engagements	and	attachments	to	
the	other	two	factors.	It	is,	therefore,	the	relationship	between	these	factors	
that	serves	to	situate	this	research	in	a	particular	way,	and	it	is	those	relations	
that	the	chapter	looks	to	outline.		
In	 doing	 this,	 I	 first	 discuss	 ethnographic	 research	 in	 general,	 thinking	
particularly	about	the	ways	in	which	ethnography	can	be	and	become	folded	
into	 non-representational	 theories	 and	 methods	 (Vannini,	 2015a)	 and	 the	
differences	 between	 this	 way	 of	 working	 and	 conventional	 ethnographies.	
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Following	that,	I	look	more	specifically	at	the	research	undertaken,	firstly	by	
discussing	the	research	sites,	and	secondly	by	focussing	on	the	specific	ways	I	
engaged	with	them	which	I	have	framed	in	terms	of	‘becoming	a	body	at	work’	
(McMorran,	 2012).	Within	 this	 section,	 I	 also	discuss	other,	 supplementary	
research	 encounters,	 notably	 with	 two	 theatre	 groups,	 and	 reflect	 on	 the	
challenges,	difficulties,	successes	and	failures	of	 these	various	methods.	The	
final	substantive	section	focusses	on	the	ways	in	which	the	research	translates	
from	‘field’	to	‘page’,	through	a	discussion	of	the	various	modes	of	writing	that	
have	occurred	alongside	and	around	the	methods	themselves.	Key	throughout	
this	section	is	a	recognition	of	the	ways	in	which	writing	serves	to	displace	‘the	
subject’	and	generate	multiple	modes	and	forms	of	subjectivity,	each	with	their	
own	situations	and	capacities	to	affect	and	be	affected.	The	concluding	section	
looks	forward	to	the	chapters	that	follow,	highlighting	the	connections	made	
between	them	and	this	chapter.		
3.2	|	Ethnographic	research	
Ethnography	 was	 developed	 within	 anthropology	 as	 a	 means	 of	 studying	
various	 indigenous	 cultures	 (e.g.	 Malinowski,	 1922).	 The	 emphasis	 of	
ethnography	 was	 to	 generate	 qualitative	 accounts	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
different	 societies’	 cultures	 shape	 the	ways	 in	which	 people	 live	 their	 lives	
(Watson	 and	 Till,	 2010).	 Following	 the	 cultural	 turn,	 the	 landscape	 of	
ethnography	shifted,	however,	with	ethnographers	reflecting	critically	on	both	
the	 ontological	 status	 of	 ‘culture’	 in	 an	 increasingly	 mobile	 world	 and	 the	
often-problematic	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 is	 represented	 within	 ethnographic	
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accounts	 (see	 Clifford	 and	Marcus,	 1986).	 It	 is	 thus	within	 this	milieu	 that	
geographers	 have	 primarily	 engaged	 with	 ethnography,	 simultaneously	
adding	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 how	 different	 spatialities	 both	
generate	 and	 affect	 the	 processes	 and	 phenomena	 through	which	 different	
forms	of	culture,	society	and	power	emerge	and	take	place	(Watson	and	Till,	
2010).	 Indeed,	 given	 the	 interest	of	both	 feminist	 and	non-representational	
theories	 in	 performance	 and	 performative	 culture,	 ethnography	 is	
increasingly	 being	 adopted	 as	 a	means	 of	 producing	more	 research	 that	 is	
based	on	close,	‘active’	and	embodied	attention	to	these	processes,	rather	than	
wider	 surveillance	 of	 trends	 and	 patterns	 (Crang,	 2003,	 2005;	McCormack,	
2003;	Thrift	and	Dewsbury,	2000).	
Geographic	 ethnographies	 are	 diverse	 and	 differentiated	 across	 site	 and	
subjects,	with	notable	works	including	Arun	Saldanha’s	(2007)	ethnography	
of	the	social	spaces	of	rave	culture	in	Goa;	Nick	Megoran’s	(2006)	writing	on	
the	 political	 landscapes	 and	 borders	 of	Uzbekistan/Kyrgyzstan;	 and	Hester	
Parr’s	(1998,	2002)	engagements	with	various	(ab)normal	bodies	in	terms	of	
mental	 and	 physical	 health	 in	 urban	 spaces.	 Despite	 these	 differences,	
Megoran	offers	a	definition	that	captures	 in	broad	terms	what	ethnography	
involves.	
[I]t	classically	denotes	an	extended	sojourn	amongst	a	group	of	people	
where	 the	 researcher	 immerses	 himself	 or	 herself	 in	 daily	 life,	
continuously	 reflecting	 on	 meticulously	 kept	 fieldnotes,	 to	 learn	 the	
social	understandings	of	the	group	in	their	own	terms	(Megoran,	2006:	
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625,	emphasis	mine)	
Megoran’s	 definition	 is	 useful	 in	 highlighting	 several	 key	 elements	 of	
ethnography:	an	extended	engagement;	immersion	within	a	group;	a	focus	on	
the	 everyday;	 and	 the	 continuous	 reflection	 on,	 and	 negotiation	 of,	
relationships	between	 researcher	and	 researched,	 insider	and	outsider,	self	
and	other,	field	and	home,	body	and	world	(see	also	Watson	and	Till,	2010)	–	
with	 this	 last	 category	 forming	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 element	 of	
geographic	 ethnographies	 (Dewsbury,	 2010;	 McDowell,	 2009;	 Parr,	 1998;	
Paterson,	2009;	Vannini,	2015a).	Another	key	area	in	which	geographers	have	
advanced	 ethnographic	 thinking	 is	 in	 enacting	what	 George	Marcus	 (1986,	
1995)	 terms	 multi-sited	 ethnographies.	 As	 Watson	 and	 Till	 (2010)	 argue,	
geographers	are	particularly	well	placed	to	conduct	ethnographies	in	this	vein	
due	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 have	 theorised	 the	 complex	 relationships	
between	 local	 and	 global	 configurations,	 including	 through	 migration,	
citizenship	and	networks	of	information,	communication	and	knowledges	(e.g.	
Massey,	1994,	2005).	
Exemplary	of	this	advantage	are	Cindi	Katz’s	(1994)	discussions	of	the	ways	in	
which	 her	 fieldwork	 in	 Sudan	 and	 New	 York	 City	 generated	 a	 series	 of	
unexpected	interconnections	through	which	the	differences	between	the	two	
places	become	juxtaposed	to	their	similarities	as	part	of	shared	networks	of	
globalized	 capital	 and	 culture.	 Significant	 here	 are	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
recognition	of	the	interconnected	nature	of	places	complicates	notions	of	‘the	
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field’	itself;	a	recognition	of	the	“double	displacement”	(C	Katz,	1994:	68)	that	
leaves	the	research	always	somewhere	else:	whether	that	be	in	relation	to	the	
locale	 (being	 away	 from	home);	 the	 relationship	with	 the	 peoples	 they	 are	
researching	(being	within	different	power	structures)	or	being	displaced	from	
the	field	itself	whilst	‘writing	up’	the	research,	either	in	a	field	notebook	or	as	
a	research	paper	afterwards.	Katz	thus	calls	for	a	recognition	that	
By	operating	within	these	multiple	contexts	all	the	time,	we	may	begin	to	
learn	not	to	displace	or	separate	so	as	to	see	and	speak,	but	to	see,	be	
seen,	speak,	listen	and	be	heard	in	the	multiply	determined	fields	that	we	
are	everywhere,	always	in.	(C	Katz,	1994:	72)	
Ethnography	 can	 thus	 be	 seen	 not	 just	 as	 a	method,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	wider	
approach	 to	 research,	 involving	 “long-term	 and	 open-ended	 commitment,	
generous	attentiveness,	relational	depth,	and	sensitivity	 to	context”	(Ingold,	
2014:	384)	–	 in	 turn	dislodging	claims	about	a	particular	set	of	methods	or	
theoretical	approach	as	being	ethnographic	 in	and	of	 themselves.	That	said,	
there	are	particular	methods	 that	 tend	 to	be	deployed	within	ethnographic	
work.	 Indeed,	 ethnography	 often	 acts	 as	 a	 synonym	 for	 ‘participant-
observation’	 (Watson	and	Till,	 2010),	but	 it	 can	also	 involve	multiple	other	
techniques	 including,	 but	 not	 limited	 to:	 interviews,	 questionnaires,	 focus	
groups	 and	 at	 times	 even	 textual	 and	 online	 sources	 (Harbers	 et	 al.,	 2002;	
Ingold,	 2014;	 Marcus,	 1995;	 Megoran,	 2006;	 Van	 Maanen,	 1988;	 Vannini,	
2015a).	Hockey	and	Forsey	(2012)	have	even	argued	convincingly	for	a	form	
of	 ethnography	 based	 entirely	 on	 interviews	 and	 involving	 no	 participant-
Chapter	3:	Situating	knowledges	
82	
observation	at	all.	
My	focus	here	remains	predominantly	on	participant-observation	given	that	it	
has	both	arguably	held	the	most	sway	in	non-representational	ethnographies	
(Vannini,	2015a)	and	more	importantly	formed	the	central	element	of	my	own	
methodology.	 Participant-observation	 encompasses	 the	 documentation	 of	
‘everyday	worlds’	(observation),	done	by	a	researcher	who	is	actively	involved	
within	 the	 context	 of	 those	 same	 worlds	 (participation)	 (Watson	 and	 Till,	
2010).	 Participant-observation	 thus	 looks	 to	 obviate	 the	 structured	 and	
controlled	environments	 through	which	much	purely	discursive	 research	 is	
conducted	 by	 embedding	 the	 researcher	within	 social	 interactions	 that	 are	
somewhat	beyond	their	control.	As	such	it	seeks	to	move	towards	emic	(self-
ascribed)	 rather	 than	 etic	 (researcher-ascribed)	 modes	 of	 analysis,	
categorisation	and	thought	(Megoran,	2006).	
Of	course,	none	of	this	is	intended	to	deny	the	various	power	relations	that	are	
involved	within	any	research	process	(C	Katz,	1994),	particularly	in	terms	of	
the	ways	in	which	they	might	affect	the	social	interactions	in	which	they	are	
taking	part	(Madge,	1993;	McDowell,	1992;	Megoran,	2006).	As	such	emphasis	
is	 placed	 once	 again	 on	 being	 reflexive	 and	 paying	 keen	 attention	 to	 the	
researcher’s	positionality	(Rose,	1997).	This	is,	in	part,	about	recognising	one’s	
position	as	either	‘insider’	or	‘outsider’,	or	gradients	between	the	two,	but	also	
through	detailed	engagements	with	the	researcher’s	own	bodily	sensations,	
emotions,	experiences	and	affective	capacities	(Crang,	2003,	2005;	Dewsbury,	
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2010;	Madge,	 2016,	 2018).	 These	 movements	 are	 intended	 to	 harness	 the	
multiple	subjectivities	and	positions	through	which	the	field	is	encountered,	
juxtaposing	them	against	one	another	in	creative	and	productive	ways	(C	Katz,	
1994,	2017;	Lancione,	2017;	also	Madge,	2018)	–	albeit	following	Gillian	Rose’s	
(1997)	 important	 intervention,	 the	 impossibility	of	knowing	the	self	 fully	 is	
now	widely	recognised.	
Non-representational	theories	have	made	a	number	of	contributions	both	to	
and	 through	 participant-observation	 based	methodologies	 (Andrews,	 2017;	
Dewsbury,	2010;	Thrift,	2000;	Vannini,	2015a).	Indeed,	the	attempt	to	move	
beyond	 representation,	 for	 Thrift	 (2003:	 3)	 at	 least,	 precludes	 the	 kinds	 of	
research	 based	 on	 interview	 and	 survey	 data	 in	which	 the	world	 becomes	
“nicely	packaged	up	in	a	few	supposedly	illustrative	quotations”.	In	these	non-
representationally	informed	methods,	therefore,	the	body	again	takes	a	more	
prominent	 role	 although	 with	 the	 recognition	 of	 it	 as	 an	 unbounded	 and	
volatile	subject,	rather	than	a	discrete	object	of	knowledge	(Dewsbury,	2010;	
Grosz,	1994).	As	such,	the	impetus	of	these	styles	of	engagement	is	to	generate	
an	attunement	“to	thought	as	inclusive	of	affect,	and,	in	general,	a	sense	of	the	
‘tone’	of	any	situation,	the	play	of	singularity,	which	might	(and	only	might)	
produce	new	virtualizations”	(Thrift	2004:	85,	cited	in	Dewsbury,	2010:	328).	
Thrift	(2000)	thus	suggests	‘observant-participation’	rather	than	‘participant-
observation’	 as	 a	 way	 of	 distinguishing	 this	 style	 of	 engagement	 and	
foregrounding	 the	 researcher	 as	 an	 always	 active	 participant	 in	 the	worlds	
they	are	observing	(also	Dewsbury,	2010).	As	Andrews	(2017:	12)	writes	“this	
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involves	doing	the	same	thing	as	the	participant,	getting	more	entangled	in	the	
action	and	invested	in	the	effort	and	experience.”	
Andrews	 (2017)	 adds	 further	 clarification	 to	 this	 style	 of	 observant-
participation	by	noting	two	separate	but	connected	modes	through	which	it	
can	 be	 enacted:	 ‘witnessing’	 and	 ‘acting	 into’.	 ‘Witnessing’	 is	 similar	 to	 the	
mode	 of	 research	 described	 above	 and	 involves	 the	 researcher	 exposing	
themselves	to	the	multitude	of	things,	events,	rhythms	and	matterings,	which,	
even	 if	 they	seem	inconsequential,	serve	to	constitute	space-time	and	allow	
the	 emergence	 of	 different	 worlds.	 In	 this	 sense,	 we	 might	 argue	 that	
witnessing	 has	 been	 the	 primary	 approach	 through	 which	 non-
representational	 theories,	 ethics	 and	 politics	 have	 developed.	 McCormack	
(2003)	for	instance	argues	that	through	witnessing	(rather	than	representing)	
the	world,	we	can	develop	a	means	of	describing	and	analysing	events	 that	
have	 more	 fidelity	 than	 those	 accounts	 based	 on	 the	 representational	
economies	 of	 signs,	 symbols	 and	meanings.	 Dewsbury	 (2003:	 1908–1909)	
similarly	notes	that	“witnessing	sees	us	move	ethically	beyond	being	‘all	too	
human’	to	being	open	to	the	world	as	a	whole”.	
Acting	into	is	a	somewhat	more	recent	form	of	engagement.	Although	similar	
to	witnessing,	it	refers	to	the	generation	of	an	intimate	relationship	between	
the	(subjective)	researcher	and	what	happens	 in	 the	 field	(Andrews,	2017).	
Acting	into	thus	marks	a	significant	muddying	of	the	relationship	between	the	
scholarly	 and	 the	 lived,	 thus	 enacting	 an	 account	 of	 the	 field	 through	what	
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Bourdieu	 (1990)	describes	as	a	scholastic	point	of	 view	–	one	 imbued	with	
theoretical	insights	and	concepts	that	are	generated	in	conjunction	with	the	
research	 rather	 than	 deduced	 from	 it	 (see	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari,	 1994;	
Massumi,	2002).	Different	to	witnessing,	acting	into	is	therefore	characterised	
by	an	increasingly	deep	entanglement	between	the	descriptive	and	analytical,	
as	well	as	the	speculative	and	the	imaginative	–	with	recent	works	by	Kathleen	
Stewart,	 Derek	 McCormack,	 and	 Paul	 Simpson	 (amongst	 others)	 proving	
exemplary	of	this	ethnographic	style	(McCormack,	2014;	Simpson,	2009,	2013,	
2015,	Stewart,	2007,	2010,	2011,	2014,	2017).	Whilst	I	adopted	both	modes,	
overall	 my	 research	 is	 perhaps	 more	 reflective	 of	 acting	 into	 rather	 than	
witnessing,	 given	 that	my	experience	of	 the	 field	 remains	 intimately	 tied	 to	
theory	 and	 the	 generation	 and	 application	 of	 various	 concepts	 rather	 than	
simply	describing	what	happens	in	the	field.	
Given	 this	 element	within	my	own	work,	 I	 am	 therefore	 forced	 to	question	
whether	my	own	research	practice	is	indeed	‘ethnography’.	On	the	one	hand,	
it	clearly	is	ethnography.	My	research	involves	extended	sojourns	for	instance	
and	focusses	on	everyday	life,	practices,	relations	and	emotions	between	the	
inhabitants.	Similarly,	it	involves	significant	moments	of	reflection,	focussed	
on	my	own	body,	feelings,	and	thoughts,	and	the	wider	social-relations,	power	
structures	 and	 cultures	 in	 which	 I	 am	 enmeshed.	 My	 work	 has	 involved	
complex	negotiations	of	‘home’	and	‘field’	in	which	these	two	locations	become	
increasingly	blurred	(C	Katz,	1994);	and	a	written	text	in	which	information	
about	these	worlds	is	narrated	in	order	to	tell	stories	about	the	relationship	
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between	laughter	and	care	across	multiple	spacetimes	(see	Marcus,	1995).	On	
the	other	hand,	however,	I	remain	vitally	aware	of	a	recent	call	by	Tim	Ingold	
(2014)	 for	 more	 precision	 in	 what	 we	 mean	 by	 ethnography	 in	 order	 to	
preserve	the	rigour	and	critical	impetus	of	the	method;	and	thus,	a	recognition	
that	my	own	engagement	 falls	 short	of	his	 and	others’	definitions.	As	 such,	
whilst	I	will	ultimately	continue	to	discuss	my	research	as	ethnography,	I	wish	
to	offer	two	key	caveats	before	I	do	so.	
The	first	caveat	involves	thinking	back	to	Megoran’s	(2006:	625)	definition.	I	
am	hard	pressed	to	make	any	claim	to	be	engaging	with	these	worlds	and	the	
people	 within	 them	 “in	 their	 own	 terms”.	 This	 again	 is	 because	 of	 the	
conceptual	 shifts	 I	 have	made	 in	 cultivating	 a	 sensibility	 towards	 laughter,	
rather	 than	 humour	 –	 which	 has	 generated	 both	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 and	 a	
vocabulary	 that	 is	 somewhat	 divorced	 from	 most	 people’s	 everyday	
terminologies.	 This	 particular	 issue	 was	 apparent	 throughout	 the	 various	
engagements	I	had	with	people	‘in	the	field’,	however,	has	become	intensified	
subsequently	 through	 my	 attempts	 to	 feed	 back	 the	 findings	 to	 various	
participants.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 is	 perhaps	 relatively	 common	 to	
theoretically	informed	‘ethnographic’	work,	also	discussed	by	Annemarie	Mol	
(2002)	 in	 her	 discussion	 of	 ontologies	 of	 a	 disease	 through	Actor-Network	
Theory,	 in	 which	 she	 notes	 that	 when	 presenting	 back	 to	 medical	
professionals,	 she	 had	 rendered	 their	 worlds	 altogether	 too	 strange	 to	 be	
recognisable.	
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The	second	caveat	is	one	that	I	wish	to	make	more	productive	and	relates	to	
the	 research	 focus.	 “Quite	 literally”,	 as	 Tim	 Ingold	 (2014:	 385)	 notes,	
ethnography	 “means	 writing	 about	 people”.	 Whilst	 my	 research	 may	 be	
people-focused,	this	is	not	its	sole	focus.	Indeed,	the	theoretical	move	to	render	
laughter	 as	 more-than-human	 (and	 therefore	 as	 about	 more-than-people)	
complicates	 the	 idea	 that	 I	 am	 researching	 or	 writing	 about	 people.	
Furthermore,	the	framing	of	this	thesis	within	geographical	literatures	means	
that	attention	is	paid	as	much	to	the	space-times	and	places	that	people	occupy	
and	 emerge	 out	 of,	 as	 to	 the	 people	 themselves.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 am	 not	
attempting	 to	 replicate	 anthropology	 here.	 My	 interest	 and	 approach	 are	
somewhat	different	 in	 that	 I	am	writing	about	worlds	–	 literally	conducting	
geo-graphy,	rather	than	ethnography	per	se.	These	worlds,	in	turn,	are	not	just	
human,	 people,	 worlds	 but	 rather	 ones	 that	 form	 alongside,	 around	 and	
sometimes	 in	 absence	 of	 people,	 and	 equally,	 serve	 to	 ‘form’	 the	 people	
themselves.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 these	worlds	that	augment	the	power	of	my	whole	
approach	to	laughter	with	care.	As	such,	whether	technically	‘ethnography’	or	
not,	it	is	this	writing	about	worlds	that	I	wish	to	hold	onto	as	I	move	on	to	the	
next	section.	
3.3	|	Researching	in	care	homes	
Having	 begun	 to	 situate	 the	 knowledges	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 within	
geographic-ethnography	 as	 a	 particular	 methodological	 framework,	 it’s	
important	now	to	think	more	clearly	about	the	situatedness	of	the	spacetimes	
in	which	these	research	engagements	took	place	(Carmalt,	2011;	C	Katz,	1996;	
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Lancione,	2017).	As	already	noted,	the	primary	research	sites	for	this	thesis	
are	 two	 individual	 nursing	 care	 homes	 both	 located	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	
Birmingham	 in	 the	 UK.	 We	 might	 thus	 argue	 that	 the	 ethnographic	
engagement	 is	one	that	 is	multi-sited,	or	multi-local,	with	the	research	sites	
connected	by	their	placing	within	wider	geographies,	networks	and	flows	of	
capital	 (Marcus,	 1995).	 Put	 in	 another	 way,	 the	 research	 can	 be	 seen	 as	
simultaneously	 situated	 within	 both	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘the	 generic	 nursing	 care	
home’	and	the	more	specific	details	of	the	two	nursing	care	homes	themselves.	
Indeed,	both	 ideas	 frame	the	thinking	and	ethics	 that	emerge,	shaping	(and	
somewhat	limiting)	the	structures,	forms	and	meanings	of	care	and	laughter	
that	I	engage	with,	and	therefore,	the	kinds	of	relationships	between	the	two	
that	I	draw	out.	
This	is	not	to	negate	the	utility	or	power	of	engaging	with	care	homes.	Indeed,	
nursing	 care	 homes	 form	 remarkably	 nuanced	 research	 sites	 for	 thinking	
about	the	interaction	between	laughter	and	care.	They	are,	after	all,	places	in	
which	 laughter	 and	 care	 enacted	 and	 often	 celebrated.	 Similarly,	 they	 are	
places	imbued	with	power	relations;	places	where	social,	economic,	cultural,	
political,	 ethical	 issues	 emerge,	 are	 contested	 and	 negotiated,	 sometimes	
resolved,	sometimes	not.	They	are	incredibly	diverse	places	in	terms	of	their	
inhabitants.	 Places	where	 residents,	 carers,	 nurses,	 activities	 co-ordinators,	
managers,	 cooks,	 cleaners,	 caretakers,	 family	members,	 doctors,	 ambulance	
and	delivery	drivers,	and	a	whole	host	of	other	non-/more-than-human	actors	
all	interact	in	different	ways	at	different	times.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	for	
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this	project	at	least,	they	are	also	places	in	which	many	kinds	of	emotions	and	
affections	emerge	and	are	felt:	love,	joy,	sadness,	upset,	hurt,	longing,	boredom,	
excitement,	 smiles,	 tears	 and	 of	 course	 laughter.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 are	
places	in	which	many	different	‘lives’	are	lived.	
As	such,	this	section	explores	the	wider	context	of	care	homes	in	the	UK,	before	
moving	 on	 to	 discuss	 the	 details	 of	 the	 two	specific	 homes	 that	 I	 primarily	
engaged	 with.	 Following	 these	 two	 parts,	 I	 offer	 a	 longer	 discussion	 that	
outlines	 how	 I	 engaged	 with	 those	 homes,	 framed	 through	 the	 idea	 of	
becoming	a	body	at	work	(McMorran,	2012),	and	detailing	the	ways	in	which	
my	body,	emotions,	positionality	and	other	ethical	issues	shaped	the	relations	
I	have	with	the	research.	Finally,	 I	move	on	to	discuss	another	set	of	(more	
minor)	engagements	with	nursing	 care	homes	 that	 also	 inform	 the	 thesis	–	
time	spent	with	two	theatre	groups	who	perform	in	care	homes	–	recognising	
the	 importance	 but	 also	 failures	 of	 these	 attempts	 to	 expand	 the	 empirical	
scope	of	the	thesis.	
3.3.1	|	Care	homes	in	context	
There	are	multiple	types	of	institutions	providing	care	for	people	in	the	UK,	
however,	the	biggest	constituent	of	this	sector	are	care	homes	for	older	people.	
There	are	 two	main	 types	of	 care	home:	a	 residential	 care	home,	providing	
“care	and	support	throughout	the	day	and	night”;	and	a	nursing	home	which	
offers	the	same	service	but	with	the	additional	support	of	a	24-hour	qualified	
nurse	(Care	Quality	Commission	[CQC]	2017:	np).	In	referring	to	‘care	homes’	
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here,	I	am	therefore	following	the	definition	set	out	by	the	National	Institute	
for	Health	and	Care	Excellence	(NICE)	as	including	“all	residential	and	nursing	
homes	 registered	 with	 the	 Care	 Quality	 Commission3	 where	 mainly	 older	
people	live”	(NICE,	2015:	1),	however	it’s	worth	noting	that	primarily	I	have	
engaged	with	nursing	homes.	
Lievesley,	et	al.	(2011)	set	out	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	history	of	the	care	
home	as	an	institution.	Prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	‘Welfare	State’	in	the	
1940s,	 older	 people	were	 either	 expected	 to	work,	 or	 if	 they	were	 ‘infirm’	
would	 fall	 under	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Poor	 Law,	 meaning	 either	 a	 very	 low	
stipendiary	income,	or	an	institutional	place	in	a	workhouse	(although	there	
were	a	small	number	of	care	homes	 from	the	early	 twentieth	century	–	see	
Thomson,	2008).	In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	much	of	this	responsibility	of	caring	
for	older	people	was	transferred	onto	the	state,	bringing	with	it	an	increasing	
number	 of	 care	 homes	 (Lievesley	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 sector	 was,	 however,	
relatively	quickly	privatised,	with	growing	numbers	of	homes	being	bought	
out	by	private	providers	from	the	1970s	onwards.	‘Local	authority	beds’	thus	
dropped	from	around	60%	of	the	market	in	1970	to	the	contemporary	figure	
of	around	8%	(LaingBuisson,	2015).	Within	this	historical	perspective,	it’s	also	
important	to	note	that	there	has	been	a	relatively	static	number	of	care	home	
places	and	residents	over	the	last	two	decades	or	so	(Smith,	2016),	perhaps	
																																																								
3	The	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC)	forms	the	primary	regulator	for	care	homes,	with	a	remit	
for	ensuring	the	quality,	standards	and	safety	of	care	provision	across	the	sector	
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reflecting	 a	 wider	 shift,	 noted	 within	 the	 geographical	 literature	 on	 care,	
towards	 people	 being	 cared	 for	 in	 their	 own	 homes	 rather	 than	 within	
institutions	(see	Atkinson	et	al.,	2011;	Dyck,	2005;	England,	2010;	Williams,	
2002).	
That	said,	the	contemporary	care	home	sector	remains	vast	in	the	UK.	There	
are	roughly	16,000	care	homes	(CQC,	2017)	providing	full	time	medical/social	
care	for	around	300,000	people	over	the	age	of	65	(Smith,	2016).	These	homes	
are	 split	 across	 three	 main	 types	 of	 ownership;	 private	 ownership	 is	 the	
largest,	 providing	 about	 200,000	 beds	 (about	 76%	 of	 all	 places);	 with	
voluntary	sector	making	up	around	16%	and	local	authority	beds	the	other	8%	
(Jarrett,	 2017).	 These	 figures	 are	 however	 perhaps	misleading	 and	 so	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	local	authorities	still	pay	for	at	least	part	of	around	60%	of	
all	care	home	places	in	the	UK	(Competitions	and	Markets	Authority,	2017).	
These	 various	 statistics,	 therefore,	 point	 to	 an	 increasing	 reliance	 on	
neoliberal	market	principles	in	the	UK	care	sector	(Barnes,	2012);	a	factor	that	
is	perhaps	crucial	in	understanding	both	the	structures	and	challenges	facing	
contemporary	care	homes.	
Indeed,	 the	 current	 economic	 and	 political	 climate	 in	 the	UK	has	 increased	
pressures	on	the	care	home	sector	over	the	last	ten	years,	generating	several	
claims	more	recently	that	the	sector	is	experiencing	(or	on	the	verge	of)	a	crisis	
(Jarrett,	2017;	Roberts	and	Barnard,	2017).	In	2011	for	instance,	the	largest	
private	provider	of	care	homes	in	the	UK,	Southern	Cross,	collapsed,	causing	
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750	care	homes	to	close,	or	be	sold	off	(Roberts	and	Barnard,	2017)	and	there	
have	 been	 increasing	 numbers	 of	 homes	 run	 by	 smaller	 private	 providers	
closing	in	the	years	since	(Competitions	and	Markets	Authority,	2017).	Much	
of	the	issue	relates	to	increased	budget	cuts	and	financial	pressures	on	Local	
Authorities,	 emerging	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Conservative/Coalition	 government’s	
austerity	agenda	which	has	seen	 local	authority	 funding	 fall	by	around	£4.6	
billion	 over	 the	 last	 five	 years	 (Roberts	 and	Barnard,	 2017).	 Given	 that,	 as	
noted	above,	local	authorities	are	the	biggest	purchasers	of	care	home	beds,	
this	reduction	in	their	purchasing	power	affects	the	whole	sector,	not	just	local	
authority	run	homes	(Jarrett,	2017).	
Another	key	factor	placing	pressure	on	care	homes	are	issues	around	staffing.	
In	part,	 this	relates	 to	cost:	with	the	CQC	reporting	that	on	average	staffing	
forms	around	60%	of	a	care	home’s	overall	costs	(Roberts	and	Barnard,	2017).	
Roberts	and	Barnard	argue	that	this	high	level	of	cost	is	compounded	by	two	
key	factors.	Firstly,	the	recent	introduction	of	the	‘National	Living	Wage’	has	
forced	 costs	 up,	 with	most	 staff	members	 paid	 at	Minimum	Wage	 levels	 –	
currently	 set	 at	 £7.50	 for	 people	 over	 25,	 but	 due	 to	 rise	 to	 £9	 by	 2020.	
Similarly,	there	is	a	shortage	of	experienced	and	willing	care	staff,	nurses	and	
managers.	Indeed,	given	that	non-British	EU	workers	constitute	around	7%	of	
the	 adult	 social	 care	 workforce	 this	 problem	 is	 currently	 being	 further	
compounded	by	the	UK’s	decision	to	leave	the	European	Union.	Ultimately	this	
means	that	care	homes	are	increasingly	having	to	supplement	their	staff	with	
more	expensive	‘agency’	staff,	employed	through	external	providers	for	short-
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term	contracts	(usually	a	single	shift).	
This	 discussion	 of	 care	 homes	 thus	 sets	 the	 backdrop	 for	 thinking	 more	
generally	about	the	ways	in	which	‘care’	is	enacted	in	care	homes	themselves.	
In	 part,	 this	 relates	 back	 to	 a	 distinction	made	 by	 Tronto	 (1993)	 as	 to	 the	
various	 roles	 people	 can	 play	 in	 relationships	 of	 care,	 particularly	 through	
recognising	 the	 entrenched	 ethico-political	 responsibilities	 of	 the	
state/private	providers	in	ensuring	that	older	populations	have	access	to	good	
quality	care	when	it	is	needed	(see	also	Barnes,	2012).	There	have	been	studies	
that	have	confirmed	a	higher	standard	of	care	within	privatised	care	homes	
(e.g.	Comondore	et	al.,	2016).	That	said,	even	these	studies	seem	to	question	
the	premises	of	their	own	findings,	particularly	noting	the	disproportionately	
high	costs	associated	with	private	care	provision	and	thus	the	extra	burden	
ultimately	placed	on	older	people	and	their	families	(e.g.	Kane,	2003).	
Perhaps	more	directly	apparent	in	this	thesis,	however,	this	discussion	sets	up	
some	 key	 structural	 issues	 that	 emerge,	 either	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly,	
throughout	the	empirical	details	in	the	chapters	that	follow	–	notably	around	
staff	 shortages	 and	 lack	 of	money.	 Indeed,	 this	 often-occluded	 relationship	
between	 the	 experiential	 registers	 of	 being	 in	 care	 homes	 and	 the	 socio-
structural	geographies	within	which	the	care	home	sits	is	somewhat	vital	to	
engage	with	 the	 lives	 (and	 laughter)	of	 those	 in	 care.	These	 issues	after	all	
frame	not	only	the	feelings,	emotions,	affective	and	physical	capacities	of	staff	
members	 who	 are	 delivering	 care,	 but	 also	 shape	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	
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residents	 themselves	 in	 much	 the	 same	 way,	 although	 often	 without	 the	
agential-capacities	to	do	much,	if	anything,	about	them.	That	said,	even	within	
this	shared	wider	geography	the	ways	in	which	care	is	enacted	in	individual	
care	 homes	 can	 also	 differ	 dramatically,	with	 the	majority	 of	 the	 empirical	
detail	in	this	thesis	focussing	on	two	such	places.	It	is	thus	to	explaining	these	
two	 places	 that	 I	 now	 turn,	 focussing	 on	 the	 similarities	 and	 differences	
between	them.	
3.3.2	|	Two	care	homes	
The	majority	 of	 the	 research	 in	 this	 thesis	 took	 place	 in	 two	 nursing	 care	
homes,	both	on	 the	outskirts	of	Birmingham	 in	 the	UK.	For	 the	sake	of	 this	
thesis,	 the	 homes	 have	 both	 been	 given	 pseudonyms:	 Winterbourne	 and	
Summerview	Care	Homes.	My	engagement	with	these	two	particular	homes	
was	facilitated	by	the	Enabling	Research	in	Care	Homes	(ENRICH)	network,	a	
group	focussing	on	the	facilitation	of	research	within	care	home	settings,	as	
part	of	the	National	Institute	for	Health	Research	(NIHR).	In	this	sense,	I	was	
not	entirely	in	control	of	choosing	the	care	homes	I	engaged	with	as	each	initial	
interaction	 was	 conducted	 by	 ENRICH’s	 coordinator,	 Mary.	 Indeed,	 Mary	
suggested	both	care	homes	because	she	felt	they	would	fit	with	the	ethos	of	
the	research	project,	describing	them	as	homes	“where	lots	of	work	was	done	
with	humour”,	and	“where	there	is	an	almost	constant	laughter”	respectively.	
On	paper,	both	care	homes	are	similar	to	each	other.	In	terms	of	their	location,	
they	both	had	similar	demographics	in	terms	of	age,	ethnicities,	deprivation	
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levels	 and	 the	 political	 makeup	 of	 the	 local	 authority.	 They	 are	 both	 also	
somewhat	 typical	 of	 the	 sector	 described	 above.	 Both	 homes,	 for	 instance,	
were	privately	owned	by	small	group	providers	(two	and	one	home	groups	
respectively),	yet	had	a	large	number	of	residents	who	were	(at	least	partly)	
funded	by	the	Local	Authority.	Each	also	had	beds	for	around	forty	residents	
and	were	at	near	maximum	occupancy	for	the	whole	time	I	engaged	with	them.	
The	majority	 of	 residents	 had	 some	 form	of	 dementia,	 as	 is	 typical	 of	 care	
homes	more	widely	(NICE,	2015).	Similarly,	the	majority	of	the	staff	in	both	
homes	 were	 women,	 with	 high	 proportions	 of	 these	 women	 being	 non-
British/British	Migrants	from	both	EU	and	non-EU	countries.	At	the	time	of	the	
research,	both	care	homes	had	also	been	assessed	by	the	CQC	and	deemed	as	
‘needing	improvement’,	although	have	subsequently	been	deemed	as	‘overall	
good’.	Despite	 these	 similarities,	however,	 it’s	worth	noting	key	differences	
between	the	two	homes,	both	‘hard’	and	‘soft’,	as	well	as	in	terms	of	the	ways	
that	I	engaged	with	them.	
In	 terms	 of	 hard	 differences	 between	 Winterbourne	 and	 Summerview,	
perhaps	the	most	obvious	is	in	terms	of	their	buildings.	Winterbourne	is	both	
an	old	and	relatively	new	building.	Originally,	a	large	house,	it	was	expanded	
in	the	1990s	as	a	custom-built	care	home.	The	two	sections	of	the	building	are	
connected	by	a	single	door	and	essentially	operate,	for	the	most	part,	as	two	
separate	facilities	(although	sharing	kitchen,	laundry	and	administration).	The	
older	section	forms	a	‘dementia	unit’	with	space	for	nine	residents	and	was	set	
up	more	like	a	‘communal	home’	rather	than	a	care	home,	whereas	the	larger,	
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newer	section	(to	which	I	will	now	be	exclusively	referring	unless	explicitly	
stated	otherwise)	was	more	akin	to	a	‘standard’	care	home.	The	new	section	
has	two	floors:	the	upper	floor	is	largely	‘residential’,	containing	bedrooms	and	
bathrooms,	alongside	storage	rooms	for	linen	and	 laundry;	with	the	ground	
floor	 providing	 largely	 ‘communal’	 and	 ‘work’	 spaces	 such	 as	 the	 kitchen,	
dining	 room,	 two	 lounges	 (one	 big,	 one	 small),	 laundry	 room,	maintenance	
room,	nurse	and	admin	offices,	 and	 five	 further	bedrooms.	The	home	has	a	
relatively	 large	 garden	 space	 although	 this	 garden	 was	 not	 used	 by	 the	
residents	at	all	during	my	time	there.	
Summerview	was	built	in	the	1930s,	and	perhaps	unusually	for	a	building	of	
that	age,	was	originally	designed	as	a	care	home.	Despite	this,	however,	it,	for	
the	most	part,	resembles	a	conventional	house	built	over	three	floors	with	an	
additional	basement	containing	the	 laundry	 facilities	and	staff	room.	Unlike	
Winterbourne,	Summerview	does	not	have	a	single	space	big	enough	to	act	as	
a	lounge	for	all	the	residents,	meaning	that	each	floor	of	the	home	has	its	own	
lounge	and	dining	areas,	serving	the	residents	of	that	floor.	In	this	sense,	each	
floor	 has	 a	 more	 mixed	 function	 than	 Winterbourne,	 providing	 both	
‘residential’	and	‘communal/work’	spaces	alongside	each	other	(although	the	
whole	 home	 is	 again	 served	 by	 single	 kitchen,	 laundry,	 and	 administration	
facilities).	 Summerview	 similarly	 had	 some	 outside	 space	 although	 for	
residents	this	was	limited	to	two	small	patios	–	one	on	the	ground	floor	and	
one	 on	 the	 first	 floor	 –	 with	 an	 additional	 garden	 area	 at	 the	 back	 of	 the	
basement	used	exclusively	by	the	staff.	
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Beyond	 the	 ‘hard’	 differences	 of	 the	 buildings,	 other	 softer	differences	 also	
exist	 between	 the	 two	nursing	 care	 homes.	One	 such	difference	was	 in	 the	
number	 of	 ‘agency	 staff’	 who	were	working	 in	 each	 nursing	 care	 home.	 In	
Winterbourne,	agency	staff	were	a	very	common	feature	–	more	days	than	not,	
there	would	be	at	 least	one	agency	staff	member	working	and	on	one	day	I	
observed	a	shift	where	there	were	four	agency	carers	working	and	only	two	
permanent	 staff	members.	 In	 Summerview	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 agency	 staff	
were	also	present,	but	far	less	often	–	mostly	staff	absences	were	covered	by	
permanent	 staff	 members	 rather	 than	 agency	 staff.	 Another	 noticeable	
difference	 is	 the	 makeup	 of	 the	 residents,	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 abilities.	 In	
Winterbourne,	 there	 was	 a	 relative	 separation	 between	 those	 who	 were	
mobile	and	those	who	weren’t.	The	larger	section,	where	I	spent	most	of	my	
time,	had	only	one	resident	able	to	walk	(although	even	then,	with	assistance).	
In	Summerview	on	the	other	hand,	each	floor	had	a	mixture	of	residents	who	
were	independently	mobile,	and	those	who	needed	assistance	at	all	times.	This	
was	explained	 to	me	as	being	a	purposeful	way	of	 avoiding	 “segregation	 in	
terms	of	ability”.	Following	a	similar	set	of	logics,	another	key	instance	of	these	
softer	 differences	 can	 be	 seen	 through	 rules	 about	 wearing	 uniforms.	 In	
Winterbourne,	everyone	had	and	wore	different	uniforms	depending	on	their	
jobs	–	e.g.	nursing	tunics,	chefs’	coats,	or	overalls.	(I	was	asked	to	wear	black	
trousers	and	a	plain	white	T-shirt	in	place	of	a	uniform.)	Contrasting	this,	in	
Summerview,	there	was	no	uniform.	The	staff	were	all	asked	to	wear	whatever	
they	would	be	comfortable	wearing,	as	was	I.	Some	people	chose	to	wear	more	
Chapter	3:	Situating	knowledges	
98	
‘work-like’	outfits	–	the	chef	and	cleaners,	for	example,	worked	in	a	chef's	coat	
and	 ‘pinafore	 tabards’	 respectively	–	but	most	 carers	wore	 casual	 everyday	
clothes	 (jeans,	 T-shirts	 and	 hoodies	 for	 example).	 When	 I	 asked	 why	 this	
uniform	policy	was	adopted,	I	was	told	that	the	logic	of	this	was	“to	make	it	
feel	more	home-like”.		
These	 various	 differences,	 therefore,	 start	 to	 frame	 the	 kinds	 of	 logics,	
experiences	and	knowledges	of	care	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	it	is	located	
within	different	places	and	cultures.	Perhaps	the	more	significant	element	of	
the	ways	in	which	the	research	was	situated	however	relates	to	the	ways	in	
which	my	own	experiences	of	being	within	these	spaces	occurred.	As	such,	the	
next	part	of	this	section	turns	to	look	at	the	specific	ways	in	which	I	engaged	
with	the	homes.		
3.3.3	|	Becoming	a	body	at	work	
There	have	been	a	number	of	ethnographic	engagements	within	care	homes	
addressing	a	diverse	range	of	topics,	narratives	and	issues	including	quality	of	
health	 provision	 (DeForge	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Diamond,	 1986);	 embodied	 and	
emotional	labours	(Diamond,	1992;	McDowell,	2009);	ideas	of	comfort	(Bland,	
2007);	eating,	diet	and	food	(Harbers	et	al.,	2002;	Mol,	2014);	and	the	general	
cultures	of	care	home	life	(Henderson	and	Vesperi,	1995).	Each	has	provided	
critical	insights	through	focusing	“on	the	actual	daily	social	relations	between	
individuals,	 rather	 than	 analysing	 the	 framework	 of	 texts,	 regulations	 and	
instructions	 within	 which	 care	 assistants	 must	 perform	 their	 work”	
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(McDowell,	 2009:	 179).	 The	 advantages	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 are	 set	 out	
eloquently	by	Hans	Harbers,	Annemarie	Mol	and	Alice	Stollmeyer	(2002:	219),	
who	 note	 that	 ethnography	 allows	 an	 attention	 to	 care	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
“practicalities	 and	 materialities”	 rather	 than	 through	 traditional	 ethical	 or	
professional	approaches,	forcing	attention	onto	specific	issues	–	“like	the	taste	
of	 chocolate”	 –	 that	 are	 continually	 at	 stake	 within	 practices	 of	 care.	
Significantly,	they	note	the	advantages	of	ethnography’s	expanded	timescales	
in	constructing	a	‘situated	ethics’,	allowing	judgements	to	be	made,	not	just	in	
relation	 to	 the	moment	or	 individual	 events,	but	 rather	 contextualised	as	a	
series	of	dynamic,	collective	socio-material	(affective)	practices	in	a	complex	
and	dynamic	world.	Indeed,	this	is	something	that	Annemarie	Mol’s	expanded	
works	similarly	deal	with	across	a	variety	of	settings	beyond	care	homes	(e.g.	
Mol,	1999,	2002,	2008b;	Mol	and	Law,	2004;	Struhkamp	et	al.,	2009).	
Methodologically,	 many	 of	 these	 previous	 ethnographies	 have	 taken	 place	
through	 traditional	 participant-observation	 techniques	 whereby	 the	
ethnographer	would	accompany	members	of	staff	during	their	daily	work	–	
similar	 to	 the	 ‘go-along’	 described	 by	Kusenbach	 (2003).	My	 own	 research	
practice	 looked	 to	 take	 this	 approach	 further	 through	becoming	what	Chris	
McMorran	(2012)	terms	‘a	body	at	work’	and	actually	undertaking	care	work	
myself.	I	thus	worked	voluntarily	in	each	care	home,	undertaking	a	variety	of	
different	 tasks,	 including:	housekeeping	and	washing	up;	helping	with	meal	
times;	assisting	with	the	administering	of	medications	(under	the	watch	of	a	
nurse);	 helping	 to	move,	 clothe,	wash,	 and	 take	 residents	 to	 the	 toilet;	 and	
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helping	with	socialisation	 through	working	as	an	 ‘activities	 co-coordinator’.	
Alongside	these	elements	of	work,	I	also	endeavoured	to	have	conversations	
with	people	and	pay	close	attention	to	the	other	things	going	on	around	me,	
noting	down	both	what	happened	and	my	thoughts,	 feelings,	and	emotional	
responses	to	these	events	in	a	field	diary	and	linking	them	to	different	theories.	
The	rationale	for	conducting	the	methodology	in	this	manner	was	about	trying	
to	enact	a	more	performative,	non-representational	methodology	(Dewsbury,	
2010;	 Vannini,	 2015a),	 in	 which	 I	 could	 take	 up	 the	 role	 of	 observant-
participant	 and	 become	 intimately	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 practices,	 rhythms,	
routines,	 and	 affectivity	 that	 makes	 up	 care	 home	 life,	 rather	 than	 simply	
observing	from	a	somewhat	more	displaced	position.	As	McMorran	writes	
There	 is	 much	 that	 can	 be	 learned	 about	 work	 through	 working	
participant	observation	that	goes	beyond	the	verbal	…	Experiences	like	
learning	 new	 tasks,	 negotiating	 one’s	 position	 within	 complex	
hierarchies	 and	 social	 networks	 of	 employees	 and	 management,	 and	
sharing	the	emotional	and	physical	stresses	and	joys	of	work	all	provide	
place-based	insights	into	workplace	attitudes,	behaviours	and	meanings	
that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 difficult	 or	 impossible	 to	 learn	 (McMorran,	
2012:	491)	
The	advantages	laid	out	by	McMorran	here	thus	frame	many	of	the	kinds	of	
knowledges	that	I	would	also	argue	I	gained	from	researching	in	this	manner,	
particularly	 in	 terms	of	 the	nuances,	 intricacies,	contexts	and	particularities	
that	frame	embodied	experiences	of	working,	caring	and	laughing	within	the	
kinds	of	contemporary	care	systems	described	above.	Although	only	obliquely	
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referenced	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	I	found	myself	starting	to	see	some	of	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 funding	 cuts,	 the	 CQC	 and	 staff	 shortages,	 for	 instance,	
played	 out	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 both	 the	 individual	 homes	 and	 in	 many	 cases	
individual	bodies	within	these	homes.	Similarly,	experiencing	the	differences	
between	 the	 two	 homes	 pointed	 towards	 the	 significance	 of	 different	 care	
home	‘cultures’,	both	at	the	management	and	staff	levels,	in	terms	of	the	ways	
in	which	these	pressures	and	issues	are	negotiated	on	‘the	front	line’.	
Similarly,	it’s	worth	noting	that	the	kinds	of	activities	I	undertook	in	each	home	
also	shaped	the	kinds	of	knowledges	gained.	Although	my	assigned	role	in	each	
home	was	similar	–	in	both	cases	intending	to	act	as	an	activities	coordinator	
and	care	assistant	for	‘non-personal’	care	–	there	were	certain	differences	that	
meant	the	actual	tasks	I	undertook	were	varied	in	each	home.	In	Summerview	
for	instance,	the	manager	was	insistent	that	I	undergo	a	Disclosure	and	Barring	
Service	(DBS)	check,	whereas	in	Winterbourne	they	did	not.	Given	the	nature	
of	the	role	I	was	supposed	to	take,	there	was	no	legal	requirement	for	such	a	
check	 in	 either	 home.	 However,	 Summerview	 undertook	 one	 as	 additional	
legal	 protection	 for	 both	 them	 and	me.	My	 having	 this	 check,	 however,	 did	
mean	that	I	was	legally	able	to	undertake	personal	care	in	Summerview,	which	
I	began	to	do	on	occasion	in	order	to	assist	when	they	were	short	staffed,	giving	
me	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 spacetimes	 of	 ‘personal	 care’	 (bed	 baths,	 getting	
residents	 dressed	 and	 toilet	 spaces	 for	 instance)	 that	 I	 did	 not	 have	 in	
Winterbourne.	 In	 both	 cases	 I	 was	 also	 supposed	 to	 work	 alongside	 the	
existing	 activities	 co-ordinator.	 However	 in	 Winterbourne	 the	 activities	
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coordinator	left	her	role	shortly	after	I	arrived	and	so	I	ended	up	being	the	sole	
activities	coordinator	for	most	of	the	time	I	worked	there.	This	meant	that	my	
days	 at	 Winterbourne	 were	 less	 structured	 and	 I	 spent	 much	 more	 time	
working	on	my	own	than	I	did	at	Summerview	where	I	worked	alongside	the	
activities	 co-coordinator	 on	 almost	 every	 day	 I	worked	 (although	often	we	
would	work	in	separate	areas	of	the	home).	
Another	key	difference	that	shaped	the	kinds	of	activities	I	undertook	in	each	
home	 relates	 to	 the	 time	 of	 year	 in	 which	 my	 engagement	 took	 place.	 My	
engagement	with	Winterbourne	occurred	between	September	and	December	
2015,	whereas	 I	engaged	with	Summerview	between	June	and	August	2016	
(thus	informing	the	choice	of	pseudonyms).	The	seasonal	difference	between	
the	 two	 kinds	 of	 engagement	 thus	 informed	 the	 kinds	 of	 activities	 that	
occurred	 and	 that	 I	witnessed	within	 the	 two	homes.	 In	Winterbourne,	 for	
instance,	there	was	a	lot	of	focus	on	activities	around	Halloween	and	Christmas	
and,	notably,	the	residents	never	went	outside	(at	least	not	in	my	presence)	
largely	because	of	the	cold/rainy	weather.	In	Summerview	on	the	other	hand,	
because	of	the	warmer	weather	there	was	much	more	emphasis	on	“getting	
the	 residents	 out	 of	 the	 house”.	 During	my	 time	 there,	 there	were	 picnics,	
barbeques,	outdoor	games,	as	well	as	two	trips	to	the	local	pub.	This	meant	
engaging	with	different	challenges,	such	as	moving	residents	outside,	but	also	
seemingly	afforded	more	opportunities	to	do	different	activities	from	day	to	
day,	 making	 both	 the	 residents	 and	 my	 experiences	 more	 varied.	 This	
difference	in	participation	in	each	home	thus	informs	the	kinds	of	knowledges	
Chapter	3:	Situating	knowledges	
103	
that	I	gained,	however,	it’s	also	crucial	to	think	about	differences	in	my	own	
position	when	encountering	each	home,	and	how	this	shaped	and	formulated	
the	kinds	of	knowledges	and	judgements	I	had	of	each	and	both	(see	C	Katz,	
1994).	
It	is	important	to	state	that	prior	to	starting	work	at	Winterbourne,	I	had	never	
worked	 in	care,	nor	 indeed	ever	entered	a	care	home.	As	such,	my	research	
often	involved	elements	of	learning	and	adapting,	finding	myself	increasingly	
able	to	negotiate	both	the	major	elements	and	the	subtleties	of	care	work	itself	
as	 the	 research	 period	 progressed.	 I	 learned	 both	 practical	 and	 emotional	
skills,	such	as:	how	to	move	residents	safely	using	a	variety	of	techniques	and	
equipment;	how	to	feed	a	resident	or	give	them	a	drink;	how	to	fill	in	charts	to	
monitor	their	behaviour,	moods	and	eating	habits;	how	to	calm	a	demented	
resident	down	when	 they	are	upset;	 and	even	how	 to	do	a	basic	manicure.	
Perhaps	more	important,	however,	was	my	forced	engagement	with	the	more	
minor,	yet	often	more	important	sides	of	care	work:	understanding	different	
relational	dynamics	between	both	residents	and	staff;	knowing	which	people	
liked	which	foods,	drinks,	perfumes,	games,	television	programmes;	knowing	
how	to	negotiate	and	motivate	people	 in	personal	ways.	Through	these	two	
kinds	of	knowledges,	therefore,	I	gained	increasing	levels	of	both	experience	
and	confidence	during	my	time	researching	–	as	indeed	is	arguably	the	point	
of	 doing	 ethnographic	 research	 in	 this	 manner.	 This	 increasing	
experience/confidence,	however,	also	generated	significant	differences	in	the	
kinds	 of	 knowledges	 I	 produced	 at	 different	 moments	 throughout	 the	
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research.	Indeed,	the	kinds	of	practical	and	ethical	judgements	that	I	made	and	
recorded	 about	 the	 care	 homes,	 and	 the	 practices	 of	 carers	 within	 them,	
shifted	from	what	was	largely	a	speculative	style	of	judgement	earlier	on	–	for	
example	“that	doesn’t	feel	right	but	I	guess	could	be	normal”	–	to	judgements	
that	were	made	with	much	more	certainty.		
Another	 key	 element	of	my	 positionality	 beyond	 a	 growing	 knowledge	 and	
experience	 base	 relates	 to	 my	 emotions	 (see	 Askins,	 2009).	 Perhaps	
unsurprisingly	the	ethnography	affected	me	significantly,	particularly	within	
Winterbourne	where	I	experienced	something	of	an	‘emotional	shock’.	Much	
of	this	was,	I	think,	to	do	with	a	lack	of	emotional	preparation.	As	ridiculous	as	
it	 is	 to	 say	 given	 the	 context	 of	 this	 research	 project,	 I	 had	 never	 really	
considered	what	 it	 would	mean	 for	 me	 to	 actually	 start	 to	 care	 about	 the	
residents	in	the	care	home	at	an	emotional	level,	nor	that	the	residents	I	would	
care	about	might	also	die	whilst	I	was	there.	Indeed,	during	my	time	working	
at	 Winterbourne	 nine	 of	 the	 residents	 died,	 many	 of	 whom	 I	 had	 spent	
significant	amounts	of	time	caring	for,	mostly	through	helping	them	to	eat	or	
drink.	This	lack	of	emotional	preparation,	therefore,	affected	me	in	a	number	
of	ways.	I	cried	many	times	on	my	way	home	from	work	for	instance	and	often	
got	angry	at	myself	and	others	within	my	field	diary	notes.	I	also	started	to	get	
increasingly	depressed	during	my	time	at	Winterbourne,	and,	by	the	time	I	left,	
I	 weighed	 around	 eight	 kilogrammes	 less	 than	 when	 I	 started.	 Given	 this	
experience	in	Winterbourne,	by	the	time	I	started	at	Summerview	I	was	more	
prepared	emotionally	for	the	experience	of	working	in	care.	Although	I	didn’t	
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know	 that	 to	 be	 true	 at	 the	 time,	 I	 remember	walking	 home	with	my	 then	
flatmate	at	one	point	and	telling	her	about	a	resident	who	had	died	that	week.	
She	turned	to	me	and	said,	“you	care	a	lot	less	than	last	time,	that’s	probably	a	
good	 thing”.	 As	 such,	 it	 seems	 that	 unconsciously	 I	 was	 less	 emotionally	
invested	 in	both	 the	 residents	and	Summerview	as	a	 care	home	 than	 I	was	
during	my	time	at	Winterbourne.		
This	 is	 important	 in	 two	respects.	First,	 it	again	demonstrates	 the	power	of	
ethnography	for	non-representational	and	emotional	styles	of	research	within	
care	 homes	 whereby	 a	 researcher	 can	 start	 to	 experience	 the	 kinds	 of	
emotional	guarding	and	‘distancing’	that	workers	involved	in	emotional	labour	
often	talk	about	(Dyer	et	al.,	2008;	Hochschild,	1983;	McDowell,	2009;	Sanders,	
2004).	 Second,	 it	 is	 important	 in	 this	 particular	 case	 because	 it	 once	 again	
actively	shapes	the	kinds	of	knowledges	and	writings	that	I	produced,	and	still	
sometimes	produce	about	each	care	home.	Indeed,	looking	back	over	my	field	
diaries	and	various	writings	now,	there	is	a	clear	difference	in	affective	tone	
between	each	home.	
In	 telling	 the	 story	 in	 this	way	 I	 risk	 setting	 up	 a	 narrative	 that	 is	 perhaps	
typical	of	classic	ethnography	in	which	I	can	be	seen	to	move	from	‘outsider’,	
with	little	knowledge	of	the	world	I	am	engaged	with,	to	being	an	‘insider’	who	
is	adept	at	the	jobs	in	care	homes	and	has	a	broad	and	detailed	knowledge	of	
their	cultures	(see	Malinowski,	1922;	Van	Maanen,	1988).	Whilst	this	in	some	
ways	reflects	what	happened	to	me	personally,	I	wish	to	distance	myself	from	
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any	claims	towards	being	an	‘insider’	within	either	care	home.	To	do	so	would,	
I	feel,	be	to	both	obscure	the	other	elements	of	my	positionality	that	preclude	
any	 such	 kind	 of	 interaction.	 Indeed,	 there	 were	 certain	 key	 differences	
between	myself	and	other	care	workers	that	mean	my	engagement	with	the	
care	home	could	never	be	 considered	equivalent	 theirs	 (Crang,	2003;	Rose,	
1997).	
Perhaps	most	 obviously	was	 the	 fact	 that	 I	was	 a	 voluntary	worker	with	 a	
stable	 income	that	came	from	elsewhere	(my	PhD	stipend)	and	 indeed	was	
more	than	a	full-time	care	worker	earns.	This	meant	that	my	being	in	the	care	
home	 was	 not	 connected	 to	 the	 same	 physical,	 material	 or	 financial	
consequences	as	many	of	the	workers,	and	therefore	potentially	came	with	a	
different	 set	 of	 emotional	 attachments.	 Similarly,	 I	 had	 an	 end	 date	 for	my	
placement,	whereas,	for	many	care	workers,	their	time	in	the	care	home	was	
indefinite.	 Another	 small	 but	 significant	 factor	 relates	 to	 my	 being	 a	 man.	
Although	 there	 were	 other	 men	 who	 worked	 in	 the	 homes,	 they	 were	
overwhelmingly	occupied	by	women.	This	element	manifested	mostly	in	the	
form	of	jokes	about	female	residents	fancying	me,	but	also	meant	that	at	times	
my	presence	was	obviously	shifting	the	kinds	of	topics	about	which	they	might	
have	 otherwise	 spoken	 to	 each	 other.	 I	 noticed	 on	 several	 occasions	 for	
instance	 that	 conversations	 shifted	 from	 relatively	 intimate	 discussions	 of	
male	partners	to	more	banal	topics	when	I	entered	a	room.	
Alongside	these	more	banal	elements,	my	status	as	‘outsider’	also	generated	a	
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number	of	further	ethical	issues.	At	times,	for	instance,	I	was	turned	to	as	a	
supposedly	 independent	arbitrator	of	disputes.	This	generated	a	number	of	
moments	where	I	had	to	make	an	ethical	choice	as	to	whether	or	not	to	pass	
judgement.	 I	 shied	 away	 from	 this	 the	 first	 time	 it	 happened,	 however,	
excusing	myself	with	a	veiled	“I	dunno	really,”	and	following	that	decided	to	
make	it	a	rule	not	to	pass	judgement	at	any	future	time	either.	At	other	times,	
I	became	a	‘sounding	board’	for	other	workers’	complaints,	both	about	each	
other	and	the	management.	With	these	instances,	I	again	reserved	any	specific	
judgements	 but	 did	 continue	 to	 let	 people	moan	 to	me,	 ultimately	 treating	
these	kinds	of	interaction	as	a	way	of	contextualising	and	understanding	the	
ways	in	which	care	work	can	affect	different	bodies.			
The	final	area	in	which	my	status	as	‘outsider’	played	a	significant	role	is	within	
the	way	in	it	affected	the	methodology	itself.	I	had	initially	intended	to	conduct	
interviews	with	 other	 staff	members	 alongside	 the	 observant-participation	
However,	when	I	broached	the	issue	with	people	in	Winterbourne,	it	received	
something	 of	 a	 frosty	 reception	 and	 only	 one	 person	 was	 willing	 to	 be	
interviewed.	I	have	to	admit,	I	was	a	little	confused	at	the	time.	I	felt	I	had	built	
a	good	rapport	with	people	and	couldn’t	understand	why	they	were	unwilling	
to	 talk	 to	me	 individually.	When	 I	 did	 conduct	 the	 one	 interview	with	 the	
person	 who	 had	 agreed,	 I	 was	 informed	 of	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 reluctance.	
Apparently,	 the	 staff	had	 become	 suspicious	 about	why	 I	wanted	 to	 talk	 to	
them	individually	and	had	started	to	worry	that	I	wasn’t	actually	a	researcher	
at	all,	but	rather	a	journalist	or	a	member	of	the	CQC,	making	them	unwilling	
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to	share	their	thoughts	personally	with	me.	By	the	time	I	knew	this,	however,	
it	seemed	too	late	to	change	my	approach	in	order	to	ease	this	worry.	I	had	
finished	my	placement	and	could	 feel	 the	 ties	 built	up	 starting	 to	erode	on	
subsequent	visits	to	the	home.		
Augmenting	 this	 reasoning	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 I	 did	 conduct	 the	 one	
interview,	it	became	apparent	that	the	terms	of	my	research	were	too	abstract	
for	a	meaningful	engagement	(it	is	partly	for	this	reason	that	I	noted	earlier	in	
the	 chapter	 that	 I	was	 definitely	 not	 engaging	with	 people	 in	 their	 terms).	
Indeed,	 my	 attempts	 at	 having	 a	 reflective	 discussion	 about	 laughter,	
inevitably	fell	back	into	a	discussion	of	the	humour	of	the	care	home	with	the	
participant	 seemingly	 unable	 to	 articulate	 moments	 of	 laughter	 to	 any	
meaningful	effect	and	 instead	resorting	to	common	tropes	and	 idioms	–	 for	
example	“if	you	don’t	laugh,	you	will	cry”.	What’s	more,	much	of	the	discussion	
echoed	many	of	the	more	informal	conversations	with	various	people	in	the	
care	home,	and	which	had	already	been	recorded	in	my	field	diary	–	somewhat	
rendering	the	interview	(at	least	in	that	form)	an	unnecessary	burden	on	both	
myself	and	the	participant.	As	such,	rather	than	risk	a	similar	scenario,	and	ask	
people	to	take	part	in	additional	engagements	that	might	well	not	add	anything	
further	 to	 the	 research,	 I	 decided	 to	 abandon	 the	 interviews	 during	 future	
elements	of	the	research	both	at	Summerview,	and	within	the	other	element	
of	my	research,	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
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3.3.4	|	Other	experimental	engagements	
Whilst	most	of	the	empirical	material	and	discussion	in	this	thesis	thus	centres	
on	this	idea	of	becoming	a	body	at	work	in	these	two	care	homes,	this	was	not	
the	 only	 form	 of	 research	 that	 I	 conducted,	 nor	 the	 only	 ones	 that	 have	
informed	 my	 thinking	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 laughter	 and	 care.	
Alongside	this,	I	also	engaged	with	another,	very	different	kind	of	care	home	
work	 through	 spending	 time	 with	 two	 theatre	 groups	 who	 perform	
(humorous)	 shows	 within	 care	 homes	 and	 other	 institutions	 of	 care.	 My	
engagement	 with	 these	 two	 groups	 formed	 something	 of	 an	 experiment	
intended	to	try	and	better	understand	the	issues	and	effects	of	a	more	‘active’	
introduction	of	laughter	to	nursing	care	homes,	as	well	as	a	chance	to	engage	
with	 more	 ‘extraordinary’	 rather	 than	 ‘everyday’	 relationships	 between	
laughter	and	care.	
As	with	the	care	home,	the	choice	of	who	and	how	I	engaged	with	the	theatre	
groups	was	partly	considered	and	partly	circumstantial.	I	encountered	the	first	
theatre	 group	 during	 my	 time	 at	 Winterbourne	 where	 they	 performed	 a	
Christmas	show.	Essentially,	their	presence	alerted	me	to	an	element	of	care	
home	life	of	which	 I	had	not	been	aware	before	and	 in	which	 laughter	was	
extremely	apparent.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 saw	an	opportunity	 to	engage	with	 the	
group,	contacted	them	and	they	agreed.	The	group	were	doing	a	national	tour	
of	a	pantomime	version	of	Beauty	and	the	Beast	over	the	Christmas	and	New	
Year	period	and	I	joined	them	for	the	ten	days	that	they	were	in	the	Midlands	
during	January	2016.	Given	this	short	(but	interesting)	engagement,	I	decided	
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a	second	period	was	necessary	in	order	to	both	produce	a	more	‘prolonged’	
(and	rigorous)	form	of	engagement,	as	well	as	generating	another	opportunity	
for	comparison	(see	Rahm,	2012).	As	such,	I	contacted	a	local	theatre	group	
who	also	performed	in	care	settings,	spending	five	days	with	them	during	April	
2016.	
Whilst	 there	 were	 similarities	 between	 the	 shows	 it	 is	 perhaps	 their	
differences	 that	 are	 most	 apparent.	 The	 Pantomime	 Group	 was	 part	 of	 a	
private	 ‘for-profit’	 company	 who	 provided	 theatre	 performances	 and	
workshops	to	both	institutions	of	care	and	schools.	The	company	itself	is	one	
of	many	companies	and	individuals	who	provide	‘entertainments’	for	nursing	
care	homes,	usually	 involving	music,	dancing,	magic,	comedy	or	mixtures	of	
these	elements.	Indeed,	it’s	worth	noting	the	size	of	the	market	for	these	kinds	
of	shows,	an	insight	into	which	can	be	gained	simply	by	inputting	“care	home	
entertainers”	 into	an	online	search	engine.	The	Theatre	Group,	on	the	other	
hand,	is	part	of	a	charity	based	in	Birmingham.	The	shows	were	funded	by	a	
specific	funding-grant	given	to	the	charity	in	order	for	them	to	produce	and	
perform	a	show	based	on	the	theme	of	‘spring’	which	folded	in	narratives	from	
research	conducted	with	older	people	in	the	Birmingham	area.	While	the	show	
was	not	necessarily	always	intended	to	be	funny,	it	had	a	distinctly	‘jovial’	style	
and	many	elements	of	it	proved	to	be	very	funny	indeed.	The	theatre	group’s	
show	 was	 also	 highly	 participatory,	 with	 members	 of	 the	 audience	 being	
picked	 to	 offer	 ‘words	 of	 advice’	 to	 the	 characters	 at	 different	 moments,	
providing	a	number	of	extra	(unplanned)	moments	of	humour	and	laughter.	
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My	time	with	both	theatre	groups	was	again	 intended	to	replicate	the	same	
idea	of	becoming	a	body	at	work	(McMorran,	2012).	There	are	some	obvious	
difficulties	 with	 positioning	 this	 as	 a	 working	 ethnography,	 however,	
particularly	 given	 that	 I	 did	 not	 perform	 in	 any	 of	 the	 shows.	 Instead,	 I	
travelled	with	both	casts,	helping	carry	and	set	up	the	sets,	stages	and	props	
and	 then	watched	 the	actual	 shows	 from	 the	audience.	As	such,	 it	might	be	
more	 appropriate	 to	 revert	 back	 to	 participant	 observation	 in	 order	 to	
describe	these	research	engagements.	The	groups	also	at	times	used	me	as	an	
unofficial	joke	writer	for	the	shows	–	drawing	on	my	background	interest	in	
comedy	writing	and	performance	(see	Emmerson,	2015,	2016)	–	with	them	
trialling	the	jokes	in	the	show	as	we	went	along.	With	the	pantomime	group	
there	were	three	shows	a	day	and	with	the	community	theatre	group	there	
were	two.	As	such,	the	majority	of	my	time	with	each	group	was	spent	in	their	
respective	vans	and	cars,	either	travelling	between	shows	or	sitting	waiting	
for	the	care	homes	and	institutions	we	were	performing	in	to	be	ready	for	us.	
In	this	sense,	I	experienced	a	completely	different	style	of	work	to	that	which	
I	was	expecting.	There	were	significant	elements	of	care	on	display	and	a	huge	
amount	of	laughter.	However	much	of	this	took	place	in	separation	from	the	
care	homes	and	residents,	instead	occurring	between	the	cast	themselves.	
In	some	ways	then,	my	experimental	engagement	with	these	theatre	groups	
did	 the	 job	 that	 it	 set	 out	 to	 do:	 demonstrating	 the	 opportunities	 and	
difficulties	 associated	 with	 the	 encounter	 between	 the	 laughter	 and	 the	
nursing	care	home,	as	well	as	highlighting	the	various	rewards	and	difficulties	
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that	frame	this	kind	of	performance	work,	as	‘care	work’,	albeit	in	a	somewhat	
different	style	to	that	of	a	conventional	care	worker.	There	were	also	a	number	
of	 supplementary	 outcomes	 emerging	 from	 this	 element	 of	 the	 research	 –	
notably	the	chance	to	survey	a	number	of	care	homes	in	a	superficial,	yet	un-
intrusive	 way.	 That	 said,	 framing	 it	 as	 an	 experiment	 is	 also	 useful	 in	
recognising	that	in	other	ways	the	two	theatre	group	elements	have	formed	
something	of	a	failure	(or	at	least	not	complete	success)	in	terms	of	the	wider	
project,	ultimately	remaining	too	fleeting	to	provide	a	truly	informed	account	
of	either	the	lives	of	the	performers,	or	the	effects	of	the	shows	in	which	they	
performed.	Similarly,	their	inclusion	in	the	wider	framework	has	often	had	the	
effect	of	unnecessarily	broadening	and	obfuscating	conceptions	of	care,	away	
from	the	core	arguments	of	this	thesis.	As	such,	they	are	mainly	discussed	in	
Chapter	6.	
The	mixed	self-response	to	this	set	of	research	engagements	has	thus	left	me	
in	something	of	a	lurch.	I	have	considered	omitting	mention	of	this	element	of	
the	research	from	this	thesis	altogether	by	way	of	focussing	or	smoothing	out	
the	 narrative.	 My	 worry,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	 would	 negate	 a	 potentially	
important	element	of	my	own	learned	relationship	with	care	homes,	both	at	
general	and	specific	registers	(Harrowell	et	al.,	2017).	Indeed,	this	notion	of	
failed	(or	not	fully	successful)	experiments	is	one	that	sits	at	the	heart	of	non-
representational	methodologies	(Vannini,	2015b)	and	particularly	these	kinds	
of	ethnographic	methodologies	 that	 I	adopted	within	my	engagements	with	
care	homes	 in	that	 they	“may	 in	 fact	offer	more	creative,	more	cooperative,	
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more	surprising	ways	of	being	in	the	world”	(Halberstram,	2001:	2,	cited	in	
Harrowell	et	al.,	2017).	
3.4	|	Writing	worlds	
This	story	about	researching	in	care	homes	thus	sets	up	the	particular	ethico-
political,	spatiotemporal	and	relationally	embodied	situations	through	which	
the	research	for	this	thesis	took	place.	In	total,	I	amassed	around	six	hundred	
hours	 of	 time	 spent	 working	 within	 the	 care	 homes,	 around	 another	 one	
hundred	 spent	with	 the	 theatre	 groups,	 and	 nearly	 100,000	words	 of	 field	
diary	notes,	reflections	and	other	pieces	of	writing.	Yet,	perhaps	obviously,	this	
is	 only	 one	 element	of	 the	 story.	The	 question	 remains	 as	 to	 how	 all	 these	
notes,	 reflections,	writings	 and	 other	 unwritten	memories	 and	 experiences	
relate	 to	 the	knowledges	presented	 in	this	 thesis?	Crucially	 this	 is	neither	a	
politically	or	ethically	neutral	question.	It	is	underscored	by	the	recognition	
that	these	writing	processes	matter	intensely	in	terms	of	their	presentational	
techniques	 (Van	Maanen,	 1988),	 and	 their	 conveyance	 of	 an	 always	 partial	
meaning	(Clifford,	1986),	both	of	which	are	indicative	of	differentiated	power-
relations	 and	 agencies,	 and	within	which	my	 position	 is	 once	 again	 of	 key	
importance	 (Askins	and	Blazek,	2017;	Braidotti,	 2014;	Clifford	and	Marcus,	
1986).	As	Annette	Markham	(2005:	822)	summarises,	“every	attempt	to	create	
precision	and	coherence	in	representation	will	be	equivocal	and	incomplete,	
insufficient”.	
This	 process	 of	 translating	 and	 re/presenting	 experiences	 and	 knowledges	
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from	‘field’	to	‘page’	is	framed	by	various	forms	of	(creative)	writing	–	where	
writing	is	taken	in	its	broadest	sense	(Cresswell,	2014;	Delyser	and	Hawkins,	
2014;	Dewsbury,	2014;	Kitchin,	2014).	Some	of	this	writing	is	clear:	the	thesis	
itself	being	the	most	obvious;	but	also,	the	various	drafts	out	of	which	it	has	
emerged,	 and	 before	 them,	 the	 writing	 in	 my	 field	 diary	 out	 of	 which	 the	
knowledges	presented	here	are	extracted.	It’s	also	worth	noting	however	that	
writing	 has	 not	 simply	 formed	 a	 mode	 of	 presentation	 but	 also	 one	 of	
thinking/analysis.	Indeed,	there	are	much	subtler	modes	of	writing	that	have	
taken	place	throughout	the	research	process	that	are	less	formed	and	obvious,	
yet	 crucial	 in	 working	 through	 and	 performatively	 (re)constructing	 the	
ethnographic	material	in	conjunction	with	the	various	theoretical	elements	of	
the	thesis.		
For	me,	 this	 form	of	 analytic	writing	 started	within	the	 field	diary	 itself.	As	
noted	above,	much	of	my	field	diary	contains	moments,	not	just	of	description	
but	 also	 of	 theoretical	 speculation,	 with	 these	 initial	 speculative	 moments	
forming	the	basis	for	much	of	my	analysis.	Indeed,	many	of	the	ideas	that	are	
displayed	within	the	following	chapters	can	be	traced	back	to	the	field	notes	
directly,	or	to	notes	made	in	the	margins	of	various	copies	of	them	and	as	such,	
I	have	used	the	field	diary	notes	verbatim	throughout	a	number	of	chapters	
that	follow.		
These	 initial	 moments	 of	 theorisation	 are	 augmented	 by	 more	 traditional	
modes	of	‘coding’	which	worked	to	the	same	effect.	Here	I	used	a	digital	coding	
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software	(NVivo	10),	 to	organise	the	 field	diary	 into	different	 themes,	 ideas	
and	theoretical	applications.	In	doing	this,	I	largely	adopted	an	approach	based	
on	 ‘grounded	 theory’	 whereby	 the	 data	was	 coded	 using	 a	 combination	 of	
open-coding	(including	writing	notes	onto	these	codes	in	a	similar	manner	to	
that	described	above),	then	axial-coding	(the	grouping	of	codes)	before	finally	
organising	 the	 codes	 into	 wider	 thematic	 groups	 (roughly	 following	 the	
methods	 laid	 out	 in	 Strauss,	 2003),	 so	 that	 it	 was	 structured	 into	 a	 well-
considered	and	delineated	set	of	themes	based	on	my	own	rational	thought.		
In	 some	ways,	 it	was	 a	 ‘good’	outcome:	 the	 data	made	 sense	 and	was	well	
divided,	 themes	 had	 emerged	 and	 there	 was	 a	 level	 of	 coherence	 to	 my	
thoughts.	Yet	there	remained	an	issue	at	this	point	–	similar	to	that	noted	by	
Turner	(2016)	with	regards	to	her	use	of	Nvivo	–	that	everything	felt	a	little	
sterile,	 it	 seemed	 to	 ‘cohere’	 too	 much,	 the	 entangled	 affectivity	 of	 my	
experiences	of	the	care	home	had	been	carved	up	and	thus	eroded.	In	other	
words,	some	of	the	liveliness	of	the	fieldwork	had	died	(Thrift	and	Dewsbury,	
2000).	 Turner’s	 remedy	 to	 this	 problem	 involves	 the	 creation	 of	 data	
ensembles:	 “a	 performative	 assembling	 of	 the	 spoken	 word,	 that	 conveys	
something	 of	 these	 diverse	 voices	 and	 the	 emotional	 charges,	 sustained	
preoccupations,	 and	 anxieties”	 (Turner,	 2016:	 542).	 My	 ‘data’,	 differ	 from	
Turner’s	(hers	being	largely	spoken	data	 in	the	 form	of	 interview	and	focus	
group	transcripts)	yet	this	desire	to	invoke	an	affectivity	in	my	data	remained	
the	same.			
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As	 such	 alongside	 my	 analysis	 through	 Nvivo,	 I	 started	 to	 produce	 longer	
pieces	of	writing,	whereby	 the	aim	was	 to	 tell	 the	 stories	 in	a	manner	 that	
evokes	rather	than	represents	different	events	of	laughter	and	care	(Vannini,	
2015a).	These	writing	pieces	took	on	a	variety	of	forms	and	were	inspired	by	
different	writers	(although	notably	Kathleen	Stewart).	In	these	pieces,	I	tried	
to	 compose	 the	 concepts/objects/subjects	 of	 laughter	 and	 care,	 not	 as	
‘academic’	or	 ‘critical’	 entities	 capable	of	being	 rationalised,	but	 rather	as	a	
series	of	affects	(Stewart,	2013).	 In	doing	this	I	 took	the	scenarios	 from	my	
field	diary	which	 felt	most	affective	 (either	because	of	 the	affective	 imprint	
they	had	left	on	me,	or	because	of	the	content	within	them)	and	experimented	
with	how	to	write	them	in	order	to	invoke	a	set	of	feelings	on	the	page	and	in	
the	 reader	 (Vannini,	 2015a).	 At	 times,	 this	 involved	 ‘amplifying’	 the	 affects	
(Probyn,	2005)	by	 furnishing	 the	 scenario	with	minor	details	 from	another	
scenario,	thus	challenging	the	‘truth’	claims	within	the	writing	(Clifford,	1986)	
or	 generating	 a	 style	 of	writing	 that	 ‘flirts’	with	 reality	 rather	 than	 tries	 to	
represent	it	objectively	(Thrift,	2000;	Vannini,	2015a).		
The	aim	of	 these	sets	of	writing	was	to	begin	to	unearth	the	ways	 in	which	
affective	life	and	power	(Anderson,	2017)	operate	–	to	uncover	the	moments	
in	 which	 affect	 makes	 difference,	 and	 better	 understand	 how	 it	 makes	 a	
difference	(Wilson,	2017).	Whilst	some	proved	more	successful	than	others,	it	
is	this	combination	of	experimental	pieces	of	writing	that	proved	a	key	way	of	
relating	my	own	singular,	situated	understandings	of	different	events,	to	the	
theoretical	 ideas	in	 this	 thesis,	 the	wider	experience	of	working	within	care	
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homes	over	a	longer	period	(Harbers	et	al.,	2002),	and	to	the	multiple	ways	in	
which	they	might	be	apprehended	when	approached	from	different	positions	
(Ahmed,	2006).	
Together	then,	these	various	forms	of	writing	form	a	bricolage	out	of	which	
the	knowledges	in	this	thesis	have	emerged	(Madge,	2018).	In	writing	up,	or	
presenting,	 these	 knowledges,	 the	 ethnographic	 materials	 thus	 switch	
function	away	from	something	analytical,	towards	something	more	exemplary	
(Dewsbury,	2003)	–	a	way	of	mobilising	 theories	 through	 ‘grounding’	 them	
within	 ‘real	world’	 scenarios	 (see	 for	 example	 Edensor,	 2012a;	 Lim,	2010).	
These	 exemplary	 moments	 thus	 appear	 in	 parts	 of	 this	 thesis	 as	 short	
‘vignettes’	 written	 in	 what	 John	 Van	 Maanen	 (1988:	 102)	 describes	 as	 an	
impressionist	writing	 style:	 “put	 together	 and	 told	 in	 the	 first	 person	 as	 a	
tightly	 focused,	 vibrant,	 exact,	 but	 necessarily	 imaginative	 rendering	 of	
fieldwork”.	Impressionist	modes	of	writing	thus	look	to	actively	involve	their	
audiences	within	them	by	invoking	affective	capacities.	Crucially,	it	is	perhaps	
this	mode	of	writing	that	has	also	been	most	utilised	by	non-representational	
ethnographers	 (J	 Lorimer,	 2008;	 Saldanha,	 2006;	 Stewart,	 2007;	 Swanton,	
2010).	As	Vannini	(2015a:	318)	argues:	
Non-representational	 ethnographers	 consider	 their	 work	 to	 be	
impressionistic	and	inevitably	creative,	and	although	they	are	inspired	
by	their	lived	experiences	in	the	field,	they	do	not	claim	to	be	able	or	even	
interested,	 in	 reporting	on	 those	 in	an	 impersonal,	neutral,	or	reliable	
manner.	
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In	writing	up	the	‘data’	therefore	I	have	also	made	two	key	stylistic	choices	–	
one	pragmatic/ethical	and	the	other	two	for	theoretical	reasons.	First,	I	have	
chosen	 to	 follow	 conventions	 used	 when	 writing	 up	 case	 studies	 around	
elderly	care	whereby	workers	are	referred	to	by	a	single	forename	whereas	
residents	are	referred	to	as	Mr/Mrs	followed	by	a	letter.	In	both	cases,	these	
are	 pseudonyms	 of	 the	 real	 people.	 This	 is	 also	 true	 of	 the	 theatre	 groups	
whereby	I	have	either	referred	to	them	in	generic	terms	(e.g.	“one	actor”)	or	
described	them	in	terms	of	their	role	within	their	respective	plays.	Second,	I	
have	 tried	 to	 write	 all	 the	 data	 in	 as	 open	 a	 way	 as	 possible	 whereby	 I	
illuminate	 one	 aspect	 without	 foreclosing	 the	 other	 (possible)	 relations	
contained	 within	 it.	 My	 intention	 here	 is	 in	 maintaining	 a	 fidelity	 to	 the	
multiple	entanglements,	 trajectories	and	embodiments	 (McCormack,	2003),	
out	of	which	different	moments	of	 (affective)	 life	 emerge	and	 thus	 to	avoid	
generating	‘nicely	packaged’	data	in	the	way	that	Thrift	(2003)	warns	against.	
Indeed,	the	point	is	to	maintain	the	subjunctive	potential,	in	which	the	reader	
is	forced	to	confront	the	uncertainty	contained	within	each	moment	described	
(Lim,	2010).	
This	 latter	 choice	 is	 therefore	used	 to	productively	engage	with,	 if	not	 fully	
know	(Rose,	1997),	my	positionality	through	recognising	the	ways	in	which	
my	knowledge	and	experience	of	the	research	is	located	in	a	series	of	multiple-
selves	(Madge,	1993),	each	with	their	own	capacities	to	affect	and	be	affected	
by	it.	Simply	put,	my	engagement	with	the	research	from	the	office	in	which	I	
write	this	now	in	mid-2018,	is	situated	very	differently	from	the	moment	in	
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which	I	was	sitting	a	little	lonely,	and	a	little	depressed,	in	the	car	on	the	way	
home	 from	 Winterbourne	 in	 late	 2015.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 knowledges	
produced	 also	 differ,	 becoming	 more	 distanced,	 more	 layered	 and	 more	
academic.	Working	between	these	various	positions	thus	allows	my	various	
subjectivities,	 in	 these	 various	 spacetimes,	 to	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 one	
another,	press	against	 and	augment	one	another	and,	of	 course,	 sometimes	
disagree	 with	 one	 another.	 Ultimately	 therefore	 this	 situates	 the	 research	
within	a	more	pluralised	mode	of	thinking,	writing	and	theorising	–	one	that	
aligns	 with	 ideas	 of	 decentred	 or	 nomadic	 subjectivities	 (Braidotti,	 2011,	
2014;	Colls,	2012;	Mol,	2008a;	Simpson,	2017)	and	thus	lends	itself	to	a	way	
of	approaching	laughter	with	care	in	worlds	of	multiplicity.	
3.5	|	Conclusions	
Within	this	chapter	I	have	looked	to	engage	with	the	ways	in	which	my	own	
knowledges	 of	 laughter	 and	 care	 have	 formed	 and	 solidified.	 Throughout	 I	
have	remained	critically	aware	of	the	situated	nature	of	knowledge	(Haraway,	
1988)	and	expressed	what	 this	means	 in	practice.	 I	have	done	 this	 through	
examining	the	ways	in	which	the	research	methods,	sites	and	my	own	body	
have	intermingled,	entangled	and	affected	one	another.	What	was	apparent	in	
the	previous	chapter	was	the	need	for	multiplicity	within	engagements	with	
laughter	 and	 care,	 particularly	 in	 recognising	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 forms,	
functions	and	meanings	of	each	vary	depending	on	the	situation	from	which	
they	 are	 encountered.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 therefore,	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	make	
clear	the	various	situations	through	which	I	have	encountered	them	in	order	
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to	frame	the	discussions	that	follow.	
Of	 particular	 importance	 are	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 various	 embodied	
experiences	and	knowledges	have	been	written	and	translated	onto	the	page,	
and	as	such	the	efforts	I	have	made	not	to	silence	or	occlude	the	often	difficult,	
contradictory	and	uncertain	forms	out	of	which	the	discussion	in	this	thesis	
has	emerged	(see	Gregson	and	Rose,	2000).	Crucially,	I	am	making	no	attempt	
to	end	this	discussion	here.	Indeed,	I	have	chosen	the	writing	style	that	I	have	
in	order	to	extend	these	discussions	into	and	through	the	chapters	that	follow,	
rather	than	present	them	as	finished,	finalised	or	straightforward	narratives.	
Doing	so,	is	once	again	about	‘staying	with	the	trouble’	(Haraway,	2016)	rather	
than	smoothing	out	the	world’s	complexity.	Indeed,	the	first	empirical	chapter	
seemingly	starts	where	this	one	has	left	off,	with	a	subjunctive	and	ambiguous	
encounter	 with	 laughter	 and	 care	 within	 Summerview	 Care	 Home.	 This	
encounter	thus	essentially	looks	to	take	the	ideas	from	these	first	two	chapters	
and	demonstrate	their	power	for	thinking	about	laughter	within	care	homes,	
and	thus	the	importance	of	cultivating	a	way	of	thinking	about	laughter	with	
care.	
	 	
Chapter	3:	Situating	knowledges	
121	
	
	
Chapter	4:	Listening	to	laughter	with	care	
122	
Chapter	4:	Listening	to	laughter	with	care	
Listening	with	 care	 is	 an	active	process	of	 intervening	 in	 the	 count	of	
whom	and	what	is	ratified	as	concerned	–	it	affects	the	representation	of	
things,	adding	mediation	to	the	mediations	
(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017:	58)	
4.1	|	Introduction	
The	 two	 previous	 chapters	 have	 addressed	 the	 key	 ontological,	
epistemological	 and	methodological	 terrain	upon	which	 this	 thesis	 looks	 to	
make	its	mark.	In	Chapter	2,	I	set	out	the	main	premises	of	the	geographical	
debates	 around	 ethics,	 laughter	 and	 care	within	which	 this	 thesis	 looks	 to	
intervene.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 then	 described	 the	 situated	 nature	 of	 this	
intervention,	with	its	specific	focus	on	ethnography	within	nursing	care	homes,	
and	discussed	the	various	possibilities	and	problematics	 that	have	emerged	
with	regards	to	generating	practical,	ethical	knowledges	from	this.	These	two	
discussions	have	thus	done	much	of	the	necessary	work	in	setting	out	some	of	
the	key	questions	that	emerge	around	trying	to	generate	an	ethical	approach	
that	 is	 more	 attentive	 to	 the	 fidelity	 of	 events	 of	 laughter	 with	 care	
(McCormack,	2003),	both	as	separate	and	related	occurrences	or	happenings.	
The	role	of	this	chapter,	therefore,	is	to	transfer,	or	translate,	these	ideas	onto	
the	 real	 and	 complex	 spaces	 of	 care	 homes	 around	 which	 this	 thesis	 has	
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formed.	Doing	so	not	only	serves	to	illustrate	the	importance	of	framing	ethical	
questions	in	the	manner	that	I	have	set	out,	but	it	also	sets	up	some	of	the	more	
specific	effects	and	implications	that	emerge	from	approaching	laughter	with	
care	–	particularly	in	terms	of	the	troubles	of	thinking	about	morals	and	ethics	
in	worlds	of	multiplicity	(Haraway,	2016)	–	therefore	establishing	the	need	to	
adopt	multiple,	situated	and	somewhat	speculative	approaches	when	thinking	
about	laughter	with	care	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017).	
In	 this	 chapter,	 therefore,	 I	 specifically	 question	 how	 different	 modes	 of	
listening	to	laughter	can	affect	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	it	as	an	ethical	
force.	In	doing	so	I	look	to	enact	something	of	a	speculative	experiment	in	the	
spirit	of	many	other	non-representational	forms	of	ethnographic	writing	(e.g.	
McCormack,	2014;	Simpson,	2015;	Stewart,	2007,	2011),	and	thus	attempt	to	
create	various	different	spaces	through	which	we	might	imagine	what	is	going	
on	 as	 laughter	 bursts,	 resonates	 and	 affects	 different	 bodies.	 Listening	 has	
been	conceptualised	widely	within	geography,	(e.g.	Engelmann,	2015;	Janus,	
2011;	 Macpherson	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Simpson,	 2009;	 Wang	 Jing,	 2012;	 Watson,	
2014).	However,	this	chapter	is	inspired	most	significantly	by	Jean	Luc	Nancy’s	
(2007)	 ruminations	 on	 listening,	 through	his	 trying	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 pause	
within,	 or	 at	 least	 slow	down,	 the	movements	 that	 take	 place	 between	 the	
burst	of	laughter	and	the	point	in	which	its	meanings	emerge,	sediment	and	
solidify.	In	particular,	I	highlight	three	different	ways	in	which	we	might	listen	
to	laughter:	as	a	signifier	of	some	meaningful	interaction;	as	an	affective	force;	
and	as	a	circumstantial	event	(see	McCormack,	2017;	Serres,	2008)	–	a	mode	
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of	 listening	 which	 somewhat	 encompasses	 the	 other	 two,	 yet	 also	 attends	
closely	to	the	spacetimes	in	which	the	laughter	itself	occurs.	
Crucially,	 each	mode	of	 listening	 also	 impacts	 the	ways	 in	which	we	might	
understand	laughter’s	relationship	with	care	and	thus	the	kinds	of	ethical	force	
that	we	ascribe	to	it	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	ways	in	which	Annemarie	Mol	
(2008b)	notes	with	other	 judgements	and	 ‘logics	of	 care’.	The	 first	offers	a	
representational	 view	 of	 care	 ethics	 through	 which	 we	 might	 make	
judgements	about	whether	laughter	is	caring	(or	not),	based	on	its	content	or	
(perceived)	function	(see	Mccreaddie	and	Wiggins,	2007).	Listening	to	care	as	
an	affective	force,	perhaps	unsurprisingly	moves	these	judgements	about	care	
into	 the	 affective	 realm	 (Conradson,	 2011;	 Popke,	 2009),	 developing	 a	
disposition	towards	thinking	about	 laughter	and	care	as	particular	 forms	of	
encounter	 (Wilson,	 2016)	 and	 thus	 a	 reading	 that	 focusses	 on	 questions	 of	
what	laughter	can	do	(Spinoza,	1970):	the	ways	in	which	laughter	can	make	
different	bodies	feel,	and	thus	the	different	capacities	for	action	and	affection	
that	it	can	either	enhance	or	restrict	(Anderson,	2006;	Braidotti,	2011).	These	
first	 two	 forms	 of	 listening	 position	 laughter	 and	 care’s	 relationship	 as	
something	 emergent	 within	 the	 moment	 or	 the	 event	 of	 laughter	 itself.	 A	
circumstantial	 mode	 of	 listening	 thus	 looks	 to	 add	 further	 context	 to	 this	
through	recognising	the	complex	relationships	between	individual	events	and	
the	historical	 and	cultural	 geographies	within,	 and	out	of,	which	 the	events	
themselves	 emerge	 (Critchley,	 1999;	 Nancy,	 2000).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	
recognises	that	the	meanings	of	both	laughter	and	care,	and	thus	the	sense	of	
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whether	an	event	of	laughter	is	caring	or	not,	are	always	already	rooted	within	
existing	 relationships	 that	 frame	 the	 worlds	 in	 which	 they	 occur	 (see	
McCormack,	2017).	
In	working	through	these	different	ways	of	listening	to	(and	thinking	about)	
laughter	 and	 care,	 this	 chapter	 focusses	 on	 an	 (arguably	 failed)	 attempt	 to	
make	 some	 sort	 of	 sense	 out	 of	 what	 is	 happening	 during	 two	 connected	
moments	 of	 laughter.	 Both	 moments	 occurred	 during	 my	 first	 week	 at	
Summerview	Care	Home,	 both	 centre	 around	similar	 kinds	of	 laughter,	 yet	
each	has	different	consequences	and	evoke	different	relationships	with	ideas	
of	care.	In	portraying	these	events,	I	have	adopted	a	performative	writing	style,	
trying	to	capture	the	uncertainty	with	which	I	encountered	these	moments,	
and	within	my	attempts	to	make	sense	of	them.	As	such,	the	story	is	presented	
over	three	parts	and	intercut	by	conceptual	discussion,	academic	analysis	and	
further	ethnographic	detail.	Each	section	and	mode	of	listening	builds	on	the	
previous,	adding	increasing	complexity	to	the	analyses	they	provide.	Between	
them,	therefore,	these	three	modes	of	listening	to	laughter	with	care	serve	to	
build	up	a	fragmented	and	complex	picture	of	the	multiple	forms,	functions,	
affects	and	ethics	that	can	emerge	from	any	given	event.	All	three	are	useful	
and	problematic	in	their	own	ways.	As	such,	my	argument	in	this	chapter	is	not	
to	espouse	one	manner	of	 listening	over	any	other,	but	rather	to	push	for	a	
more	multiple	and	speculative	approach	when	listening	to	laughter	with	care:	
an	 approach	which	 holds	 open	 all	 of	 their	 different	 potentials,	 rather	 than	
closing	them	down.	Through	this,	I	argue,	we	might	enact	what	Karen	Barad	
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(2007:	392)	calls	an	“ethic	of	worlding”	whereby	“[a]ll	bodies,	including	but	
not	 limited	 to	 human	 bodies,	 come	 to	 matter	 through	 the	 world’s	 …	
performativity”	 and	 thus	 ethical	 differentiation	 “is	 not	 about	 othering	 or	
separating	but	on	the	contrary	about	making	connections	and	commitments.”	
This	multi-modal	 listening,	 and	 the	 ethos	 of	 connections	 and	 commitments	
afforded	by	it,	thus	open	up	key	trajectories	through	which	I	approach	laughter	
with	 care	 throughout	 the	 rest	of	 the	 thesis	 in	which	 the	uncertainty	of	 this	
chapter	gives	way	to	a	more	certain	style	of	analysis.	
The	event:	part	1	
It’s	my	third	day	working	in	Summerview	Nursing	Home	…	Fire	safety	training.	
I	sit	in	a	room	that	is	too	warm	with	too	many	people	in	it.	There	is	a	feeling	of	
slight	aggravation	and	a	sense	of	frustration	from	those	who	had	come	in	on	
their	day	off.	Perhaps	because	of	this,	a	slightly	mischievous	mood	hangs	in	the	
air.		
A	moment’s	break	emerges	as	the	trainer	goes	to	make	a	cup	of	tea.	The	door	
opens	out	onto	the	downstairs	corridor.	Hubbub,	music,	TV	spill	in.	The	bodies	
in	the	room	begin	to	converse,	voices	piling	on	top	of	each	other,	fighting	for	a	
space	in	the	sensory	web	of	the	ensuing	din.	The	noise	level	raises,	step	by	step,	
moment	by	moment.	Conversations	become	extensive	–	stretching	across	the	
room.	
Through	the	open	door,	a	resident’s	voice	cuts	through:	“help	me	…	help.”	Two	
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or	 three	 seats	 down	 from	me	 a	 different	 voice	 pipes	 up,	 similar	 sounding,	
possibly	 identical.	 “Help	 me	 …	 help.”	 Laughter	 bursts,	 filling	 the	 room.	
Everyone	is	laughing.	At	least	they	seem	to	be.	I’m	at	once	amused	and	angry,	
not	sure	what	to	make	of	the	event.	A	decent	impression,	sure,	but	such	little	
care.	Why	 is	 it	 bothering	me?	All	 care	 homes	are	 like	 this	…	 but	 it	 doesn’t	
normally	 feel	 this	way.	 Have	 I	 laughed	 at	 similar	 impressions	 in	 the	 past?	
Probably.	No,	definitely.	But	I	care,	she	doesn’t	seem	to	…		
As	suddenly	as	it	started,	for	some	reason,	the	laughter	stops.	A	moment	seems	
to	last	forever.	Nothing	has	changed,	yet	everything	suddenly	feels	different.	
“Shall	we	get	going	again?”	Calm	returns	with	the	fire	safety	trainer…	
4.2	 |	Listening	to	 laughter	as	a	representation	(of	something	
else)	
Traditionally	 laughter	 has	 been	 framed	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 both	
distinctly	 human	 and	 distinctly	 social.	 As	 Bergson	 (1980:	 65)	 writes,	 for	
instance:	“laughter	must	answer	to	certain	requirements	of	life	in	common.	It	
must	 have	 social	 signification”.	 As	 was	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 however,	
laughter’s	social	signification	can	take	on	many	forms,	each	of	which	serves	to	
situate	 it	 within	 it	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 power	 relations	 (Brigstocke,	 2014;	
Douglas,	2015;	Ridanpää,	2014a).	Although	not	often	framed	in	exactly	these	
terms,	 the	 general	 argument	 within	 many	 studies	 of	 laughter	 is	 thus	 that	
through	listening	to	the	laughter	in	a	situation	we	can	start	to	unpack	various	
social	structures,	dynamics	or	hierarchies	and	thus	the	power	relations	that	
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frame	particular	groups	(Albrecht,	1999;	Amarasingam,	2010;	Delph-Janiurek,	
2001;	Flint,	2001;	Gray,	1994;	Kehily	and	Nayak,	1997;	Sanders,	2004).	In	this	
sense,	laughter	is	seen	within	this	framework	as	‘meaningful’	both	through	its	
specific	roles	within	social	interactions	themselves,	and	through	its	capacities	
to	 represent	 something	much	more	 serious,	 and	 therefore	more	 significant	
about	 the	 groups,	 organisations	 and	 societies	 that	 are	 under	 study	
(Macpherson,	2008;	Watson,	2015).	Again,	as	we	have	noted	already,	broadly	
speaking,	there	are	three	main	theories	that	are	most	often	used	within	these	
styles	of	analysis	–	superiority,	 incongruity	and	release/relief	 theory	–	with	
each	theory	designating	the	emergence	of	laughter	a	different	cause:	from	a	
sense	 of	 feeling	 superior;	 a	 sense	 of	 surprise;	 or	 as	 a	 release	 of	 emotional	
tension	respectively	–	which	together	 form	a	 framework	through	which	we	
might	begin	to	understand	the	event	of	laughter	described	above.	
Perhaps	the	most	immediately	obvious	of	these	theories	to	apply	to	the	story	
above	would	 involve	 designating	 the	 laughter	 as	 a	moment	 of	 superiority:	
laughter	 at	 the	 impression	 generates	 a	 “sudden	 glory	 arising	 from	 some	
sudden	conception	of	some	eminency	 in	ourselves;	by	comparison	with	the	
infirmity	of	others”	as	Hobbes	describes	it	(see	Elias,	2017:	296).	Through	this,	
we	might	 thus	 argue	 that,	 in	 simple	 terms,	 to	 hear	 this	 laughter	 is	 to	 hear	
certain	 power	 structures	 within	 the	 care	 home	 being	 reproduced	 and	
reinforced:	a	performative	citation	of	political	and	ethical	spacings	between	
different	bodies.	Furthermore,	drawing	on	Bergson	 (1980),	we	might	argue	
that	the	laughter	serves	as	a	form	of	‘corrective’	to	the	image	of	the	‘helpless’	
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resident	and	thus	reinforces	the	idea	of	carers	and	other	staff	members	as	a	
‘norm’	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 resident	Others	 (see	also	Billig,	2005;	Douglas,	
2015).	This	kind	of	analytic	would	therefore	designate	the	laughter	as	having	
a	social	function	that	serves	to	generate	differences,	borders	and	boundaries	
between	 different	 people	 and	 groups	 (Wilson,	 2017)	 and	 therefore	 as	
precluding	 relational	 forms	of	 embodiment	 such	as	empathy,	openness	and	
respect	between	residents	and	staff	–	what	Bergson	(1980:	64),	describes	as	
an	“anaesthesia	of	 the	heart”.	As	such,	we	might	argue	that,	as	a	moment	of	
superiority,	it	is	also	a	moment	that	lacks	the	necessary	‘requirements’	for	a	
relation	of	care	and	therefore	is	a	care-less	moment	of	laughter.	
Crucially,	however,	superiority	theory	is	not	the	only	route	through	which	we	
might	 understand	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 laughter.	 Indeed,	 arguably	 both	
release	 theory	 and	 incongruity	 theory	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 explain	 this	
particular	event.	Through	 release	 theory,	 for	 instance,	we	might	well	 argue	
that	the	laughter	is	a	means	of	releasing	a	collective	tension	within	the	room	
(Meyer,	2000).	This	tension	is	somewhat	evident	within	my	telling	of	the	story,	
through	the	overcrowding	and	the	heat,	the	frustration	felt	by	members	of	staff	
who	have	come	into	work	just	for	the	training	and	through	the	absence	of	the	
fire	safety	trainer	which	generates	an	absence	of	purpose	in	the	room.	As	such,	
thinking	through	release	theory	positions	laughter	as	having	a	particular	social	
function	 in	 that	 it	 acts	 as	 an	 “escape	 valve”	 (Dittmer,	 2013:	 500)	 and	 thus	
enables	the	workers	in	the	room	to	continue	in	as	normal	a	manner	as	possible.	
This	reading	of	laughter	thus	engenders	a	different	way	of	understanding	it	in	
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terms	of	care,	particularly	in	terms	of	Tronto’s	(1993:	103)	definition	of	care	
as	anything	that	we	do	to	maintain	our	worlds	so	that	we	may	continue	living	
in	them	as	well	as	possible	–	with	laughter,	framed	as	a	release	of	(negative)	
tension,	capable	of	being	positioned	as	means	through	which	the	workers	can	
continue	to	live	as	well	as	possible.	In	other	words,	we	might	see	the	laughter	
here	as	part	of	 the	moral	economy	through	which	the	various	bodies	 in	 the	
room	are	able	to	care	for	themselves	(McDowell,	2009).	This	kind	of	argument	
is	most	often	framed	through	notions	of	coping	(Astedt-Kurki	and	Liukkonen,	
1994;	 Duncan,	 1990;	Kehily	 and	 Nayak,	 1997;	Macpherson,	 2008;	 Sanders,	
2004).	 However,	 it’s	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 I	 offer	 a	 re-reading	 of	 ‘coping	
laughter’	for	care	workers	in	Chapter	7	of	this	thesis.	
Thinking	 through	 incongruity	 theory	 is	 arguably	 the	most	 diverse	 and	 the	
most	complex	means	of	understanding	this	laughter.	In	terms	of	incongruity,	
we	 might	 argue	 that	 the	 laughter	 emerges	 from	 the	 sudden	 divergence	
between	expectation	and	reality	(Critchley,	2002).	In	other	words,	the	laughter	
emerges	 from	 the	 surprise	 encounter	 with	 the	 impression,	 either	 because	
impressions	 of	 residents	 such	 as	 this	 one	 are	 social	 taboo	 and	 therefore	
unexpected	 in	 a	 place	 framed	 around	 care,	 or	 because	 an	 impression	 of	 a	
resident	was	not	expected	at	 all.	 Crucially,	many	scholars	who	use	 ideas	of	
incongruity	do	so	in	conjunction	with	ideas	around	both	power	and	emotional	
release	in	a	similar	manner	to	that	described	above,	with	both	Bergson	(1980)	
and	 Bakhtin	 (1984)	 offering	 key	 discussions	 around	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
(planned	and	unexpected)	incongruous	moments	serve	to	generate	particular	
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power	relations	and	social	formations.	Indeed,	given	that	an	impression	of	an	
infirm	 resident	 needing	 help	might	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 form	of	 ‘dark	 humour’	 or	
intentional	breaking	of	 taboo,	we	might	well	 frame	the	moment	of	 laughter	
through	similar	 ideas	 to	Bakhtin’s	 carnivalesque,	whereby	 particular	 styles	
and	 forms	 of	 laughter	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 socially	 unacceptable,	 are	
sanctioned	 in	 particular	 spacetimes	 (Brigstocke,	 2014;	Macpherson,	 2008).	
Readings	such	as	 this	one,	 therefore,	provide	a	particular	moral	and	ethical	
complexity	to	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	laughter,	and	thus	add	another	
level	of	complexity	to	judgements	of	it	as	caring	or	not.	
Indeed,	echoing	Tronto’s	(1993)	definition	of	care	once	again,	Bakhtin	(1984)	
frames	 the	 carnivalesque	 as	 a	 means	 of	 maintaining	 people’s	 worlds,	 yet	
crucially	many	have	noted	that	within	the	carnivalesque	Bakhtin	is	discussing	
a	particular	kind	of	 laughter,	 and	as	 such	 it	 is	 important	 to	 remain	 critical,	
rather	than	giving	in	to	this	idealised	vision	of	laughter	which	risks	belying	the	
slippery	relation	between	laughter	as	liberation	and	laughter	as	oppression	(of	
someone	 else)	 (Barnard,	 2004;	 Grindon,	 2004;	 Macpherson,	 2008).	 In	 this	
sense,	whilst	out	of	these	three	theories	incongruity	theory	can	be	used	most	
widely	 to	understand	 laughter’s	 emergence,	 it	 is	perhaps	 the	 least	 effective	
way	 of	 generating	 moral	 or	 ethical	 judgements	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 the	
laughter	itself	contributes	to	an	ethic	of	care.	
In	thinking	about	these	three	theories	together	therefore,	we	can	start	to	see	
that	each	has	certain	strengths	in	producing	understandings	of	why	laughter	
Chapter	4:	Listening	to	laughter	with	care	
132	
emerges	and	together	can	thus	be	used	to	generate	a	clearer	understanding	of	
the	 reasons	 that	 people	 laugh	 within	 care	 homes,	 generating	 connections	
between	 the	objects	of	 laughter	 (what	 is	being	 laughed	at)	 and	 the	psycho-
social	movements	that	produce	laughter	as	an	embodied	action.	Indeed,	within	
my	analysis	 I	did	experiment	with	such	a	 task,	 taking	all	of	 the	moments	of	
laughter	that	I	had	noted	down	and	mapping	them	onto	an	object	of	laughter,	
the	space	within	each	home	in	which	this	occurred	and	then	trying	to	ascribe	
each	moment	to	either	superiority,	incongruity	or	release	theory.	This	analysis	
thus	gave	a	great	indication	of	where	people	were	laughing,	and	to	some	extent	
what	 people	were	 laughing	 at	 (although	 notably	 the	most	 populated	 ‘node’	
was	 the	 one	 for	 an	 ‘unknown’	 object	 of	 laughter),	 yet	 it	 proved	 extremely	
difficult	to	make	judgements	about	which	theoretical	category	each	moment	
of	laughter	fitted	best	with.	As	with	the	single	example	given	in	this	chapter,	
many	of	the	moments	of	laughter	could	be	ascribed	to	more	than	one,	or	all,	of	
the	theoretical	frameworks:	the	question,	as	always,	was	which	one	to	choose?	
This	 exercise	 proved	 even	 more	 problematic	 when	 trying	 to	 map	 these	
moments	of	laughter	onto	an	ethic	of	care.	Again,	as	we	have	seen	in	terms	of	
the	example	here,	each	theory	of	laughter	generates	a	different	understanding	
of	its	functions	and	therefore	its	ethical	and	moral	status	within	the	care	home.	
Indeed,	in	using	the	three	theories	to	understand	a	single	event	of	laughter,	it	
is	possible	to	see	the	ways	in	which	laughter’s	meanings,	and	thus	the	ways	in	
which	we	understand	and	make	judgements	of	it,	can	be	refracted	in	multiple	
directions	 and	 generate	 an	 ethically	 uncertain	 response.	 In	 other	 words,	
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through	drawing	out	ideas	of	care-full	or	care-less	laughter	based	on	the	idea	
of	laughter	as	a	representational	practice,	I	ended	up	enacting	an	intervention	
that	 reduced	 the	 possible	 meanings	 and	 performances	 of	 care	 (as	 well	 as	
laughter),	to	a	set	of	codes,	signifiers	and	(perceived)	intentions	rather	than	
recognising	the	multiple	and	often	conflicting	ways	 in	which	care	ethics	are	
practised,	 felt,	 followed	 and	 lived	 both	 within	 and	 outwith	 moments	 of	
laughter	(Bartos,	2018;	Bondi,	2008;	Brannelly,	2006;	Mol,	2008b).	
As	 such,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 significant	value	within	 listening	 to	 laughter	 in	
conjunction	 with	 these	 representational	 theories	 –	 particularly	 in	
understanding	how	and	why	laughter	emerges	within	particular	settings	–	my	
feeling	is	that	they	remain	too	simplistic	to	really	grasp	a	full	sense	of	what	is	
going	on	within	both	this	and	other	moments	of	laughter.	In	conceptual	terms,	
one	 reason	 for	 this	 simplicity	 emerges	 because	 this	 form	 of	 listening	 to	
laughter	assumes	that	laughter	is	a	purely	intentional	action	(cf.	Sills,	2017):	
something	 done	 by	 a	 (human)	 body	 and	 directed	 towards	 another	 (not	
necessarily	human)	body.	As	such,	listening	in	this	manner	tends	to	negate	the	
agential	 inter/intra-actions	 that	 can	 occur	 through	 the	 performance	 of	
laughter	 itself	 (Barad,	2003)	–	 rendering	 laughter	always	 “as	a	 response	 to	
something	else”	(Parvulescu,	2010:	3)	instead	of	as	a	phenomenon	in	its	own	
right.	 As	 such,	 through	 listening	 in	 this	manner,	 we	 end	 up	 never	 actually	
listening	to	laughter,	but	rather	listening	for	this	something	else.	
Perhaps	 more	 significantly,	 however,	 I	 have	 a	 vague	 sense	 that	 I	 have	
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encountered	this	kind	of	laughter	before.	I	know	instinctively	that	both	within	
Winterbourne	and	with	the	theatre	groups,	similar	moments	of	laughter	have	
occurred,	yet	 in	 those	cases	they	 felt	different,	 they	 felt	 less	 lacking	 in	care.	
Indeed,	looking	back	through	my	field	diary	notes	confirms	this	fact.	There	are	
many	notations	of	laughter	that	emerge	from	either	impressions	of	residents	
or	laughter	that	is	sparked	by	the	actions	of	residents	who,	usually	because	of	
their	 dementia/Alzheimer’s,	 tend	 to	 say	 or	 do	 things	 that	 are	 distinctly	
incongruous,	 and	 break	 the	 mould	 of	 normative	 interaction.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	
probably	 this	 vague	 sense	 that	 provided	 the	 most	 forceful	 and	 lasting	
impression	 and	 thus	 the	 particular	 intellectual	 and	 affective	 confusion	 that	
emerged	from	the	situation.	Interestingly,	however,	this	factor	was	one	that	
emerged	just	as	forcefully	two	days	later…	
The	event:	part	2	
…	A	day	or	so	after	the	training,	I	sit	eating	in	the	staff	room	with	a	nurse	and	
two	other	carers.	We	are	chatting	quietly,	enjoying	a	moment	of	rest.	The	nurse	
receives	a	phone	call	from	upstairs.	A	few	words	are	spoken	in	a	business-like	
manner	…	“I’ll	be	up	in	a	minute”	…	Phone	hangs	up.	He	looks	at	his	sandwich	
contemplating	 something.	 Another	 impression	 of	 a	 resident	 emerges.	
Laughter	bursts	from	all	four	of	us	sat	around	the	table.	This	one	feels	different	
for	some	reason.	I	do	not	feel	the	anger	or	frustration.	The	nurse’s	impression	
does	something	different.	 It	matters	 less.	The	whole	situation	 is	different	…	
somehow	…	
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4.3	|	Listening	to	laughter	as	an	affective	force	
Without	 this	second	encounter,	 the	story	of	 the	 first	event	would,	 I	suspect,	
have	featured	in	a	very	different	form	in	this	thesis.	The	juxtaposition	of	the	
laughter	 emerging	 from	 the	 first	 and	 second	 impressions,	 and	 their	
establishing	profoundly	different	meanings,	however,	served	to	add	another	
layer	of	complexity	to	my	thinking	about	the	moments	of	laughter	described	
in	 this	 chapter,	 and	 thus	 the	ways	 in	which	we	might	 listen	 to	 the	 laughter	
within	 care	homes	as	a	whole.	 Indeed,	 the	similarity	between	 the	 causes	of	
laughter,	yet	the	differences	in	how	they	are	received,	serves	to	further	erode	
the	utility	of	positioning	laughter	as	a	representation	of	something	else.	It	does	
so	in	particular	through	breaking	down	the	connection	between	object	or	style	
of	laughter	and	the	ways	in	which	it	affects	different	bodies,	and	affects	bodies	
differently:	 “This	one	 feels	different	 for	some	reason.”	Ultimately,	 therefore,	
this	suggests	that	perhaps	a	different	form	of	listening	to	laughter	with	care	
might	be	required.		
In	cultivating	this	renewed	approach,	therefore,	we	might	draw	on	the	work	of	
Nancy	 (2007),	 particularly	 through	 the	 distinction	 he	 makes	 between	
‘listening’	 and	 ‘hearing’.	 Hearing,	 for	 Nancy,	 is	 a	 practice	 that	 involves	
searching	 for	 the	 intentionality	 of	 a	 sound	 (its	 object	 or	 direction)	 and	
therefore	 assumes	 that	 a	 sound	 inherently	 means	 something,	 and	 that	
something	is	already	there	to	be	understood	(Simpson,	2009).	Listening,	on	the	
other	hand,	is	a	practice	in	which	the	body	does	not	seek	to	understand,	but	
rather	attunes	to	the	sensation	itself,	opening	the	body	up	to	the	possibility	of	
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a	meaning	yet	to	be	revealed:	“to	listen	is	to	be	straining	towards	a	possible	
meaning,	and	consequentially	one	that	is	not	immediately	accessible”	(Nancy,	
2007:	6).	As	Simpson	(2009)	notes,	Nancy’s	approach	to	listening	is	therefore	
characterised	by	six	themes,	three	of	which	are	more	general	to	his	philosophy	
as	a	whole	 (the	body,	 the	 subject,	 and	 sense),	 and	 three	of	which	are	more	
specific	 to	 engagements	with	 sounds	 (resonance,	 timbre,	 and	 rhythm).	 It’s	
worth	noting	here	that	although	all	six	of	these	remain	important	for	this	re-
working	of	laughter,	there	remains	a	certain	difficulty	in	attending	to	the	more	
specific	 sonorous	 elements	 of	 laughter	 given	 that	 my	 descriptions	 were	
written	‘after	the	fact’	and	that	I	was	not	necessarily	looking	to	attend	to	these	
issues	whilst	I	was	in	the	field,	and	I	will	therefore	mostly	concentrate	on	the	
first	three.	
My	intention	here	is	not	necessarily	to	provide	a	‘Nancian’	reading	of	the	ways	
in	which	we	might	listen	to	laughter	(see	also	Nancy,	1993),	but	rather	to	draw	
connection	 between	 Nancy’s	 arguments	 and	 non-representational	
geographies	more	widely	 (in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	 Simpson,	 2009),	 through	
arguing	 that	we	can	 listen	 to	 laughter,	not	 through	 its	 assumed	capacity	 to	
represent	some	other	social	force,	but	instead	through	its	capacities	to	affect	
bodies	 in	 ways	 that	 exceed	 their	 representational	 characteristics	 (see	 also	
Janus,	2011;	Wang	Jing,	2012).	In	particular,	I	wish	to	destabilise	the	notion	
that	the	subject	precedes	the	actions	and	cognitions	that	‘it’	produces	through	
‘its’	body,	and	instead	recognise	the	ways	in	which	the	subject	and	the	spaces	
of	 its	 actions,	 movements,	 emotions	 and	 thoughts	 are	 co-emergent	
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performative	entities	(Barad,	2007;	McCormack,	2013;	Simpson,	2017;	Wylie,	
2006,	 2010).	 In	 other	 words,	 paraphrasing	 Judith	 Butler’s	 (2006)	 famous	
proposition	that	the	doer	does	not	precede	the	deed	but	is	created	from	it,	I	
want	 to	 recognise	 that	 neither	 the	 laugher,	 nor	 the	 listener,	 pre-exist	 the	
laughter,	but	rather	that	they	are	brought	into	being	in	conjunction	with	the	
laughter	itself	(Harrison,	2009;	Nancy,	1993).	
This	manner	of	 listening,	 therefore,	has	 two	connected	 implications	 for	 the	
ways	in	which	we	understand	the	relation	between	laughter	and	the	subject	
(and	 therefore	 between	 laughter,	 care	 and	 ethics	more	 generally).	 First,	 in	
listening	to	laughter	in	this	manner	we	essentially	position	it	as	a	‘thing’,	or	a	
‘matter	 of	 concern’,	 in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	 that	 described	 by	Bruno	 Latour	
(2004,	 2005),	 Jane	Bennet	 (2004,	 2005,	 2010)	 and	 other	 scholars	working	
within	the	realms	of	what	we	might	loosely	term	agential-materialisms	(e.g.	
Barad,	2003,	2007;	Braidotti,	2011;	Puig	de	 la	Bellacasa,	2017).	Laughter	 is	
rendered,	not	simply	as	an	extension	of	the	human	subject,	but	rather	as	a	body	
in	its	own	right,	capable	of	acting	on	and	affecting	different	bodies	in	ways	that	
exceed	the	control,	or	indeed	the	intention,	of	the	joker	or	laugher	themselves	
(see	also	Deleuze	and	Parnet,	1987;	Massumi,	1992).	Second,	therefore,	are	the	
ways	 in	 which	 this	 form	 of	 listening	 challenges	 the	 phenomenological	
intentionality	 of	 laughter,	 and	 particularly	 the	 assumption	 that	 laughter	 is	
directed	towards,	or	means,	something	in	particular	(Sills,	2017).	Indeed,	for	
Nancy	 (2007:	 20),	 listening	 (rather	 than	 hearing)	 dislodges	 the	 assumed	
intentionality	of	sound:	“sound	(and/or	sense)	is	what	is	not	at	first	intended.	
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It	is	not	first	 ‘intentioned’:	on	the	contrary,	sound	is	what	places	its	subject,	
which	has	not	preceded	it	with	an	aim”	–	that	is	to	say,	the	listener	does	not	
precede	 the	 listening.	 Indeed,	 as	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 elsewhere	 in	 Nancy’s	
work,	 we	 find	 the	 suggestion	 that	 perhaps	 this	 process	 might	 be	 further	
intensified	by	 laughter	 itself.	 “Intention	 is	abolished	 in	 laughter,	 it	explodes	
there,	and	the	pieces	into	which	it	bursts	are	what	laughter	laughs	–	laughter,	
in	which	there	is	always	more	than	one	laugh”	(Nancy,	1993:	384).	
In	essence,	therefore,	both	of	these	implications	–	the	positioning	of	laughter	
as	 a	 thing	 and	 the	 displacement	 of	 its	perceived	 intentionality	 –	 serve	 as	 a	
mode	 of	 ‘spacing’	 the	 subject	 in	 relation	 to	 laughter	 (Crouch,	 2003;	 Doel,	
1996),	where	spacing	refers	to	“an	active	and	ongoing	process,	a	movement	of	
differing	and	deferral,	where	‘the	subject’	is	always	already	in	relation	to	what	
it	is	not,	always	emerging	from	these	relations,	but	where	such	relations	are	
by	 no	 means	 fixed	 or	 certain”	 (Simpson,	 2017:	 6).	 Although	 a	 seemingly	
abstracted	 apprehension	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 bodies,	 subjects	 and	
laughter,	 it’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 this	 chapter	 emerges	 directly	 from	 these	
processes	 of	differing	 and	deferral:	 the	 lasting	 sense	 of	my	not	 knowing	 in	
which	manner	(or	direction)	to	think	about	these	moments	of	laughter.	What’s	
more,	this	spacing	holds	open	laughter’s	contingent	multiplicity	(Grosz,	2005)	
(the	‘more	than	one	laugh’	described	by	Nancy	(1993)	above),	in	the	sense	that	
laughter,	 even	 when	 directed	 at	 something,	 in	 particular,	 can	 generate	
multiple	outcomes,	affects	and	meanings,	some	of	which	remain	contradictory.	
We	can	see	this	to	some	extent	within	the	telling	of	both	events	where	I	have	
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tried	to	capture	the	sense	of	uncertainty	and	unknowing	which	consumes	my	
body	as	it	is	jostled	into	a	place	through	the	encounter	with	each	laughter:	the	
mixed	feelings	of	amusement	and	anger,	a	recognition	of	my	own	complicity	
within	 the	 moment,	 the	 confusion	 and	 the	 questions	 of	 care	 that	 emerge	
throughout.	Yet	 this	mode	of	spacing	 is	perhaps	accentuated	and	expressed	
best	 within	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 event,	 particularly	
through	the	ways	in	which	their	affective	tonality,	subjective	positioning	and	
senses	of	 care,	 contradict	 and	 therefore	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 each	
other.	
Crucially,	 therefore,	 through	 the	 spacing	 of	 the	 subject	 in	 each	moment	 of	
laughter	we	can	start	to	question	the	a	priori	nature	of	its	matterings,	the	way	
it	comes	to	‘mean’	something	and	therefore	the	kinds	of	ethical	judgements	we	
might	make	of	it.	Indeed,	the	meaning	of	laughter	is	no	longer	attached	to	the	
intentions	of	the	joker,	nor	to	the	intentionality	of	the	laughter	itself,	but	rather	
is	held	open,	“pregnant	with	possibilities”	(Latham,	2003:	1994),	capable	of	
attaching	 itself	 in	 multiple	 directions	 and	 mattering	 in	 different	 ways.	
Presumably	in	each	case	I	could	have	made	very	different	moral	judgements	
about	the	relationship	between	laughter	and	care,	yet	because	of	the	ways	in	
which	each	moment	of	laughter	affects	me,	or,	the	ways	in	which	I	am	‘moved’	
by	 it	 (McCormack,	 2008b),	 or	 the	ways	 in	which	my	 subjectivity	 is	 placed	
somewhere	in	relation	to	the	event	(Nancy,	2007;	Simpson,	2009),	the	decision	
ultimately	falls	one	way	and	then	the	other.	In	listening	to	rather	than	hearing	
laughter,	 therefore,	 we	 not	 only	 destabilise	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter’s	
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meanings	 are	 understood,	 but	 also	 the	ways	 in	which	 care’s	meanings	 are	
understood	 as	 well.	 This	 happens	 through	 shifting	 from	 an	 ‘objective’	
understanding	of	laughter	and	care	based	on	forms	of	practice	(e.g.	the	style	of	
the	 humour)	 and	 instead	 towards	more	 embodied,	 situated	 and	 subjective	
judgements.	These	judgments	are	rooted	in	the	question	of	what	laughter	can	
do:	the	ways	in	which	laughter	affects	bodies	(in	this	case	my	body	specifically)	
either	to	increase	or	reduce	their	capacities	to	act	(see	also	Anderson	2006;	
Braidotti,	2011;	Deleuze,	1988a).	
In	mapping	this	back	onto	Tronto’s	(1993:	103)	definition	of	care	and	into	the	
wider	 ethical	 landscapes	 of	 the	 care	 homes,	 therefore,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	
through	listening	to	laughter	based	on	its	affects	we	move	the	ethical	impetus	
of	 its	relationship	with	 care	away	 from	 the	notion	of	 intended	practice	 (i.e.	
“care	as	everything	we	do”)	and	instead	onto	the	outcomes	of	those	practices	
(i.e.	their	capacities	to	“maintain,	continue	and	repair	our	world”).	Indeed,	this	
is	useful	in	cutting	through	some	of	the	non-normative	elements	of	joking	and	
laughter,	such	as	the	moments	in	which	an	apparently	‘cruel’	joke	(such	as	an	
impression)	actually	generates	a	level	of	affection	between	the	joker	and	the	
target	of	the	joke;	or	the	converse,	where	a	comment	made	in	jest	generates	
offence	or	hurts	the	target	without	that	being	the	intention	of	the	joker.	In	this	
sense,	this	way	of	thinking	also	shifts	the	manner	in	which	we	are	forced	to	
make	 judgements,	 away	 from	 universalised	 ethical	 norms	 and	 principles,	
which	Derek	McCormack	(2003:	503)	describes	as	“ethics-as-rule-following”	
and	which	presumes	an	advanced	notice	of	how	different	people	will	act	or	
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react	to	certain	‘unknowable’	situations,	and	instead	towards	a	more	situated	
affective	 ethics	 which	 “demands	 an	 openness	 to	 the	 uncertain	 affective	
potentiality	of	the	eventful	encounter	as	that	from	which	new	ways	of	going	
on	in	the	world	might	emerge”	(ibid).	In	other	words,	it	demands	that	we	make	
ethical	judgements	about	different	moments	based	on	an	attunement	to	“what	
happens”	 (Thrift,	2008:	8)	 through	an	encounter	with	 laughter,	 rather	 than	
what	we	think	will	or	should	happen	(see	Barnett,	2012).	In	this	sense,	each	
judgement	needs	to	be	made	about	each	event:	new	and	unexpected,	different	
every	time.	
This	mode	 of	 listening,	 therefore,	 serves	 to	 add	 a	 level	 of	 precision	 to	 our	
understanding	of	laughter’s	ethics.	It	forces	us	to	consider	not	the	expressions	
out	of	which	 laughter	emerges,	nor	 the	assumed	direction	of	 its	 travel,	but	
rather	the	ways	in	which	it	matters	and	therefore	why	and	how	it	matters	in	
each	encounter	(Wilson,	2017).	It	is	an	ethical	approach	that	opens	itself	to	the	
unexpected	and	well	noted	contradictory	elements	 that	make	up	 laughter’s	
cultural	politics	(Brigstocke,	2014;	Dittmer,	2013;	Speier,	1998):	its	capacities	
to	work	in	between	the	discourses	and	modes	of	power	that	surround	it	and	
to	enact	something	of	a	‘doublespeak’	that	remains	ambiguous	until	it	registers	
as	alterity.	As	with	much	non-representational	 thinking,	however,	 there	 is	a	
potential	critique	that	needs	to	be	acknowledged	here,	in	that	we	might	argue	
this	mode	of	 listening	 remains	 too	 focused	on	 the	 singularity	of	 each	event	
(individual	moment,	 individual	 listeners	 etc.)	 without	 fully	 recognising	 the	
wider	cultural-political-historical-spatial	forms,	textures	and	tensions	within	
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which,	and	out	of	which,	these	encounters	take	place	(Cresswell,	2006;	Nash,	
2000;	Olson,	2017;	Popke,	2009),	thus	meaning	that	they	may	not	always	be	
as	surprising	as	one	might	first	expect…	
The	event:	part	3	
That	evening	I	sit	on	the	sofa	at	home,	reflecting	on	the	day	and	writing	in	my	
field	 diary.	 My	 attention	 turns	 to	 the	 moment	 of	 laughter	 and	 draws	 a	
comparison	with	the	one	a	day	or	so	before.	I	write:	“It	didn’t	feel	so	bad	today	
which	was	strange.	I	think	the	laughter	the	other	day	gave	me	a	feeling	malice	
which	 just	 wasn’t	 present	 today.	 [Carer]	 probably	 had	 the	 same	 attitude	 as	
[Nurse]	however.	I	guess	it	may	be	important	to	attend	to	wider	circumstances	
in	which	 these	 events	 occur…”	 (Field	Diary	Notes,	 Summerview	Care	Home,	
16/06/2016)	
4.4	|	Listening	to	laughter	as	a	circumstantial	encounter	
Retrospectively,	 thinking	 about	 laughter’s	 meanings	 (and	 therefore	 its	
relationship	with	 both	 care	 and	 ethics	more	 generally)	 as	 being	 dependent	
upon	the	worlds	within	which	it	is	embedded	is	perhaps	not	that	radical.	It	is	
a	 factor	 of	 laughter	 that	 most	 people	 know	 instinctively:	 a	 sense	 that	
sometimes	and	 in	some	spaces	 laughter	 is	more	appropriate	 than	 in	others.	
Similarly,	this	recognition	of	contingency	is	also	held	within	Tronto’s	(1993:	
103)	 discussion	 of	 care,	 in	 which	 she	 ‘insists’	 that	 care	 “is	 largely	 defined	
culturally,	and	will	vary	among	different	cultures.”	The	key	question,	however,	
rests	 around	 how	 we	 define	 these	 different	 spacetimes	 and	 cultures	
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themselves,	which	are,	to	my	mind	at	least,	too	often	understood	both	in	terms	
that	are	to	static	rather	than	being	seen	as	processual	entities	that	are	always	
in	 flux,	 continuously	 emerging	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 events,	 practices	 and	
performances	within	them	(McCormack,	2013),	but	also	without	taking	into	
full	account	the	historical,	social,	cultural,	material	and	embodied	geographical	
contexts	that	always	surround	such	performances	(Cresswell,	2006;	Massey,	
2005;	Nash,	2000;	Noxolo,	2009).	
In	this	sense,	my	use	of	the	word	‘circumstances’,	although	written	without	too	
much	 thought	 at	 the	 time,	 gains	 a	 new	 resonance,	 particularly	 through	
engagement	 with	 the	 work	 of	 Derek	 McCormack	 (2017)	 who	 has	 recently	
pushed	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 worlds	 as	 ‘circumstantial	 spacetimes’.	
Drawing	on	Michel	Serres,	McCormack	(2017:	3)	thus	describes	circumstance	
as	“a	way	of	naming	the	extrusion	of	the	impersonal	forces	excessive	of	a	life	
into	the	worldly	textures	and	trajectories	of	that	life”	and	thus	generates	an	
approach	 that	 is	 not	 “centred	 on	 the	 human	 experience	 of	 life	worlds”	 yet	
“remains	attentive	to	the	affective	force	of	worlds,	to	how	their	‘pinch’	is	felt	in	
the	 stances	 of	 bodies	 and	 forms	 of	 life.”	 What	 this	 claim	 about	 the	
circumstantial	 nature	 of	worlds	 (variously	 conceived)	 does,	 therefore,	 is	 to	
move	away	from	purely	phenomenological	ideas,	in	which	the	‘world’	is	only	
that	which	is	experienced	or	perceived	(in	the	moment)	and	 instead	adds	a	
recognition	that	there	are	various	other	elements,	forces	and	bodies	that	also	
actively	contribute	to	experiences	themselves	(even	if	we	are	unaware	of	their	
existence),	and	which	are	therefore	crucial	in	contextualising	the	meanings	of	
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different	events.	
Working	 through	 the	 concept	 of	 circumstance,	 therefore,	 pushes	 our	
understandings	 of	 the	 events	 in	 this	 chapter	 further	 towards	 a	 post-
phenomenological	stance	(Ash	and	Simpson,	2016;	Wylie,	2006)	and	therefore	
again	makes	contact	with	the	post-phenomenological	style	of	thinking	within	
the	work	of	Jean	Luc	Nancy	(1993,	2000,	2007).	In	this	sense,	a	circumstantial	
form	of	listening	to	laughter	with	care	captures	much	of	what	has	already	been	
discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 yet	 serves	 to	 further	 disrupt	 the	 ‘authenticity’	 of	
immediate	 affective/cognitive	 experiences,	 instead	 rendering	 them	 as	 only	
one	element	within	the	myriad	of	ways	through	which	meaning	is	produced.	
In	 other	 words,	 whilst	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	 affect	 at	 each	 moment	 are	
important	 for	 understanding	 its	 ethical	 force	 (Braidotti,	 2011;	McCormack,	
2003),	it	is	also	crucial	to	recognise	the	complex	and	often	contradictory	ways	
in	which	these	events	are	situated	in	relation	to	the	wider	ethical	landscapes	
or	worlds	in	which	they	take	place	(Popke,	2009).	
In	this	sense,	listening	to	laughter	as	a	circumstantial	encounter	establishes	an	
attunement	 that	 straddles	 both	 the	 immediacy	 of	 the	 event	 and	 the	wider	
spatiotemporal	 structures	 within	which,	 and	 out	 of	 which,	 the	 event	 itself	
emerges	 (Nancy,	 2000).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 moves	 towards	 an	 evaluative	
judgement	of	ethics	that	is	not	just	about	the	emotional/affective	spacetimes	
of	the	events	themselves,	and	what	laughter	can	do	in	the	here-and-now,	but	
also	questions	how	the	event	of	laughter	relates	to,	and	affects,	other	elements	
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of	the	care	home	as	a	‘landscape’	or	‘assemblage’	of	care	(Foley,	2014;	Gorman,	
2017a,	2017c;	Milligan	and	Wiles,	2010).	In	other	words,	I	am	suggesting	that	
ethical	judgements	about	the	relationship	between	laughter	and	care	should	
be	 made,	 not	 just	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 individual	 moment	 (whether	 that	 be	
representationally	 or	 non-representationally),	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 balance	
between	these	individual	moments	and	their	place	within	the	‘culture’	of	a	care	
home	more	generally.	What	this	does	is	to	recognise	ethics	(and	politics)	as	
something	 that	 is	 situated	 across	 multiple	 different	 spacetimes:	 emergent	
during	 the	 singularity	 of	 every	 event,	 but	 also	 existing	 and	 emerging	 as	 an	
aggregate	of	the	multiplicity	events	that	make	up	the	world.	
In	 terms	of	 the	events	of	 this	chapter,	 therefore,	 there	are	perhaps	two	key	
factors	 that	 we	 might	 draw	 upon	 to	 illustrate	 the	 potential	 of	 this	 way	 of	
thinking:	the	sense	that	care	is	practised	in	multiple	ways	within	the	care	home	
itself	 –	 not	 all	 of	 which	 are	 expressed	 through	 empathy,	 compassion,	 love,	
kindness	or	any	of	the	other	emotional	traits	we	might	normatively	ascribe	to	
caring	relations	(Bondi,	2008)	–	and	that	the	care	home	is	also	a	place	in	which	
various	relations	exist	that	have	nothing	to	do	with	caring	for	the	residents	at	
all,	notably	forms	of	friendship	between	staff	members.	
The	 first	 of	 these	 factors	 is	 something	 that	 can	 already	 be	 found	 explicitly	
within	the	literature	on	care	where	care	is	variously	described	in	terms	of	not	
only	 providing	 physical	 or	 emotional	 assistance	 directly	 to	 the	 body	 of	 a	
person	 to	 make	 them	 well,	 but	 also	 through	 dwelling	 practices	 and	
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housekeeping/homemaking	 (England,	 2010;	 Schillmeier	 and	 Domenech,	
2009),	disciplining	people	(particularly	 in	 terms	of	caring	 for	children	–	see	
Dunkley,	2009;	Schliehe,	2015),	maintaining	the	environment	(Bennett,	2005;	
Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017),	and	through	the	production	of	wider	policies	and	
governance	(Barnes,	2012).	Similarly,	as	Liz	Bondi	(2008:	250)	makes	clear,	
care	 can	 also	 sometimes	 involve	 emotional	 traits	 that	 are	 somewhat	
paradoxical:	 “[c]are	 oppresses	 and	 inspires;	 it	 hurts	 and	 it	 nurtures;	 it	
demeans	and	 it	 fulfils;	 it	enrages	and	 it	moves;	 it	evokes	 love	and	 it	evokes	
hate”.	 This	 set	 of	 paradoxical	 feelings	 is	 one	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 and	 felt	
throughout	 my	 field	 diary,	 primarily	 through	 the	 various	 moments	 of	
frustration	and	anger	from	carers	and	myself,	where	our	efforts	were	either	
apparently	 not	 appreciated	 by	 the	 residents,	 or	where	 the	 residents	would	
actively	 work	 against	 the	 assistance	 that	 was	 being	 provided.	 I	 was	 once	
punched	in	the	lip	by	a	resident	for	instance	when	trying	to	help	put	an	oxygen	
mask	on	her,	making	me	both	frustrated	and	angry	with	her,	despite	knowing	
it	 wasn’t	 really	 her	 “fault”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	
02/12/2015).	In	this	sense,	we	might	see	the	laughter	from	the	events	in	this	
chapter	as	part	of	this	wider	emotional	landscape	of	caring	relations	with	an	
affective	tonality	that	is	akin	to	these	other	paradoxical	emotional	experiences	
(Bondi,	2008)	and	therefore	as	something	that	is	part	of	working	within	and	
through	care	itself	rather	than	as	something	that	cuts	against	it.	
The	second	point,	about	various	relations	existing	in	care	homes	that	are	not	
necessarily	 framed	around	caring	 for	residents	 is	 far	 less	recognised	within	
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the	 literature,	 which,	 perhaps	 for	 obvious	 reasons,	 has	 largely	 focussed	 on	
‘therapeutic’	practices	and	relations	for	people	in	care,	although	there	is	some	
literature	that	recognises	relations	between	therapeutic	aspects	of	landscapes	
and	wider	socio-spatial	assemblages	(e.g.	Foley,	2011,	2014;	Gorman,	2017a).	
Experiences	of	working	within	care	homes,	however,	bring	to	the	fore	a	series	
of	other	relations	that	exist,	frame	and	shape	the	worlds	of	the	people	within	
them	–	which	in	and	of	themselves	can	perhaps	be	seen	to	exceed	notions	of	
‘therapeutic’	 encounters	 (Emmerson,	 under	 review).	 Although	 there	 are	
perhaps	 too	 many	 of	 these	 relations	 to	 map	 out	 in	 their	 entirety	 here	
(including	economic	relationships,	rivalries,	and	personal	and	medical	issues	
for	 care	workers	 themselves),	 the	most	 significant	 in	 this	 instance	 are	 the	
personal	 friendships	 that	 develop	 between	 different	 workers	 within	 care	
homes.	
Friendship	 is	 widely	 recognised	 as	 a	 specific	 context	 in	 terms	 of	 personal	
relations	between	people	in	that	it	is	governed	by	different	‘rules’	and	social	
conventions	than	relationships	between	colleagues,	strangers,	 ‘superiors’	or	
‘inferiors’,	because	they	are	usually	marked	by	a	levelling	of	power	relations	
and	a	sense	of	mutual	respect	and	understanding	(Green,	1998).	Friendship	is	
also	 something	 that	 is	 culturally	 defined	 to	 some	 respects,	 with	 noted	
differences	in	the	ways	in	which	women	and	men,	older	and	younger	people,	
and	different	classes	of	people,	do	friendship	(ibid).	Recognising	friendships	
within	 the	 care	 home,	 and	 treating	 them	 as	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 entity	 to	
collegiate	 relations,	 thus	 adds	 a	 further	 layer	 of	 complexity	 to	 the	ways	 in	
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which	we	understand	and	contextualise	the	relationship	between	laughter	and	
care,	in	both	representational	and	affective	terms.	Friendships	create	different	
forms	of	 ‘acceptability’	 and	 thus	different	 registers	of	morality	surrounding	
what	can	be,	should	be	and	is	laughed	at	and	about	(Kotthoff,	2006;	Sanders,	
2004)	–	something	we	perhaps	recognise	instinctively,	given	that	many	of	us	
will	 joke	and	 laugh	about	 things	with	our	 friends	that	would	be	completely	
unacceptable	in	terms	of	wider	societies.	We	might	thus	argue	that	friendships	
in	 care	 homes	 enable	 the	 production	 of	 affective	 spacetimes	 that	 are	 both	
different,	 and	 somewhat	 separate,	 from	 the	 normative	 responsibilities,	
practices	and	affectivities	of	care	and	care	work.	
In	this	sense,	we	might	think	about	the	events	of	laughter	in	this	chapter	as	
something	that,	although	ethical	in	the	sense	that	they	do	shape	and	change	
the	world	and	people’s	experiences	of	it	(as	we	have	seen),	might	actually	be	
sometimes	better	thought	of	as	situated	in	spacetimes	that	are	spaced	apart	
from	the	wider	ethics	of	care	within	the	home,	and	therefore	as	something	that	
ultimately	doesn’t	affect	care	itself	in	any	significant	way.	In	other	words,	we	
might	 just	see	 it	as	something	that	happens,	and	affects	people,	but	doesn’t	
actually	matter	 in	 terms	of	 the	wider	workings	or	ethics	of	care	 in	 the	care	
home.	
It	might	 seem	 strange	 to	 come	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 a	 chapter	 focused	 on	 a	
particular	set	of	events,	only	then	to	say	that	perhaps	they	don’t	matter.	What	
this	proposition	does,	however,	is	highlight	a	particular	strength	of	listening	
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to	laughter	as	a	circumstantial	encounter.	Indeed,	what	this	kind	of	listening	
does	is	open	up	intellectual	space	through	which	we	might	(re)think	the	events	
themselves,	 beyond	 the	 immediacy	 of	 their	 representational	 or	 affective	
qualities,	and	open	them	up	to	a	form	of	analysis	that	is	simultaneously	more	
open,	more	speculative,	and	potentially	more	generous	in	its	assessment	of	the	
ethical	 impetus	 of	 the	 bodies	 involved	 in	 each	 scenario	 (Bartos,	 2018;	
Haraway,	2016;	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017).	Put	in	another	way,	it	serves	to	
contribute	 a	 level	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 specific	 forms	 of	 judgements	 and	
understandings	(or	indeed	misunderstandings)	that	we	produce	when	we	are,	
ourselves,	enrolled	within	the	affectivities	of	the	event.	In	this	sense,	this	final	
form	of	 listening	opens	a	space	 in	which	the	events	described	here,	 for	one	
reason	or	another,	may	not	necessarily	have	meant	what	I	thought	they	did	at	
the	time,	mattered	in	the	way	I	thought	they	did	at	the	time,	and	therefore	may	
well	have	had	a	very	different	relationship	with	care	than	my	first	thoughts	
might	have	suggested.	In	other	words,	listening	(and	re-listening)	through	a	
circumstantial	mode,	 opens	 a	 crucial	 space	 for	 the	 listener	 to	 be	wrong	 or	
change	their	mind.	
4.5	|	Conclusion:	Listening	to	laughter	with	care	
The	 rest	 of	my	 time	 spent	 in	 that	 care	 home	with	 these	 same	people	 (and	
indeed	 reflection	 on	my	 time	 in	 the	 one	 before)	 does	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	
perhaps	my	 initial	 assessments	of	 the	 first	 event	 in	 this	 chapter	did	 indeed	
require	a	little	more	nuance.	Indeed,	whilst	it	affected	me	in	particular	ways,	
establishing	 emotional/affective	 alterity	 with	 my	 own	 sense	 of	 morality,	
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seemingly	that	particular	moment	had	very	little	effect	on	the	wider	ways	in	
which	care	was	provided	to	residents,	both	those	who	were	the	subject	of	the	
impressions	and	more	widely.	Indeed,	life	seemed	to	carry	on	‘as	normal’	over	
the	next	few	days	and	weeks,	with	reference	to	this	particular	moment	never	
occurring	again	throughout	my	time	in	the	home.	I	also	never	brought	it	up	
and	so	ultimately,	as	I	suggested	in	the	opening	to	this	chapter,	I	remain	unsure	
of	exactly	what	happened	during	these	moments,	and	what	it	means.	In	this	
sense,	a	cogent	ethical	judgement	about	the	relationship	between	laughter	and	
care	within	this	set	of	events	remains	impossible.	In	terms	of	the	aims	of	this	
chapter,	however,	it	perhaps	doesn’t	seem	to	matter	either	way.		
Where	 the	 experiment	 in	 this	 chapter	 does	 make	 its	 mark,	 however,	 is	 in	
unpacking	how	the	ways	 in	which	we	 listen	to	 laughter	shapes	the	ways	 in	
which	we	think	its	relationships	with	care,	and	ultimately	how	we	think	about	
laughter	with	care	as	an	ethical	 force.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	chapter	has	pushed	
towards	a	recognition	that	when	we	make	judgements	about	care’s	presence	
or	absence,	and	about	whether	we	are	witness	to	good,	bad,	better	or	worse	
care,	we	are	always	ourselves	enacting	an	intervention	(Mol,	2008b).	Indeed,	
as	we	have	seen	throughout	the	chapter,	listening	through	the	three	different	
modes	can	territorialise	often	drastically	different	understandings	of	laughter	
in	 terms	 of	 the	 ways	 it	 can	 induce	 affective	 states,	 feelings	 and	 forces,	
understandings	 and	 misunderstandings	 in	 the	 body,	 and	 that	 these	 often	
exceed	the	intentionality	of	the	laughter	or	listener	themselves.	Together	these	
forces	 thus	 generate	 meaning,	 and	 these	 meanings	 in	 turn	 also	 produce	
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different	understandings	of	 laughter’s	 relationship	with	 care:	 situating	 it	 as	
either	 care-full	 or	 care-less,	 or	 indeed	 sometimes	 as	 something	 that	 is	
somewhat	separate	from	ethics	of	care	in	care	homes	themselves.	
Overall,	the	chapter	has	therefore	looked	to	destabilise	the	certainties	of	each	
mode	of	listening	and	thus	unveil	some	of	the	generative	precarity	that	is	held	
within	their	capacities	to	mean	different	things,	to	different	people	at	different	
times.	 Although	 I	 lean	 most	 heavily	 towards	 the	 circumstantial	 forms	 of	
listening	 within	 this	 thesis,	 the	 point	 of	 this	 experiment	 has	 not	 been	 to	
establish	 one	 form	 of	 listening	 as	 ‘better’	 than	 any	 other,	 but	 rather	 to	
understand	 how	 each	 situates	 laughter	 within	 a	 different	 relation	 to	 care	
therefore	generate	worlds	that	are	framed	around	multiplicities,	rather	than	
universal	 ‘certainties’	 and	 ‘rules’	 (Barad,	 2007;	 McCormack,	 2003).	
Movements	such	as	these	are	important,	as	Maria	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017:	
61)	 argues,	 because	 they	 can	 “leave	 open	 the	 …	 specific	 relational	
arrangements	of	caring	in	each	situation	instead	of	presupposing	there	is	only	
one	 way	 of	 caring”	 and	 therefore	 become	 crucial	 once	 again	 for	 thinking	
through	what	 the	“inescapable	troubles	of	 interdependent	existences”	(ibid:	
70).	As	such,	it	remains	important	to	listen	through	all	three	modes	at	different	
times	when	making	ethical	judgements	about	laughter.	This	allows	the	listener	
to	 move,	 think,	 feel,	 imagine	 and	 speculate	 from	 multiple	 directions	 and	
locations;	shifting	between	centres	and	margins;	and	thus,	generate	accounts	
of	 ethics	 that	 are	more	 open,	 affirmative	 and	 generous	 towards	 laughter’s	
multiple	 roles,	 forms	 and	 functions	 within	 the	 landscapes	 of	 care	 homes	
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themselves.	
Ultimately,	the	residual	uncertainty	surrounding	the	empirical	events	of	this	
chapter,	 although	 significant	 in	 opening	 up	 these	 multiple	 potentials	 and	
meanings	 of	 laughter	 and	 care,	 perhaps	 belies	 the	 power	 of	 this	 way	 of	
thinking	about	their	ethics.	As	such,	the	next	three	chapters	of	this	thesis	build	
on	 this	 approach	 through	 addressing	 laughter’s	multiple	 relationships	with	
care	in	terms	of	three	key	elements:	their	performances	and	practices;	their	
affective	 spatialities;	 and	 the	 ethico-political	 impetus	 that	 surrounds	 them.	
Although	there	is	significant	overlap	between	these	three	elements,	focussing	
on	them	individually	 is	useful	both	 in	mapping	 laughter	onto	the	version	of	
care	ethics	as	outlined	by	Tronto	(1993)	and	others	(e.g.	Conradson,	2011)	and	
used	 throughout	 the	 thesis;	 as	well	 as	onto	 geography’s	 (emergent)	 ethical	
landscapes	 as	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 In	 focussing	 on	 each	 individually,	
therefore,	we	can	not	only	begin	to	diagram	to	multiple	relations	that	emerge	
between	laughter	and	care	–	the	ways	in	which	laughter	works	with,	towards	
or	against	the	maintenance,	continuation,	and	repair	of	worlds	–	but	also	to	
plot	 a	way	 of	 thinking	 through	 the	 ethical	 refrains	 that	make	 up	 the	world	
more	generally,	and	that	geographers	are,	I	argue,	forced	to	confront	in	making	
ethical	sense	of	these	worlds	more	generally.
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Chapter	5:	Performative	folds	of	laughter	and	
care	
[W]hat	kinds	of	subjects	are	we	when	we	laugh?	What	does	it	mean	to	
be	a	laugher,	to	anchor	one’s	subjectivity,	however	provisionally,	in	‘I	
laugh	therefore	I	am	(or	am	not)’?	
(Parvulescu,	2010:	3)	
5.1	|	Introduction	
Where	 the	 previous	 chapter	 was	 concerned	with	 the	 ethics	 of	 listening	 to	
laughter	with	care,	this	chapter	shifts	concern	to	the	ethics	of	its	practices	and	
performances	 in	 care	 homes,	 questioning	 how	 these	 intersect	 with	 other	
practices	and	performances,	notably	those	associated	with	care.	In	attending	
to	 these	 performances,	 however,	 I	 again	 pay	 heed	 to	 the	 circumstantial	
arrangements	surrounding	laughter’s	bursting,	recognising	the	ways	in	which	
the	 meanings	 of	 laughter	 in	 relation	 to	 care	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 contexts,	
cultures,	 spaces	 and	 times	 in	which	 it	 emerges,	 but	 also,	who	 is	 doing	 the	
laughter	 (McCormack,	 2017).	 Although	 this	 approach	 risks	 a	 return	 to	
representationalism,	 such	 as	 producing	 an	 argument	 that	 laughter’s	 ethical	
acceptability	 should	 be	 read	 through	 identity	 politics	 (e.g.	 Albrecht,	 1999;	
Ridanpää,	 2017),	 I	 resist	 this	 through	 framing	 the	 subject	 as	 an	 emergent	
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entity	 that	 is	both	provisional	 and	plural	 (Saldanha,	2010;	Simpson,	2017):	
simultaneously	 situated,	 decentred,	 and	 relational	 (Mol,	 2008a).	 In	 other	
words,	this	chapter	diagrams	the	multiple	ethical	possibilities	afforded	by	the	
doing	of	laughter	as	part	of	everyday	care	practices	through	engaging	with	the	
different,	 yet	 overlapping,	 modes	 of	 relational-subjectivity	 that	 constitute	
‘being-with-in’	care	homes	themselves	(see	Nancy,	2000).	
In	framing	this	discussion,	I	draw	inspiration	from	Nixon’s	(2017)	writings	on	
laughter	 and	 pride,	 specifically	 her	 deployment	 of	Deleuze’s	 (1988a,	 1993)	
concept	of	‘the	fold’	(le	pli).	For	Nixon	(2017)	the	fold	enables	an	affective	and	
ethical	attentiveness	to	the	multiple	ways	in	which	laughter	comes	into	being	
and	thus	what	it	can	do	at	different	moments	through	recognising	the	multiple	
‘scales’	across	which	it	occurs,	in	her	case:	the	individual;	the	collective;	and	
the	structural	(although	following	Guattari	(1995)	I	refer	to	‘the	institutional’	
rather	than	‘the	structural’	in	my	analyses).	My	argument	is	thus	that	applying	
this	framework	to	laughter	with	care	enables	a	more	holistic	understanding	of	
the	multiple	ways	in	which	both	laughter	and	care	are	practised	within	care	
homes,	the	ways	 in	which	they	 fold	 into	and	out	of	one	another	at	different	
times	and	for	different	reasons	and	thus	crucially	enables	an	attentiveness	to	
the	ethical	differences	that	emerge	within	and	between	‘the	subject’	at	each	of	
these	registers.	
The	 significance	of	 this	 approach,	 therefore,	 is	 in	 its	 ‘undoing’	of	normative	
conceptions	of	the	‘the	carer’	as	a	moral	subject	(Bartos	2018),	instead	posing	
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a	more	multiple,	differentiated,	distributed	and	diverse	understanding	of	the	
singular-plurality	through	which	subjects	of	laughter	and	care	come	into	being	
(Nancy,	2000).	This	means	recognising	the	multiple	ways	in	which	practices	of	
laughter	and	care	fold	into	and	out	of	different	modes	of	subjectivity.	This	once	
again	moves	us	away	from	universal	ethics	and	towards	a	more	minor	“ethics	
of	enactment”	in	which	the	ethical	subject	and	the	ethics	of	the	subject	can	be	
seen	as	emergent	and	distributed	entities	(McCormack,	2005:	142),	brought	
into	being	through	the	circumstantial	specificity	of	the	encounters	they	have	
with	a	variegated	set	of	O/others	across	a	variety	of	‘scales’	(Wilson,	2017).	As	
such,	 this	movement	 “provides	 a	 space	 not	 for	 the	 application	of	 pre-given	
moral	 tenants,	 but	 rather	 for	 the	 emergence	 and	 cultivation	 of	 ethical	
sensibilities	 that	 value	moments	of	 generosity	 and	 open	 engagements	with	
difference”	(Darling,	2010:	241).		
I	begin	the	chapter	with	a	discussion	of	the	fold,	drawing	linkages	between	it	
and	 performativity	 and	 thus	 setting	 out	 how	 we	 might	 deploy	 these	 two	
concepts	 together	 in	 thinking	 about	 laughter	 and/with	 care.	 Within	 this	
section,	the	emphasis	is	placed	on	the	ways	in	which	different	practices	serve	
to	constitute	and	transgress	various	forms	of	‘inside’	and	‘outside’.	Following	
this,	 I	 briefly	 turn	 to	 the	 care	 home	 itself,	 positioning	 it	 as	 a	 ‘folded	 place’	
constituted	 through	multiple	different	bodies	moving	between	 ‘insides’	 and	
‘outsides’	 at	 a	variety	of	 scales.	This	discussion	 thus	 sets	up	 the	 individual,	
collective	and	institutional	as	three	key	registers	through	which	‘care’	can	be	
enacted.	These	three	registers	thus	frame	the	discussion	of	laughter	through	
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the	 rest	of	 the	 chapter.	At	 the	 individual	 register,	 I	note	 the	ways	 in	which	
laughter	serves	to	‘externally’	express	‘internal’	qualities,	but	also	how	it	can	
reinforce	 ‘the	 internal’	 in	 relation	 to	 external	 practices.	 At	 the	 collective	
register,	 laughter	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 generate	 and	 reinforce	 the	 boundaries	 of	
different	groups:	including	and	excluding	people	from	them	at	different	times.	
At	the	institutional	register,	laughter	becomes	enveloped	into	the	logics	and	
matters	of	the	care	home,	generating	particular	ways	of	being-within	it	which	
often	exceed	the	idea	of	conscious	choice.	The	conclusion,	therefore,	notes	that	
because	these	three	registers	serve	to	fracture	any	sense	of	a	singular	subject	
of	laughter,	in	thinking	about	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care	we	need	to	adopt	
a	 more	 generous	 ethos	 that	 recognises	 the	 multiple	 positions	 from	which	
laughter	emerges.	
5.2	|	Performative	folds	
Non-representational	 theories	 have	 increasingly	 worked	 to	 decentre	 and	
multiply	the	idea	of	a	pre-existing	singular	‘subject’	(Simpson,	2017),	although	
they	are	by	no	means	alone	 in	 this	 regard.	As	Wylie	 (2010:	99)	notes:	 “the	
status	of	the	‘I’	–	the	gazing	subject,	the	writing	subject,	the	body-subject	–	has	
been	 one	 of	 the	 standout	 problematics	 for	 several	 generations	 of	 critical	
inquiry	 in	 the	 social	 sciences	 and	 humanities.”	 In	 non-representational	
geographies	more	specifically,	we	might	argue	that	 the	resolution	(a	word	I	
use	very	tentatively)	to	this	problematic	has	primarily	taken	two	forms.	First,	
there	has	been	a	desire	to	expand	what	we	might	consider	to	be	a	 ‘subject’,	
primarily	 through	 the	 inclusions	of	non-human	animals,	 objects,	 forces	and	
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affects	(ibid).	Second,	there	has	been	a	more	substantial	movement	to	unsettle	
the	 association	 between	 the	 ideas	 of	 a	 singular	 subject	 with	 a	 singular	
embodied	‘housing’	and	instead	to	position	the	subject	as	an	emergent	entity	
that	 is	 co-constituted	 through	 its	 relations	with	 the	 spatial,	 social,	 cultural,	
economic,	political	and	ethical	worlds	that	the	‘self’	inhabits.	As	Thrift	(1999:	
319,	n7)	writes:	“subjectivity	is	not	an	isolated	state…	but	is	distributed	within	
particular	situations	among	‘dividuals’	of	many	kinds.”	Conceptualisations	of	
the	 subject	 along	 these	 grounds,	 whether	 that	 be	 as	 ‘hybrid’	 (Whatmore,	
1997),	 ‘nomadic’	 (Braidotti,	 2011;	 Colls,	 2012),	 ‘distributed’	 (Mol,	 2008a),	
‘more-than-human’	 (McCormack,	 2013),	 or	 ‘post-human’	 (Roelvink	 and	
Zolkos,	2015)	therefore	all	share	a	relational	understanding	of	the	subject	as	
something	 that	defies	a	neat	 classification	between	 ‘in	here’	 and	 ‘out	 there’	
(see	also	Wylie,	2006).	 In	more	 recent	work,	 Simpson	 (2017:	10,	 emphasis	
mine)	 pushes	 this	 further	 by	 suggesting	 that	 there	 are	 “opportunities	 for	
recognising	 both	 the	 internal	 and	 relative	 differentiation	 of	 subjects	 from	
themselves”.	Whilst	I	will	return	to	the	first	of	these	reimaginings	of	the	subject	
in	the	next	chapter,	I	will	focus	primarily	on	the	second	in	this.	In	this	section,	
in	 particular,	 I	 look	 to	 forward	 a	 means	 of	 thinking	 through	 Simpson’s	
recognition	of	the	internal	differentiation	of	the	subject,	particularly	through	
drawing	on	Deleuze’s	conception	of	‘the	fold’.	
The	fold	(le	pli	[the	pleat])	is	a	conceptual	schema	that	permeates	throughout	
Deleuze’s	 work,	 although	 appears	 most	 recognisably	 within	 his	 books	 on	
Foucault	(Deleuze,	1988a)	and	Leibniz	(Deleuze,	1993).	The	fold	is	essentially	
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one	of	Deleuze’s	ways	of	negotiating	the	boundaries	between	the	‘inside’	and	
‘outside’	of	various	entities	including	buildings,	capitalism,	thought,	power	and	
life	 (Colebrook,	 2002).	 His	 most	 substantial	 deployment	 of	 the	 concept,	
however,	occurs	as	a	means	of	understanding	subjectivity	and	processes	of	
subjectivation.		
In	simple	terms,	the	fold	outlines	the	idea	that	the	‘internal’	is	always	held	in	
continuous	state	of	encounter	with	the	‘external’	whereby	the	inside	is	always	
both	unfolding	into	the	outside,	and	the	outside	being	folded	into	the	inside	
(Nixon,	2017).	Elizabeth	Grosz	(1994)	adopts	a	different	imagery	to	express	
this	same	idea,	in	the	form	of	the	Mobius	Strip.	The	overtly	anti-Cartesian	and	
relational	 characteristics	 of	 the	 fold,	 alongside	 its	 inherent	 spatiality,	 thus	
draw	parallels	between	it	and	a	variety	of	other	poststructuralist,	feminist	and	
phenomenological	thinking	from	within	and	outwith	geography,	which	equally	
stress	 the	 porosity	 of	 borders,	 boundaries	 and	 territories	 and	 thus	 the	
inherent	 fluidity	 of	 the	 spaces,	 places,	 bodies,	 subjects,	 objects,	 matters,	
practices	and	affects	that	make	up	‘the	world’	(Grosz,	1994;	Longhurst,	1995;	
Merleau-Ponty,	 2002).	 These	 connections	 thus	 enable,	 in	 a	 resolutely	
Deleuzian	 fashion,	 a	 series	 of	 linkages	 to	 emerge	 with	 other	 conceptual	
apparatus	frequently	deployed	in	geographical	thinking.	However,	there	are	
two	 key	 conceptual	 differences	 afforded	 by	 the	 fold.	 As	Wylie	 (2006:	 529,	
emphasis	mine)	writes:	
The	precise	distinction	of	Leibnizian	philosophy,	as	Deleuze	presents	it,	
is	 that	 it	 offers	 a	 nonphenomenological	 alternative	 to	 Cartesian	
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accounts	 of	 spatiality.	 The	 world	 is	 neither	 a	 res	 extensa	 of	 three	
indifferent,	 rectilinear	 dimensions	 nor,	 pace	Heidegger	 and	Merleau-
Ponty,	the	existential	context	of	being-in	and	being-there.	Instead,	‘the	
world	is	an	indefinite	series	of	curvatures	or	inflections	...	the	world	is	
the	 infinite	 curve	 that	 touches	 at	 an	 infinity	 of	 points	 an	 infinity	 of	
curves’	 ([Deleuze]	1992,	page	24).	 In	 this	world,	 the	 fold,	rather	than	
the	subject	or	object,	is	primary…	
Whilst	the	full	implications	of	this	differentiation	are	perhaps	too	numerous	to	
outline	 within	 this	 short	 section	 (see	 Doel	 (1996)	 and	 Wylie	 (2006)	 for	
detailed	accounts	from	a	geographical	perspective),	the	fundamental	point	of	
importance	here	is	that	placing	the	fold	as	the	primary	element	of	the	world	
serves	 to	 de-essentialize	 the	 subjects	 of	 both	 laughter	 and	 care	 (and	 their	
associated	 ethics),	 instead	 positioning	 the	 subject	 as	 an	 always	 dynamic,	
relational	becoming	that	is	constituted	differently	depending	on	the	particular	
configuration	 of	 foldings	 surrounding	 ‘its’	 emergence	 (Deleuze,	 1988a).	 In	
other	 words,	 ‘the	 subject’	 can	 be	 seen	 ‘simply’	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 the	
circumstantial	 arrangement	 of	 foldings	 (material,	 practised,	 affective,	
discursive)	that	constitute	a	given	spacetime	(McCormack,	2013,	2017).	This	
fundamental	point	of	importance	thus	leads	to	a	second,	yet	equally	significant	
implication	 for	 thinking	 about	 the	 subject	which	 is:	 given	 that	 foldings	 are	
themselves	 always	multiples,	 so	 too	must	 be	 the	 subjectivities	 that	 emerge	
from	them,	even	within	a	single	body.	Whilst	Deleuze	does	address	this	issue	
of	subjective	multiplicity	in	his	own	writings	(particularly	through	the	“four	
folds”	 outlined	 in	 the	 Foucault	 book),	 it	 perhaps	 crystallises	 most	 clearly	
through	 his	 work	 with	 Guattari	 (see	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari,	 1983,	 1988),	
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encapsulated	 by	 their	 understanding	 of	 ‘the	 subject’	 as	 inherently	
schizophrenic:	always	many	selves.	In	building	on	this	work,	Guattari	(1995)	
would	later	pose	three	modes	of	subjective	territorialisation	–	the	individual,	
the	collective,	and	the	institutional	–	which	I	have	deployed	here	as	a	structural	
typology,	 for	 thinking	 through	 the	 internally	 differentiated	 subject,	
particularly	within	the	context	of	care	homes.	
The	 fold,	 therefore,	 offers	 a	 means	 of	 conceptualising	 the	 variegated	
circumstances	 that	 surround	 the	 subjects	 of	 laughter	 with	 care	 as	 always	
multiple:	always	in	excess	of	a	singular,	universal,	moral/ethical	positioning.	
There	is,	however,	a	need	to	think	more	clearly	about	how	these	folds	affect	
practices	 of	 laughter	 and	 care	 themselves,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
capacities	of	laughter	and	care	to	fold	into	and	out	of	one	another.	In	doing	this,	
we	might	turn	more	explicitly	to	Nixon’s	(2017)	writings	around	laughter	in	
which	she	deploys	the	fold	alongside	somewhat	more	central	socio-geographic	
concepts,	 notably	 ideas	 of	 inclusion	 (‘inside’)	 and	 exclusion	 (‘outside’).	
Although	 never	 made	 explicit,	 Nixon’s	 paper	 is	 in	 this	 way	 suggestive	 of	
laughter	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 performative	 action	 that	 serves	 to	 (re)produce	 both	
spaces	and	subjectivities	 in	a	variety	of	ways	(perhaps	unsurprisingly	given	
that	both	performativity	and	the	fold	have	a	shared	Foucauldian	root).	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 therefore,	 engaging	 performativity	 and	 the	 fold	 together	
therefore,	particularly	through	non-representational	theories	(see	Dewsbury,	
2000;	Latham,	2003;	Thrift,	2000,	2004b;	Thrift	and	Dewsbury,	2000),	can	be	
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seen	to	facilitate	further	understanding	of	the	ways	in	which	laughter	and	care	
enact	differently	folded	relational	configurations,	particularly	through	moving	
or	 reinforcing	 the	 ‘boundaries’	between	bodies,	matters	and	affects.	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 performative	 also	 speaks	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 bodies’	
differentiated	relationality	can	fold	into,	and	shape,	the	enactment	of	laughter	
and	care	themselves,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	kinds	of	circumstances	out	of	
which	these	doings	emerge.	As	the	previous	chapter	attested	to,	the	ways	in	
which	we	do	both	laughter	and	care	amongst	friends,	for	example,	is	markedly	
different	 from	 how	 we	 might	 perform	 them	 with	 strangers	 or	 senior	
colleagues.	
Crucially,	however,	these	two	elements	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	but	rather	
establish	 a	 dynamic	 relationality	where	 each	 becomes	 both	 the	 inside	 and	
outside	of	each	other.	As	Deleuze	(1988a:	96–97)	writes,	“the	outside	is	not	a	
fixed	limit	but	a	moving	matter	animated	by	peristaltic	movements,	folds	and	
foldings	that	together	make	up	an	inside”.	Furthermore,	as	Nixon	(2017:	36)	
argues:	
That	Deleuze	evokes	peristalsis	and	digestion	is	not	unintentional;	he	
references	bodily	processes	as	exemplary	of	the	movement	of	folding	to	
describe	 the	 embodied	 negotiations	 between	 inside	 and	 outside,	
absorption	 and	 repulsion,	 a	 body-subject	 perpetually	 undergoes	
(Deleuze,	 1988).	 Food	 and	drink,	 consciousness,	 spatial	 negotiations,	
encounters	with	ideas,	feelings,	other	human	and	non-human	animals,	
are	material	affective	encounters	with	our	environments	that	 involve	
negotiating	foldings	both	above	and	below	conscious	perception.	
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The	 burst	 of	 laughter	 has	 long	 been	 associated	 with	 the	 fluidity	 of	 bodily	
functions	 (see	Bakhtin,	1984)	and	clearly	demonstrates	a	mode	of	material	
unfolding	 from	 inside	 to	outside	of	 the	body:	 “a	process	of	breaking	bodily	
boundaries”,	with	the	“emphatic	involvement	of	guts	as	a	designated	source	of	
the	utterance”	which	thus	serves,	in	some	ways,	to	“turn	the	body	inside	out”	
as	Jack	Katz	(1999:	322,	340)	suggests.	Yet	laughter	also	does	social	work	that	
might	 equally	 be	 considered	 as	 performative	 foldings	 (Nixon,	 2017).	 Emily	
Douglas	 (2015)	 for	 instance	 argues	 that	 laughter	 serves	 as	 a	 means	 of	
normalising	 certain	 kinds	 of	 bodies	 and	 behaviours	 through	 mocking	
difference	 (see	 also	 Billig,	 2005),	 but	 also	 through	 modes	 of	 compulsory	
happiness.	Quoting	Sara	Ahmed	(2010:	55),	she	argues	that	“happiness	is	not	
so	much	what	the	[happy	housewife	archetype]	has	but	what	she	does	…	any	
deviation	 from	gender	roles	 in	 terms	of	women	being	trained	to	make	men	
happy	 is	 a	 deviation	 from	 the	 happiness	 of	 all”	 (see	 Douglas,	 2015:	 148).	
Elsewhere,	Ridanpää	(2017:	64)	discusses	the	role	that	laughter	plays	in	the	
narrativisation	 of	 belonging,	 arguing	 that	 it	 can	 be	 “simultaneously	
understood	both	as	a	performative	act	of	narrativization	and	also	as	a	topic	of	
narrativization”,	 thus	 reinforcing	 feelings	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	
depending	 whether	 or	 not	 you	 are	 ‘in’	 on	 the	 joke.	 Nixon’s	 (2017)	
conceptualisations	are	somewhat	more	fluid	in	that	they	speak	to	less	static	
positions	of	norm,	centre	and	inside,	instead	posing	laughter	as	something	that	
works	 to	 continuously	 fold	 different	 people	 into	 and	 out	 of	 specific	 social	
configurations	 at	 different	moments,	 thus	 shifting	 the	 boundaries	 between	
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what	it	means	to	be	included	or	excluded	within	a	given	situation.	
Care	too	can	be	conceptualised	as	a	form	of	performative	folding.	In	practice,	
the	 doing	 of	 care	 often	 involves	 the	 ‘sharing’	 of	 emotional	 states	 to	 create	
modes	of	sympathy,	empathy,	support	and	even	love,	which	similarly	speak	to	
the	blurring	of	boundaries	between	the	‘internal’	self	and	the	‘external’	other,	
as	well	as	movements	between	feelings	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.	In	material	
terms,	 care	 work	 also	 often	 involves	 the	 blurring	 of	 bodily	 boundaries,	
sometimes	 through	 the	 active	 folding	 of	 matters	 into	 a	 body	 (e.g.	
administering	medications),	but	also	through	dealing	with	bodily	 fluids	and	
matters	that	come	out	of	another’s	body,	whether	that	be	blood,	mucus,	saliva,	
urine	or	faecal	matter	(see	McDowell,	2009).	As	such,	to	care	(and	to	be	cared	
for)	can	be	seen	as	a	reciprocal	movement	in	which	the	self	becomes	affectively	
entwined,	or	folded	together,	with	the	self	of	another	in	order	to	enact	a	change	
of	some	sort	(Conradson,	2011):	the	interwoven	web	of	life	to	which	Tronto	
(1993)	speaks.	The	doing	of	care	however	is	also	often	bound	up	with	a	series	
of	 wider	 structural	 forces	 which	 fold	 together	 to	 associate	 and	 normalise	
particular	cultural	expectations	about	the	kinds	of	people	who	are	considered	
responsible	for	care	work	–	notably	female,	black	and	migrant	bodies	(Lawson,	
2007,	2009;	McGregor,	2007)	–	as	well	as	the	kinds	of	(moral)	subjectivities	
that	these	same	people	should	perform	emotionally	and	practically	(Barnes,	
2012;	Tronto,	1993).	
What	we	start	to	see	through	this	brief	discussion,	therefore,	are	the	ways	in	
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which	the	folding	and	unfolding	of	bodies,	matters	and	affects	into	different	
configurations	through	doing	both	laughter	and	care	can	not	only	emerge	from	
particular	 subjective	 positions	 but	 also	 serve	 to	 (re)produce	 these	 same	
positions.	 What’s	 more,	 underlying	 these	 movements	 of	 folding,	 there	 are	
often	 implicit	 ethical	 presuppositions	 whereby	 the	 enactments	 generated	
through	 folding	 take	 on	 differentiated	meanings	 depending	 on	 the	ways	 in	
which	wider	foldings	produce	‘the	subject’	under	question.	As	such,	in	thinking	
about	 the	ethics	of	 folding	laughter	and	care	together	 it	once	again	remains	
absolutely	vital	 to	attend	 to	 the	particularities	of	 the	 subject	 in	 terms	of	 its	
complex	folded	relationship	with	both	space	and	society	and	thus	understand	
the	 circumstantial	 implications	 of	 what	 is	 happening	 at	 each	 moment.	 In	
thinking	about	doing	laughter	with	care	in	care	homes	specifically,	however,	
this	is	complicated	further	through	the	recognition	of	the	plurality	of	enfolded	
subject	 positions	 (individual,	 collective,	 institutional)	 that	 care	 homes	
produce.	As	such,	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	looks	to	draw	out	the	doing	of	
laughter	 with	 care	 through	 these	 three	 positions	 and	 question	 how	 this	
recognition	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 folding	 can	 shape	 our	 understandings	 of	 the	
ethics	of	laughter	and	care	themselves.	In	setting	this	up,	however,	it	becomes	
important	 to	 outline	 how	 these	 subjective	 positions	 emerge	 through	
examining	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 spaces	 of	 the	 care	 home	 itself	 emerge	
through,	and	enact,	a	series	of	foldings.		
5.3	|	Care	homes	as	‘folded	places’	
Places	 of	 care,	 such	 as	 care	 homes,	 are	 increasing	 being	 conceptualised	 in	
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relational	terms	with	a	series	of	different	scholars	suggesting	that	we	examine	
them	 as	 ‘landscapes’	 (Gesler,	 1992;	 Milligan	 and	 Wiles,	 2010),	 ‘ecologies’	
(Conradson,	2005),	 ‘assemblages’	(Duff,	2014;	Foley,	2011,	2014),	or	indeed	
simply	that	we	must	view	them	as	relational	places	constituted	through	their	
interconnections	with	 other	 places	 (Andrews	et	 al.,	 2005;	 Gorman,	 2017c).	
Although	 these	 approaches	 differ	 in	 their	 conceptions	 of	 exactly	 how	 we	
should	approach	spaces	of	care,	they	all	recognise	“the	individual,	objects	and	
the	milieu	of	place	as	open,	connected	and	mutually	constitutive”	(Lea,	2008:	
91).	 In	other	words,	all	of	 these	accounts	recognise	that	 the	 interrelation	of	
forces	that	are	both	‘inside’	and	‘outside’	specific	body/ies	and	environments	
all	play	a	crucial	part	in	constituting	the	experiences	of	‘the	self’	who	is	caring	
or	being	cared	for	in	particular	places	(see	Conradson,	2005).	Drawing	on	from	
this,	 therefore,	we	can	start	 to	see	how	the	 fold	might	contribute	 further	to	
understanding	the	dynamic	and	contingent	nature	of	these	places,	particularly	
through	recognising	how	various	bodies,	things,	ideas	and	affects	serve	to	fold,	
unfold	and	refold	these	relations	as	they	move	‘into’	and	‘out	of’	the	places	of	
care	in	question	(Nixon,	2017).	
In	thinking	about	care	homes	specifically,	therefore,	we	might	note	the	ways	
in	which	various	external	‘bodies’	influence	the	internal	workings	of	the	home	
itself.	Perhaps	the	most	obvious	of	 these	are	the	political,	medical	and	 legal	
institutions	 (briefly	discussed	 in	Chapter	3)	which	dictate	both	 the	 funding	
available	to	care	homes,	as	well	as	making	and	enforcing	rules	and	regulations	
around	care	practices	specifically	(e.g.	from	the	Care	Quality	Commission)	and	
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more	 general	 laws	 around	 employment	 and	 statutory	 rights	 for	 workers.	
Similarly,	we	might	note	a	series	of	other	socio-economic	structures	that	also	
shape	the	spatialities	of	different	care	homes.	Again,	as	noted	in	Chapter	3,	in	
both	 homes	 that	 I	worked	 in	 residents’	 care	was	 primarily	 funded	 by	 local	
authorities	meaning	that	the	access	to	funding,	and	thus	the	facilities	available,	
were	 fewer	 than	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 large-scale	 ‘up-market’	 private	 care	
home	providers4	that	I	encountered	during	my	time	with	the	theatre	groups.	
These	 private	 care	 homes	 “were	 completely	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 both	
environment	and	set-up.	Much	nicer,	more	open,	with	everything	looking	new	
and	fresh”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Pantomime	Group,	22/01/2016).	As	such,	we	
can	start	to	see	the	ways	in	which	the	‘insides’	of	care	homes	are	always	in	part	
a	reflection	of	their	relations	with	the	‘outside’	world.		
Socio-economic	 foldings	 do	 not	 just	 affect	 the	 materialities	 of	 the	 space,	
however,	 but	 also	 the	 kinds	of	 bodies	who	 enter	 particular	 homes,	 both	 in	
terms	of	workers	and	residents.	At	a	more	general	register,	for	instance,	we	
might	 note	 that	 in	 both	 homes	 that	 I	 worked	 in	 the	 staff	 members	 were	
predominantly	working-class	women,	many	also	being	recent	migrants	to	the	
UK	 (both	 from	 EU	 countries	 such	 as	 Poland	 and	 Romania,	 but	 also	 from	
countries	in	the	Global	South,	notably	India,	Pakistan,	the	Philippines,	Nigeria	
and	Zimbabwe)	These	are	all	common	traits	amongst	care	workers	in	‘Global	
																																																								
4	“Sunrise	Living”	is	a	typical	example	of	such	a	provider	in	the	UK,	see	https://www.sunrise-
care.co.uk/	
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North	 Countries’	 and	 is	 well	 recognised	 within	 the	 literatures	 on	 the	
geographies	of	care	(see	Dyck,	2005;	McDowell,	2009;	McGregor,	2007).	At	a	
more	specific	register,	however,	we	might	note	the	interconnectedness	of	the	
residents	and	‘the	places’	in	which	each	care	home	was	situated,	with	almost	
all	of	the	residents	in	each	home	previously	living	within	close	proximity	to	it.	
This	meant	 that	 they	often	knew	about	 the	home	prior	 to	entering	 it	and	 in	
many	cases	would	have	some	form	of	personal	connection	with	at	least	one	
staff	member	from	within	the	home	(who	might	be	friends	with	one	of	their	
children,	nephews	or	nieces	for	instance,	or	in	one	case,	a	resident	used	to	be	
one	of	the	care	worker’s	teachers	at	school).	This	again	speaks	strongly	to	how	
certain	 interconnections	 between	 the	 insides	 and	 outsides	 of	 care	 homes	
shape	the	kinds	of	(caring)	interactions	that	occur	within	them.	
It’s	also	worth	noting	that	these	processes	of	folding	can	occur	in	much	more	
banal	and	subtle	ways,	through	the	literal	movement	of	different	bodies	into	
and	 out	 of	 the	 home.	 Indeed,	 a	 huge	 variety	 of	 different	 bodies	 cross	 the	
threshold	of	 the	home	on	a	daily	basis	with:	workers	arriving	to	start	shifts	
and	leaving	at	the	end	of	them;	family	members	and	friends	of	relatives	coming	
in	and	out	to	visit	them;	delivery	drivers	bringing	in	food,	drinks,	medications	
and	other	goods,	or	taking	away	rubbish	and	medical	waste;	and,	indeed,	as	
residents	 arrive	 into	 the	 home	 for	 admission	 into	 care	 and	 leave	 to	 go	 to	
appointments,	to	hospital	or	because	they	have	died.	Each	of	these	movements	
thus	marks	a	moment	of	folding	which	has	the	capacity	to	change	the	nature	
of	 the	 care	 home	 as	 a	 place.	 At	 its	 simplest,	 this	 change	 emerges	 through	
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reworking	who	is	involved	within	the	care	home	and	thus	who	might	require,	
aid	or	disrupt	the	care	that	is	provided	–	with	family	members,	in	particular,	
seeming	 to	 fold	 into	 and	 out	 of	 the	 home	 in	 different	 ways	 in	 that	 they	
sometimes	help	staff	with	everyday	tasks,	but	sometimes	also	‘get	in	the	way’	
a	bit,	or	challenge	staff	on	certain	issues.	
Often	this	change	seems	to	occur	simply	within	the	immediacy	of	the	moment:	
a	resident	might	seem	happier	when	a	particular	staff	member	is	on	shift	or	
their	family	are	present;	people	might	become	excited	if	a	dog	comes	in	with	
someone;	a	staff	member	might	become	annoyed	by	someone	else;	or	someone	
might	not	arrive	for	work,	leaving	the	home	short	staffed	until	cover	can	arrive.	
As	 Conradson	 (2005:	 340)	 notes,	 however:	 “[h]umans	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	
psychically	internalise	their	experiences,	in	a	sense	folding	particular	events	
into	their	selves,	so	that	even	short-lived	relational	encounters	may	resonate	
and	 have	 effects	 beyond	 their	 immediate	 occurrence”.	 At	 one	 stage,	 for	
instance,	 I	questioned	whether	the	disruption	caused	by	being	short-staffed	
the	previous	day	had	rolled	over	on	the	next,	suggesting	the	ways	in	which	the	
folding	 together	 of	 particular	 collectives	 of	 bodies	 (human	 or	 otherwise)	
within	the	home	can	shape	how	particular	care	practices	are	given,	received	
and	experienced:		
The	 home	 felt	 very	 sedated	 this	 morning,	 with	 the	 residents	 and	 staff	
seeming	quieter	 than	usual.	 I	wonder	 if	 this	 is	a	knock-on	 from	 the	day	
before	 when	we	were	 short	 staffed	 and	 everything	was	 running	 behind	
which	always	seems	to	leave	residents	unsettled.	There	is	something	here	
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about	 the	 rhythms	of	 the	home	and	how	 sensitive	 these	are	 to	 forms	of	
disruption	–	almost	like	an	ecosystem	I	guess?		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	28/06/2016)	
We	might	also	note	the	ways	in	which	the	folding	between	‘inside’	and	‘outside’	
of	 individual	 bodies	 are	 directly	 implicated	 in	 practices	 of	 care	 within	 the	
home.	Often	care	 is	about	repairing	the	 internal	spaces	of	 the	body,	both	 in	
terms	 of	 material	 dysfunction	 (illness)	 whereby	 other	 matters,	 such	 as	
medications	are	folding	into	bodies	in	order	to	make	them	better,	or	in	terms	
of	emotional	unrest,	whereby	certain	forms	of	emotional	labour	are	deployed	
in	order	to	help	people	feel	better	in	themselves	(Dyer	et	al.,	2008),	or	perhaps	
most	often	a	mixture	of	these	two	forms	of	care	is	undertaken	(see	Atkinson	et	
al.,	 2011).	 Similarly,	 the	 staff	 members’	 health	 and	 emotions	 also	 inflect	
practices	of	care	in	various	ways.	A	staff	member	might,	for	instance,	be	in	a	
bad	mood	which	can	shape	their	capacities	to	perform	the	kinds	of	emotional	
labours	described	above	(see	also	Hochschild,	1983).	Furthermore,	the	health	
of	the	staff	members	can	also	intersect	with	their	capacities	to	perform	care.	
On	 several	 occasions	 staff	 members	 had	 to	 leave	 work	 because	 they	 were	
feeling	 unwell,	 and	 I	 noted	 at	 one	 point	 that	because	 I	was	 starting	 to	 feel	
unwell	I	was	finding	it	more	difficult	to	concentrate	on	the	work	I	was	doing	in	
the	care	home,	feeling	a	“little	less	able	to	attend	to	the	residents’	wants	and	
whims	or	listen	to	their	stories”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	
22/06/2016)	–	with	the	language	used	here	perhaps	indicating	my	reduced	
capacity	for	care.	
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The	 internal	 spaces	 of	 care	 homes	 themselves,	 therefore,	 are	 far	 from	
homogeneous	entities,	but	 can	also	be	 seen	 as	a	 series	of	 foldings	between	
insides	and	outsides	of	various	kinds.	We	might	note	that	the	internal	spaces	
of	 the	 office,	 lounge,	 bathroom	 or	 a	 resident’s	 bedroom	 are	 qualitatively	
different	to	the	other	spaces	of	the	home	both	in	terms	of	their	functions	and	
the	kinds	of	practices	that	happen	within	them.	This	is	again	not	to	say	that	
they	 are	 bounded	 in	 any	 way:	 there	 is	 significant	 movement	 across	 the	
thresholds	of	these	spaces,	both	in	terms	of	the	physical	movement	of	people	
into	and	out	of	them,	and	in	terms	of	various	symbolic	interactions,	rules	and	
procedures	 around	 what	 can	 and	 should	 happen	 within	 them,	 which	 are	
implemented	from	outside	the	specific	rooms.	Alongside	this,	however,	there	
is	 also	a	 sense	 that	 the	 spaces	of	particular	rooms	are	 constructed	 through	
processes	of	unfolding,	or	externalisation,	of	the	individuals	who	inhabit	them	
(see	also	Valentine,	2001).	Although	this	was	visible	within	both	care	homes	
more	generally,	it	is	perhaps	in	terms	of	the	bedrooms	that	this	becomes	most	
obvious:	
The	bedrooms	upstairs	were	strikingly	different	from	each	other	(and	to	
the	 feel	of	downstairs).	They	were	all	decorated	 individually	–	making	a	
small	statement	about	the	people	who	live	in	them.	If	I’m	honest,	I	hadn’t	
really	noticed	the	differences	too	much	until	I	walked	into	a	room	that	had	
even	been	carpeted	differently.	The	floor	felt	softer	underfoot	and	walking	
on	it	made	me	feel	warm	and	cosy.	It	was	funny	as	well	because	I	found	
myself	paying	extra	care	in	the	room,	spending	longer	making	the	bed	and	
arranging	all	of	the	cushions	nicely.	I	wonder	if	she	will	notice.	It	was	a	nice	
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difference	in	that	room.	It	felt	like	home.			
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	12/10/2015)	
Here	then	we	start	to	get	a	sense	of	the	ways	in	which	places	of	care	fold	into	
and	out	of	different	bodies,	generating	differences	within	the	ways	in	which	
care	itself	is	both	felt	and	practised:	the	unfolding	of	an	individual	resident	into	
the	space	and	the	subsequent	folding	of	that	expression	of	space	into	my	body	
seems	to	cause	me	to	pay	extra	care	to	the	room.	What’s	crucial	here,	therefore,	
are	 the	dynamic	processes	of	 folding	 that	 cut	across	and	between	different	
bodies,	matters	 and	 affects	which	 together	 influence	 the	 kinds	 of	 care	 that	
occurs.	 In	many	ways,	 therefore,	 this	 example	 serves	 to	 exemplify	how	 the	
various	foldings	that	make	up	places	of	care	come	to	matter,	often	in	relatively	
banal	ways:	whether	that	 is	 through	the	 inclusion	of	certain	bodies	 into	the	
home,	which	changes	its	capacities	to	run	smoothly	and	efficiently,	or	through	
new	forms	of	‘best	practice’	which	change	the	nature	of	what	can	and	should	
be	done	at	particular	points.	
In	bringing	this	section	to	a	close,	therefore,	it’s	worth	noting	a	clear	similarity	
between	 this	 idea	 and	 other	 relational	 approaches	 to	 care	 noted	 above,	
particularly	 assemblage	 (Duff,	 2014;	 Foley,	 2011,	 2014)	 and	 ecological	
approaches	(Conradson,	2005).	Yet	my	argument	would	be	that	‘the	fold’	adds	
a	 further	 level	 of	 multiplicity	 and	 nuance	 to	 these	 approaches	 through	 its	
capacities	 to	 think	 both	 ‘holistically’	 and	 ‘finitely’	 at	 the	 same	 time	 (Nancy,	
2003):	that	is	to	say,	through	focussing	on	the	fold,	rather	than	‘the	subject’,	
we	can	start	to	understand	care	(and	the	people	who	‘do’	it)	as	something	that	
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is	 always	distributed	and	differentiated	 through(out)	 the	places	 in	which	 it	
occurs.	Across	this	section	as	a	whole,	therefore,	it	becomes	clear	that	 ‘care’	
emerges	in	care	homes	across	a	number	of	different	foldings	simultaneously,	
notably:	individual,	collective	and	institutional	folds	(Guattari,	1995).	In	other	
words,	 care	 in	 care	 homes	 is	 not	 just	 provided	 through	 institutional	
frameworks,	 collections	 of	 bodies	 working	 together,	 or	 individuals	 doing	
things	 for	other	 individuals,	but	rather	 it	works	across	all	 three	registers	 in	
different	ways	at	the	same	time.	This,	in	turn,	means	that	the	idea	of	a	singular	
ethic	 of	 care	 for	 care	 homes	 itself	 becomes	 fractured,	 distributed	 and	
differentiated,	something	that	becomes	crucial	for	understanding	the	ethics	of	
laughter’s	working	within	them.	As	such,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	offers	
three	sections	that	piece	through	laughter’s	capacities	to	inflect	care	at	each	of	
these	registers,	starting	with	the	individual,	then	the	collective	and	finally	the	
institutional.	
5.4	|	‘Individual’	practices	of	laughter	with	care		
As	briefly	touched	upon	above,	much	of	what	happens	in	care	homes	is	guided	
by	 ‘individuals’,	 each	with	 their	 own	 personalities,	 identities,	 histories	 and	
lives	outside	of	the	care	home.	This	is	true	not	just	of	the	staff	members,	but	
also	 family	 members,	 other	 support	 workers,	 visitors	 and,	 of	 course,	 the	
residents	themselves,	each	of	whom	brings	these	subjectivities	into	the	home	
with	 them	whenever	 they	 cross	 the	 threshold.	 Indeed,	 people	would	 often	
share	elements	of	their	lives	with	each	other	and	with	the	residents	through	
talking	 about	 their	 friends	 and	 families,	 sharing	 stories	 about	holidays	 and	
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activities	and	seeking	advice	from	others	about	problems	or	issues	that	they	
were	 facing.	 These	 activities	 sometimes	 occurred	 somewhat	 in	 separation	
from	care	itself,	but	more	often	would	end	up	becoming	folded	into	the	ways	
in	which	care	is	done	within	the	care	home,	albeit	in	relatively	banal	ways.	For	
example:	
I	spent	most	of	the	morning	working	on	the	ground	floor	with	Melissa.	We	
were	 supposed	 to	 be	 doing	 activities.	 However,	 Melissa	 has	 her	 driving	
theory	test	later	this	week	and	was	worrying	about	it	quite	a	lot.	She	kept	
pulling	up	the	test	app	on	her	phone	and	doing	questions	(which	she	kept	
getting	wrong).	Both	David	and	I	were	trying	to	help	her,	whilst	pottering	
about	 getting	 bits	 and	 pieces	 for	 the	 residents.	 Eventually,	 we	 started	
asking	the	residents	the	questions	from	the	test,	which	they	mostly	didn’t	
know	the	answers	to,	but	it	became	a	sort	of	activity	in	and	of	itself.	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	03/08/2016).	
Whilst	this	example	is	relatively	rare	in	its	overt	nature	it’s	worth	noting	that	
individual	 subjectivities	 become	 folded	 into	 the	 care	 practices	 that	 they	
provide	 almost	 constantly	within	 care	 settings,	 albeit	 in	 subtler	 forms.	One	
carer	 in	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	 for	 instance,	 would	 tell	 almost	 all	 the	
residents	 about	 her	 recent	 successes	 and	 failures	 at	 Bingo	whilst	 she	 was	
undertaking	whatever	form	of	care	they	needed,	and	many	others,	across	both	
homes,	would	show	pictures	of	their	children	or	dogs	to	the	residents	and	tell	
them	about	 things	that	were	going	on	at	home.	At	a	more	generic	 level,	we	
might	note	the	ways	in	which	different	people’s	personalities	affect	the	ways	
in	which	they	both	engage	with	the	residents	whilst	caring	(e.g.	being	friendly,	
cheery,	distanced	or	nonchalant)	and	the	ways	in	which	they	actually	do	care	
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itself,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 they	 imagine	 what	 might	 be	 ‘good’,	
‘enjoyable’	or	‘comforting’	for	the	residents	at	different	moments.	Some	staff	
members,	 for	 instance,	 are	 much	 more	 intimately	 ‘touchy-feely’	 with	 the	
residents,	 hugging	 them	 and	 kissing	 them	on	 the	 cheeks	 and	 foreheads	 for	
instance,	whereas	other	carers	(myself	included)	were	seemingly	a	little	less	
intimate	in	their	touching,	perhaps	holding	a	resident’s	hand	or	squeezing	a	
shoulder,	but	not	more.	
One	of	the	most	obvious	foldings	in	this	manner,	however,	relates	to	laughter.	
In	a	 similar	manner	 to	 touching,	 the	ways	 in	which	 individuals	do	 laughter	
within	 care	homes	can	vary	widely	depending	on	 their	disposition	 towards	
laughter	 (including	 their	 sense	of	humour),	which	shapes	how	often,	when,	
where	and	at	what	they	would	laugh.	Some	people,	for	instance,	would	involve	
laughter	relatively	ubiquitously	within	their	everyday	practices:	laughing	at	a	
whole	manner	of	different	things	(many	of	which	were,	to	my	mind,	not	at	all	
funny).	 Others	 would	 be	 much	 more	 reserved	 with	 their	 laughter,	 rarely	
laughing	 despite	 their	good	 ‘humour’;	 and	others	 still	would	 tell	 numerous	
jokes,	but	 rarely	 laugh	 themselves.	 In	 terms	of	 jokes,	 these	were	 also	often	
inflected	 through	 individuals’	 personalities	 and	 lives.	 In	 Summerview,	 for	
instance,	one	of	the	carers	spent	a	whole	lunch	break	trying	to	teach	the	rest	
of	 us	 to	 swear	 in	 Polish,	 causing	 huge	 amounts	 of	 laughter,	 both	when	we	
pronounced	 the	words	 right	 and	when	we	 pronounced	 them	wrong	 (Field	
Diary	 Notes,	 Summerview	 Care	 Home,	 21/06/2016).	 There	 was	 a	 similar	
moment	of	significant	laughter	in	Winterbourne	relating	to	a	video	of	a	band	
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who	performed	parodies	of	AC/DC	songs,	whom	one	of	 the	carers	had	seen	
recently	 at	 a	 music	 festival	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	
05/12/2015).	Together,	 then,	 these	brief	examples	show	the	ways	 in	which	
the	enactment	of	laughter	within	care	homes	can	emerge	as	a	folding	of	factors	
that	are	both	outside	and	inside	their	walls.		
In	terms	of	the	doing	of	laughter	with-in	care	itself	a	similar	mode	of	folding	
can	be	seen	to	apply	whereby	the	ways	in	which	carers	do	laughter	serves	to	
express	something	of	the	individual	 ‘self’	when	attending	to	matters	of	care.	
Here	laughter	can	perhaps	most	clearly	be	seen	as	a	way	of	‘showing’	that	you	
are	kind	or	 friendly	(to	echo	the	CQC	report	 from	Chapter	1),	and	thus	as	a	
means	 of	 demonstrating	 that	 you	 care.	 Often,	 this	 is	 a	 relatively	 banal	
occurrence	–	simply	a	case	of	either	laughing	at	the	appropriate	time	when	a	
resident	makes	a	joke	or	trying	to	make	the	resident	laugh	by	making	jokes	
yourself.	Laughing	in	these	instances,	however,	demonstrates	another	form	of	
folding	 at	 the	 individual	 level	whereby	 doing	 laughter	 becomes	 a	means	 of	
folding	 together	 two	 people,	 shifting	 the	 boundaries	 between	 them	 as	
individuals,	and	thus	enabling	forms	of	intersubjective	connection	to	emerge	
(Simpson,	2015,	2017).	One	of	my	early	reflections	on	laughter,	for	instance,	
notes	that:	“I	bonded	with	one	of	the	residents	primarily	through	laughter	(and	
smiles).	She	was	in	the	care	home	recovering	from	a	stroke	and	so	struggled	
with	 speaking.	 Smiles	 and	 laughs	 seemed	 to	 form	 a	 connection,	 however”	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	06/10/2015).	This	folding	and	
unfolding	not	only	shapes	the	‘internal’	affections	of	bodies	in	terms	of	how	
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connected	 to	 others	 they	 feel,	 however,	 but	 can	 also	 change	 the	 ‘external’	
relations	 through	which	 a	 body,	 and	 its	 subjectivities,	 are	 understood.	 As	 I	
once	noted:	
I	 should	 perhaps	 be	 honest	 here	 and	 say	 that	 up	 until	 now	 I	 had	 been	
unsure	about	Ella.	It’s	not	that	I	didn’t	like	her,	just	for	some	reason,	I	felt	
that	she	was	a	bit	disconnected	from	the	residents.	Today	changed	that.	We	
were	 giving	 out	 tea	 and	 toileting	 a	 few	 residents.	 Seeing	 her	 working	
closely	 with	 the	 residents	 for	 the	 first	 time	 gave	 a	 completely	 different	
impression.	 I	 could	 sense	 how	 much	 she	 actually	 cared	 about	 them.	
Laughing	and	joking	with	them,	you	could	see	real	connections	and	it	was	
very	heartwarming.	She	said	at	one	point,	however,	 following	a	burst	of	
laughter,	“I	have	to	laugh,	otherwise	I	would	cry.”			
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	28/10/2015)	
Here,	 then,	we	can	see	how	the	ways	in	which	 ‘Ella’	does	laughter	seems	to	
project	or	express	a	something	that	 informs	the	ways	 in	which	I	make	(and	
indeed	change)	judgements	about	the	care	that	she	provides	to	the	residents.	
There	is	a	sense	here	that	her	‘internal’	subjectivity	is	unfolded	onto	both	the	
practices	 she	 is	 undertaking	 and	 the	 spaces	 in	 which	 she	 is	 doing	 them	
(Deleuze,	1993;	Grosz,	1994),	changing	their	nature	in	some	way.	This	way	of	
thinking	thus	maintains	something	of	a	connection	with	the	idea	of	laughter	as	
representing	something	about	people,	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	
also	Albrecht,	1999;	Ridanpää,	2014a;	Watson,	2015).	However,	 it	differs	 in	
that	it	focusses	not	on	the	precise	form	of	the	enactment	of	laughter,	through	
joke	structures	and	discourses	for	instance,	but	rather	on	the	affordances	of	
doing	laughter	more	generally	(see	Green,	1998).	As	I	wrote	elsewhere,	“I’m	
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really	 starting	 to	 recognise	 the	 advantages	 of	 talking	 about	 laughter	 rather	
than	humour,	as	it	allows	you	to	think	beyond	the	content	of	the	‘jokes’	and	to	
start	to	think	what	it	is	that	laughter	(or	even	humour)	can	and	does	do”	(Field	
Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	13/11/2015).	
Drawing	on	from	this	then,	we	might	note	that	 the	final	point	of	the	extract	
above,	in	which	she	suggests	she	has	to	laugh	or	she	will	cry,	is	suggestive	of	
another	way	in	which	the	doing	of	laughter	serves	to	generate	particular	kinds	
of	 subjective	 foldings,	 albeit	 ones	 that	 reinforce	 the	 individual	 subject’s	
boundaries,	 rather	 than	 opening	 them	 up.	 These	 kinds	 of	 utterances	 were	
common	in	my	interactions	with	people,	forming	something	of	a	trope	in	terms	
of	how	people	talked	to	me	about	their	practices	of	laughter.	Another	notable	
instance	emerged	at	a	time	when	a	carer	of	Indian	origin	was	hit	by	a	racial	
slur	 from	a	resident	as	 she	was	 trying	 to	help	him.	“She	 continued	to	work	
calmly	but	let	out	a	little	chuckle	which	I	copied	and	she	then	offered	a	smile	
which	seemed	to	say,	‘what	can	you	do,	eh?’	She	then	turned	to	me	and	said,	
‘you	sometimes	just	have	to	laugh.	The	residents	can	be	so	abusive	but	you	just	
have	 to	 put	 up	 with	 it.	 They	 don’t	 really	 mean	 it’”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	
Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	 19/10/2015).	 These	 kinds	 of	 laughter	 are	 thus	
indicative	 of	 what	 we	might	 think	 of	 as	 a	 ‘coping	 laughter’	 (Harris,	 2013;	
Korczynski,	2003;	Macpherson,	2008;	McGregor,	2007)	–	although	again	it’s	
worth	noting	that	in	Chapter	7	I	look	to	add	nuance	to	the	language	and	idea	
of	‘coping’	laughter.	Indeed,	describing	a	similar	kind	of	laughter	in	one	of	her	
participants,	Nixon	(2017:	36)	notes:	 “Laughter	 literally	and	metaphorically	
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inflates	her	body	and	self,	acting	as	a	protective	barrier	…	transforming	her	
body	into	an	entity	that	takes	up	space	and	has	secure	boundaries,	and	keeping	
feeling	(fear,	exhaustion,	rage,	grief,	pain)	at	bay.”	As	such,	we	can	start	to	see	
how	laughter	can	also	serve	to	unfold	intersubjective	connections,	and	fold	the	
self	in	on	itself,	thus	becoming	a	way	of	(productively)	‘not	caring’	rather	than	
the	other	way	around.		
Despite	the	relative	frequency	of	moments	such	as	those	described	above,	this	
in-folding	 through	 doing	 laughter	 was	 arguably	 most	 common	 within	 the	
much	more	 everyday	 encounters	 surrounding	 personal	 care.	 The	 doing	 of	
personal	 care	 practices	 has	 sustained	 significant	 academic	 attention	 (e.g.	
Atkinson	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Dyer	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 McDowell,	 2009;	 Twigg,	 2000),	
particularly	in	terms	of	the	emotional	and	subjective	implications	caused	by	
frequent	 and	 intimate	 contact	 with	 “dirty”,	 “messy”	 and	 naked	 bodies	
(Wolkowitz,	 2002:	 497).	 Twigg	 (2000),	 for	 instance,	 specifically	 notes	 the	
ways	in	which	a	mixture	of	abjection	and	routinisation	around	these	moments	
of	 care	 engender	 subjects	 with	 something	 of	 an	 ambivalence.	 This	 is	
recognisable	 in	my	 own	 experiences	whereby	 in	 describing	 the	 first	 time	 I	
wiped	a	resident’s	bottom,	I	noted:	“It	was	strange	but	also	normal	doing	jobs	
like	this.	I	guess	by	this	point	I	have	had	so	much	exposure	to	care	homes	that	
the	 rules	 have	 definitely	 changed	 in	my	 own	mind.	My	 barriers	 have	 been	
broken	 down	 significantly”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Summerview	 Care	 Home,	
13/06/2016).	There	is	a	certain	complexity	to	the	modes	of	folding	occurring	
here	whereby	the	repeated	experience	of	these	practices	serves	to	open	the	
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subject	 up	 to	 a	more	 ‘normalised’	 engagement	with	what	 ‘outsiders’	might	
deem	to	be	‘objectionable’	tasks.	This	is	not	just	the	case	for	staff	members,	but	
residents	 too	 who	 often	 seemed	 somewhat	 more	 uncomfortable	 during	
personal	care	tasks	when	they	first	arrived	in	comparison	to	when	they	had	
lived	in	the	home	for	a	longer	period	of	time.	Although	not	the	only	practice	
through	which	these	modes	of	normalisation	occur	there	is	much	to	suggest	
that	 laughter	plays	a	key	 role	within	this	process,	 as	 the	 following	moment	
suggests:	
Whilst	some	carers	had	lunch,	I	helped	with	taking	to	residents	to	the	toilet	
for	a	while	with	Amelia.	Whilst	we	were	moving	Mrs	E	into	her	wheelchair	
and	then	into	the	toilet,	she	was	singing	Amelia’s	praises	to	me,	telling	me	
how	much	she	liked	her	and	how	good	a	carer	she	was.	As	Amelia	moved	
her	onto	the	toilet	and	helped	her	trousers	down,	she	made	a	small	 joke	
(although	I	didn’t	hear	what	it	was).	Mrs	E	piped	up	again,	“that’s	the	best	
thing	about	her,”	she	said,	“she	always	manages	to	turn	everything	into	a	
dirty	laugh	which	helps	you	not	feel	so	embarrassed	or	uncomfortable”	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	12/07/2016).	
This	encounter	thus	suggests	the	doing	of	laughter	within	personal	care	tasks	
as	enacting	a	complex	set	of	foldings	in	which	the	borders	of	the	individual	self	
(as	 neither	 embarrassed	 nor	 uncomfortable)	 are	 reaffirmed,	which	 in	 turn	
enables	 a	 sense	 of	 routinisation	 and	 normalisation	 through	 which	 the	
individual	 (both	 carer	 and	 cared	 for)	 becomes	 more	 ‘open’	 to	 the	 deeply	
intersubjective	and	collective	nature	of	these	kinds	of	caring	relations.	“All	of	
being	 is	 in	 touch	with	all	of	being,	but	 the	 law	of	 touching	 is	separation”	as	
Nancy	 (2000:	5)	notes.	What	 this	 indicates,	 therefore,	 is	 a	 reconstitution	of	
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what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 an	 ‘individual’	 within	 a	 care	 home:	 the	 refolding	 of	
subjectivation	itself	as	something	that	‘requires’	prosthesis.	Indeed,	we	might	
see	this	process	as	a	somewhat	extreme	augmentation	of	the	same	process	we	
might	go	through	if	wearing	glasses	for	the	first	time	whereby	at	first	they	are	
uncomfortable,	even	laughable,	but	as	time	passes	they	fold	into	our	sense	of	
being,	 becoming	 part	 of	who	we	 are	 as	 individuals	 (see	Horton	 and	Kraftl,	
2006).		
In	this	manner,	then,	we	must	recognise	the	necessary	folding	of	the	individual	
with	 the	 collective:	 that	 the	 individual	 is	 always	 constituted	 through	 the	
foldings	of	that	which	is	‘outside’	of	itself	(Deleuze,	1988a)	and	thus	is	never	
simply	 being-in-the-world,	 but	 always	 being-with	 it	 (Nancy,	 2000;	 Wylie,	
2006).	Yet	attending	to	the	collective	doing	of	both	laughter	and	care	within	
care	homes	demands	a	different	 form	of	attunement	to	both	their	practices	
and	 their	 ethics:	 a	 “need	 to	 theorize	 the	 meaning	 and	 contours	 of	 the	 in-
common,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 its	 spaces	 can	 become	 sites	 of	 ethical	
responsibility”	(Popke,	2009:	84).	As	such,	it	is	these	contours	that	I	attend	to	
in	the	next	section.		
5.5	|	‘Collective’	practices	of	laughter	with	care	
Perhaps	the	most	resounding	impressions	from	my	time	working	in	both	care	
homes	relate	to	the	collective	nature	of	being-within	them.	By	this,	I	don’t	just	
mean	 the	 impression	 left	 by	 the	 sheer	 number	 of	 bodies	 within	 them,	 as	
described	above,	but	rather	the	effects	and	affects	generated	by	the	jostling	of	
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these	bodies	into	and	out	of	particular	social	formations.	As	such,	whilst	I	once	
might	have	been	tempted	(in	a	somewhat	 idealistic	manner)	 to	 think	about	
care	homes	as	truly	‘collective’	sites	of	care,	where	people	work	together	for	
the	good	of	the	whole,	my	actual	experience	perhaps	speaks	to	something	that	
is	much	more	 frictious	 and	 combative	 than	 this,	 with	 different	 people	 and	
groups	often	‘butting	heads’	over	a	whole	manner	of	matters	of	concern.	To	
speak	of	collective	ethics	in	care	homes,	therefore,	demands	an	attention	to	the	
ways	in	which	people	and	matters	get	folded	into	and	out	of	different	groups	
and	the	effects	of	these	folding	movements.		
It’s	also	worth	noting	that	these	‘collectives’	can	either	be	relatively	enduring	
or	much	more	fleeting.	One	clear	example	of	an	enduring	collective	surrounds	
the	various	cliques	that	emerge	between	members	of	staff	themselves.	As	one	
care	worker	expressed	to	me	having	found	out	she	had	to	work	Christmas	Day	
for	the	second	year	running:	“It’s	always	the	people	close	to	the	manager	who	
get	 what	 they	 want	 …	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 just	 get	 shit”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	
Winterbourne	Care	Home,	20/10/2015).	As	alluded	to	above,	we	might	again	
note	 friendship	 groups	 as	 similar	 formations,	 often	 held	 together	 not	 just	
through	interactions	at	work	but	also	through	more	lasting	connections	where	
carers	might	have	been	at	school	or	college	together.	Indeed,	in	Summerview	
two	staff	members	lived	together	(as	friends)	at	the	time	I	worked	there	and	
two	nurses	were	married	to	one	another,	once	again	suggesting	a	sense	of	the	
‘external’	world	being	folded	into	the	care	home	itself	in	a	similar	manner	to	
the	 previous	 section.	 The	more	 fleeting	 collectives,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	
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enacted	primarily	through	the	undertaking	of	practices	as	pairs	or	groups:	
One	thing	I	have	been	thinking	about	on	my	way	home	has	been	working	
as	a	team	versus	working	alone.	I	have	done	the	tea	round	both	ways	today	
and	it’s	fair	to	say	that	working	as	a	team	is	much	better,	not	only	for	the	
workers	but	 it	means	that	 things	get	done	quicker	too	–	perhaps	that	 is	
obvious.	It	does	also	make	it	easier	to	care.	There	is	a	sense	that	talking	to	
the	 residents	 is	 sometimes	 not	 quite	 the	 same	 as	 talking	 to	 other	 staff	
members	…	many	have	lost	any	sense	of	the	world	really	and	so	it	can	be	
hard	to	connect	with	them.	Instead,	you	just	seem	to	be	connecting	with	
yourself	through	them,	perhaps	reflecting	yourself	off	the	interactions	that	
you	have	with	them.	When	you	are	with	another	staff	member,	however,	it	
seems	 easier	 to	 connect	 with	 residents	 in	 a	more	 personal	 way.	 This	 is	
perhaps	because	you	are	reflecting	off	the	other	staff	member	rather	than	
just	the	resident.	I’m	not	sure.			
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	26/11/2015)	
Retrospectively,	I	have	some	concerns	with	this	particular	passage	of	my	field	
diary.	 It	 was	 written	 following	 a	 very	 specific	 and	 relatively	 intensive	
engagement	 with	 the	 upstairs	 section	 of	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home	 where	
many	of	the	residents	remain	bed	bound	because	they	are	both	highly	frail	and	
highly	 demented.	 As	 such,	 I	wish	 to	make	 clear	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 universal	
account	of	 the	role	of	 the	residents	within	care	home	collectives.	 Indeed,	at	
many	times,	the	residents	were	themselves	deeply	enrolled	within	the	same	
kinds	of	being-in-common	as	I	depict	in	relation	to	the	staff	here.	Despite	its	
problematics,	however,	this	passage	does	offer	a	relatively	clear	portrayal	of	
the	 modes	 of	 folding	 through	 which	 these	 being-in-commons	 are,	 and	
sometimes	 are	 not,	 enacted.	 Specifically,	 it	 describes	 the	ways	 in	which	 an	
Chapter	5:	Performative	folds	of	laughter	and	care	
184	
unfolding	of	the	self	can	either	reinforce	boundaries	between	‘us’	and	‘them’	
(in	this	case	the	staff	members	and	resident	respectively),	depending,	in	part	
at	least,	on	whether	or	not	it	is	met	by	a	reciprocal	unfolding.	Perhaps	more	
importantly,	 it	 notes	 how	 this	 reciprocal	 being-in-common	 exceeds	 the	
bounds	of	 the	bodies	between	which	 it	 is	occurring	 (Maclaren,	2014a),	 and	
ultimately	makes	it	‘easier	to	care’	for	and	about	others	–	thus	foregrounding	
the	complex	ethicality	of	‘the	collective’	within	the	provision	of	care.	
The	 idea	of	a	reciprocation	also	provides	an	entry	point	 into	thinking	more	
specifically	 about	 collective	 doings	of	 laughter	within	 care	 homes	 in	which	
being	part	of	the	‘collective’	often	requires	being	‘in	on	the	joke’.	Sara	Ahmed	
(2006:	556),	for	instance,	notes	that	“shared	laughter”,	more	often	than	not,	is	
“about	 returning	 laughter	 with	 laughter”.	 Similarly,	 Michael	 Billig’s	 (2005:	
192)	concept	of	unlaughter,	 “a	display	of	not	 laughing	when	 laughter	might	
otherwise	be	expected,	hoped	 for	or	demanded”,	offers	 the	 counterpoint	 to	
this	 through	 its	 capacities	 to	 resist	 ‘inclusion’	and	compliance	within	group	
joking	behaviours	(see	also	Douglas,	2015).	However,	it’s	worth	nothing	that	
not	laughing	might	more	generally	suggest	a	sense	of	being	an	‘outsider’	to	the	
collective	 circumstances	 through	 which	 laughter	 is	 being	 enacted	 (Nixon,	
2017).	The	language	of	folding	here	thus	allows	a	way	of	thinking	through	the	
roles	in	which	sharing	in	laughter,	or	not,	serves	to	fold	people	into	and	out	of	
particular	 groups,	 thus	 producing	 modes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	
respectively	 (ibid).	 One	 of	 the	 clearest	 examples	 of	 this	 emerges	 from	 a	
reflection	 on	 my	 own	 transition	 from	 ethnographic	 ‘outsider’	 to	 ‘insider’	
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within	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	where	I	actually	use	the	language	of	the	fold,	
albeit	 colloquially,	 to	 describe	 my	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 group	 of	 staff	
members:		
Increasingly	I	am	finding	myself	being	folded	into	the	everyday	humour	of	
the	 care	 home.	 A	 recurring	 joke	 has	 emerged	 that	 I	 am	 either	 the	 ‘The	
Secret	Millionaire’	or	‘Undercover	Boss’	(I	have	assured	them	I	am	not!!).5	
Today	a	different	kind	of	joke	came	from	Maureen.	She	asked	me,	“Do	you	
have	to	write	a	report	or	something	at	the	end	of	this?”	to	which	I	replied,	
“Yeah,	 sort	 of,”.	 “I’ve	 always	 liked	 you,	 Phil,	 you	 remember	 that,”	 she	
retorted	dryly,	to	which	a	wider	group	of	carers	laughter	heartily.	It’s	good!	
I	feel	like	I	have	transitioned	into	the	care	home	well	which	is	pleasing	from	
a	 methodological	 point	 of	 view	 but	 I	 guess	 it	 also	 comes	 with	 many	
responsibilities	too.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	30/10/2015)	
My	direct	 inclusion	 in	the	humour	and	 laughter	of	 the	care	home	here	thus	
formed	an	important	marker	of	my	position	–	a	becoming	one	of	 ‘us’	rather	
than	one	of	‘them’.	Crucially,	as	Nixon	(2017:	37)	notes,	however,	laughter	in	
these	cases	is	not	so	much	“a	test	of	identity	(are	you	‘like’	us),	as	much	as	it	is	
a	 test	of	humility	(can	you	be	 ‘with’	us)”	and	therefore	remains	much	more	
open	 to	 intra-group	 heterogeneity	 than	 traditional	 humour	 theories	 might	
suggest	(e.g.	Ridanpää,	2017).	We	see	this	in	the	example	above,	whereby	the	
joke	 is	 based	 not	 on	my	 similarity	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group	 but	 rather	my	
																																																								
5	Both	of	these	are	references	to	television	shows,	whereby	someone	will	enter	a	situation	or	
business	incognito	to	find	out	what	“real	 life”	 is	 like	and	then	usually	reward	the	people	in	
some	way	at	the	end.		
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difference,	seemingly	working	as	a	‘tester’	for	whether	or	not	I	can	be	part	of	
the	group	despite	that	difference.	In	other	words,	it	is	my	ability	to	take	part	in	
the	 moment	 of	 laughter	 that	 is	 significant	 here,	 rather	 than	 the	 precise	
wording	 of	 the	 joke,	 once	 again	 suggesting	 these	 doings	 as	 something	 that	
exceeds	representationalist	interpretations.	
As	the	 final	sentence	of	 the	diary	entry	notes,	however,	envelopment	 into	a	
group	in	this	manner	brings	with	it	ethical	implications	and	responsibilities.	
As	Donna	Haraway	 (1997:	182)	astutely	writes:	 “I	 laugh:	 therefore,	 I	 am	…	
implicated.	 I	 laugh:	 therefore,	 I	 am	 responsible	 and	 accountable”.	 When	
writing	 this	passage	 initially,	 I	was	actually	 referring	 to	 the	 responsibilities	
surrounding	ethnographic	writing	(as	discussed	in	Chapter	3).	However,	being	
‘within’	a	group	also	comes	with	further	responsibilities,	notably	the	need	to	
support	and	care	for	the	grouping	itself	both	in	terms	of	the	individuals	within	
it	and	the	collective	as	a	whole.	At	 its	most	basic,	 these	 forms	of	caring	and	
support	are	often	about	expressing	a	sense	that	‘you	are	not	alone’,	or	‘others	
are	with	you’.	These	expressions	come	in	multiple	forms,	including	the	forms	
of	 ‘touch’	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 although	 laughter	 arguably	
remains	one	of	the	most	common:	“I	think	my	‘inkling’	about	laughter	during	
brief	encounters	might	have	something	to	do	with	it	–	may	be	something	to	do	
with	 ‘patting	people	on	the	back’	–	a	sort	of	we	are	all	 in	 this	 together	type	
thing”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Summerview	 Care	 Home,	 15/06/2016).	 These	
moments	of	laughter	are	thus	about	maintaining	the	boundaries	of	the	group,	
performatively	re-iterating,	and	thus	re-folding,	different	subjects’	placing	as	
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inside	or	outside	(with	or	against)	it.	
Crucially,	 however,	 the	 group’s	 boundaries,	 and	 thus	 who	 is	 included,	 are	
always	also	(consciously	or	less	than	consciously)	defined	by	its	exterior:	who	
and	what	is	not	within	it,	who	and	what	is	Other	to	it.	The	doing	of	laughter,	
then,	 is	 equally	 important	 in	 maintaining	 this	 other,	 particularly	 through	
modes	of	 laughing	at	or	 ridiculing	 this	other	 (such	 as	was	 suggested	 to	 be	
happening	in	the	previous	chapter).	This	other	is	by	no	means	static,	with	my	
field	diary	notes	containing	examples	of	staff	members	laughing	at	residents,	
the	management,	other	staff	members	and	various	‘imagined’	(or	not	present)	
others	 in	an	almost	equal	measure.	Within	my	notes,	however,	many	of	 the	
most	 poignant	 examples	 of	 this	 emerge	 once	 again	 in	 relation	 to	 family	
members,	 whose	 presence,	 as	 noted	 above,	 can	 drastically	 affect	 the	
experiences	 and	 practices	 of	 being-within	 the	home	 for	 both	 residents	 and	
staff	members.		
In	this	sense,	family	members	serve	to	somewhat	exemplify	a	need	for	both	
complexity	and	multiplicity	in	terms	of	how	we	might	understand	collective	
foldings	within	care	homes.	Some,	for	instance,	seem	to	hold	the	same	capacity	
to	be-with	(Nixon,	2017)	the	staff	members	as	described	above,	particularly	
those	where	the	resident	has	been	in	the	home	for	a	long	time	and	therefore	a	
level	of	trust	and	humility	has	presumably	been	established	between	the	staff	
and	 family	 members.	 Others,	 however,	 seem	 to	 be	 more	 combative,	
challenging	 the	 staff	 members	 on	 the	 kinds	 of	 care	 that	 their	 family	 are	
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receiving.	These	challenges	are	often	around	simple	things	such	as	what	they	
have	had	to	eat,	what	kinds	medications	they	are	receiving,	and	the	 level	of	
social	interaction	they	are	getting,	always	with	the	aim	of	improving	life	for	
their	 family	member.	On	more	 serious	 occasions,	 however,	 I	 have	 seen	 the	
competence	 of	 the	 collective	 staff	 themselves	 being	 brought	 into	 question,	
usually	 because	 of	 incidents	 such	 as	 falls	 in	 which	 a	 resident	 has	 hurt	
themselves.	 Here,	 then,	 laughter	 can	 again	 work	 to	 generate	 foldings	 that	
reinforce	 the	 collective	 ‘us’	 of	 the	 staff	 members,	 versus	 the	 ‘them’	 of	 the	
family,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 subsequent	 description	 of	 the	 events	which	
took	place	following	a	morning	in	which	exactly	this	happened,	and	where	a	
group	of	staff	members	use	 laughter	 in	order	to	protect	and	reinforce	their	
collective	 sensibilities,	 particularly	 through	 the	 ‘exclusion’	 of	 the	 complaint	
itself:	
After	 lunch,	 the	 staff	 were	 all	 sat	 around	 in	 the	 dining	 room	 and	 they	
started	laughing	and	joking/complaining	about	the	whole	situation.	There	
was	 a	 general	 feeling	 that	 the	 family	 were	 being	 totally	 unreasonable.	
Stephanie	was	sweeping	up	and	kind	of	shouted	over	“I	 think	 it	must	be	
really	worrying	to	 leave	your	mother	 in	a	new	place.”	No	one	seemed	to	
hear	her	except	me,	possibly	they	just	didn’t	want	to	hear	her,	but	I	kind	of	
agreed	with	her	…	I	guess	the	laughter	emerges	out	of	these	tensions,	but	
there	seems	to	be	a	somewhat	self-preserving	nature	about	it	where	staff	
place	themselves	in	a	position	where	these	worries	of	the	family/residents	
are	laughable,	beyond	the	realms	of	reason	etc.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	19/11/2015)	
Whilst	 this	 scene	 does	 demonstrate	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 generates	
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modes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	in	terms	of	the	staff	members	and	families	
respectively,	it	is	augmented	and	complicated	further	by	Stephanie’s	dissent	
(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2012,	2017)	or	unlaughter	(Billig,	2005),	which	can	be	
seen	as	 form	of	unfolding	 from	the	staff	member	collective	 in	order	to	offer	
generosity	and	care	to	the	family	members	instead.	This,	therefore,	becomes	
suggestive	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 people	 are	 folded	 into	 and	 out	 of	 many	
different	collective	 formations	simultaneously	within	care	homes,	with	each	
group	 demanding	 different	 modes	 of	 being-with,	 responsibility	 and	 care	
(Guattari,	1995).	Indeed,	in	the	lines	that	directly	followed	my	account	of	this	
incident	I	reflected	that:	“I	find	myself	often	positioned	in	an	in-between	state	
of	empathy	for	the	resident	(and	their	families)	but	also	empathy	for	the	staff.	
Both	 are	 often	 in	 highly	 stressful	 and	 emotional	 positions	 where	 they	 are	
essentially	fighting	for	the	same	end	goal	but	from	very	different	viewpoints	
and	experiences”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	19/11/2015).		
This	recognition,	therefore,	moves	us	again	towards	the	sense	that	the	folding	
together	of	different	groups	(and	individuals)	fractures	the	idea	of	a	‘singular’	
position	through	which	we	might	understand	the	meaning	of	laughter’s	doings	
(see	 James,	 2006;	 Nancy,	 2000).	 Indeed,	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 play	 out	
through	one	final	encounter	with	laughter	on	that	same	day,	in	which	I	reflect	
on	the	fragmented	nature	of	laughter,	and	thus	its	capacities	to	fold	people	into	
and	out	of	particular	collectives:	
Over	lunch,	whilst	waiting	for	the	food	to	be	plated,	Ruby	and	Kelly	started	
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to	flick	each	other	with	rolled	up	napkins,	giggling	as	each	blow	struck	the	
other.	 Stephanie	 told	 them	 off,	 to	 which	 they	 tried	 to	 claim	 that	 it	 was	
“entertainments	for	the	residents,	making	them	laugh.”	Stephanie	said,	“it’s	
not	entertainments	unless	they	are	involved!”	She	is	right	of	course,	but	I	
think	their	 laughter	was	actually	doing	something	else	 in	 this	 instant:	 it	
was	 cheering	 them	 up,	 and	 “professionalism”	 aside,	 this	 is,	 in	 fact,	
important,	 perhaps	 as	 important	 as	 entertaining	 the	 residents	 in	 some	
ways.	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	19/11/2015)	
Whilst	this	moment	in	many	ways	reflects	the	other	moments	discussed	in	this	
section,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 the	 doing	 of	 laughter	 serves	 to	 fold	
different	people	into	and	out	of	collectives,	it	also	brings	to	the	fore	a	series	of	
what	we	might	call	 institutional	 logics	about	 laughter	within	the	care	home	
(Mol,	2008b):	how,	where	and	when	 it	should	be	done	 in	order	to	maintain	
‘professionalism’;	who	it	should	involve	in	order	to	be	considered	as	a	viable	
and	 appropriate	 form	 of	 care;	 and	 how	 this,	 in	 turn,	 impacts	 the	 doing	 of	
laughter	by	both	individual	and	collective	subjects.	As	such,	the	final	section	of	
this	chapter	will	turn	to	these	institutional	logics.	
5.6	|	‘Institutional’	practices	of	laughter	with	care	
I’m	starting	to	get	a	sense	of	the	truly	collective	nature	of	the	laughter	in	
the	home.	It’s	a	way	of	folding	different	people	(and	more-than-humans)	
together	into	a	political	ecology	of	laughter.	It	mediates	the	space	in	some	
respects,	making	the	home	(as	an	institution)	into	an	assemblage,	with	its	
own	milieu	(rules	and	regulations)	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	13/10/2015)	
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Whilst	this	moment	of	reflection	in	some	ways	captures	elements	of	what	has	
already	been	 said	 in	 this	 chapter,	particularly	 in	 terms	of	how	 the	doing	of	
laughter	can	‘fold’	individuals	into	collectives,	it	also	pushes	further	through	
foregrounding	 ‘the	 institutional’	 as	 a	 specific	 relational	 formation	 (an	
‘assemblage’	or	a	‘political	ecology’).	In	this	sense,	the	institution	as	a	relational	
formation	differs	in	that	it	has	a	more	‘structured’	formation,	albeit	one	that	
folds	out	of	the	interactions	of	the	individuals	and	groups	within	it.	As	Guattari	
argues,	 subjective	 relations	 are	 always	 decentred	 “with	 an	 outside	 to	
whichever	institutions	and	academies	the	individual	happens	to	be	‘part	of’”	
(see	 O’Sullivan,	 2008:	 4).	 Here	 then,	 my	 note	 about	 the	 more-than-human	
gains	further	significance	by	suggesting	the	importance	of	entities	in	excess	of	
human	 bodies,	 including	 rules	 and	 regulations,	 within	 these	 institutional	
frameworks.	As	such,	in	looking	to	push	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	to	its	
completion	 this	 final	 section	 will	 attend	 to	 this	 the	 more-than-human	
institutional	 ‘outside’	 and	how	 it	 further	augments	 the	 subjective	doings	of	
laughter	and/with	care	in	care	homes.	
As	noted	above,	 ‘institutional’	foldings	within	care	homes	are	perhaps	more	
overt	in	terms	of	the	various	policies	and	guidelines	which	are	distributed	to	
care	homes	from	external	professional	bodies,	and	then	implemented	within	
them.	This	means	that,	whilst	the	provision	of	care	does	take	place	as	both	as	
an	 individual	 and	 a	 collective	 doing,	more	 often	 than	 not	 these	 doings	 are	
informed,	 shaped	 and	 constrained	 by	 policies	 and	 guidelines	 such	 as	 ‘best	
practice’	models	which	directly	affect	how	caring	bodies	perform	certain	tasks	
Chapter	5:	Performative	folds	of	laughter	and	care	
192	
(Mol,	2008b).	Ultimately	this	serves	to	(intentionally)	reduce	the	‘individual’	
or	‘collective’	responsibilities	for	care	through	dictating	what	should	happen	
and	 what	 shouldn’t,	 implicitly	 setting	 the	 boundaries	 of	 what	 is	 ‘ethically	
acceptable’	behaviour	in	care	homes.	Although	this	is	most	obvious	in	terms	of	
care,	 laughter	 is	 also	 often	 folded	 into	 these	 kinds	 of	 institutional	 logics.	
Indeed,	the	doing	of	laughter	within	care	homes	is	often	presented	as	a	form	
of	‘best	practice’	–	I	was	often	told	for	instance	that	“it	is	important	to	laugh	
whilst	caring”	or	“it	is	good	for	residents	to	laugh”,	and	judgements	of	 ‘good	
care’	can	be	made	based	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	laughter	within	care	
homes	 (as	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 CQC	 report	 quoted	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 this	 thesis).	
Similarly,	 we	 might	 suggest	 that	 the	 conducting	 of	 ‘activities’	 and	
entertainments	(including	those	provided	by	external	theatre	groups	such	as	
those	 I	 spent	 time	 with)	 also	 fall	 under	 this	 category.	 Although	 here	 it’s	
important	to	note,	as	the	example	at	the	end	of	the	previous	section	showed,	
that	laughter	for	this	purpose	is	not	always	deemed	to	be	good	practice.	
The	 imposition	 of	 external	 policies,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 only	way	 in	which	
‘institutional	 subjectivities’	 emerge.	 Alongside	 this,	 a	 series	of	performative	
phrases	 and	 enactments	 also	 serve	 to	 generate	 particular	modes	 of	 being-
within	care	homes.	One	common	refrain,	 for	 instance,	was	the	phrase:	“all	 I	
care	about	is	the	residents”;	which	I	questioned	at	one	point	noting:	“it	[the	
phrase]	sometimes	just	seems	like	a	performative	action.	It’s	often	clearly	not	
true,	often	being	 said	at	 a	 time	when	 the	person	definitely	does	 care	about	
something	 else,	 but	 just	 doesn’t	 want	 to	 deal	 with”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	
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Summerview	 Care	 Home,	 21/06/2016).	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	might	 suggest	 that	
these	kinds	of	phrases	serve	to	enact	a	mode	of	folding	which	reinforce	ideas	
of	 caring	 about	 certain	 matters	 (notably	 the	 residents)	 and	 exclude	 cares	
about	other	matters,	such	as	home-lives,	money	and	often	‘the	self’.	Laughter	
again	plays	a	role	here,	often	serving	to	enact	 these	kinds	of	 folds	and	thus	
reinforce	the	‘values’	of	being	part	of	the	institution:	
At	some	point	during	the	afternoon,	two	carers	started	to	talk	about	pay.	
They	 were	 talking	 about	 someone	 they	 knew	 who	 worked	 at	 Lidl	 [a	
supermarket]	 and	 saying	 that	 the	 workers	 there	 get	 paid	 £8	 per	 hour,	
which	is	about	£1	more	per	hour	than	the	care	workers.	One	of	the	carers	
suddenly	 started	 to	 laugh	 however	 and	 said	 “well	 I	 guess	 all	 they	 do	 is	
bleep,	 bleep,	 bleep,”	 miming	 the	 action	 of	 passing	 shopping	 through	 a	
scanner	whilst	she	said	it,	“whereas	we	get	to	wipe	arses	and	clean	up	sick	
all	day”,	continuing	to	laugh	at	her	own	joke	for	a	moment.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	18/07/2016)	
We	might	note	that	within	the	doing	of	both	laughter	and	care	in	this	manner	
there	is	a	moral	impetus	at	play	here	which	might	again	be	read	as	a	form	of	
performative	 ‘compulsory	 happiness’	 	 in	 which	 workers	 become	
unconditionally	expected	to	perform	the	role	of	the	‘happy	carer’,	regardless	
of	their	individual	or	collective	emotional	states	(Ahmed,	2010;	Douglas,	2015;	
see	 also	Hochschild,	 1983).	 Indeed,	 often	 they	 seem	 to	 face	 the	 sanction	 of	
moral	judgment	if	they	do	not	perform	in	this	manner.	In	one	case,	for	instance,	
a	group	of	staff	members	in	Winterbourne	began	calling	an	agency	nurse	“a	
miserable	cow”	because	she	was	deemed	not	to	be	jovial	enough	whilst	doing	
her	 job	 (Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	 Care	Home,	 05/12/2015),	 and	 in	
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another	a	worker	was	told	she	“had	to	cheer	up”	when	she	was	feeling	stressed	
because	the	person	who	was	caring	for	her	child	had	cancelled	on	her	(Field	
Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	07/07/2016).	In	this	sense,	we	can	start	
to	 see	 how	 the	 institutional	 generates	 its	 own	 distinctive	 boundaries	 of	
‘acceptability’	(Crawley,	2004),	which	then	fold	into	and	out	of	the	individuals	
and	collectives	who	 inhabit	 it	 (Guattari,	1995).	Again,	we	have	already	seen	
this	 process	 at	work	 to	 some	 respects	 through	 discussion	 of	 personal	 care	
whereby	I	suggested	processes	of	folding	as	producing	subjects	who	“seem	to	
be	somewhat	immune	to	the	kinds	of	tasks	and	situations	that	outsiders	would	
find	 distressing,	 uncomfortable	 or	 abject”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Summerview	
Care	Home,	16/06/2016).	
None	of	this	is	to	suggest	that	‘the	institutional’	is	a	homogeneous	entity	that	
subsumes	 all	 bodies	 into	 continual	 care.	 Indeed,	 a	 series	 of	 institutional	
frameworks	 also	 serve	 to	 differentiate	 people	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 care	 they	
provide.	One	such	performative	can	be	seen	within	the	assignment	of	different	
‘roles’:	e.g.	carer,	nurse,	activities	coordinator,	cleaner,	cook;	which	serve	to	
divide	and	distribute	(fold	and	unfold)	care	across	multiple	bodies,	with	each	
being	 ascribed	 particular	 boundaries	 to	 their	 ‘responsibilities’	 at	 different	
moments.	This	affects	different	practices	in	a	variety	of	ways,	but	crucially	sets	
up	particular	moral	and	ethical	frameworks	around	what	and	when	different	
matters	should	be	cared	about,	and	perhaps,	more	importantly,	what	and	when	
matters	need	not	be	cared	about.	At	an	individual	level,	for	instance,	it	was	not	
uncommon,	 for	people	to	decline	to	do	certain	tasks	by	uttering	the	equally	
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performative	refrain	“that	isn’t	part	of	my	job”.	Similarly,	we	might	note	the	
ways	 in	which	doing	 laughter	 can	be	used	 to	 ‘resist’	 institutional	pressures	
such	as	when	staff	mock	the	management	or	each	other.	
Although	I	have	largely	focussed	on	the	ways	in	which	moments	of	laughter	
serve	to	fold	people	into	and	out	of	‘the	institution’,	it’s	worth	further	noting	
that	the	institutional	also	folds	into	the	ways	in	which	laughter	itself	is	done.	
This	occurs	both	in	terms	of	what	kinds	of	objects	are	acceptable	to	laugh	at,	
but	perhaps	also	through	the	ways	in	which	the	various	materialities	of	 the	
care	home	become	 folded	 into	practices	of	 laughter	 itself,	 both	 individually	
and	collectively.	One	good	example	of	this	surrounds	a	group	of	staff	members	
who	were	putting	together	a	joke	present	for	another	staff	member’s	fortieth	
birthday:	“They	had	put	a	box	together	which	included	things	like	net	knickers,	
an	 incontinence	 pad	 and	 a	 bag	 for	 soiled	 clothes,	 laughing	 each	 time	 they	
added	 a	 new	 item”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	
13/11/2015).	 Other,	 more	 banal	 examples	 included:	 pushing	 each	 other	
around	in	wheelchairs;	pretending	to	the	residents	that	the	home	had	run	out	
of	tea,	coffee	or	food;	imitating	each	other’s	actions	(as	we	saw	in	the	previous	
chapter);	and	putting	 ‘thickener’,	a	substance	that	 increases	the	viscosity	of	
drinks	to	aid	residents	who	struggle	to	swallow,	into	staff	members’	tea	and	
coffee.	
Each	of	these	moments	thus	marks	a	doing	of	laughter	that	is	inflected	through	
what	we	might	conceptualise	as	a	form	of	institutional	morality,	acceptability	
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or	an	ethic	 that	 is	 somehow	differentiated	 from	what	exists	 ‘outside’	of	 the	
institution	 itself.	 Interestingly,	 at	 one	 point	 this	 institutional	 subjectivity	
actually	impacted	laughter	not	just	in	terms	of	what	was	being	laughed	at,	but	
in	a	manner,	that	was	somewhat	further	ensconced:	
Whilst	we	were	handing	out	cups	of	tea,	Nicole	and	Mrs	J	started	telling	me	
about	what	they	did	yesterday.	Nicole,	 in	particular,	was	stressing	to	me	
how	much	they	had	 laughed	all	day.	 “We	 laughed	so	much	that	we	kept	
having	to	change	your	[incontinence]	pad,	didn’t	we?”.	Although	the	fact	
that	they	had	been	laughing	was	interesting,	what	struck	me	most	was	how	
the	materialities	of	the	home	were	making	their	way	back	into	the	jokes	
and	laughter	that	were	going	on.	The	toilet	humour	of	what	is	essentially	
a	statement	of	‘we	laughed	so	hard	that	you	wet	yourself’	gets	folded	over	
into	the	material	and	emotional	relationships	between	the	carer	and	the	
person	 cared	 for.	 They	 adopt	 a	 new	 ‘language’	 –	 one	 that	 extends	 far	
beyond	the	laughter	–	but	one	that	has	become	so	mundane	in	the	setting	
of	the	home	that	it	can	be	used	in	a	form	of	a	joke;	it’s	no	longer	a	sensitive	
issue.	This	is	also	a	highly	contextual	affair,	something	that	I	guess	could	
be	called	‘care	home	humour’.	For	most	people,	I	guess	incontinence	would	
be	a	subject	that	is	humorous	in	itself,	through	its	taboo	nature.	In	the	care	
home,	however,	where	incontinence	is	an	everyday	reality,	it	can	be	used	as	
what	might	 be	 known	 as	 a	 ‘topper’,6	 a	 way	 of	 creating	 a	 further	 set	 of	
imagery	to	describe	laughter	itself		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	12/11/2015)	
Within	this	moment,	therefore,	we	can	clearly	see	not	only	the	ways	in	which	
institutional	foldings	(re)produce	certain	forms	of	subjectivities	but	also	the	
																																																								
6	 A	 ‘topper'	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 comes	 from	Stand-up	 comedy.	 It	 is	essentially	 an	 additional	
punchline	to	a	joke,	that	allows	multiple	moments	of	laughter	to	emerge	from	a	single	set	up.		
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ways	 in	which	 these	 subjectivities	 serve	 to	 reproduce	 themselves.	 In	many	
ways	this	 is	an	archetypal	example	of	what	Deleuze	describes	as	a	 ‘double’:	
“But	the	double	is	never	a	projection	of	the	interior;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	an	
interiorization	of	the	outside.	It	is	not	a	doubling	of	the	One,	but	a	redoubling	
of	 the	 Other.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 reproduction	 of	 the	 Same,	 but	 a	 repetition	 of	 the	
Different”	(Deleuze,	1988a:	98).	In	this	sense,	it	is	arguably	here	that	the	most	
significant	 forms	 of	 institutional	 folding	 can	 be	 apprehended.	 ‘Institutional	
foldings’,	 therefore,	 are	 always	 about	 more-than-just	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
different	 ideas,	 things	 and	 matters	 from	 the	 outside	 are	 folded	 into	 the	
practices	of	different	bodies	(individual	or	collective),	but	rather	how	these	
elements	become	‘internalised’	or	‘doubled’.	The	repetition	of	these	foldings	
enacts	 a	 form	 of	 habituation	 (Dewsbury,	 2012).	 As	 I	 reflected	 in	 both	
Winterbourne	and	Summerview:	
I	feel	like	I	have	really	learnt	to	embody	the	work.	It	has	become	so	routine	
to	me,	mechanised	and	‘everyday’.	This	is	perhaps	important	it	means	that	
the	experience	of	working	 in	a	care	home	has	set	 into	my	body,	perhaps	
been	folded	into	my	own	sense	of	self,	changing	it	on	the	way	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	26/11/2015).	
I	am	really	starting	to	understand	the	‘banter’	at	the	home	though	and	am	
able	to	make	little	jokes	more	regularly.	I	am	also	finding	it	easier	to	make	
myself	useful,	although	continuously	presenting	myself	as	insider/outsider,	
moving	between	modes	as	it	seems	most	appropriate		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	22/06/2016).	
Whilst	the	implications	of	this	‘institutional	interiorization’	are	perhaps	both	
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too	multifaceted,	and	too	expansive,	to	discuss	in	their	entirety	(there	are,	for	
instance,	 a	 number	 of	 implications	 for	 how	 we	 understand	 the	 ‘political’	
subject	of	laughter	with	care,	some	of	which	I	will	return	to	in	Chapter	7),	here	
I	 will	 focus	 specifically	 on	 the	 implications	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 we	 might	
understand	the	ethics	of	doing	laughter	with	care	in	care	homes.	In	particular,	
we	might	note	the	ways	in	which,	through	institutional	foldings,	the	idea	of	the	
‘singular’	moral	subject	(individual	or	collective)	becomes	further	distributed,	
differentiated	and	pluralised	across	time	and	space	(see	Braidotti,	2011;	Colls,	
2012;	 Mol,	 2008a;	 Simpson,	 2017).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 subject’s	 actions	
(whether	 that	 be	 laughter,	 care	 or	 another)	 become	 inflected	 through	 the	
habituated	actions	(and	non-actions)	of	multiple	other	bodies	 that	make	up	
the	institutions	in	which	they	reside.	In	this	sense,	we	might	note	that	many	of	
the	practices	of	both	laughter	and	care	discussed	in	both	this	chapter	and	the	
rest	 of	 the	 thesis	 can	 be	 further	 contextualised	 as	 (possibly)	 habitual,	
preconscious	 refrains	 rather	 than	conscious,	 intentional	choices	 (Dewsbury,	
2012;	Massumi,	2015).	
This	is,	of	course,	not	to	say	that	these	foldings	are	all-encompassing.	I	note	for	
instance	that	I	remain	in	a	process	of	folding/unfolding	as	I	‘present’	myself	as	
insider/outsider	(worker/researcher)	at	different	moments,	meaning	that	‘the	
subject’	can	and	does	unfold	from	the	institution	also.	Rather,	it	is	to	suggest	
that	 the	 practices	 that	 occur	 within	 care	 homes	 might	 themselves	 be	
considered	 as	 more-than-human	 singular-pluralities	 (Nancy,	 2000),	 “plural	
and	polyphonic”	as	Guattari	(1995:	1)	describes,	always	in	excess	of	a	singular	
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moral	 subject.	 In	 other	 words,	 to	 recognise	 all	 of	 these	 modes	 as	 part	 of	
institutional	foldings	is	to	remain	hesitant	in	terms	of	our	representations	of	
the	 actions	of	 individual	or	 collective	 subjects	 as	moral/ethical	or	 not;	 and	
instead	 to	 offer	 a	 little	 more	 generosity	 through	 recognising	 the	 multiple	
foldings	that	make	up	the	circumstances	in	which	laughter	and/or/with	care	
is	enacted.	
5.7	|	Conclusions	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 looked	 to	 think	 about	 the	ways	 in	which	 laughter	 is	
practised	with	and	alongside	care	in	care	homes,	specifically	questioning	how	
we	might	 understand	 the	 ethics	 of	 this.	 In	 particular,	 through	 drawing	 on	
Deleuze’s	(1988a,	1993)	concept	of	the	fold	(see	also	Nixon,	2017),	alongside	
notions	of	performativity,	I	have	both	disrupted	the	idea	of	laughter	and	care	
as	 done	 by	 a	 singular	 (moral)	 subject,	 and	 in	 turn	 shifted	 away	 from	 ‘the	
subject’	itself	as	the	primary	focus	of	ethical	attention	(Simpson,	2017;	Wylie,	
2006).	Indeed,	the	fold	has	enabled	a	way	of	thinking	about	the	‘doing	subject’	
in	a	manner	that	is	distinctly	multiple:	“more	than	one,	but	less	than	many”	as	
Annemarie	Mol	 (2002:	 55)	 eloquently	 puts	 it.	 Following	 Guattari	 (1995),	 I	
have	 thus	 offered	 three	 registers	 through	 which	 subjects	 in	 care	 homes	
perform	 both	 laughter	 and	 care:	 the	 individual;	 the	 collective;	 and	 the	
institutional.	 Each	 register	 is	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 kinds	 of	 folding	 it	
involves;	 yet	 they	 are	 also	 connected,	 folding	 into	 and	out	of	 each	 other	 at	
different	times	and	to	different	effects.	
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In	 terms	 of	 laughter	 with	 care	 more	 specifically,	 at	 the	 individual	 register	
laughter	can	be	seen	as	a	means	of	expressing	 ‘internal’	qualities,	 therefore	
helping	to	establish	emotional	connections	between	people	that	enhance	their	
capacities	 to	 care	 and	 be	 cared	 for,	 in	 both	 affective	 and	 practical	 senses.	
Laughter,	however,	also	serves	as	a	mechanism	through	which	‘subjects’	can	
maintain	distance	and	thus	a	sense	of	individuality,	despite	the	demands	of	the	
inter-corporeal/intersubjective	 engagement	 that	 comes	 with	 care.	 At	 the	
collective	 register,	 laughter	 enables	 a	 sense	 of	 solidarity	 to	 be	maintained,	
often	in	direct	relation	to	Others.	Doing	collective	laughter,	therefore,	becomes	
a	way	of	moving	and	maintaining	borders	and	boundaries	between	different	
groups	 of	 people,	 generating	 processes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion.	 As	 such	
through	laughter,	different	people	can	fold	themselves	into	and	out	of	different	
groupings	at	different	times,	shifting	their	ethical	responsibilities	in	each	case.	
At	the	institutional	register,	the	performance	of	laughter	can	become	folded	
into	 various	 logics	 around	 ‘best	 practice’	 (Mol,	 2008b)	 and	 thus	 reinforce	
particular	moral	subjectivities	such	as	the	‘happy	carer’.	Similarly,	laughter	can	
become	inflected	through	the	particularities	of	the	matters	of	the	institution,	
forming	 particular	 ways	 of	 being-with,	 speaking	 and	 practising	 care	work.	
These	performatives,	 in	 turn,	establish	modes	of	habituation	through	which	
particular	ways	of	doing	 laughter	and	care	 can	be	understood	as	 less-than-
fully-conscious	rather	than	as	rational	choices	made	at	each	moment.		
The	 significance	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 ethics	 of	 laughter	 with	 care,	
therefore,	 lies	 within	 its	multiplicities.	 Addressing	 these	 three	 registers	 as	
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different,	 yet	 related,	 establishes	 practices	 of	 laughter	 and	 care	 as	 always	
having	multiple	directions	and	relations	with	subjectivity.	In	this	sense,	there	
is	 no	 single	moral	 subject	 to	 be	 understood	 (or	 judged)	 in	 each	 encounter;	
rather	 the	 subject	 is	 always	 both	 distributed	 across	 multiple	 sites	 and	
internally	 differentiated	 within	 ‘its	 self’	 (Simpson,	 2017).	 As	 such,	 ethical	
thinking	demands	both	an	understanding	of	this	relationality,	and	a	generosity	
towards	 the	 different	 ways,	 or	 reasons,	 for	 laughter’s	 emergence	 in	 each	
moment	(Darling,	2010).	We	need	to	not	undertake	an	ethics	that	attends	to	
the	subject	directly	but	rather	an	ethics	that	attends	to	the	multiple	folds	and	
foldings	that	form	the	particular	circumstances	through	which	different	forms	
of	 laughter	with	 care	 are	 enacted	 for	 different	 reasons	 (McCormack,	 2003,	
2017).	 This,	 in	 turn,	 means	 that	 we	 need	 to	 be	 attentive	 to	 the	 different	
responsibilities	 that	different	people	 in	care	homes	may	have	towards	both	
matters	inside	particular	‘boundaries’	and	matters	beyond.	Ultimately,	as	this	
chapter	has	 shown,	 this	belies	an	understanding	of	practices	of	 laughter	as	
ethically	‘good’	or	‘bad’,	and	instead	demands	a	more	minor	(Jellis	and	Gerlach,	
2017;	 Lancione,	 2017)	 attention	 to	 what	 these	 practices	 can	 do	 (Spinoza,	
1970).	
Ultimately,	therefore,	this	chapter	has	offered	a	further	approach	to	laughter	
with	care	through	decentring	the	singular	subject	in	relation	to	the	laughter	‘it’	
performs.	 Although	 I	 have	 resisted	 approaching	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 humour	
theories,	or	‘representationalist’	accounts	of	particular	joking	structures,	we	
might	 note	 that	 the	 approach	 offered	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 one	 that	 remains	
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centred	on	the	idea	of	laughter	as	something	that	is	‘done’	by	people	within	a	
particular	set	of	circumstantial	arrangements.	In	this	sense,	whilst	this	chapter	
has	offered	a	sense	of	the	ethics	surrounding	why,	where,	in	what	form	and	for	
what	reasons	laughter	takes	place	within	and	with	care,	it	has	remained	less	
clear	on	what	laughter	can	do	as	a	thing	or	a	force	in	its	own	right.	As	such,	the	
next	chapter	turns	to	this	question,	looking	to	understand	how	the	presence	of	
laughter	 itself	 (rather	 than	 just	 its	 doings)	 can	 affect	 different	 people’s	
experiences	of	giving	and	receiving	care.	 	
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Chapter	6:	Atmospheric	laughter	in	spaces	of	
care7	
Laughter	is	a	chain.	Something	like	contagion.	It	fuses	and	diffuses,	fuses	
because	it	defuses	
(Serres,	2012:	81)	
6.1	|	Introduction	
One	of	 the	aims	of	 this	 thesis	has	been	 to	 take	 seriously	Anca	Parvulescu’s	
(2010)	argument	that	most	theories	of	laughter	are	often	not	concerned	with	
laughter	 at	 all,	 instead	 positioning	 it	 as	 the	 response	 to	 something	 else	 –	
humour,	jokes,	the	ridiculous	or	the	grotesque	–	and	therefore	theorising	these	
things	instead.	Whilst	the	preceding	chapter	looked	to	push	away	from	these	
particular	registers,	and	to	generate	a	more	multiple	and	generous	account	of	
the	 ethical	 capacities	 surrounding	 laughter’s	 emergence,	 in	 bringing	 it	 to	 a	
conclusion	I	noted	that	it	too	could	be	critiqued	for	maintaining	analytic	focus	
on	the	doing	subject	of	laughter	rather	than	laughter	itself.	In	other	words,	it	
could	be	argued	to	generate	an	ethical	account	of	the	(intentional)	practice	of	
																																																								
7	Elements	of	this	chapter	have	also	been	published	in	a	revised	form	as:	Emmerson	P	(2017)	
Thinking	 laughter	 beyond	 humour:	 atmospheric	 refrains	 and	 ethical	 indeterminacies	 in	
spaces	of	care.	Environment	and	Planning	A	49(9):	2082–2098.	
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laughing,	rather	than	addressing	the	question	of	what	laughter	itself	can	do.	As	
such,	this	chapter	looks	to	redress	this	balance	through	offering	an	approach	
to	laughter	with	care	that	moves	away	from	the	laugher	as	the	subject	of	ethics,	
and	 instead	 foregrounds	 laughter’s	spatial	 and	ethical	potentials	 as	distinct	
from	its	causes,	once	again	framed	by	the	question	what	can	laughter	do?	
In	framing	this	approach,	I	turn	to	geographic	engagements	with	the	concept	
of	affective	atmospheres	which	have	become	a	key	means	of	understanding	
how	different	entities	“emerge,	relate,	and	are	distributed	differently	across	
space	 and	 are	 enrolled	 into	 the	 social”	 (Edensor,	 2012b:	 1105;	 see	 also	
Anderson,	 2009a,	 2014;	 Ash,	 2013;	 McCormack,	 2013;	 Stewart,	 2011).	
Although	somewhat	defying	definition,	both	Anderson	(2014)	and	McCormack	
(2008a)	 note	 that	 atmospheres	 mark	 diffuse	 spatialities	 that	 can	 be	 both	
material	 (thingy)	 and	 ephemeral	 (qualified),	 each	 of	 which	 is	 useful	 for	
thinking	 about	 laughter.	 In	 everyday	 language,	 for	 instance,	we	might	 both	
speak	of	laughter’s	sounds	as	‘filling	a	space’	and	we	might	ascribe	a	quality	to	
this	 laughter	 as	 ‘good’,	 ‘bad’,	 ‘unusual’,	 ‘unsettling’,	 ‘callous’,	 ‘soothing’	 or	 a	
whole	host	of	other	terminologies	(as	indeed	I	have	done	already	in	this	thesis	
–	see	Chapter	4	in	particular).	Perhaps	more	importantly,	atmospheres	do	not	
only	impress	on	the	spaces	in	which	they	are	felt,	but	they	also	change	them	
(Anderson,	2014)	allowing	a	means	of	thinking	through	what	laughter	can	do	
when	it	bursts	forth	(McCormack,	2008a).	
As	such,	engaging	with	atmospheres	offers	not	only	a	means	of	thinking	about	
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laughter	as	a	spatial	thing	but	also	the	ways	in	which	laughter	can	affect	spaces	
of	care	themselves	and	thus	the	ways	in	which	it	can	make	a	difference	to	how	
care	 is	 experienced	 (Wilson,	 2017).	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 approach,	
therefore,	rests	on	its	ability	to	conceptualise	laughter	as	having	the	capacity	
to	affect	and	be	affected	 in	a	manner	that	exceeds	the	intentionality	of	both	
humour	and	of	 the	bodies	who	produce	 it	 (Hughes,	2016;	Nancy,	1993).	 In	
part,	this	is	a	movement	to	further	decentre	the	‘moral’	subject	of	laughter	and	
thus	offer	 further	generosity	 to	 the	ethical	happenings	that	surround	 it,	yet	
perhaps	more	 significantly,	 the	 chapter	also	offers	a	distinctly	geographical	
way	 of	 thinking	 about	 laughter	 –	 one	 that	 not	 only	 sees	 laughter	 as	
contextualised	by,	or	expressive	of,	particular	spaces	and	places,	but	rather	as	
something	 that	 actively	 contributes	 to	 the	 processual	 generation	 and	
emergence	of	spaces	and	places	themselves.	
The	chapter	thus	opens	with	a	discussion	of	atmospheres,	particularly	as	Ben	
Anderson	 (2009a,	 2014)	 has	 conceived	 of	 them,	 and	 their	 potential	 for	
thinking	 about	 laughter.	 Atmospheres	 provide	 a	 useful	 framework	 for	
attending	 to	 laughter	 as	 something	 that	 is	 simultaneously	 materially	
embodied,	 sonically	 diffuse,	 affectively	 charged	 and	 socially	 potent,	 but	
crucially	 also	 as	 something	 whose	 capacities	 to	 affect	 are	 never	
predetermined.	 Following	 this,	 the	 chapter	 briefly	 discusses	 atmospheres	
within	care	homes	more	generally	and	the	role	that	laughter	is	perceived	to	
play	in	this,	noting	that	atmospheres	can	be	both	spontaneous	and	staged.	The	
next	 section	 turns	 to	 laughter’s	 atmospheric	 capacities,	 positioning	 it	 as	
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something	 that	 can	affect	 in	ways	 that	 exceed	both	humour	and	 the	bodies	
from	which	 it	 emanates,	 arguing	 that	 this	 demonstrates	 a	 form	of	 ‘nascent	
creativity’	 (Williams,	2016).	The	next	section	 furthers	this	creative	capacity	
through	 discussing	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	 generate	 spaces,	 particularly	
noting	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 can	 enhance,	 or	 repair,	 felt	 qualities	 and	
relations	 within	 spaces	 of	 care.	 Where	 these	 initial	 discussions	 emphasis	
laughter’s	role	in	aiding	care,	the	final	substantive	section	looks	to	re-orientate	
our	 approach	 (Ahmed,	 2006),	 adopting	 a	 speculative	 ethos	 (Puig	 de	 la	
Bellacasa,	 2017)	 in	 order	 to	 attend	 to	 (potential)	 other	 experiences	 of	
laughter’s	atmospheres	in	which	its	affects	might	be	understood	as	somewhat	
less	positive.	Whilst	these	affective	happenings	are	less	common	(in	my	field	
diary	at	least)	they	point	towards	a	need	adopt	more	critical,	more	careful	and	
more	multiple	standpoints	when	making	ethical	judgements	about	laughter’s	
atmospheres	within	spaces	of	care	whereby	any	question	of	what	laughter	can	
do	must	always	be	followed	by	the	critical	suffix	‘for	whom?’.	
6.2	|	Atmospheric	laughter	
Throughout	the	thesis	thus	far	I	have	maintained	a	dual	position	for	laughter,	
stating	that	it	is	both	‘something	we	do’	and	‘a	thing’	that	is	separate	from	us	
(see	Chapters	2	and	4	 in	particular).	 Indeed,	 although	 the	previous	 chapter	
focused	mainly	on	 the	 first	of	 these	 propositions,	 I	did	 speak	 briefly	 to	 the	
second,	whereby	laughter	was	argued	to	be	produced	by	a	body,	but	also	to	
leave	it,	turning	the	body	‘inside	out’	in	the	process	(J	Katz,	1999).	This	chapter	
thus	largely	attends	to	this	second	proposition.	However,	I	do	not	want	to	do	
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away	with	the	first	completely.	As	such,	I	am	inclined	to	suggest	that	we	might	
instead	position	laughter	as	a	quasi-thing	(Griffero,	2017):	not	quite	an	object	
proper,	nor	technically	a	subject,	but	rather	adopting	a	“position	in-between	
humans	 and	 objects”	 (Bille	 et	 al.,	 2015:	 33).	 This	 conception	 speaks	 to	 the	
phenomenological	 sense	 that	 laughter	 (which	 is	 essentially	 a	 bundle	 of	
percepts	and	affects)	is	rendered	as	such	by	an	encounter	with	‘a	subject’	who	
interprets	 it	 as	 laughter,	 yet	 also	 knows	 it	 to	 be	 distinct	 from,	 outside	 or	
beyond	the	intimate	spaces	of	that	subject	themselves.	Indeed,	even	when	the	
laughter	encountered	is	produced	from	the	subject	themselves	it	still	remains	
somehow	 distinct,	 uncanny	 even,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 subject	 proper:	 we	 can	
laugh	and	not	know	precisely	why	(Macpherson,	2008).	In	this	sense,	we	might	
repurpose	Derek	McCormack’s	(2008a:	415)	words	to	argue	that	laughter	has,	
or	perhaps	more	precisely	‘expresses’,	an	“affective	materiality	[which]	is	not	
necessarily	 reducible	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 an	 individual	 subjective	 experience”	
giving	it	the	same	qualities	as	an	affective	atmosphere.	
Emerging	from	a	mixture	of	aesthetic,	spatial	and	affective	theories,	affective	
atmospheres	have	been	positioned	as	a	means	of	 addressing	 the	vague,	 yet	
highly	palpable	felt	qualities	of	particular	spacetimes	(McCormack,	2013).	Like	
meteorological	atmospheres,	affective	atmospheres	are	seen	to	envelop	and	
surround	 bodies,	 as	well	 as	 being	 apprehended	 through	 both	material	 and	
qualitative	registers	(McCormack,	2008a,	2018).	In	material	terms,	we	might	
note	 that	 atmospheres	 are	 always	 associated	 with	 something	 particular	 –	
bodies,	 sounds,	 events,	 encounters,	 spaces,	 epochs	 –	 and	 can	 therefore	
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arguably	be	held	in	separation	from	other	‘things’	(Anderson,	2014)	(although	
they	can	overlap	with	and	affect	other	‘things’	including	other	atmospheres	–	
see	Ahmed,	2006).	In	qualitative	terms,	they	provide	a	particular	tone,	mood,	
intensity,	feeling	or	aura	to	the	something	in	question	which	although	might	
be	 difficult	 to	 describe,	 allows	 a	 specific	 (singular)	 understanding	 of	 its	
qualities	to	emerge.	Atmospheres	may	be	‘staged’	(Bille	et	al.,	2015)	through	
modes	of	design	such	as	architecture	(Adey	et	al.,	2013;	Edensor,	2012b,	2015)	
or	 through	 performative	 actions	 (Bissell	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Closs	 Stephens,	 2016;	
McCormack,	 2008a,	 2013);	 yet	 they	 may	 also	 emerge	 accidentally	 or	
spontaneously,	becoming	‘unruly’	occurrences	(Shaw,	2014;	Simpson,	2013).	
In	 both	 cases,	 atmospheres	 are	 generated	 through	 modes	 of	 relationality	
between	multiple	 types	of	different	bodies	 (Anderson,	2014;	Bissell,	 2010).	
These	bodies	may	be	human	but	they	might	equally	be	non-human	bodies	such	
as	 animals	 and	 technologies,	 or	 indeed	 discursive	 bodies	 and	 bodies	 of	
sensation	such	as	colour,	lights,	smells	or	sounds	interacting	with	one	another	
(Ash,	2013;	Edensor,	2012b).	
Atmospheres	“at	once	describe	a	particular	quality	of	the	environment	from	
which	 they	 emanate,	 just	 as	 they	 require	 a	 sentient	 subject	 for	 their	
signification,	 their	 coming	 into	 meaning”	 (Duff,	 2016:	 62–63).	 They	 are	
themselves	quasi-objects:	“objective	and	subjective	at	the	same	time,	meaning	
that	 they	 are	 both	 and	 neither”	 (Anderson,	 2014:	 146),	 simultaneously	 the	
quality	of	 something,	 yet	never	entirely	 reducible	 to	 that	 something,	or	 the	
experience	 of	 it	 either	 (McCormack,	 2008a).	 As	 with	 the	 fold	 (Chapter	 5)	
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therefore,	atmospheres	speak	to	the	blurred	distinction	between	‘subjectivity’	
and	the	external	world,	“a	class	of	experience	that	occur	before	and	alongside	
the	formation	of	subjectivity,	across	human	and	nonhuman	materialities,	and	
in-between	 subject/object	 distinctions”	 (Anderson,	 2009a:	 78,	 emphasis	 in	
original),	 once	 again	 drawing	 connections	 with	 both	 Bataille	 (2001)	 and	
Nancy’s	(1993)	conceptions	of	laughter	as	pre-subjective	or	more	precisely	as	
an	 event	 out	 of	 which	 subjectivity	 is	 made	 present.	 That	 said,	 affective	
atmospheres	offer	a	somewhat	different	spatial	imagination	to	the	fold	in	that	
they	suggest	an	encounter	with	something	that	remains	somehow	separated	
or	 spaced	 from	 the	 formation	 of	 subjectivity,	 rather	 than	 something	 that	
necessarily	becomes	‘incorporated’	into	it.	In	less	abstract	terms,	therefore,	we	
might	follow	Anderson	(2014)	in	suggesting	atmospheres	as	having	a	‘radiant’,	
‘voluminous’	 and	 ‘spherical’	 spatiality	 (see	 also	 McCormack,	 2018),	 rather	
than	one	made	of	joints	and	folds	(cf.	Doel,	1996):	
…atmos	to	indicate	a	tendency	for	qualities	of	feeling	to	fill	volume	like	a	
gas,	and	sphere	to	indicate	a	particular	form	of	spatial	organisation	based	
on	 the	 circle.	 Together	 they	 enable	 us	 to	 think	 how	 atmospheres	 are	
connected	to	particular	‘envelopments’	that	surround	people,	things	and	
environments.	 Note	 how	 an	 atmosphere	 ‘surrounds’	 a	 couple	 or	 one	
finds	 oneself	 ‘enveloped’	 by	 an	 atmosphere.	 The	 centre	 and	
circumference	of	an	affective	atmosphere	may,	however,	be	indefinite	or	
unstable;	especially	if	an	atmosphere	is	taken	not	only	to	occupy	a	space	
but	 to	 permeate	 it.	 Thus	 affective	 atmospheres	 may	 ‘leak	 out’,	
overflowing	ways	of	bounding	a	sphere	…	Atmospheres	within	a	specific	
site	 may	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 one	 another,	 changing	 as	 they	 do	
(Anderson,	2014:	148–149)	
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In	this	sense,	atmospheres	arguably	offer	a	more	tangible	account	of	laughter’s	
spatial	forms	than	the	fold.	We	can	think	for	example	about	the	ways	in	which	
laughter	 radiates	 from	 individual	 or	 collective	 bodies,	 expanding	 outwards	
like	a	gas	to	‘fill’	space	and	envelop	the	bodies	within	that	space.	Similarly,	we	
might	note,	as	I	have	done	already	in	this	thesis,	that	particular	laughter	can	
have	particular	qualities,	both	in	aesthetic	(e.g.	‘harsh’,	‘soft’,	‘short’,	‘deep’	or	
‘hearty’)	and	affective	senses	(e.g.	 ‘soothing’,	 ‘friendly’,	 ‘unnerving’	 ‘cruel’	or	
‘caring’),	 each	 of	 which	 change	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 people	 feel	 about	 and	
understand	the	laughter.	Indeed,	in	everyday	language,	we	might	well	describe	
the	tone	or	feel	of	laughter	as	atmospheric	in	much	the	same	manner	(Ahmed,	
2010).	Crucially,	because	of	laughter’s	voluminous,	and	enveloping	qualities,	
each	of	these	apprehensions	can	also	affect	the	ways	in	which	different	bodies	
apprehend	the	nature	of	the	spaces	in	which	it	occurs	whereby	the	space	takes	
on	an	associated	quality	through	becoming	an	atmosphere	of	laughter.	
We	might	also	note	the	ways	in	which	laughter	is	hard	to	contain	and	how	it	
too	may	‘leak	out’,	be	heard	and	affect	bodies	beyond	the	specific	spheres	of	its	
emergence,	often	changing	affective	capacities	in	the	process.	Emily	Douglas	
(2015:	147),	for	instance,	gives	the	example	of	“a	book	club	made	up	primarily	
of	black	women”	being	“evacuated	from	Napa	Valley	Wine	Train	in	California	
because	a	white	passenger	 complained	 that	 they	were	 laughing	 too	 loudly”	
which	speaks	to	the	ways	in	which	the	overhearing	of	laughter	from	a	different	
atmospheric	 sphere	 can	 lead	 to	 markedly	 different	 affective,	 political	 and	
ethical	outcomes	(see	also	Bergson,	1980;	Bissell,	2010;	Maclaren,	2014b	–	all	
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of	whom	 also	 discuss	 laughter’s	 affective	 capacities	 in	 the	 context	 of	 train	
travel).	
This	latter	point,	and	the	specific	example	given	by	Douglas	(2015),	thus	opens	
up	space	for	discussion	of	two	further	critical	facets	when	thinking	about	the	
ethics	of	laughter’s	atmospheres.	The	first,	and	arguably	most	obvious	in	this	
case,	relates	 to	 the	ways	in	which	atmospheres	overlap	with	other	 forms	of	
spatiality	and	are	thus	informed	by	the	circumstantial	nature	of	the	worlds	in	
which	 they	 take	 place	 (McCormack,	 2017),	 including	 other	 atmospheres	
(Anderson,	2014).	In	simple	terms	this	means	that	although	each	atmosphere	
forms	 a	 spacetime	with	 singularity	 and	 specificity	 (haecceity)	 (McCormack,	
2013),	 it	 is	 important	 to	 appreciate	 that	 atmospheres	 can,	 and	 will,	 be	
experienced	differently	by	different	bodies	(Bissell,	2010),	informed	in	part	by	
historical	 processes	 of	 interaction	 (Edensor,	 2012b).	 This	 is	 an	 important	
recognition	in	terms	of	paying	more	attention	to	the	relation	between	bodily	
difference	and	encounters	with	atmospheres	(Ahmed,	2006;	Colls,	2012),	and	
therefore	 in	moving	away	from	some	of	 the	more	universalising	tendencies	
within	affective	 thinking	 (Nayak,	2010;	see	Tolia-Kelly,	2006);	 as	well	 as	 in	
attending	to	the	very	well	documented	effects	of	culture,	gender,	race,	age	and	
ability	on	the	ways	that	bodies	laugh	and	are	affected	by	laughter	(Albrecht,	
1999;	 Douglas,	 2015;	 Macpherson,	 2008;	 Mbembe,	 2001).	 Similarly,	 it	
becomes	 important	 in	 terms	 of	 spaces	 of	 care	 within	 which	 laughter	 can	
emerge	 from	multiple	different	 reasons	between	multiple	groups	of	people	
many	 of	whom	 exist	 in	 close	 spatial	 proximity	 (as	we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	
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chapter).	
Building	 on	 this,	 therefore,	 the	 second	 facet	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	 above	
example	is	the	ideas	of	atmospheres	of	laughter	as	always	‘unfinished’:	
[A]tmospheres	are	unfinished	because	of	their	constitutive	openness	to	
being	expressed	and	qualified	 in	specific	encounters.	Atmospheres	are	
indeterminate.	They	are	resources	that	must	be	attuned	to	by	bodies	…	
Atmospheres	are,	on	this	account,	always	in	the	process	of	emerging	and	
transforming.	 They	 are	 always	 being	 taken	 up	 and	 reworked	 in	 the	
events	of	lived	experience:	being	expressed	in	feelings	and	qualified	in	
emotions	 that	 may	 themselves	 become	 elements	 within	 future	
atmospheres	 …	 Atmospheres,	 emanating	 and	 enveloping	 particular	
things,	sites	or	people,	are	endlessly	being	formed	and	reformed	through	
encounters	as	 they	are	attuned	 to	and	become	part	of	 life.	 (Anderson,	
2014:	145)	
Positioning	laughter	as	an	‘unfinished’	atmosphere,	therefore,	captures	a	sense	
of	 ambiguity	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	 plurality	 of	 encounters	 that	 give	 it	 a	
collective	form.	This	sense	draws	a	direct	parallel	between	atmospheres	and	
refrains,	 with	 McCormack	 (2013)	 arguing	 that	 the	 refrain	 provides	 a	
mechanism	for	explaining	the	ways	in	which	certain	atmospheres	are	drawn	
together,	and	atmospheres,	in	turn,	capture	some	sense	of	the	territories	that	
refrains	 produce.	 Similarly,	 this	 plurality	 serves	 to	 affirm	 the	 idea	 of	
“sometimes”	 in	 relation	 to	 laughter’s	 affective	 capacities	 (Deleuze	 and	
Guattari,	 1988:	 312).	 Laughter	 for	 instance,	 sometimes	 affords	 bodies	 with	
increased	 capacities	 for	 action	 through	 drawing	 them	 together	 (Routledge,	
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2012),	 offering	 (atmospheric)	 modes	 of	 critique	 (Bissell	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 or	
transforming	 corporeal	 experiences	 of	 space	 (Brigstocke,	 2014).	 Yet	
sometimes	it	reduces	capacities,	through	disciplining	bodies	(Douglas,	2015),	
excluding	 them	 (Nixon,	 2017)	 or	 generating	 negative	 affections	 (Ahmed,	
2010).	Indeed,	sometimes	it	can	do	both	to	different	bodies	at	the	same	time;	
or,	 sometimes	 neither.	 The	 fundamental	 point	 is	 that	 because	 atmospheric	
laughter	operates	between	bodies	and	pre-subjectively	 its	outcomes	can	be	
neither	 fully	 determined	 in	 advance	 nor	 always	 attributed	 to	 the	
intentionalities	of	laughers	themselves	(Hughes,	2016;	Nancy,	1993).	In	this	
way,	 laughter	maintains	 the	potential	 for	what	Nina	Williams	 (2016:	1550)	
describes	as	“nascent	creativity”	–	a	capacity	to	create	something	new	out	of	
the	 relations	 between	 corporeality,	 materiality	 and	 affectivity	 themselves	
rather	 than	 through	 cognitive	 agencies	 (thus	 echoing	Macpherson’s	 (2008)	
distinctions	between	humour	and	laughter).	
This	capacity	also	serves	to	highlight	the	complex	relations	between	cause	and	
effect	when	thinking	about	both	atmospheres	and	laughter	which	serves	as	a	
key	challenge	to	ethical	accounts	of	both.	In	part,	this	is	because	of	the	complex	
and	heterogeneous	composite	of	elements	out	of	which	atmospheres	emerge	
(corporeality,	materialities	and	affectivities	of	many	kinds),	which	ultimately	
means	that	“[i]t	becomes	impossible	to	pin	a	cause	to	one	element	within	the	
ensemble	 from	 which	 an	 atmosphere	 emanates	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 which	
atmospheres	 are	 enhanced,	 transformed	 or	 intensified”	 (Anderson,	 2014:	
153).	Rather	than	preceding	in	a	linear	fashion	from	cause	to	effect	we	might,	
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therefore,	 instead	 think	about	 laughter	as	enacting	an	 “emergent	 causality”	
(ibid;	see	also	De	Landa,	2006)	in	which	it	becomes	impossible	to	understand	
its	 ‘causal’	 capacities	before	 is	 effects	have	 registered	and	vice	versa.	Every	
moment	 of	 laughter	 is,	 therefore,	 rendered	 precarious	 and	 unpredictable	
(Anderson,	 2014)	 which	 erodes	 any	 universal	 sense	 of	 its	 ethicality,	
particularly	when	held	in	relation	to	care	(McCormack,	2003).	
In	drawing	this	section	to	a	close,	therefore,	we	can	note	that	thinking	about	
laughter	through	affective	atmospheres	thus	opens	up	both	a	theoretical	and	
practical	 space	 in	which	we	can	consider	 laughter	with	 care	 in	 terms	of	 its	
capacities	 to	 shape	 affective	 spacetimes	 and	 people’s	 involvement	 within	
them.	More	specifically	in	this	chapter	this	becomes	a	question	of	laughter’s	
capacity	 both	 to	 generate	 new	 atmospheres	 and	 to	 disrupt	 the	 existing	
atmospheres	within	the	care	home	itself,	changing	the	ways	in	which	different	
bodies	 inhabit	 spaces	 of	 care	 (Duff,	 2016)	 and	 therefore	 altering	 their	
capacities	to	care	and	be	cared	for.	Again,	it’s	worth	reiterating	that	under	this	
conception	 laughter’s	 atmospheres	 are	 neither	 ‘good’	 nor	 ‘bad’	 in	 and	 of	
themselves	but	rather	their	apprehension	as	such	is	situated	(Mol,	2008b;	Puig	
de	la	Bellacasa,	2017),	with	their	specific	affective	capacities	often	dependent	
on	the	angle,	position	or	situation	from	which	they	are	encountered	(Ahmed,	
2006,	2010).	
Although	atmospheres	are	deployed	within	this	chapter	primarily	as	a	way	of	
thinking	about	laughter,	it’s	worth	noting	that	the	idea	of	atmospheres	is	also	
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something	that	also	features	within	care	and	care	homes	more	widely,	shaping	
how	their	spaces	feel	and	the	kinds	of	capacities	that	they	engender	at	different	
times.	As	such,	the	next	section	looks	to	situate	laughter’s	atmospheres	within	
spaces	 of	 care	 through	 briefly	 discussing	 these	 more	 general	 atmospheric	
properties	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	they	emerge,	register	and	how	they	
come	to	matter	for	care.	
6.3	|	Care	home	atmospheres	
Alongside	their	more	general	use,	affective	atmospheres	have	been	taken	up	
and	deployed	in	thinking	about	the	affective	capacities	of	different	spaces	care.	
Gavin	 Andrews	 (2017:	 9)	 for	 instance	 notes	 that	 increased	 attention	 to	
atmospheres	 can	 aid	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 “a	 host	 of	 material	 and	
affective	 environmental	 stimuli	 …	 block	 or	 open	 up	 positive	 or	 negative	
affection	in	clients.”	Similarly,	Cameron	Duff	(2016:	59),	as	part	of	his	work	on	
the	assemblages	of	health,	 introduces	 the	 idea	of	 ‘atmospheres	of	recovery’	
through	which	he	seeks	“to	prise	open	the	spatial	and	embodied	rhythms	of	
recovery,	 the	 real	 experience	 that	 propels	 a	 body	 along	 a	 line	 of	 becoming	
well”.	 There	 are	 echoes	 here	 with	 Conradson’s	 (2005)	 discussion	 of	 the	
relational-self	within	landscapes	of	health	and	wellbeing	in	which	he	depicts	
the	complex	ecologies	that	generate	particular	affective	experiences	and	the	
ways	 in	 which	 these	 facilitate	 the	 differentiation	 (enhancement)	 of	 bodily	
capacities.	Moving	away	 from	 issues	around	health	 specifically,	Tucker	and	
Goodings	 (2017)	 also	 use	 atmospheres	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
collective	 emotions	 such	 as	 distress,	 support	 and	 care	 can	 unfold	 and	 be	
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mediated	 through	 online	 forums	 and	 social	media.	 Although	 perhaps	more	
distanced	from	formal	spaces	of	care	such	as	care	homes	their	analysis	allows	
key	 insights	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 care	 can	 be	 held	 together	 in	 ‘fragile’	
atmospheric	forms	where	proximity	and	distance	are	blurred.	Perhaps	more	
importantly	 for	 this	 chapter,	however,	 they	also	 suggest	 the	ways	 in	which	
these	 atmospheres	 can	 both	 be	 ‘unintentionally’	 enhanced	 or	 destroyed	 by	
non-human	actors	and	forces	which	in	turn	affect	a	wider	‘ensemble’	of	entities	
than	 simply	 the	 immediate	 atmospheric	 sphere	 of	 the	 (web)site	 and	 its	
inhabitants.	
In	this	sense,	we	can	start	to	glimpse	the	role	and	the	significance	of	affective	
atmospheres	 within	 care	 homes,	 particularly	 through	 their	 capacities	 to	
generate	co-constitutive	relations	between	the	spaces	of	 the	care	home,	 the	
bodies	 and	 subjects	 who	 inhabit	 them	 (human	 or	 otherwise),	 to	 influence	
relational	forms	of	sociability	across	a	number	of	subjective	registers	and,	of	
course,	to	affect	the	care	that	is	given	and	received	within	them.	Indeed,	it’s	
worth	noting	that	we	have	already	encountered	some	of	these	atmospheres	
within	this	thesis,	albeit	not	naming	them	as	such.	In	Chapter	4,	for	instance,	
the	moments	of	 laughter	were	seen	to	generate	certain	kinds	of	spacetimes	
characterised	 by	 different	 affective	 tonalities:	 frustration,	 calm,	 surprise,	
relaxation,	 care,	 not	 care,	 confusion	 and	 so	 on.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	although	 laughter	was	seen	as	a	means	of	producing	or	reinforcing	
particular	relational	configurations,	alongside	this	many	of	the	examples	also	
generated	 a	 series	 of	 affects	which	 “become	 conditions	 that	 shape	without	
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necessarily	determining	capacities	to	affect	and	be	affected”	(Anderson,	2014:	
137,	my	emphasis).	These	 configurations	 for	 instance	 sometimes	 facilitated	
feelings	of	connection,	togetherness,	complicity	and	care,	but	equally	had	the	
capacity	 to	 sometimes	 enact	 moments	 of	 frustration,	 anger,	 dissent	 and	
alienation	 –	 all	 of	 which	 seem	 to	 exceed,	 or	 cut	 across,	 the	 delineations	
between	the	various	registers	of	subjectivity/objectivity	being	enacted.	
I	will	return	to	the	significance	of	laughter’s	affective	atmospheric	capacities	
more	specifically	in	the	next	section	However,	for	now	it’s	worth	noting	the	
ways	in	which	the	ideas	of	atmospheric	capacities	also	permeate	care	homes	
in	a	more	everyday	way.	Indeed,	the	idea	of	atmospheres	is	common	within	
my	 field	 diary	 notes	where	 I	 often	 described	 the	 feel	 of	 the	 two	homes	 on	
particular	 days	 through	 reference	 to	 particular	 affective	 qualities:	 ‘calm’;	
‘peaceful’;	 ‘stressed’;	 ‘rushed’;	 ‘unsettled’;	 ‘brighter’;	or	 ‘manic’,	 for	example.	
Whilst	 this	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising,	 given	 my	 inclination	 towards	 non-
representational	theories,	it’s	worth	noting	that	this	kind	of	language	was	also	
used	by	staff	members,	residents	and	visitors	to	describe	the	home’s	particular	
felt	qualities:	
I	arrived	at	Winterbourne	and	immediately	went	to	help	one	of	the	carers,	
Chloe,	giving	out	breakfasts.	Riding	up	in	the	lift	with	her,	she	turned	to	me	
and	said,	“I’m	struggling	today,	I	have	already	had	a	cry.	I’m	just	working	
so	much	and	I’m	really	tired.	Don’t	get	me	wrong,	I	like	working	here	but	
not	when	there	is	an	atmosphere,	and	today	there	is.	Something	seems	to	
be	up	with	Angela,	 she	 is	 in	a	mood.	And	 then	 I	 cried	and	Amanda	 just	
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shouted	at	me,	telling	me	to	stop	it!!”		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	20/11/2015)	
Here	we	can	start	to	see	more	clearly	the	ways	in	which	affective	atmospheres	
are	apprehended	and	understood	by	people	 in	 care	homes	 (and	 indeed	 the	
similarities	 between	 this	 intuitive	 understanding	 and	 the	 theoretically	
informed	one	discussed	above).	In	particular,	we	might	note	the	specific	use	of	
‘atmosphere’	as	the	term	to	describe	the	care	home’s	affective	feel,	albeit	in	a	
way	that	remains	ambiguous	–	there	is	simply	‘an	atmosphere’.	The	qualities	
of	this	atmosphere	are	qualified	in	similarly	ambiguous	terms.	Angela	is	in	‘a	
mood’,	 something	 is	up	with	 her.	 ‘Chloe’	 also	 furnishes	 this	 ambiguity	with	
further	details	about	the	ways	in	which	it	affects	her	and	the	others	around	
her:		
she	is	struggling	
she	doesn’t	like	it	
she	cries	
someone	shouts	at	her		
Within	this	short	moment,	 therefore,	we	can	start	 to	see	the	ways	 in	which	
various	combinations	of	bodily	practices,	emotional	expressions	and	somatic	
feelings	 can	 combine	 and	 generate	 particular	 atmospheric	 qualities	 which	
‘shape’	 the	 relations	 that	 occur	 between	 people	 and	 generate	 different	
capacities	to	provide	care	(or	not)	in	the	process.	
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In	a	similar,	yet	different,	manner	we	might	also	note	the	ways	in	which	these	
atmospheric	qualities	are	often	ascribed	to	particular	individuals	or	collectives	
of	 people.	 At	 one	 point,	 for	 instance,	 I	 noted	 the	ways	 in	which	 particular	
groups	of	people	generate	a	different	feel	to	the	home:	“I	think	that	the	days	
feel	better	when	certain	staff	are	on	rather	than	others.	Today’s	group	I	think	
like	each	other	and	so	don’t	seem	to	moan	at	each	other	in	the	way	that	some	
groups	 do”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Winterbourne	 Care	 Home,	 12/11/2015).	
Similarly,	during	my	initial	visit	 to	meet	 the	manager	of	Winterbourne	Care	
Home,	 she	 talked	 to	me	about	how	different	staff	members	 could	 “make	or	
break”	a	day	in	the	care	home:	
We	get	nurses	who	come	in	here	and	are	full	of	energy.	They	bring	a	buzz	
into	the	home	and	it	can	last	all	day,	really	lifting	everyone’s	moods.	They	
are	brilliant.	Other	nurses	however	just	seem	lack	energy.	They	become	like	
the	Dementors	from	Harry	Potter,	sucking	all	of	the	energy	and	life	out	of	
the	home	and	bringing	people	down	with	them	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	16/09/2015)	
Again,	here	we	get	a	sense	of	the	ways	in	which	different	nurses’	‘energy’	can	
affect	the	atmospheres	of	the	home,	either	giving	it	a	palpable	sense	of	buzz	
which	enhances	the	mood	or	alternately	bringing	people’s	moods	down	and	
deadening	 the	 shared	 experiences	 of	 life.	 This	 ‘energy’	 although	 probably	
corresponds	 directly	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 speed	 and	movement	 (see	 McCormack,	
2008a),	arguably	emerges	in	an	ambiguous	manner	that	is	difficult	to	pin	down	
to	 a	 single	 property	 but	 is	 sensed	 through	 its	 capacities	 to	 change	 the	 felt	
nature	of	space	and	thus	the	interactions	other	people	have	with	it.	Within	this	
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quote	 we	 might	 also	 note	 the	 moral	 undertones	 that	 emerge,	 particularly	
through	the	juxtaposition	of	the	‘energetic’	nurses	and	those	who	become	like	
‘Dementors’,	 with	 the	 Dementors	 described	 in	 the	 Harry	 Potter	 books	 as	
resembling	evil	spirits	(see	Rowling,	1999).	In	this	way	we	can	start	to	think	
through	 the	ways	 in	which	 particular	 kinds	 of	 affective	 atmospheres	 carry	
with	them	symbolic	and	performative	associations	with	‘good’	or	‘bad’	care	in	
much	the	same	way	as	the	‘happy	carer’	trope	that	I	described	in	the	previous	
chapter.	
Although	most,	 if	 not	 all,	 of	 the	 atmospheres	 discussed	 thus	 far	 have	 been	
spontaneous,	 because	 they	 are	 instinctively	 understood	 often	 with	 moral	
undertones,	they	too	often	also	become	folded	into	‘institutional’	logics	of	the	
care	home	(see	also	Chapter	5).	This	can	be	seen	clearly	through	attempts	to	
‘stage’	particular	kinds	of	atmospheres	and	suppress	others	(Bille	et	al.,	2015)	
with	 the	 aim	 of	 shaping	 the	 kinds	 of	 relations	 these	 bodies	 have	 with	 the	
spaces	in	which	they	inhabit	and	thus	enabling	the	care	home	to	feel	caring,	
supportive,	safe	and	homely	(Andrews	et	al.,	2005;	Hauge	and	Heggen,	2008).	
Often	these	attempts	at	staging	were	both	subtle	and	relatively	banal.	In	both	
care	homes	that	I	worked	in,	for	instance,	I	remember	being	asked	to	wear	‘soft	
soled	shoes’.	This	was	in	part	for	safety	reasons	(to	avoid	slips),	but	it	was	also	
emphasised	to	me	that	“these	places	are	people’s	homes”	and	as	such	soft	soles	
mean	 that	 there	 is	no	 ‘clip-clopping’	noise	as	you	walk	down	 the	 corridors.	
Another	 example	 of	 this	 staging	 of	 atmospheres	 relates	 to	 the	 spatial	
organisation	 of	 residents,	 particularly	 in	 Summerview	 Care	 Home.	 I	 had	
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always	assumed	that	the	placing	of	the	residents	across	the	three	floors	of	the	
Summerview	was	random,	dependant	simply	on	the	availability	of	rooms	in	
the	home.	Over	 lunch	one	day,	however,	 I	was	 talking	 to	 the	manager	who	
“explained	to	me	that	she	actually	puts	considerable	thought	into	it,	trying	to	
ensure	that	the	carers	are	matched	to	residents	in	ways	that	promote	positive,	
and	 easy	 relations	 and	 therefore	 generate	 atmospheres	 (although	 not	 the	
word	she	used)	that	would	reflect	this”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	
Home,	13/07/2016).	
Perhaps	 the	most	obvious	example	of	 staged	production	of	 atmospheres	 in	
care	homes,	however,	centres	around	outside	entertainments	groups	such	as	
the	 two	 theatre	 groups	 I	 spent	 time	 with.	 As	McCormack	 (2013:	 7)	 notes,	
following	Gernot	Böhme,	“performative	spaces,	and	particularly	the	practices	
of	 set	 and	 stage	 design	 through	 which	 these	 spaces	 are	 produced,	 offer	
privileged	opportunities	for	exploring	this	question	[of	how	atmospheres	are	
produced]”.	 Indeed,	 although	 never	 stated	 in	 such	 a	 manner,	 care	 home	
entertainments,	such	as	 theatre	performances,	are	arguably	centred	around	
atmospheres.	 Usually	 based	 around	 artistic	 performance	 –	 such	 as	 music,	
comedy,	 dance,	 magic	 or	 mixtures	 of	 these	 –	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 enact	
sensations	(both	perceptive	and	affective)	that	deterritorialise	the	‘ordinary’	
feel	of	care	home	spaces	and	reterritorialise	an	atmosphere	that	 feels	more	
‘special’	or	 ‘enjoyable’.	As	 I	described	having	watched	my	first	performance	
with	the	pantomime	group:	
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Having	settled	into	the	audience	I	was	immediately	struck	by	how	different	
the	room	feels.	Minutes	ago,	it	was	just	a	dining	room,	like	any	other	in	a	
care	home	I	guess.	Now	a	stage	had	been	erected.	There	was	music	on	–	
show	tunes	that	bounce	and	skip	around	the	room.	A	buffet	lunch	was	being	
set	out	on	one	side	of	the	room.	People	were	beginning	to	gather.	The	noise	
of	the	room	started	to	raise.	There	was	a	sense	that	something	was	about	
to	happen,	but	no	one	seemed	to	know	quite	what.	I	was	sitting	on	a	table	
with	a	couple	of	elderly	ladies.	They	talked	at	me	excitedly,	clearly	pleased	
by	 the	 change	 of	 scenery	 and	 the	 special	 occasion.	 “It’s	 so	 nice	 to	 have	
something	different	going	on,”	said	one	of	them	tellingly.	I	remembered	the	
excitement	 from	when	 the	 show	 came	 to	Winterbourne,	 knowing	 inside	
how	much	these	shows	matter	to	people.	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Pantomime	Group,	18/01/2016)	
The	theatre	performances,	however,	also	open	up	space	for	thinking	about	the	
limits	 of	 staged	 atmospheres	 given	 that	 several	 factors	 exist	 that	 affect	 the	
capacity	 of	 shows	 to	 enact	 these	 kinds	 of	 atmospheres,	 particularly	
surrounding	what	Sharpe	et	al.	(2014:	117)	term	the	capacity	of	performers	to	
“habituate”	 their	 audience.	Within	 the	 shows	 that	 I	witnessed,	 for	 instance,	
many	residents	had	dementia	and	therefore	found	it	difficult	to	engage	with	
the	 performances.	 Similarly,	 a	 reduced	 capacity	 to	 hear	meant	 that	 several	
struggled	to	follow	the	plot	and	thus	maintain	interest.	Some	residents	did	not	
necessarily	wish	to	be	present	but	were	often	‘forced’	to	watch	shows,	unable	
to	leave	due	to	needing	mobility	assistance.	Several	times	I	overheard,	or	was	
told	statements,	such	as:	“I	hate	pantomimes”;	or	“this	is	not	very	good”;	and	
in	 one	 case	 “I	 wish	 they	 hadn’t	 brought	 me	 in	 here”	 –	 again	 reducing	
engagement	 from	 audiences	 and	 often	 meaning	 that	 shows	 struggled	 to	
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provide	their	intended	outcomes.	
In	this	sense,	we	can	start	to	recognise	the	ways	in	which	certain	embodied,	
cultural,	 emotional	 and	 personal	 differences	 can	 affect	 the	 capacities	 of	
atmospheres	in	care	homes	more	generally	to	generate	their	intended	feelings	
of	care,	support,	safety	and	comfort,	thus	throwing	open	the	question	of	both	
their	 practical	 efficacy	 and	 their	 ethical	 capacities.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 most	
pertinent	in	terms	of	laughter	which,	as	we	have	seen	already,	is	often	actively	
promoted	 in	 care	 homes	 yet	 carries	 with	 it	 a	 number	 of	 affective/ethical	
ambiguities	and	uncertainties.	As	such,	much	of	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	
will	 look	 more	 specifically	 at	 atmospheres	 of	 laughter,	 addressing	 their	
capacities	to	enhance	care,	but	also	questioning	the	limits	of	these	capacities	
when	approached	from	different	angles	or	orientations	(Ahmed,	2006,	2010).	
Before	this,	however,	the	next	section	turns	to	laughter’s	atmospheres	in	care	
more	 generally,	 looking	 to	 outline	 their	 ‘excessive’	 nature	 (Bataille,	 2001;	
Nancy,	1987,	1993),	particularly	 in	 terms	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 it	can	affect	
without	 and	 beyond	 humour,	 as	 well	 as	 the	ways	 in	 which	 it	 exceeds	 the	
boundaries	 of	 body-subjects	 and	 the	 representational	 economies	 usually	
associated	with	its	emergence	(see	also	Anderson,	2006;	McCormack,	2003).	
6.4	|	Laughter’s	excess	
In	 thinking	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 becomes	 ‘excessive’,	 and	
therefore	has	 the	 capacity	 to	affect	beyond	and	without	humour,	one	of	 the	
most	obvious	places	to	begin	the	discussion	is	with	its	contagious	capacities.	
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As	the	sub-title	 to	Robert	Provine’s	(1992)	article	outlining	his	experiments	
with	‘canned	laughter’	states	for	instance:	“[l]aughter	is	a	sufficient	stimulus	
for	[further]	 laughs	and	smiles”.	Similarly,	Macpherson	(2008)	argues	 in	her	
discussion	of	contagious	laughter	that	laughter	itself	can	provoke	laughter	in	
others	but	also	that	people	who	are	already	laughing	may	find	it	more	difficult	
to	 stop.	 Contagious	 laughter	 thus	means	 “opening	 ourselves	 to	 the	 present	
moment,	the	flow	and	rhythm	of	laughter”	(Macpherson,	2008:	1083).	In	this	
way,	 laughter	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 enact	modes	 of	 relational	 sociability	 between	
different	bodies	which	in	turn	generate	“contagious	subjectivit[ies]”	(Lawtoo,	
2011:	74)	‘born’	out	of	the	affections	of	laughter	itself	(Nancy,	1993).	Similarly,	
contagious	 laughter,	because	of	both	 its	material	 and	affective	qualities,	has	
often	been	offered	up	as	an	exemplar	of	 the	 ‘transmission’	or	 circulation	of	
affect	(see	Bissell,	2010;	Bissell	et	al.,	2012;	Brennan,	2004;	Brigstocke,	2014;	
Nixon,	2017)	thus	pointing	explicitly	its	affective	atmospheric	qualities,	as	the	
following	moment	suggests:	
I	was	sitting	in	the	dining	room	feeding	breakfast	to	Mrs	S	with	a	number	
of	other	carers	and	residents.	The	room	was	fairly	calm	and	quiet	so	Laura	
decided	to	put	some	music	on.	She	pressed	the	button	on	the	stereo,	there	
was	a	click	and	a	whirring	of	the	CD	in	the	drive.	Suddenly,	the	calmness	of	
the	 room	 was	 shattered	 by	 an	 eruption	 from	 the	 speakers	 as	 ABBA’s	
‘Dancing	Queen’	 blared	 out	 at	 top	 volume.	 At	 that	 exact	moment,	Mary	
arrived,	wheeling	Mrs	F	in	front	of	her.	Both	of	them	were	in	fits	of	laughter,	
Mrs	F	rocking	back	and	forth	in	her	wheelchair	and	Mary	half	folded	at	the	
waist,	tears	glinting	in	the	corner	of	her	eyes.	They	had	been	laughing	all	
the	way	downstairs	and	as	they	enter	the	dining	room,	their	guffaws	and	
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giggles	combine	with	the	sound	of	Swedish	Pop,	to	create	an	excess	of	jovial	
energy	that	instantly	filled	the	room.	The	whole	room	was	suddenly	in	a	
state	of	laughter.	I	couldn’t	stop	myself,	it	just	came	from	my	belly	and	out	
of	my	mouth,	a	hearty	laugh	that	shook	my	whole	body.	I	looked	up	at	Nina	
–	she	caught	my	eye	–	her	face	creasing	up	–	her	laugh	intensifying.	Then	
the	same	thing	with	Tara,	then	Mrs	S,	then	Mrs	H,	Karen,	and	Laura.	The	
room,	the	walls	and	tables	almost	pulsated	–	a	crescendo	of	laughter	and	
music	moving	around	like	a	wave.	I	sat	in	the	middle	of	it	all	shaking	and	
gasping	for	air.	Slowly	over	the	next	few	minutes,	the	laughter	faded	back,	
my	breathing	returned	to	normal.	The	room	itself	remained	thick	with	a	
certain	tension,	and	from	time	to	time	bursts	of	laughter	punctured	the	air	
only	to	be	quickly	stifled	by	sharp	intakes	of	breath…	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	20/10/2015)	
Although	 a	 relatively	 ‘extreme’	 event	 in	 terms	 of	 my	 experiences,	 this	
encounter	 provides	 an	 overt	 example	 of	 laughter,	 rather	 than	 humour,	
generating	 actions	 and	 affections	 within	 bodies.	 There	 is	 no	 obvious	 joke	
present.	I	found	out	later	that	a	perfume	bottle	had	broken	which	meant	Mrs	F	
had	been	covered	in	perfume,	providing	the	initial	catalyst	for	hers	and	Mary’s	
laughter,	but	this	remained	unknown	at	the	time.	As	such,	we	can	start	to	see	
laughter	 here	 as	 forming	 a	 means	 through	 which	 the	 expressive	 relations	
between	bodies	can	be	redefined,	realigned	and	reterritorialised.	The	laughter	
draws	 out	 an	 atmospheric	 territory	 which	 is	 physically	 and	 affectively	 felt	
within	 different	 bodies	 and	 circulates	 between	 them,	 through	 actions	 of	
creasing,	 folding,	 rocking,	 shaking,	 swaying	and,	of	 course,	 laughing	 further.	
The	laughter	fills	the	space	of	the	dining	room	with	waves	and	bursts	of	jovial	
energies	of	differing	intensities,	 forming	a	“unique	totality	 that	 incorporates	
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individual	bodies	by	subsuming	them	within	an	assemblage	of	forces”	(Duff,	
2016:	64).	Of	these	forces,	sonorous	sensations	are	clearly	central,	yet	they	act	
alongside	other	modes	of	atmospheric	expression	–	the	glancing	and	catching	
of	eyes	and	the	crumpling	of	faces	–	and	constellations	of	music,	food,	smells	
of	perfume,	wheelchairs	and	other	affective	intensities	and	memories	(of	the	
earlier	 calm	 and	 quietness	 for	 instance).	 The	 atmosphere	 of	 laughter	 thus	
draws	all	of	 the	bodies	in	 the	dining	room	into	a	new	relational	assemblage	
characterised	 by	 common	 affection	 (Edensor,	 2012b).	 We	 were	 no	 longer	
individual	 bodies	 but	 instead	 what	 Bataille	 and	 Nancy	 might	 call,	 not	
unproblematically,	a	‘community	of	laughers’	(Parvulescu,	2010).	
The	 example,	 therefore,	 shows	 how	 laughter	 can	 become	 a	 primary	 way	
through	which	bodies	relate	to	one	another	and	space	itself.	It	is	important	to	
recognise,	 however,	 that	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	 precarity	 here	 whereby	
laughter	can	also	mobilise	bodies	in	similar,	yet	smaller	and	more	subtle,	ways,	
generating	affections	in	just	a	few	people	within	a	larger	set:	
Sarah	and	Kate	were	hoisting	Mrs	P	onto	her	chair.	All	three	were	laughing	
about	something	(I’m	not	sure	what	exactly).	I	was	talking	to	Barbara	at	
the	time	and	watching	them	out	of	the	corner	of	my	eye.	Suddenly	I	let	out	
a	little	laugh	myself.	Mrs	P	looked	directly	at	me,	“Why	you	laughing?”	she	
barked	at	me.	I	felt	too	rude	to	admit	that	it	is	just	because	they	were	
(Field	Diary	notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	12/11/2015)	
Here,	the	three	women’s	laughter	draws	me	in	even	though	I	am	not	involved	
in	 the	 joke	 (cf.	 Chapter	 5).	 Once	 again,	 therefore,	 we	 can	 start	 to	 see	 how	
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laughter	can	move	bodies	in	ways	that	are	not	necessarily	related	to	humour	
through	modes	of	contagious	or	 infectious	affectivity.	The	spatialities	of	 this	
laughter	again	display	atmospheric	 characteristics	 through	 its	dispersal	out	
across	the	lounge	and	creation	of	affective	proximity	between	the	group	and	
myself,	 rhythmically	 aligning	 my	 body	 with	 theirs,	 eliciting	 a	 moment	 of	
‘shared’	 laughter	 (Edensor,	 2012b;	 Macpherson,	 2008).	 Yet	 what	 we	 also	
glimpse	within	this	encounter	is	a	sense	of	indeterminacy	within	the	laughter	
–	the	ways	it	affects	(or	doesn’t)	bodies	differently.	Although	there	were	several	
other	people	in	the	lounge,	I	seemed	to	be	the	only	one	who	was	prompted	to	
laugh.	The	reason	for	my	‘openness’	here	is	probably	due	to	my	positionality	–	
my	research	focus	making	me	more	attuned	to	laughter	and	thus	more	likely	
to	be	affected	by	 it	–	however	the	differences	demonstrate	a	key	element	 in	
responding	 to	 critiques	 of	 the	 ‘universalising’	 tendencies	 of	 some	 affective	
thinking	 (Tolia-Kelly,	 2006)	 through	 recognising	 the	 differing	 capacities	 of	
bodies	to	be	affected	by	atmospheres	depending	on	their	positions,	situations	
or	orientations	(Ahmed,	2006;	Nayak,	2010).	
In	both	of	these	cases,	therefore,	we	can	start	to	see	the	ways	in	which	bodies	
can	 become	 involved	 in	 atmospheres	 of	 laughter,	 even	 when	 there	 is	 no	
recognisable	humour	to	cause	this	laughter.	Although	in	each	case	there	was	a	
‘joke’,	I	was	privy	to	neither	and	yet	still	laughed.	Laughter	can,	therefore,	be	
seen	 to	 affect	 bodies	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 exceeds	 humour	 itself.	 We	 might	
similarly	 note,	 however,	 that	 even	when	 the	 joke	 is	 clear	 and	 recognisable,	
laughter	can	still	exceed	the	intentionality	of	that	joke	(cf.	Sills,	2017),	through	
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generating	actions	and	affections	that	contradict	(or	work	differently	to)	the	
representational	 economies	held	within	 its	 form.	This	 is	seen	clearly	 in	 the	
following	description	of	a	show	performed	by	the	pantomime	group:	
The	third	show	of	the	day	was	turning	out	to	be	slightly	sluggish.	We	were	
in	a	care	home	for	people	with	dementia	and	mobility	impairments.	The	
cast	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 little	 bored	 of	 each	 other	 and	 the	 performance	 –	
probably	tiredness	from	the	two	shows	earlier	today,	the	driving,	and	the	
months	of	being	on	the	road.	The	jokes	from	the	start	of	the	show	produced	
very	few	laughs	–	it	definitely	felt	like	a	care	home	rather	than	‘the	theatre’.	
‘The	Beast’	entered	the	stage	…	He	looked	slightly	unkempt,	his	shirt	was	
supposed	to	be	tucked	in	neatly	but	it	hung	down	slightly	from	the	side	and	
had	 become	 increasingly	 creased	 by	 being	 stuffed	 into	 a	 suitcase	
throughout	the	day.	Suddenly	a	voice	became	audible	towards	the	back	of	
the	room	as	one	man	turned	to	his	neighbour	and	says,	loud	enough	for	the	
whole	 room	 to	 hear,	 “what	 a	 scruff!”	 For	 just	 a	 moment	 there	 was	 a	
palpable	tension	in	the	room	and	then	all	of	a	sudden	laughter	erupted	–	
residents,	carers,	actors,	and	me	–	deep	and	uncontrollable.	The	cast	could	
no	longer	carry	on,	corpsing	every	time	they	tried	to	get	going	again.	When	
they	did	manage,	there	was	a	noticeable	change:	the	audience	seemed	to	
sit	up	a	little	straighter,	eyes	more	focused	on	the	performance	and	the	next	
few	 jokes	 prompted	 a	much	 greater	 response.	 Together	 we	were	 taken	
from	a	care	home	in	Birmingham	to	a	magical	world	of	Beauties,	Beasts,	
talking	candlesticks	and	clocks…	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Pantomime	Group,	18/01/2016)	
Within	 this	 example	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 joke	 present	 yet,	 in	 many	 ways,	 it	
exemplifies	the	argument	that	there	is	an	advantage	to	thinking	about	laughter	
‘beyond	the	joke’	even	if	a	joke	is	present.	While	it	is	possible	to	interpret	this	
laughter	 in	 terms	 of	 humour,	 particularly	 superiority	 theory	 –	 laughter	 as	
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emerging	from	a	ridiculing	of	the	scruffiness	of	‘The	Beast’	(see	Billig,	2005)	–	
there	 is	 again	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 the	 theories	 of	 laughter	 and	 its	 actual	
workings.	Superiority	theory	is	usually	associated	with	feelings	of	power	for	
laughers	 over	 those	 who	 are	 laughed	 at	 yet,	 in	 this	 instance,	 the	 actions	
produced	 by	 this	 encounter	with	 laughter	 seem	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 bringing	
together	of	all	the	bodies	(including	‘The	Beast')	rather	than	separating	them	
into	different	parts.	I	would	thus	suggest	that	it	is	instead	the	event	of	laughter	
itself	 in	 this	 situation	 that	 serves	 to	 disrupt	 or	 interrupt	 the	 unfolding	
experience	(Dawney,	2013)	and	reterritorialise	bodies	around	new	matters	of	
affective	and	corporeal	expression	that	are	themselves	distinctly	atmospheric	
(Stewart,	2011).	
Although	there	is	a	contagious	element	to	this	laughter	–	a	moment	in	which	
we	can	all	enjoin	–	 the	 laughter	here	also	enables	a	 transition	between	two	
different	 atmospheres:	 the	 first,	 of	 tiredness,	 subdued	 bodies,	 and	 slight	
disinterest;	 the	 second	 is	 more	 attentive,	 allowing	 for	 a	 ‘magical’	 and	
immersive	 experience;	 thus,	 suggesting	 its	 capacities	 to	 generate	 forms	 of	
affection	 beyond	 simply	 further	 laughter.	 Leading	 on	 from	 this	 we	 might	
further	note	that	although	in	the	moments	of	laughter	discussed	thus	far	my	
body	 has	 formed	 an	 active	 component	 –	 always	 joining	 in	 with	 the	 act	 of	
laughing	–	 there	were	many	more	 instances	during	the	 fieldwork	 in	which	I	
encountered	 laughter	 but	 did	 not	 laugh	 myself.	 Although	 these	 occurred	
throughout	the	home,	certain	spacetimes	seemed	more	likely	associated	with	
them,	 notably	 during	 personal-care	 tasks	 such	 as	 washing,	 dressing	 and	
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assisting	 residents	 going	 to	 the	 toilet	 as	 already	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter.	Crucially,	these	laughs	not	only	fill	the	rooms	in	which	they	occur,	but	
also	exceed	these	spaces,	often	audibly	passing	through	the	care	home’s	doors,	
walls,	ceiling,	and	floors,	as	the	laughter	extends	ever	outwards.	My	field	notes	
describing	these	encounters	are	full	of	further	indicators	of	activity	and	affect	
–	 the	sound	of	 laughter	as	making	me	feel:	 ‘nice’,	 ‘pleased’,	 ‘less	bored’,	 ‘less	
lonely’,	 ‘intrigued’,	 ‘cheerier’;	 or	 making	 me:	 ‘skip’,	 ‘sing’,	 ‘hum’	 or	 ‘smile’	 –	
which	demonstrate	the	haptic	nature	of	my	body	becoming	enveloped	by	the	
affective	sensations	of	laughter	shared	by	others	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	1988;	
McCormack,	2013).	 In	pushing	this	 further,	 I	might	note	that	 there	are	even	
moments	in	my	field	diary	that	suggest	laughter’s	atmospheres	as	being	able	
to	be	felt,	even	in	the	absence	of	much	actual	laughter.	As	I	reflected:	
I	spent	the	afternoon	with	Olivia	sorting	out	the	upstairs	a	little	bit,	moving	
furniture	 around,	 tidying	 out	 the	 big	 cupboard,	 throwing	 lots	 of	 things	
away,	 and	 generally	 just	 cleaning	 up.	 It	 was	 really	 hard	 work,	 but	
enjoyable.	We	had	a	bit	 of	a	 laugh.	 I’m	not	quite	 sure	how	much	actual	
laughter	occurred	but	the	mood	of	it	seemed	to	capture	a	similar	feel.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	04/08/2016)	
I	 remain	 unsure	 as	 to	whether	 the	 colloquial	 terminology	 around	 ‘having	 a	
laugh’	 (which	 generally	means	 just	 to	 have	 a	 bit	 of	 fun)	 should	 actually	 be	
counted	as	a	moment	of	laughter	per	se.,	and	as	such	I	am	not	going	to	dwell	
on	 the	 implications	 of	 it	 to	 a	 great	 extent.	 Yet,	 together,	 these	 examples	 all	
suggest	laughter	as	capable	of	affecting	bodies	in	a	manner	that	exceeds	the	
intensities	of	 its	 actual	 doings.	 This	 has	 key	 implications	 for	 how	we	 think	
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about	 cause	 and	 effect	 in	 terms	 of	 laughter	 through	 not	 only	 positioning	
laughter’s	affective	capacities	as	somewhat	distinct	from	its	humorous	causes	
(jokes)	but	also	rendering	it	somewhat	distinct	from	actively	laughing	(or	not)	
itself	(Billig,	2005).	Indeed,	this	places	us	in	a	similar	position	to	the	affective	
form	of	listening	outlined	in	Chapter	4	and	thus	again	points	towards	a	sense	
of	 co-production,	 or	 emergent	 causality,	 whereby	 the	 causes	 of	 laughter’s	
affective	 capacities	 are	 only	 apprehensible	 through	 the	 various	 effects	 they	
have	on	the	body	(Anderson,	2014;	De	Landa,	2006).	
Furthermore,	 this	disruptive	 cause	and	effect	 relationship	also	throws	open	
the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 laughter	 causes	 an	 atmosphere,	 or	 vice	 versa.	
Therefore,	this	poses	key	implications	for	how	we	think	about	the	ethics	of	its	
affects	and	effects	(particularly	 in	relation	to	human	actions)	and	thus	once	
again	suggests	a	form	of	ethical	attunement	is	needed	that	does	not	focus	on	
the	‘who	did	what	and	why’	style	of	analysis	but	rather	one	that	is	more	open	
to	the	complexity	entanglements	that	make	up	laughter’s	excess.	As	such,	it	is	
this	 attention	 to	 laughter’s	 excess,	 in	 terms	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 it	 can	 act	
beyond	bodies,	humour,	intention	and	even	the	intensity	of	laughter	itself,	and	
the	complexity	of	its	entanglements	that	emerge	from	this,	that	I	take	forward	
into	 the	 next	 section,	which	 attends	more	 specifically	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	
laughter’s	atmospheres	overlap	with	the	provision,	and	affective	spatialities,	of	
care	itself.	
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6.5	|	Laughter’s	creative	force	
Although	the	analysis	in	the	previous	section	focussed	on	laughter’s	capacities	
to	become	excessive,	within	the	examples	discussed	it	is	also	possible	to	see	
how	these	excessive	capacities	serve	to	shape	the	affective	spacetimes	within	
which,	 or	 perhaps	more	 precisely	 alongside	which,	 laughter	 bursts.	 In	 this	
manner,	and	particularly	through	the	explicit	attention	afforded	to	laughter’s	
role	beyond	humorous	intentionality	within	this,	we	can	start	to	see	the	ways	
in	which	laughter	can	enact	forms	of	nascent	creativity	(Williams,	2016)	which	
change	the	ways	 in	which	bodies	 interact	with	space.	Although	this	 is	again	
somewhat	 ambiguous,	 defying	 any	 sense	 of	 definiteness	 that	 laughter	will	
shape	 spacetimes	 in	a	 specific	way,	 there	are	 two	connected	kinds	of	broad	
affective	movements	 that	we	might	highlight,	particularly	 in	 thinking	 about	
how	 these	 atmospheres	 of	 laughter	 intersect	 with	 care	 specifically:	 the	
capacity	to	shift	the	‘direction’	of	unfolding	trajectories	and	create	something	
processually	 new	 (Massey,	 2005;	 McCormack,	 2013);	 and	 a	 capacity	 to	
generate	(different)	 forms	of	being	with	one	another	(Cloke	and	Conradson,	
2018;	Popke,	2009).	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 first	 of	 these	 capacities,	 therefore,	 this	 is	most	 clear	 in	 the	
section	above	within	the	example	of	the	pantomime	show	where	the	laughter	
serves	not	only	to	bring	bodies	together	but	also	enables	the	atmosphere	of	the	
show	itself	to	be	 ‘lifted’	and	thus	 for	 it	 to	provide	 its	 intended	outcomes.	 In	
terms	 of	 care	more	 specifically	 then,	we	 can	 start	 to	 think	 about	 laughter’s	
capacities	 to	 “maintain,	 continue,	 and	 repair”	 affective	 relations	 between	
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people,	 places	 and	 spaces,	 particularly	 when	 there	 are	 points	 of	 friction,	
tension	and	disagreement	(Tronto	1993:	103):		
Towards	 the	 end	of	 the	day,	 I	 sat	with	most	of	 the	 carers	 in	 the	 lounge	
whilst	 they	 were	 filling	 in	 the	 charts.	 One	 asked	 if	 she	 could	 check	 her	
payslip	with	the	shift	 supervisor.	She	doesn’t	 feel	 that	she	has	been	paid	
properly.	They	were	gone	 for	a	 few	moments	and	when	they	returned,	a	
thick	 tension	 followed	 them,	 enveloping	 the	 room.	 The	 rest	 of	 us	 were	
throwing	 a	 ball	 to	 back	 and	 forward	 between	 a	 few	 of	 the	 residents	 in	
between	writing	in	charts.	A	moment	later,	a	cascade	of	events	unfolded:	
Mrs	J	didn’t	quite	catch	the	ball;	Mrs	B	cried	out	her	favourite	line:	“Help	
me…	 I	am	 in	 terrible	pain…	 I	 fell	 and	broke	my	arm	…	and	my	bottom”	
(none	of	these	things	is	true	and	she	can	call	it	out	about	50	times	a	day),	
and	I	Mr	L	raised	himself	from	his	slumber	in	his	chair,	shouting,	“Fuck	off	
you	bastards!”	into	open	space.	Suddenly	the	tension	in	the	room	cracked	
and	we	all	laughed.	It	was	like	we	realised	why	we	were	there	…	It	felt	like	
the	 individual	 feuds	were	worthless	compared	to	the	predicament	of	 the	
residents.	We	were,	for	a	brief	moment,	a	collective	–	an	assemblage	–	who	
had	been	restored	to	our	roles	in	the	machine	that	is	the	care	home.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	08/10/2015)	
Within	this	example,	we	can	see	clearly	the	ways	in	which	laughter	can	serve	
to	repair	the	worlds	in	which	caring	itself	takes	place,	in	this	case	through	the	
removal	of	 tensions	between	people	which	enable	a	different,	 less	 frictious,	
form	 of	 being-together	 to	 emerge.	 It’s	 worth	 noting	 the	 connections	 with	
‘release	theories’	here,	whereby	we	might	see	the	laughter	in	this	instance	as	
something	of	a	‘safety	valve’	through	which	‘psychic	tensions’	can	be	received	
and	made	collective	(Lippitt,	1995).	In	this	sense,	there	is	nothing	particularly	
‘ethical’	 about	 this	 form	 of	 laughter	 in	 and	 of	 itself.	 Instead,	 the	 ethics	 are	
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situated	within	the	new	trajectories	that	emerge	from	this	laughter,	such	as	the	
enhanced	capacity	to	act,	think	and	care	for	people	other	than	‘the	self’.	In	other	
words,	 where	 the	 tense	 atmosphere	 preceding	 the	 moment	 of	 laughter	 is	
marked	 by	 an	 apparent	 concern	 for	 the	 self,	 the	 atmosphere	 following	 the	
moment	of	laughter	seemingly	enables	a	more	communal	concern	for	others,	
including	the	residents,	and	therefore	implies	a	reinstating	of	care	as	the	way	
of	being	and	acting	in	the	world	(Lawson,	2007).	In	this	sense,	we	might	argue	
for	a	dual	enactment	of	care	in	this	moment	of	laughter	–	both	a	repair	of	the	
world	 through	 the	 release	 of	 tension,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 increased	
capacities	 to	 attend	 to	 others,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 enacted	 by	 the	 sense	 of	
laughter	itself	as	a	mode	of	being-with-others.		
This	latter	point,	therefore,	moves	us	to	the	second	of	atmospheric	laughter’s	
key	 capacities:	 its	 capacities	 to	 generate	 moments	 of	 collective	 becoming	
between	people,	whether	that	be	for	all	or	just	some	of	those	who	encounter	
it.	 We	 might	 note	 here	 something	 of	 an	 echo	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter,	
particularly	 in	 the	 way	 the	 example	 above	 discusses	 a	 movement	 between	
individual,	collective	and	institutional	registers.	However,	there	is	also	a	need	
here	to	recognise	the	ways	in	which	the	atmospheric	qualities	of	laughter	itself	
(rather	than	the	subjectivity	of	the	person	doing	it)	can	bring	about	particular	
kinds	of	affective	movements	that	cut	across	these	somewhat	representational	
categories.	For	example,	I	wrote	at	different	moments:	
Laughing	with	Heather	was	much	more	personal	than	it	is	with	the	others.	
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Her	laugh	is	much	softer	and	it	draws	you	into	her,	enveloping	you	into	her	
world.	 It	 seems	 perhaps	 to	 be	much	more	 similar	 to	 the	 descriptions	 of	
‘women’s	laughter’	than	the	more	brash	style	of	many	other	carers.	
(Field	Diary	notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	22/10/2015)	
…	Laughter	also	seems	to	do	something	else,	however,	in	drawing	you	into	
a	more	‘intimate'	relationship	and	making	you	linger	that	little	bit	longer.	
It	 often	 sparks	 questions	 and	 conversations	 that	 can	 create	 a	 sense	 of	
closeness.	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	30/06/2016)	
These	examples,	therefore,	show	the	different	ways	in	which	atmospheres	of	
laughter	 can	 produce	 affective	 relations	 that	 enable	 distinct	 forms	 of	 being	
with	one	another	to	emerge.	More	specifically,	in	these	two	examples,	we	can	
see	the	ways	 in	which	 laughter	envelops	bodies	within	a	 ‘shared	affectivity’	
(Lawtoo,	2011)	 that	 can	 enact	 forms	of	 spacing	 between	 bodies	 and	 create	
moments	of	‘intimacy’	or	‘closeness’	(Maclaren,	2014a).	That	said,	in	each	case	
the	mechanism	through	which	this	closeness	is	generated	is	slightly	different,	
thus	again	stressing	the	ambiguous	workings	of	atmospheres	in	relation	to	the	
bodies	who	encounter	them	(Anderson,	2014).	In	the	first	for	instance,	affect	
can	be	seen	to	emerge	through	the	aesthetics	of	‘Heather’s’	laughter	–	the	tone,	
timbre	 and	 rhythm	 (Nancy,	 2007;	 Simpson,	 2009)	 which	 give	 it	 a	 certain	
‘softness’	that	draws	you	in.	In	the	second,	laughter’s	affects	emerge	through	
its	 capacities	 to	 change	movements,	 generating	 a	 desire	 to	 ‘linger’	 and	 talk	
further.	Laughter’s	capacity	to	generate	‘intimacy’	in	this	manner	thus	opens	
up	further	space	to	think	about	atmospheric	laughter’s	relation	with	care,	with	
the	idea	of	intimacy	often	being	seen	as	a	key	component	of	generating	and	
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maintaining	 the	 affective	 connections	 between	 people	 out	 of	 which	 care	
emerges	(see	Bowlby,	2011;	Cloutier	et	al.,	2015;	Conradson,	2011;	England,	
2010;	Seo,	2016).	
Furthermore,	 both	 laughter	 and	 intimacy	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 ‘antidotes’	 to	
impersonal,	institutional	affective	forms	of	care	(Maclaren,	2014a):	a	way	of	
enlivening	and	introducing	a	more	personal	(and	human)	atmosphere	to	the	
otherwise	highly	homogenous,	mechanised	and	routinised	spaces	of	the	care	
home.	 In	 this	 sense,	 both	 laughter	 and	 intimacy	 often	 work	 to	 erode	 the	
‘functionality’	of	 the	spaces	of	 the	care	home	as	places	 in	which	 ‘care	work’	
happens,	and	thus	creates	a	space	in	which	other	forms	of	interaction	can	take	
place,	although	these	often	still	involve	‘care’	more	generally.	Again,	although	
not	solely	working	through	laughter,	we	can	see	this	quality	on	display	clearly	
in	 terms	of	both	theatre	performances	and	through	activities,	both	of	which	
are	intended	to	stage	particular	kinds	of	atmospheres	that	are	different	to	the	
normal	feel	and	function	of	care	home	spaces,	and	both	of	which	often	involve	
intimacy	and	laughter	of	various	sorts.	As	I	noted	following	an	afternoon	spent	
painting	residents’	nails:	“It	is	a	good	chance	to	spend	a	little	time	one	on	one.	
It’s	also	a	chance	to	‘have	a	laugh’	on	a	more	personal	level	with	people.	Mrs	P	
was	making	fun	of	me	today	because	I	kept	slipping	with	the	nail	varnish	and	
getting	 it	 on	 people’s	 fingers”	 (Field	Diary	Notes,	 Summerview	Care	Home,	
01/07/2016).	 Beyond	 this,	 however,	 there	 is	 also	 sense	 that	 laughter’s	
capacities	to	help	produce	spaces	that	are	less	‘functional’	can	also	make	room	
for	the	provision	of	care	in	ways	that	are	also	less	‘functional’	and	thus	once	
Chapter	6:	Atmospheric	laughter	within	spaces	of	care	
238	
again	enable	more	‘human’	and	intimate	connections:	
Today	was	the	first	day	I	had	stayed	later	into	the	evening.	Much	of	the	last	
hour	or	so	was	spent	just	sitting	in	the	lounge.	Many	of	the	residents	had	
gone	to	bed	with	just	a	couple	left	sitting	in	the	lounge.	The	curtains	had	
been	pulled	shut,	Coronation	Street	was	on	in	the	background	and	the	staff	
gathered	to	write	the	final	notes	in	their	charts.	Most	of	the	day	to	day	work	
had	 been	 completed,	 so	 their	 only	 real	 job	 was	 to	 react	 if	 anyone	 calls	
through	from	their	rooms,	and	just	to	be	there	until	the	next	shift	started.	
Grace	left	and	came	back	with	a	big	glass	of	sherry	for	one	of	the	residents.	
She	 has	 another	 smaller	 glass	 for	 herself	 and	 the	 two	 of	 them	 clinked	
glasses	gently,	smiling	at	each	other	and	giggling	as	they	did	so.	I	sensed	a	
feeling	of	naughtiness	between	them.	I	and	the	staff	just	sat	there	talking	
between	ourselves	and	 the	 residents.	 Laughter	 popped	up	as	 jokes	were	
made.	Small	bursts	of	different	intensity	and	tone.	The	room	felt	somehow	
lulled	by	the	sense	of	genial	laughter.	There	was	what	I	can	only	describe	
as	a	family	atmosphere:	a	sense	of	familiarity	in	which	boundaries	between	
staff	and	residents	became	blurred	and	broken	down,	as	did	the	distinctions	
between	‘work’	and	‘home’.	The	weight	of	the	day	melted	slowly,	replaced	
by	a	firm,	almost	heavy,	comforting	feeling.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	23/10/2015)	
Here	 then	we	can	 see	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	atmosphere	of	 familiarity	and	
‘homeliness’	helps	to	transform	the	space	and	erode	the	‘functional	structures’	
that	 usually	 surround	 care	work,	 creatively	 transforming	 the	 spaces	 in	 the	
process	 and	 producing	 something	 new	 in	 their	 place.	 In	 this	 instance,	 this	
transformation	enables	a	new	set	of	circumstances	to	emerge,	within	which,	
and	out	of	which,	different	forms	of	care	can	take	place:	a	‘more	human’	form	
of	 relation	 which	 cuts	 against	 the	 structured,	 automated,	 impersonal	 or	
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machenic	forms	of	care	work	that	make	up	the	majority	of	everyday	practices	
within	 care	 homes.	 In	 this	 sense,	 we	 might	 thus	 position	 laughter	 and	 its	
associated	 atmospheres	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	 Bergson	 (1980)	 does,	 as	 an	
antidote	to	the	‘mechanisation’	of	bodies	(see	also	Goldberg,	1999)	and	thus	as	
a	means	 of	 reintroducing	 care	 as	 an	 emotional/affective	 disposition	 rather	
than	just	something	to	be	done	to	other	bodies	(Conradson,	2011).	That	said,	
it’s	 worth	 noting	 the	 somewhat	 complex	 position	 that	 laughter	 maintains	
within	this	transformative	process	whereby	it	both	emerges	from	within	the	
‘homely’	atmospheric	mixture	and	simultaneously	aids	the	production	of	the	
atmosphere	 itself	 through	 further	 intensifying	 the	 effects	 that	 it	has	on	 the	
space	and	the	bodies	who	engage	with	it.	
As	such	we	can	start	to	address	the	unfinished	nature	of	atmospheric	laughter	
within	encounters	such	as	this	one	whereby	it	can	be	seen	as	both	central	and	
peripheral	 to	 the	 production	 of	 particular	 affective	 spacetimes	 and	 social	
relations.	In	other	words,	whilst	in	this	case	it	seems	that	the	atmosphere	of	
laughter	does	serve	to	produce	particular	forms	of	socio-spatial	relations	that	
can	be	qualified	as	more	 caring	 through	 their	capacities	 to	generate	a	more	
personal	and	intimate	style	of	engagement,	it’s	very	difficult	to	say	with	any	
certainty	that	laughter	is	either	the	cause	or	simply	an	effect	of	this	affective	
movement,	and	as	such	we	must	always	think	about	it	in	terms	of	emergent	
causality	 (Anderson,	 2014).	 Indeed,	 although	 I	 have	 no	 direct	 comparison	
noted	 in	my	field	diary,	 it’s	not	difficult	to	 imagine	that	 if	 the	circumstances	
before,	during,	or	after	this	encounter	were	other	than	they	seem	to	be	in	this	
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instance	 –	 if	 for	 instance	 there	 was	 a	 complaint	 about	 the	 staff	 member	
drinking	alcohol	on	shift	–	 then	this	particular	atmosphere	and	 its	qualified	
meanings	might	become	drastically	different,	and	seem	far	less	caring.	
This	idea	of	emergent	causality	is,	therefore,	crucial	in	connecting	this	section	
to	the	last	and	thus	in	thinking	through	the	ethics	of	laughter’s	transformative	
capacities	in	conjunction	with	its	always	being	in	excess	of	singular	meaning.	
Indeed,	where	all	of	the	examples	in	this	section	have	suggested	an	affirmative	
relation	between	 laughter	and	care	–	whereby	 laughter’s	 atmospheres	have	
been	presented	as	having	capacities	to	differentiate	existing	relations	between	
bodies,	matters	and	spaces	and	therefore	to	create	new	circumstances	of	care	
that	 are	 somehow	 ‘less	 functional’,	 ‘more	 human’	 and	 ‘more	 caring’	 –	 it’s	
important	 to	 recognise	 that	 these	 outcomes	 are	 both	 situated	 within	 the	
specific	examples	used,	and	are	not	the	only	possible	outcomes	of	that	could	
emerge	 from	 each	 moment	 laughter,	 particularly	 if	 we	 approach	 it	 from	 a	
different	angle,	position	or	orientation	(Ahmed,	2006).	As	Sara	Ahmed	(2010:	
125)	writes	“we	may	walk	into	a	room	and	‘feel	the	atmosphere’,	but	what	we	
may	feel	depends	on	the	angle	of	our	arrival.”	In	drawing	this	chapter	towards	
its	close,	therefore,	the	final	section	looks	to	add	a	further	critical	standpoint	
in	asking	what	else	laughter	can	do,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	for	whom?	
6.6	|	Differential	encounters	
As	 already	 noted,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 critiques	 levelled	 at	 non-representational	
styles	of	 thought	 is	 that	 they	often	do	not	 seem	 to	attend	enough	to	how	a	
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plurality	of	bodily	and	social	differences	influence	the	kinds	of	engagements	
and	encounters	that	people	have	with	affect	and	its	worlds	(see	Bondi,	2005;	
Nayak,	2010;	Thien,	2005;	Tolia-Kelly,	2006).	One	key	response	to	this	has	been	
to	 think	 through	 the	 variegated	 means	 through	 which	 both	 encounters	
between	different	bodies	produce	certain	forms	of	affect	(Ahmed,	2004)	and	
how	 encounters	 with	 affective	 spacetimes	 and	 atmospheres	 become	
differentiated	depending	on	the	embodied	and	geographical	positions	of	those	
taking	part	(Ahmed,	2006;	Colls,	2012).	Helen	Wilson	(2017:	456)	thus	argues	
that	we	need	to	approach	encounters	holding	difference	at	the	forefront	of	our	
thinking,	adopting	an	ethic	of	attunement	that	is	“not	only	about	researching	
encounters	 in	 less	 self-focused	ways	 but	 about	 attending	 to	 and	 embracing	
failure,	unbecoming,	ambiguity,	ambivalence,	rupture	and	the	fleeting.”	In	this	
section,	 therefore,	 I	 look	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 more	 speculative	 form	 of	 ethical	
attunement	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017)	through	which	we	might	think	further	
about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 differences,	 pluralities	 and	 multiplicities	 emerge	
through	encounters	with	atmospheres	of	laughter.	
In	particular,	I	look	to	outline	the	sense	of	possibility	afforded	by	juxtaposition	
(Deleuze	 and	 Parnet,	 1987)	 through	 drawing	 on	 two	 similar	 moments	 of	
laughter	 which	 are	 experienced	 from	 different	 positions	 and	 thus	 create	
different	affective	outcomes;	once	again	suggesting	the	ethical	indeterminacies	
held	within	atmospheres	of	laughter,	particularly	in	terms	of	how	the	‘same’	
moment	 of	 laughter	 can	 generate	 multiple	 affections	 in	 different	 bodies,	
depending	on	their	situations	(both	present	and	historical).		
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The	 particular	 juxtaposition	drawn	on	 relates	 staff	 breaks	 in	Winterbourne	
Care	Home.	Where	most	breaks	in	Summerview	happened	in	the	staff	room,	
which	 was	 in	 the	 basement	 of	 the	 building,	 in	Winterbourne	 breaks	 often	
happened	in	the	dining	room	due	to	the	staff	room	being	around	five	minutes’	
walk	from	the	main	working	areas	and	so	going	there	was	seen	to	‘eat	into’	the	
break	itself.	As	such,	a	certain	flexibility	in	the	ways	that	the	space	of	the	dining	
room	 is	 engaged	 at	 different	 times	 is	 therefore	 necessary.	 As	 with	 the	
transformative	 capacities	 of	 laughter	 described	 above,	 once	 again	
atmospheres	of	laughter	seem	to	form	an	important	aspect	of	this	flexibility,	
often	working	to	deterritorialise	the	function	of	the	room	as	a	workspace	and	
reterritorialise	 it	 as	 a	 break	 space	 with	 different	 emotional	 and	 affective	
attachments:	
I	walked	into	the	dining	room	where	some	carers	were	sat	at	a	table	having	
a	break.	“Join	us!”	they	called	over	to	me,	and	for	the	first	time	in	the	three	
weeks	I	have	been	here,	I	got	to	sit	down	and	have	an	‘official’	break	with	
other	people.	Today	had	been	running	smoothly	and	so	everyone	was	in	a	
good	mood.	The	carers	sat	chatting	with	each	other	and	eating	a	plate	of	
biscuits.	It	was	nice,	they	were	‘bantering’	and	making	fun	of	each	other	a	
little	while	they	talked	about	stuff	that	is	going	on	at	home.	Moments	of	
laughter	 peppered	 the	 conversation,	 short	 intense	 bursts	 at	 relatively	
consistent	 intervals	 which	 started	 to	 blend	 into	 one	 another.	 Each	 one	
seemed	to	relax	the	muscles	in	my	back	and	sooth	my	feet	a	little.	I	just	sat	
there,	remaining	silent,	and	bathing	in	the	laughter	rather	than	joining	in	
myself		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	29/10/2015)	
	The	atmosphere	and	its	effects	are	again	clear	in	this	moment:	I	can	‘bathe’	in	
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it;	it	affects	my	body,	physically	relaxing	my	muscles	and	creating	feelings	of	
enjoyment,	 rest,	 inclusion.	Laughter,	 again	although	not	 the	only	element	of	
this	 atmosphere,	 marks	 something	 of	 a	 refrain	 around	 which	 it	 becomes	
territorialised.	Indeed,	on	my	preliminary	visit	to	the	home,	one	carer	told	me	
“we	do	laugh	a	lot	here,	especially	over	a	brew	[cup	of	tea]”	(Field	Diary	notes,	
Winterbourne	Care	Home,	16/09/2015).	This	is,	of	course,	not	to	say	that	all	
breaks	felt	exactly	the	same.	However	many	of	the	breaks	I	was	involved	in	did	
share	a	similar	affective	imprint	–	feelings	which	mark	those	spacetimes	out	as	
breaks	 rather	 than	work	 –	which	 is	 again	 suggestive	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	
atmospheres	 of	 laughter	 can	 both	 emerge	 from	 these	 kinds	 of	 affective	
relations	 and	 creatively	 transform	 particular	 spaces,	 enabling	 bodies	 to	 do	
different	 things,	perform	different	actions,	affect	and	be	affected	 in	different	
ways.		
As	noted	in	the	discussion	of	laughter’s	excessive	nature,	however,	laughter	is	
never	bound	within	a	particular	space	–	overflowing	and	exceeding	individual	
rooms	meaning	people	will	 experience	 it	 from	different	 locations,	positions	
and	situations	which	in	turn	generates	ethical	differences	within	its	capacities	
to	affect	bodies	and	to	generate	or	undo	caring	relations.	To	demonstrate	this,	
I	juxtapose	this	first	encounter	with	a	staff	break	with	a	different	one	from	a	
month	 or	 so	 later.	 The	 events	 of	 laughter	 are	 themselves	 very	 similar	 but	
experienced	 from	 different	 locations,	 and	 thus	 produce	 palpably	 different	
affective	experiences:	
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I	was	 sitting	 in	 the	 little	 lounge	 talking	quietly	with	Mr	H.	Three	of	 the	
carers	were	on	break	at	a	table	just	inside	the	dining	room,	the	murmur	of	
their	conversation	buzzing	away	in	the	background.	I	couldn’t	see	them	but	
an	open	archway	connects	the	two	rooms	and	Mr	H	could	just	about	see	
them	from	where	he	was	sat.	Suddenly	a	cackle	of	laughter	erupted	from	
their	table,	reverberating	through	the	archway	and	into	the	lounge.	Mr	H’s	
face	lit	up,	the	corner	of	his	mouth	creeping	upwards	and	his	eyes	widening.	
He	turned	towards	them	join	in,	shouting	“what’s	that?”	One	of	the	carer’s	
faces	 appeared	 in	 the	 archway	 as	 she	 rocked	 her	 chair	 backwards.	
Seemingly,	without	noting	what	he	said,	she	automatically	replied	“we	are	
on	break	[Mr	H],	we	will	come	 in	 five	minutes”	and	she	swung	forwards	
again,	 seeming	 to	 think	 nothing	 of	 it.	 A	 second	 or	 two	 passed,	 the	
murmuring	continued,	and	then	again,	a	second	wave	of	laughter	washed	
outwards	 from	 them	 and	 into	 our	 room.	 His	 face	 fell,	 seeming	 to	 grey.	
Looking	at	him,	I	felt	his	pain,	his	isolation,	his	rejection.	My	body	tensed,	
and	he	obviously	no	longer	wanted	to	chat	…		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	5/12/2015)	
Both	encounters	with	breaks	can	be	seen	as	‘arrivals’	(Ahmed,	2010).	The	first	
is	a	literal	arrival	as	I	enter	a	room,	the	second	emerges	as	laughter	spills-over	
into	an	adjacent	room.	Clearly,	each	of	these	events	affects	bodies	in	different	
ways	 –	 I	 am	 easily	 incorporated	 into	 the	 first;	 Mr	 H	 is	 rejected	 and	 thus	
restricted	by	the	second.	We	must,	therefore,	recognise	the	contingent	nature	
of	the	various	material/affective	forces	that	compose	laughter’s	atmospheres,	
and	particularly	the	ways	in	which	the	arrival	of	a	new	body	requires	a	creative	
‘re-composition’	–	either	to	destroy	or	incorporate	that	body’s	forces	(Deleuze	
and	 Guattari,	 1988).	 The	 second	 encounter	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 fleeting	
nature	 of	 these	 compositions	 and	 the	 way	 that	 they	 can	 enact	 multiple	
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‘trajectories’	 that	 produce	 different	 affective	 responses	 and	 relational	
experiences,	at	different	times.	Initially	Mr	H	experiences	a	positive	affection	–	
his	face	lights	up,	he	turns	to	them,	he	is	feeling	positive,	included,	wants	to	
join	in	–	yet	he	is	rejected	and	therefore	the	second	burst	of	laughter	produces	
a	negative	affection	–	his	face	drops,	there	is	exclusion,	isolation,	his	actions	
become	limited,	and	he	no	longer	wants	to	talk	to	me.	This	reiterates	the	point	
that	 atmospheres	of	 laughter	 are	 not	homogenous	 entities	 but	 are	 rather	 a	
multiplicity	 of	 material	 and	 affective	 qualities,	 trajectories	 and	 intensities,	
capable	 of	 shifting	 and	 thus	 affecting	 bodies	 differently	 at	 different	 times	
(Edensor,	2015).	
In	both	of	these	cases,	therefore,	it	is	imperative	to	recognise	how	bodily	and	
spatial	 differences	 can	 affect	 the	 meaning	 and	 ethics	 of	 encounters	 with	
laughter’s	 atmospheres	 (Wilson,	 2017).	 In	 the	 first	 encounter	 I	 am	
incorporated	into	the	atmosphere	of	laughter,	in	part	because	I	can	enter	the	
space	of	the	table	without	physical	assistance	–	distinguishing	me	from	most	
residents.	I	am	also	identified	as	‘worker’	and	thus	seen	as	entitled	to	a	break,	
a	chance	to	rest	my	body	and	mind	in	the	same	way	as	‘regular’	workers.	Mr	H	
does	not	have	the	same	potential.	Not	only	is	he	physically	unable	to	move	into	
the	room	and	thus	must	shout	to	try	and	join	in,	but	as	a	resident,	his	body	is	
layered	with	meaning	(both	representational	and	non-representational)	that	
designate	 him	 as	 ‘work,’	 and	 thus	 beyond	 the	 realms	 of	what	 constitutes	 a	
break	 space.	We	can	 start	 to	 see	how	atmospheres	of	 laughter	are	not	only	
enacted	within	the	bounds	of	the	spaces	in	which	they	occur	but	also	the	ways	
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in	which	they,	alongside	a	myriad	of	social,	material,	and	discursive	resources	
(Duff,	2010),	can	produce	space	itself	–	although	a	space	that	might	not	feel	the	
same	for	everyone	within	it.	
Although	moving	away	from	the	direct	nature	of	this	juxtaposition,	in	fleshing	
this	out	further	we	might	also	note	the	ways	in	which	atmospheres	of	laughter	
and	their	associated	effects	can	affect	as	much	through	physical	movements	of	
bodies	(or	lack	thereof)	as	they	do	through	their	sonic	spreading	(McCormack,	
2013).	 Indeed,	 related	 to	 my	 comment	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 about	
atmospheres	of	 laughter	 facilitating	a	desire	 to	 ‘linger’,	 I	noted	a	number	of	
times	within	my	field	diary	that	laughter	sometimes	seems	to	have	the	capacity	
to	distract	bodies	from	what	else	is	happening	around	them.	Often	this	was	just	
a	 case	of	 spending	a	moment	or	 two	here	and	 there,	 enjoying	a	moment	of	
shared	laughter,	without	necessarily	impacting	care	provision	directly,	but	at	
its	more	extreme,	 it	can	also	have	a	more	profound	effect	on	experiences	of	
care	itself:	
I	got	very	frustrated	today.	Mr	J	had	been	needing	the	toilet	for	a	while	and	
I	had	told	the	staff	a	couple	of	times.	They	were	busy	as	always	so	it	took	a	
while	to	get	to	him.	Just	as	they	were	about	to	come	and	take	him	through	
someone	 did	 something	 funny	 in	 the	 little	 lounge	 and	 a	 huge	 burst	 of	
laughter	 roared	 through.	 The	 carers	 who	 were	 coming	 to	 help	 him	
suddenly	stopped,	turned	back	and	went	to	join	in	with	whatever	it	was.	He	
had	to	wait	about	ten	more	minutes	before	they	finally	got	back	to	him		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	12/07/2016)	
This	moment	of	distracting	laughter	thus	also	speaks	to	a	problem	associated	
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with	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	 produce	 spatialities	 that	 are	 outside	 of	 the	
‘structured’	nature	of	care	spaces.	By	‘eroding’	structures	in	this	manner	(even	
momentarily),	attention	can	potentially	be	drawn	away	from	the	residents	in	
favour	of	other	matters	of	care	–	in	part	re-iterating	the	‘need’	to	structure	care	
in	 the	 first	place.	 In	other	words,	whilst	 it	may	seem	at	 first	glance	that	 the	
undoing	of	structure	through	laughter	is	a	‘good’	thing	because	it	can	make	the	
home	feel	less	‘clinical’,	more	‘lively’	and	more	human,	it’s	worth	recognising	
that	from	the	residents’	perspective,	this	may	not	be	what	they	want,	need	or	
require	 from	 the	 care	home,	or	 indeed	 the	 care	 that	 is	 (or	sometimes	 isn’t)	
provided.	
This	section	has	thus	looked	to	add	another	layer	of	speculative	complexity	to	
our	 thinking	 around	 laughter	 with	 care	 through	 attending	 to	 some	 of	 the	
differences	 between	 the	 experiences	 of	 those	 who	 encounter	 them.	 More	
specifically,	the	section	is	about	recognising	that	although	many	moments	of	
laughter	 may	 feel	 positive	 at	 the	 outset	 when	 approaching	 them	 from	 a	
different	angle,	things	might	not	feel	quite	so	‘positive’	after	all	(Ahmed,	2006,	
2010).	It’s	worth	noting	that	these	other	experiences	are	relatively	infrequent	
within	my	field	diary	(although	this	 is	possibly	due	to	my	positionality),	yet	
their	presence	prompts	us	to	recognise	their	imminent	potential	within	every	
moment	of	laughter	and	thus	pushes	us	towards	a	need	here	to	think	more	fully	
about	 the	 ethical	multiplicities	within	 the	 singularity	 of	 each	 event	 (Nancy,	
2000).	
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What’s	 more,	 their	 co-existence	 with	 laughter’s	 positive	 potentials	 –	 their	
happening	at	the	same	time	and	through	the	same	kinds	of	laughter	–	enables	
full	 recognition	of	 the	 ‘messiness’	of	 the	worlds	 in	which	 laughter	happens,	
particularly	given	that	these	movements	from	‘good’	to	‘bad’,	‘better’	to	‘worse’	
and	vice	versa,	are	often	somewhat	disconnected	 from	the	 intentions	of	 the	
laughers,	and	the	intentionality	of	their	laughter.	As	such,	there	is	arguably	a	
need,	as	both	Maria	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017)	and	Helen	Wilson	(2017)	note,	
for	 an	 ethical	 attunement	 to	 these	 atmospheres,	 and	 different	 people’s	
encounters	with	them,	that	recognises	the	variegated	ethical	affects	they	can	
enact,	 to	 enhance	 or	 to	 restrict	 bodies’	 capacities	 (see	 Braidotti,	 2011),	 or	
sometimes	 both	 simultaneously,	whilst	 still	 offering	 the	 generosity	 towards	
the	fact	that	often	these	outcomes	are	excessive	and	unintended,	and	therefore	
can	 sometimes	 be	 held	 outside	 of	 normative	 moral	 judgements,	 or	 blame,	
about	those	who	happen	to	be	laughing.	
6.7	|	Conclusions	
This	 chapter	 has	 looked	 to	 move	 away	 from	 thinking	 about	 laughter	 as	
something	that	is	‘done’	by	humans	and	instead	consider	what	it	can	do	as	a	
thing	 or	 force	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 I	 have	 drawn	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 affective	
atmospheres	(Anderson,	2009a,	2014),	arguing	that	positioning	moments	of	
laughter	as	affective	atmospheres	allows	a	means	of	not	only	conceptualising	
their	often	diffuse	and	ephemeral	spatialities	but	also	their	capacities	to	affect	
bodies	in	a	manner	that	exceeds	human	and	humorous	intentionality	(Hughes,	
2016).	In	this	way,	I	have	somewhat	echoed	both	Nancy	(1993)	and	Bataille’s	
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(2001)	 claims	 that	 laughter’s	 capacities	are	 separate	 from	 those	of	humour,	
and	that	it	is,	therefore,	something	that	occurs	“beyond,	around,	and	alongside	
the	 formation	 of	 subjectivity”	 (Anderson,	 2009a:	 77).	 That	 said,	 in	 piecing	
through	 the	 empirical	 detail	 in	 the	 chapter,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 avoid	 any	
universalising	 tendencies	 through	 remaining	 attentive	 to	 the	 wider	
constellation	of	forces	beyond	simply	the	affective	(Nayak,	2010),	out	of	which	
atmospheres	are	produced	and	apprehended	and	thus	recognise	how	different	
social,	 cultural,	 historical	 and	 geographical	 positionings	 also	 shape	 the	
capacities	for	laughter	to	affect	and	be	affected	(see	Ahmed,	2006,	2010;	Colls,	
2012).	
In	empirical	terms,	therefore,	the	chapter	has	addressed	how	we	might	think	
through	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter’s	 atmospheres	 serve	 to	 interrupt	 and	
reshape	the	affective	spacetimes	of	care	homes	(McCormack,	2013),	and	thus	
how	they	affect	different	people’s	experiences	of	giving	and	receiving	care.	I	
opened	 this	 discussion	 through	 recognition	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 various	
atmospheres	exist	within	care	homes	beyond	laughter,	and	noting	the	ways	in	
which	this	can	affect	care	itself.	I	then	outlined	the	ways	in	which	atmospheres	
of	laughter	can	be	seen	as	always	in	excess	of	singular	humorous	intentions	or	
representations,	 having	 the	 capacities	 to	 occur	 both	 without	 and	 beyond	
humour,	as	well	as	sometimes	seeming	to	exceed	the	doing	of	laughter	itself.	
Following	this,	I	noted	the	ways	in	which	laughter	can	enhance	caring	relations	
through	its	capacities	to	remake	the	spacetimes	in	which	it	occurs,	sometimes	
working	to	repair	them	when	tensions	emerge	(as	was	seen	in	the	example	and	
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surrounding	the	disagreement	about	wages),	but	also	through	creating	spaces	
and	 relations	 between	 people	 which	 feel	 somehow	 less	 functional	 and	
therefore	more	‘human’	(see	Bergson,	1980).	As	the	juxtapositions	in	the	final	
section	 affirm,	 however,	 there	 is	 clear	 need	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 excessive	
nature	 of	 laughter’s	 atmospheres	 means	 that	 they	 will	 be	 experienced	
differently	 by	 different	 people	 depending	 on	 their	 situations,	 and	 therefore	
that	a	moment	of	laughter,	even	if	encountered	from	just	around	the	corner,	
might	have	ethical	potentials	that	are	very	different	and	more	complex	than	
those	which	initially	appear	(Ahmed,	2010).	
The	 significance	 of	 this	 discussion	 in	 terms	 of	 ethics,	 therefore,	 is	 in	 its	
complicating	of	the	relationships	between	cause	and	effect	within	moments	of	
laughter.	Not	only	does	thinking	about	laughter’s	atmospherics	enact	a	break	
with	the	intentionality	of	humour	and	thus	further	erode	any	ethical	thinking	
based	on	humour	theories,	but	the	complex	nature	of	atmospheres	themselves	
also	makes	thinking	about	its	causes	in	a	linear	fashion	somewhat	problematic	
(Anderson,	2014).	As	we	have	seen,	 it	often	becomes	difficult	 to	distinguish	
whether	or	not	atmospheres	are	a	cause	or	an	effect	of	 laughter,	meaning	 it	
often	 seems	more	 precise	 to	 think	 about	 emergent	 causality	 whereby	 this	
relation	can	be	understood	in	both	ways	simultaneously	(Nancy,	1993).	In	this	
sense,	 the	 ethical	 potential	 of	 laughter	 must	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 emergent	
property	 that	 can	 only	 be	 apprehended	 ‘after	 the	 fact’	 and	 through	 its	
capacities	 to	 either	 enhance	 or	 restrict	 different	 bodies’	 capacities	 to	 act	
(Braidotti,	2011),	which	is	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	it	probably	does	
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both	to	different	bodies	at	the	same	time.	As	such,	I	would	argue	that	there	is	
a	need	to	move	away	from	ascribing	laughter	to	an	individual	moral	position	
based	 on	 its	 effects,	 particularly	 when	 attempts	 to	 intentionally	 ‘stage’	
atmospheres	through	laughter	end	up	affecting	some	people	in	a	manner	that	
is	unintended.	Instead,	we	need	to	once	again	recognise,	that	“what	care	[and	
laughter]	 can	 mean	 in	 each	 situation	 cannot	 be	 resolved	 by	 ready-made	
explanations”	 and	 that	 thinking	with	 and	 through	 care,	 therefore	 “requires	
critical	standpoints	that	are	[themselves]	careful”	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017:	
85)	and	somewhat	more	generous	in	spirit.	
Indeed,	 this	 ethical	 sensibility	 towards	 laughter	 is	 compounded	 when	 the	
previous	chapters	are	also	taken	into	account,	particularly	in	thinking	through	
the	 ‘reasons’	 for	 laughter’s	emergence,	and	therefore	 its	 intentions,	as	often	
being	curtailed	by	the	particular	socio-spatial	circumstances	in	which	it	occurs	
(McCormack,	2017),	which	are	often	somewhat	removed	from	an	abstracted	
and	 idealised	scenario.	This	 recognition	 in	 turn	adds	a	political	 edge	to	our	
thinking	about	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care,	through	placing	‘boundaries’	
or	‘limits’	on	the	possibilities	and	potentials	of	each,	in	turn	pushing	the	ethical	
impetus	 away	 from	 the	 ideal	 and	 instead	 towards	 the	 “as	well	 as	 possible”	
(Tronto,	1993:	103).	Perhaps	nowhere	is	this	more	the	case	in	care	homes	than	
in	relation	to	death,	which	is	often	positioned	as	the	limit	to	‘life’,	‘knowledge’	
and	‘relationality’	(see	Bataille,	2001;	Harrison,	2007;	Romanillos,	2011).	As	
such,	the	next	chapter	engages	with	death	by	means	of	unpacking	what	this	
might	 mean	 for	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 understand	 the	 ethico-political	
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positioning	of	laughter	with	care.
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Chapter	7:	The	vital	pragmatism	of	laughter,	life	
and	death8	
How	does	one	lead	a	good	life	in	a	bad	life?	…	we	have	two	problems:	the	
first	is	how	to	live	one’s	own	life	well,	such	that	we	might	say	that	we	are	
living	a	good	life	within	a	world	in	which	the	good	life	is	structurally	or	
systematically	foreclosed	for	so	many.	The	second	problem	is,	what	form	
does	this	question	take	for	us	now?	
(Butler,	2012:	9)	
7.1	|	Introduction	
This	chapter	begins	in	the	lounge	of	Winterbourne	Care	Home.	The	lounge	was	
quiet,	except	for	the	sound	of	daytime	TV	coming	from	the	corner	just	above	
me.	All	the	other	residents	of	the	care	home	were	in	the	dining	room	and	the	
carers	were	either	with	them	or	upstairs.	It	was	Thursday	and,	for	the	third	
day	in	a	row,	I	was	charged	with	feeding	Mrs	B	her	lunch.	At	that	time,	I	was	
the	only	reason	she	could	eat.	I	raised	my	hand	to	her	mouth,	letting	her	bite	a	
jam	sandwich	weakly.	She	chewed,	sucked,	slurped.	And	then	it	happened.	The	
same	thing	that	had	happened	every	day	since	I	arrived…	I	recoiled	my	hand	
																																																								
8	Elements	of	this	chapter	have	been	published	in	a	revised	form	as:	Emmerson	P	(2018)	From	
coping	 to	 carrying	 on:	 a	 pragmatic	 laughter	 between	 life	 and	 death.	 Transactions	 of	 the	
Institute	of	British	Geographers:	1–14.	DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12252	
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quickly	as	moist	bread,	jam	and	saliva	propelled	across	my	wrist	and	rolled	
along	 the	 floor.	 “No	more!”	 she	 said,	 with	 a	 force	 that	 I	 would	 have	 been	
surprised	by	if	I	hadn’t	heard	it	many	times	before.	I	sat	there,	the	useless	and	
unwanted	appendage	of	an	ageing	woman,	contemplating	the	mostly	full	plate	
of	jam	sandwiches	that	sat	on	my	lap.	Then	I	looked	at	her,	staring	into	space	
through	eyes	that	hadn’t	seen	for	an	eternity,	and	watched	her	slowly	dying.	
“No	more,”	she	said	again,	with	a	renewed	frailty.	I	don’t	think	she	knew	what	
she	was	saying.	She	had	hardly	eaten	for	weeks.	I	let	out	a	little	laugh.	Stifling	
it	I	looked	around.	We	were	still	alone,	and	the	laughter	bubbled	through	again.	
It	seemed	as	though	we	laughed	together	although	she	didn’t	make	a	sound.	I	
don’t	know	if	I	knew	it	before,	but,	at	that	moment,	it	was	overly	apparent.	She	
was	going	to	die.	I	knew	it,	I	think	she	did	too.	There	was	nothing	I	or	anyone	
else	could	do.	It	was	only	a	matter	of	time.	I	picked	up	another	jam	sandwich	
and	lifted	it	to	her	mouth.	She	bit	it	weakly…		
Everyday	 understandings	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 laughter	 and	 death,	
such	as	this	one,	generally	position	laughter	as	an	emotional	release	through	
which	negative	feelings	can	be	‘pushed	aside’	and	replaced	by	positive	ones.	
Academic	work	also	 largely	 confirms	 this	 line	of	 thinking	 through	engaging	
with	nurses	(Harris,	2013),	social	workers	(Sullivan,	2000)	and	the	terminally	
ill	 (De	Moor,	2005),	 for	 example,	 to	 argue	 that	 laughter	 acts	 as	 a	means	 of	
distancing	or	detaching	oneself	from	the	emotional	or	affective	consequences	
of	dealing	with	death.	This	way	of	 thinking	 is	one	based	on	a	conception	of	
death	as	negative,	abject	or	taboo	and	thus	something	needing	to	be	pushed	to	
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the	margins	of	‘life’	itself	(Romanillos,	2015).	Yet	this	mode	of	removing	death	
is	 neither	 available	 to,	 nor	 enacted	 by,	 all	 those	 who	 encounter	 death	
(Mbembe,	2001)	and	therefore	at	certain	times	and	in	certain	spaces,	people	
generate	other	ways	of	laughing	with	death	–	ones	that	enliven	(Stevenson	et	
al.,	2016)	and	affirm	death	(Harrison,	2015;	Romanillos,	2011);	folding	it	into	
practised,	material	and	affective	modes	of	living.	
Following	Madge’s	(2016,	2018)	call	for	more	visceral	and	emotional	accounts	
of	 death	 and	 dying,	 this	 chapter	 thus	 looks	 to	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
experiences	of	laughter,	life,	and	death	–	such	as	the	one	described	above	–	can	
be	understood	in	more	affirmative	terms.	It	argues	that	for	care	workers,	in	
particular,	 the	 relationship	 between	 laughter,	 life	 and	 death	 often	 remains	
experientially	 separate	 from	 governance	 theories	 such	 as	 bio/necropolitics	
(Mbembe,	 2003)	 and	 therefore	 needs	 to	 be	 apprehended	 in	 terms	 of	more	
pragmatic	 politico-ethical	 projects,	 similar	 to	 those	 found	 in	 vitalist	
philosophies	of	life.	I	exemplify	this	argument	by	offering	a	new	understanding	
of	the	relationship	between	laughter	and	death	as	a	form	of	carrying	on	rather	
than	 coping.	 Although	 a	 subtle	 shift	 in	 language	 this	move	 is	 significant	 in	
reconceptualising	 laughter	 as	 a	means	 of	 reshaping	 affective	 relations	 and	
rendering	 them	 productive	 rather	 than	 simply	 as	 pushing	 other	 emotions	
away.	 This	move	 towards	 pragmatics	 is,	 in	 turn,	 crucial	 for	 thinking	 about	
laughter,	 life	 and	 death	within	 practices	 of	 care,	 where	 the	 politico-ethical	
impetus	 is	often	realistic	rather	than	 idealistic:	paraphrasing	Tronto	(1993:	
103)	‘simply’	about	the	maintenance,	continuation	and	repair	of	(life)worlds	
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so	that	they	can	be	lived	in	as	well	as	possible.	
As	 such,	 the	 chapter	 responds	 to	 recent	debates	around	 the	geographies	of	
laughter	and	of	death/dying,	and	in	doing	so	begins	to	draw	together	some	of	
the	wider	 themes	within	 this	 thesis	 as	 a	whole.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 first	 aim,	 I	
question	the	ways	in	which	key	concepts	are	deployed	and	offer	three	ways	
through	 which	 these	 research	 agendas	 might	 be	 advanced.	 First,	 I	 suggest	
laughter	 as	 an	 exemplary	means	 through	which	we	 can	 empirically	 engage	
with	the	paradoxical	nature	of	death	and	dying	(Romanillos,	2015).	Second,	an	
alternative	reading	of	 the	 function	of	 laughter	around	death:	as	carrying	on	
rather	than	coping.	Third,	I	propose	pragmatics	as	a	key	framework	through	
which	to	think	about	caring	for	life	and/or	death	–	albeit	drawing	on	a	form	of	
pragmatics	implicit	within	the	vitalist	philosophies	of	Bergson	and	those	who	
follow	 him,	 rather	 than	 American	 pragmatists	 such	 as	 Dewey	 or	 James.	
Together	these	highlight	a	politico-ethic	of	“as	well	as	possible”	(Tronto,	1993)	
within	 caring	 for	 life	 and	 death	 through	which	 different	 people’s	 practices,	
affections	and	ethical	positions	 can	be	 better	 understood	and	assessed	and	
thus	provide	a	framework	through	which	we	can	(re)think	the	politico-ethical	
potentials	of	the	other	moments	of	laughter,	discussed	throughout	this	thesis	
so	 far.	 In	 particular,	 the	 provisionality	 of	 the	 “as	well	 as	 possible”	 offers	 a	
means	of	being	more	generous	 (Puig	de	 la	Bellacasa,	2017)	and	affirmative	
about	laughter’s	place	as	good	or	bad,	through	recognising	that	these	kinds	of	
judgements	 are	 themselves	 always	 held	 in	 a	 provisional	 status,	 given	 the	
complex,	messy	and	imperfect	nature	of	the	worlds	in	which	we	live,	die,	laugh	
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and	care	for	one	another.	
As	 such,	 the	 chapter	 begins	 by	 outlining	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 human	
geographers	have	conceptualised	life	and	death,	before	turning	to	laughter’s	
role	within	 these	 debates	more	 specifically.	 The	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 on	 the	
different	 political	modes	 through	which	 these	 three	 phenomena	 have	 been	
engaged	and	 the	argument	made	 for	providing	more	 ‘ordinary’	 experiential	
accounts	 of	 them.	 The	 bulk	 of	 the	 chapter	 develops	 this	 approach	 through	
discussion,	first	of	laughter’s	relationship	with	the	‘politics	of	life’	in	nursing	
care	homes	–	in	terms	of	both	biopolitical	governance	and	vitalism.	Following	
this,	 I	shift	 focus	onto	death,	specifically	 thinking	about	 the	various	ways	 in	
which	laughter,	life	and	death	fold	together	within	care	homes,	and	outline	the	
move	from	thinking	about	coping	to	carrying	on	as	exemplary	of	an	underlying	
pragmatic	 politico-ethic.	 I	 conclude	 by	 proposing	 these	 more	 pragmatic	
accounts	of	laughter,	life	and	death	as	forming	a	new	direction	through	which	
we	might	 frame	 the	politico-ethical	stances	 surrounding	 the	ways	 in	which	
many	ordinary	people	approach	laughter	when	caring	for	theirs	and	others’	
lifeworlds	–	both	within	care	homes,	but	crucially	beyond	them	too.	
7.2	|	Conceptualising	life	and	death	
The	concept	of	 ‘life’	 is	 arguably	a	 focal	point	 around	which	most	of	Human	
Geography	has	circulated,	yet	through	preceding	adjectives	such	as	biological,	
social,	political,	public,	private	–	and	more	specialised	terms	such	as	‘bare	life’	
–	life	also	becomes	apprehended	in	multiple	ways.	Within	discussions	of	life’s	
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politics,	however,	it	sometimes	feels	as	though	there	is	a	lack	of	plurality.	As	
Anderson	(2012:	28)	notes,	for	example,	the	concepts	of	‘affect’	and	‘biopower’	
have	become	“increasingly	popular	placeholders	for	a	broad	concern	with	life,	
albeit	 in	 ways	 that	 might	 initially	 appear	 to	 be	 quite	 different”.	 Biopower	
describes	 the	ways	 in	which	 life	 has	 become	 the	 ‘object-target’	 of	 political	
intervention	–	a	taking	control	of	‘life’	both	at	the	individual	bodily	scale	and	
at	the	scale	of	whole	populations.	Affect	contrasts	this	somewhat,	providing	a	
‘sense	of	push’	to	life	through	which	new	ways	of	living	continuously	emerge.	
Despite	this	difference,	Anderson	brings	these	two	together	to	argue	that	affect	
has	also	become	the	object-target	of	state-level	political	interventions.	
That	 said,	 non-representational,	 new	materialist	 and	 other	 vitalist	 theories	
have	offered	a	different	vision	where	life	can	be	seen	as	a	more-than-human	
entity	with	 a	more	 pragmatic	 political	 impetus.	 Grosz	 (2004),	 for	 instance,	
traces	 the	 concept	 through	 the	 work	 of	 Darwin,	 Nietzsche,	 and	 Bergson,	
arguing	that	‘life’	here	is	marked	by	an	incessant	vitality	that	‘propels’	bodies	
through	time	and	space.	Indeed,	as	Bennet	(2010:	76)	notes,	Bergson’s	use	of	
‘life’	 in	 particular,	 “names	 a	 certain	 propensity	 for	 ‘the	 utmost	 possible’	
activeness,	a	bias	in	favour	of	mobile	and	morphing	states”	and	thus	relies	on	
a	distinction	between	fixity	in	the	present	and	a	more	dynamic	reach	for	the	
future	 (Braidotti,	 2011).	 In	 framing	 this	 as	 pragmatic,	 therefore,	 I	 am	
exploiting	 the	 fact	 that	much	of	Bergson’s	work	on	vitalism,	 and	 those	 that	
follow	 him,	 hold	 within	 them	 pragmatic	 force	 –	 the	 sense	 of	 doing	 what’s	
necessary	rather	than	following	a	specific	ideology.	
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Complementing	 this	 interest	 in	 life,	 a	 growing	 literature	 has	 also	 emerged	
which	addresses	the	geographies	of	death	and	dying	(for	excellent	overviews	
see	Romanillos,	2015;	Stevenson	et	al.,	2016).	These	engagements	with	death	
have	 similarly	 traversed	 different	 modes	 and	 scales,	 including:	 mapping	
projects	 (Dorling	 and	 Gunnell,	 2003);	 discussions	 of	 mortality	 rates	 and	
governance	 strategies	 (Tyner,	 2015,	 2016)	 including	 bio/necropolitical	
frameworks	 (Allinson,	 2015;	 Jassal,	 2014;	 Mbembe,	 2003);	 social/cultural	
geographies	 of	 different	 deathscapes	 and	 places	 (Brown	 and	 Colton,	 2001;	
Maddrell	 and	 Sidaway,	 2010);	 and	 philosophical	 discussions	 of	 finitude	
(Harrison,	2008,	2015,	Romanillos,	2011,	2015).	 In	part,	 this	 scholarship	 is	
about	recognising	that	the	ways	in	which	relations	with	death	are	influenced	
by	the	cultural	settings	in	which	they	occur,	including	factors	such	as	faith	and	
generational	based	differences	(Maddrell,	2016).	As	Dunn	et	al.	(2016)	argue,	
for	instance,	emotional,	material	and	practised	engagements	with	death	differ	
between	European,	North	American	and	urban	Asian	settings	in	comparison	
to	more	rural	areas	of	the	Global	South	and,	therefore,	require	engagements	
with	different	styles	and	scales	of	political	theory.	
Closer	to	the	specific	themes	of	this	chapter,	there	have	recently	been	calls	for	
‘enlivened’	geographical	accounts	of	death	and	dying	(Stevenson	et	al.,	2016).	
These	kinds	of	accounts	have	largely	focussed	on	personal,	embodied	accounts	
of	survival,	grief	and	remembrance	(Maddrell,	2013,	2016,	Madge,	2016,	2018;	
Stevenson,	2016).	Maddrell	(2016),	for	instance,	has	looked	to	revitalise	the	
ways	in	which	we	might	‘map’	the	geographies	of	mourning	and	remembrance	
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in	ways	that	account	for	emotional/affective	spatialities	alongside	wider	social	
relations	that	help	to	formulate	senses	of	place.	Similarly,	through	discussing	
‘suicidal	 journeys,’	 Stevenson	 (2016:	 191)	 argues	 that	 death	 and	 dying	 are	
“vibrant	and	vital”	and	that	we	need	a	more	relational	understanding	of	death	
in	 terms	of	 the	ways	 it	 is	 folded	 into	 the	 practices	 of	 life.	 Elsewhere	Tyner	
(2016)	suggests	a	need	for	political	engagements	with	death	‘on	the	ground’,	
particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 survivability,	 with	 Clare	 Madge	 (2016,	 2018)	
advancing	 this	 idea	 through	 arguing	 for	 a	more	 compassionate	 and	 caring	
politico-ethic	that	places	the	visceral	and	emotional	aspects	of	encountering	
death,	dying	and	surviving	at	its	core.	
Much	 of	 this	 recent	work	 is	 informed	 by	 a	 theoretical	 turn	 away	 from	 the	
‘broken	bonds’	model	based	on	‘putting	aside’	or	‘moving	on’	and	towards	the	
‘continuing	 bonds’	 model	 “which	 recognises	 the	 importance	 of	 people’s	
continuing	attachment	to	their	dead	loved	ones”	(Young	and	Light,	2013:	136).	
Continuing	 bonds	 are	 perhaps	 most	 explicit	 in	 Maddrell’s	 (2013)	 work	 on	
absence	and	presence.	She	challenges	the	notion	of	death	as	absence,	instead	
developing	the	idea	of	‘absence-presence’	as	a	means	of	exploring	the	dynamic	
relationality	 and	 experiential	 tensions	 between	 physical	 absence	 and	
emotional	 presence.	 Specifically,	 Maddrell	 argues	 that	 material	 forms,	
embodied	practices	and	emotional	performances	form	‘conduits’	between	the	
bodies	 of	 the	 living	 and	 deceased	 and	 through	 which	 the	 deceased	 can	
continue	to	act	within	the	present.	As	such,	memorials	are	places	that	“need	to	
be	 recognised	 as	moored	 in	 the	 embodied	 past	 life,	 present	memorial	 and	
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ongoing	 emotional	 journey	 of	 the	 bereaved”	 (Maddrell,	 2013:	 504)	 but	
crucially	also	that	memorials	can	take	on	a	“life	of	 their	own”	through	their	
capacities	 to	 engender	 actions	 and	 affections	 in	 other	 bodies	 –	 once	 again	
echoing	vitalist	pragmatic	thinking.	
The	politics	of	life	and	death	in	geography	can	thus	be	seen	to	emerge	from	a	
tension	 between	 two	 positions:	 a	 macro-politics	 in	 which	 life	 is	 “made	
productive	through	techniques	of	 intervention”	(Anderson,	2012:	28)	and	a	
more	 micro-political	 engagement	 in	 which	 life’s	 politics	 emerge	 at	 an	
experiential	and	embodied	level	(Madge,	2016).	As	Stewart	(2007:	1)	reminds	
us,	these	modes	and	scales	of	life	are	not	completely	separate,	yet	often	“[t]he	
notion	of	a	totalised	system,	of	which	everything	is	already	a	part,	is	not	helpful	
(to	say	the	least)	in	the	effort	to	approach	a	weighted	and	reeling	present”.	As	
such,	 it	 is	within	 the	 spirit	of	 this	 embodied,	 visceral	 and	emotional	micro-
political	 engagement	 that	 I	 situate	 my	 own	 discussions	 in	 this	 chapter,	
thinking	about	how	life	and	death	become	entangled	within	care	home	spaces.	
In	doing	this,	I	turn	to	laughter	as	one	specific	emotional/visceral	response	to	
death,	 arguing	 that	 it	 forms	not	only	a	means	of	 ‘enlivening’	death	but	also	
allows	 insights	 into	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 politico-ethical	 engagement	 with	 a	
distinct	emotionality	at	its	core	(Madge,	2016).	
7.3	|	Laughter,	life	and	death	
As	noted	within	this	thesis	already,	laughter	is	starting	to	acquire	increasing	
purchase	 within	 geographical	 thought	 as	 a	 means	 of	 addressing	 different	
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forms	of	(micro)political	 life	(Brigstocke,	2014;	Dittmer,	2013;	Macpherson,	
2008;	Nixon,	2017;	Ridanpää,	2014a;	Sharpe	et	al.,	2014;	Sharpe	and	Hynes,	
2016).	Laughter,	for	instance,	is	often	positioned	as	a	disciplinary	mechanism,	
both	for	individual	bodies	who	may	be	laughed	at	for	breaking	social	norms	or	
conventions	 (Bergson,	 1980;	 Billig,	 2005;	 Douglas,	 2015),	 and	 for	 whole	
populations,	 through	 engendering	 a	 sense	 of	 ‘banal	 nationalism,’	 often	
couched	within	a	politics	of	stereotype	and	racist	humour	(Billig,	2005;	Dodds	
and	 Kirby,	 2012;	 Ridanpää,	 2007).	 Laughter	 can	 also	 challenge	 these	
disciplinary	 mechanisms:	 through	 disruption	 of	 power	 (Hughes,	 2016);	
providing	 alternative	 narratives	 (Brigstocke,	 2014);	 and	 creating	 ‘sensuous	
solidarities’	 (Routledge,	 2012)	 –	 all	 of	 which,	 can	 engender	 bodies	 with	 a	
capacity	 to	 exceed	 the	 control	 of	 structural	 powers.	 These	 conceptions	 of	
laughter	also	touch	on	its	position	as	affective,	that	is	to	say,	its	capacities	to	
prompt	actions	and	affections	within	and	between	bodies	through	generating	
different	rhythmic	engagements	with	space	(Sharpe	et	al.,	2014)	and	the	sense	
of	(often	atmospheric)	push	through	which	‘liveliness’	can	emerge	within	and	
between	 different	 bodies	 (Bissell	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Brigstocke,	 2014;	 Dittmer,	
2013).	
In	a	similar	manner	to	‘biopower’	and	‘affect’	(Anderson,	2012),	laughter	itself	
can,	 however,	 also	 be	 a	 ‘placeholder’	 for	 life.	 “As	 Vladimir	 Propp	 tells	 us,	
laughter	is	par	excellence	the	sign	of	life”	(Parvulescu,	2005:	495).	Although	
emerging	from	multiple	philosophical	orientations	this	claim	is	perhaps	most	
overt	again	within	Bergson’s	(1980)	work	in	which	he	positions	laughter	as	a	
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‘vital	 impulse’	 through	 which	 a	 sense	 of	 life	 (or	 liveliness)	 can	 be	
(re)introduced	 into	bodies	 that	have	been	rendered	static	or	mechanic	(see	
also	 Brigstocke,2014;	 Goldberg,	 1999;	 Parvulescu,	 2010).	 It	 is	 worth	
remaining	critical	of	Bergson’s	account,	however,	which	again	often	seems	to	
remain	blind	to	the	effects	of	(bodily)	difference	which,	as	the	previous	chapter	
notes,	is	often	key	to	understanding	how	laughter	affects	different	people	and	
affects	people	differently.		
Laughter	 has	 also	 been	 brought	 into	 geographic	 dialogue	 with	 death,	
recognising	 the	 different	ways	 in	 which	 each	 are	 perceived	 and	 embodied	
across	 different	 socio-cultural	 settings	 (Mbembe,	 2001;	 Parvulescu,	 2005).	
Galvany	 (2009:	 58)	 for	 instance	 notes	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 for	 the	
Chinese	Zhuangzi	can	serve	to	“neutralize	the	usual	political	exploitation	of	the	
emotions	by	means	of	methodically	channelling	them”	thus	enabling	forms	of	
friendship	 to	 endure	 beyond	 death.	 In	 Europe,	 the	 USA	 and	 Australasia	
particularly,	 the	 relationship	 between	 laughter	 and	 death	 is	 most	 often	
understood	in	terms	of	coping,	highlighted	by	frequent	reference	to	‘gallows’	
or	 ‘black’	humour	 in	spaces	where	people	are	emotionally	exposed	 to	pain,	
death	and	grief	(Dean	and	Major,	2008).	Laughter	in	these	instances	is	seen	as	
“a	survival	tactic,	a	defence	mechanism,	a	way	of	lessening	the	horror,	and	a	
method	 to	attain	a	 certain	amount	of	 control”	 and	 therefore	 to	 remove	 the	
individual	from	the	‘pain’	of	death	and	dying	(De	Moor,	2005:	739).	In	these	
conceptions,	 laughter	 is	 thus	depicted	as	a	means	 to	 ‘move	beyond’	or	 ‘put	
aside’	 death	 and	 so	 risks	 returning	 to	 the	 ‘broken	 bonds’	model	 described	
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above.	
In	this	sense,	we	might	see	‘coping	laughter’	as	an	affirmation	of	life,	although	
an	 affirmation	 that	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	what	 Harrison	 (2015:	 286)	 derides	 as	
“forgetting	dying,	or	of	forgetting	finitude,	and	forgetting	the	give	and	take	of	
living”.	 Romanillos	 (2011)	 attempts	 to	mitigate	 this	 ‘forgetting	 of	 finitude,’	
through	 turning	 to	 Heidegger,	 Foucault	 and	 Bataille	 arguing	 that	 all	 three	
reveal	the	ways	in	which	finitude	does	not	mark	absence	but	instead	is	made	
indicatively	present	within	experiences	of	life	(cf.	Maddrell,	2013).	Bataille	in	
particular,	folds	laughter	into	his	understandings	of	death	and	finitude,	noting	
that	it	forms	a	non-positive	affirmation:	“a	yes	saying	or	rather	yes-laughing	
negativity	…	a	moment	of	joy	and	laughter	in	the	face	of	death”	(Parvulescu,	
2010:	80).	
For	 Bataille	 (2001),	 encounters	 with	 death	 fall	 into	 the	 realms	 of	 ‘inner	
experience’	–	sitting	at	the	margins	of	what	is	‘liveable’	and	‘can	be	felt’.	Inner	
experience,	like	affect,	exceeds	both	representation	and	‘conscious	experience’	
(Lawtoo,	2011)	and	therefore	again	has	an	affinity	with	many	of	the	vitalist	
theories	already	discussed.	Laughter	is	seen	to	offer	a	means	of	dramatizing	
this	inner	experience,	“punctuat[ing]	the	‘experience’	of	death	with	a	burst	of	
laughter”	(Parvulescu,	2010:	82)	and	generating	other	relationships	with	the	
past	and	future.	It	is	an	ontogenetic	becoming	of	‘life’	itself	(Dewsbury,	2012).	
The	affirmation	of	Bataille’s	‘laughter	in	the	face	of	death’,	therefore,	marks	a	
very	different	political	project	from	that	of	laughter	as	a	means	of	‘coping’	or	
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forgetting	 death,	 instead	 providing	 a	 means	 of	 exploring	 the	 multiple	
possibilities	 that	encounters	with	death	afford	and	suggesting	that	different	
outcomes	and	futures	might	well	be	possible	(Romanillos,	2011).	
Within	these	various	conceptualisations	of	laughter	we	can	again	start	to	see	
two	 dominant	 political	 perspectives	 emerge	 that	 somewhat	 align	 with	
Anderson’s	(2012)	discussions	of	life.	On	the	one	hand,	laughter	serves	as	a	
means	of	disciplining	bodies	and	(re)placing	them	within	a	biopolitical	system	
–	either	through	shaming	them	into	conformity	(Billig,	2005)	or	providing	a	
coping	mechanism	through	which	negative	feelings	can	be	pushed	aside.	On	
the	other	hand,	there	is	the	kind	of	excessive,	transgressive	laughter	evoked	
by	 Bataille,	 which	 serves	 to	 disrupt	 both	 the	 representation	 and	 the	
functioning	 of	 biopolitical	 economies.	 Again,	 however,	 this	 dichotomy	 both	
fails	to	recognise	that	these	ethico-political	stances	are	neither	open	to	all	who	
laugh	around	death	 (Mbembe,	2001)	nor	do	 they	necessarily	map	onto	 the	
visceral	and	emotional	experiences	of	laughter	with	death	that	Madge	(2016)	
calls	for.	
Indeed,	as	the	moment	that	opens	this	chapter	demonstrates,	in	spaces	such	
as	 nursing	 care	 homes	 these	 encounters	 are	 often	 complex,	 messy	 and	
entangled	 with	 other	 politico-ethical	 commitments,	 orientations	 and	
sensibilities	that	suggest	laughter	as	not	sitting	neatly	within	either	position	
of	 the	 biopower/transgression	 dichotomy	 but	 rather	 as	 something	 more	
mobile,	vital	or	pragmatic.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	modes	of	power	do	not	
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exist	within	care	homes	however	and	as	such,	in	developing	this	point	further,	
I	now	turn	to	think	more	specifically	about	laughter	in	relation	to	care	home	
life,	and	its	relationship	with	forms	of	discipline,	governance	and	vitality.	
7.4	|	Laughter	and	the	politics	of	care	home	life	
Although	not	specifically	writing	about	care	homes,	Phillip	Vannini’s	(2015a:	
320)	description	of	everyday	life	as	“a	mix	of	taken-for-granted	realities,	habit,	
and	routine,	as	well	as	impulse,	novelty,	and	vivaciousness”	captures	a	sense	
the	two	care	homes	I	worked	in	with	somewhat	remarkable	precision.	
Indeed,	 care	home	 life	can	 be	highly	 structured,	 regulated	and	controlled	–	
often	through	particular	modes	of	(biopolitical/disciplinary)	governance.	The	
residents,	 for	 example,	 are	 often	woken,	washed	 and	 taken	 to	 the	 toilet	 at	
specific	times,	which,	due	to	needing	mobility	assistance,	can	be	beyond	their	
control.	They	are	also	subject	to	a	near	constant	gaze,	both	medical	and	social.	
Biology,	 cognition,	 eating	and	mood	patterns	are	 tested,	noted,	 charted	and	
compared	 with	 previous	 days.	 Movement	 around	 the	 home	 is	 watched;	
whereabouts	are	shared	among	staff;	and,	 if	needed,	people	are	returned	to	
their	‘correct’	positions.	In	Winterbourne	Care	Home	movement	was	further	
controlled	by	doors	that	needed	a	passcode	to	be	provided	in	order	to	open	
them.	This	second	gaze	 is	often	 just	 as	applicable	 to	 staff	who	have	arrival,	
leaving,	break	times	and	position	in	the	home	monitored	(with	Summerview	
Care	 Home	 intensifying	 this	 process	 using	 ‘biometric’	 system	which	 scans	
workers’	eyes	at	the	start	and	end	of	each	shift);	and	to	visitors	who	also	have	
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to	log	in	and	out.	As	noted	in	other	chapters,	at	a	wider	scale,	there	are	also	a	
series	of	other	institutions	that	govern	the	workings	of	the	homes	themselves,	
notably	 the	 Care	 Quality	 Commission	 (CQC),	 whose	 ability	 to	 conduct	 an	
inspection	at	any	time	without	any	notice,	generates	an	almost	quintessential	
panoptic	 power	 structure	 (Foucault,	 1977,	1986)	 through	which	 discipline,	
order,	regulation	and	routine	can	be	enforced.	
Within	 this	 regulatory	 framework,	 laughter	 can	 become	 an	 object-target	 of	
power	(Anderson,	2012).	As	we	saw	to	some	extent	in	the	previous	chapter,	
for	instance,	certain	logics	surround	laughter	within	care	homes	which	shape	
the	 various	 ways	 in	 which	 activities	 and	 spaces	 are	 ‘curated’.	 This	 might	
happen	 through	 discourses	 that	 promote	 laughter	within	 practices	 of	 care,	
through	 placing	 particular	 people	 in	 proximity	 to	 one	 another	 in	 order	 to	
promote	more	 laughter	 or	 through	 staging	 particular	 activities	 and	 events,	
such	 as	 theatre	 shows,	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 producing	 laughter	 itself.	
Furthermore,	these	logics	extend	to	value	judgments	about	care	itself,	as	seen	
within	the	quote	from	the	CQC	that	opens	this	thesis,	where	the	presence	of	
laughter	is	seen	as	a	key	means	of	showing	the	residents	that	staff	members	
care.	Again,	as	noted	in	this	thesis	already,	at	times	laughter	can	also	become	
a	matter	 for	 censure	 –	with	 staff	members,	 in	 particular,	 being	 told	 off	 by	
managers	for	standing	around	laughing,	rather	than	working	or	for	showing	a	
lack	of	care	through	laughing	at	something	in	a	manner	that	is	‘inappropriate’.	
Alongside	this,	within	care	homes	laughter	can	also	become	the	mechanism	
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through	which	 power	 is	 deployed	 or	 resisted,	 in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	 that	
described	 in	the	section	above.	As	noted	 in	Chapter	5,	 for	 instance,	 in	some	
cases	laughter	was	deployed	as	a	means	of	(disciplinary)	ridicule	(Billig,	2005)	
in	the	care	homes.	This	was	usually	between	staff	members	themselves,	and	
often	revolved	around	a	moment	of	 ‘soft’	censure,	either	when	someone	did	
something	within	their	working	practices	that	was	deemed	‘silly’	(ridiculous)	
or	 through	modes	of	humorous	mocking	with	an	 intended	purpose:	“I	can’t	
believe	you	have	had	your	nails	done	so	nicely,	when	you	know	you	are	going	
to	have	 to	 remove	 them	before	your	next	 care	 shift	 –	haha	–	you’re	 such	a	
numpty”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	24/06/2016).	Laughter	
emerges	in	a	manner	that	could	be	framed	as	resistance	to	these	disciplinary	
powers.	 Again,	 most	 often	 this	 occurred	 through	 staff	 joking	 about,	 and	
mocking,	the	management	–	again	deeming	their	actions	to	be	ridiculous	–	as	
a	form	of	laughing	upwards	(Davies,	2007;	Douglas,	2015)	–	but	there	were	
also	a	few	instances	where	the	residents	would	do	a	similar	thing	to	the	staff:	
imitating	their	actions	or	words	in	an	overly	exaggerated	manner.	
Although	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 liveliness	 to	 these	 moments	 of	 laughter;	 this	
framing	for	a	discussion	about	care	homes	risks	positioning	them	as	‘gloomy’	
Foucauldian	spaces	(Thrift	2007	cited	in	Philo,	2012)	in	which	power	is	heavy	
and	 stifling.	 As	many	 have	 conceded,	 however,	 analysing	 in	 this	manner	 is	
often	to	miss	what	else	is	happening,	to	miss	the	moments	the	exceed	control	
(Anderson,	 2012;	 Philo,	 2012),	 or	 to	 miss	 the	 moments	 of	 vital	 life	 and	
vivaciousness	 within	 these	 otherwise	 ‘dead	 geographies’	 (Thrift	 and	
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Dewsbury,	2000;	Vannini,	2015a).	
These	moments	of	vivaciousness	arguably	revolve	around	two	different,	but	
connected,	 kinds	 of	 event:	 laughter	 and	 unexpected	 situations.	 In	 terms	 of	
laughter,	 vivaciousness	 often	 emerges	 through	 laughter’s	 capacities	 to	
generate	 differential	 atmospheres,	 which	 enable	 different	 forms	 of	
engagement	with	 space	 and	 other	 bodies	 –	 in	much	 the	 same	way	 as	was	
discussed	in	the	previous	chapter:	
The	home	seemed	quiet	this	morning;	people	were	working	together	but	
not	really	chatting.	The	nurse	was	courteously	handing	out	medications	to	
the	residents,	 room	by	room,	one	by	one.	 I	did	my	usual:	walking	up	the	
floors	 of	 the	 home	 and	 saying	 good	morning	 to	 the	 residents	who	were	
awake;	getting	a	series	of	muted	responses;	their	eyes	flicking	to	me	and	
then	back	to	the	TV	or	just	off	into	space.	On	the	top	floor,	Mr	F	gave	me	a	
little	more,	so	I	sat	with	him	for	a	moment	talking	about	the	weather	and	
then	cricket.	It	was	cordial	and	pleasant.	Suddenly	there	is	a	shriek	as	one	
of	the	carers	squealed	and	ran	past	the	door,	the	cleaner	following	her	and	
squirting	water	from	a	bottle.	Both	laughed	and	playfully	wrestled	in	the	
corridor.	Mr	F	and	I	chuckled	together	as	we	watched	them.	The	cleaner	
entered	the	room	greeting	us	both	cheerily;	a	bustle	of	movement,	noise	
and	laughter	that	brightened	the	mood.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	01/08/2016)	
This	simple	example	is,	again,	demonstrative	of	how	laughter	can	cut	through,	
overflow	or	escape	the	rhythms	and	routines	of	the	care	homes.	Again,	in	many	
ways,	 these	 instances	 reflect	 Bergson’s	 (1980)	 claims	 that	 laughter	 is	 an	
antidote	to	mechanised	bodies.	Yet	in	line	with	the	overall	thrust	of	the	thesis,	
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rather	than	universalise	laughter	in	this	way,	we	might	simply	note	here	that	
the	example	shows	some	of	laughter’s	potential	to	affect	people,	practices	and	
spaces	 (Brigstocke,	2014)	and	 in	 turn	 to	 re-shape	 individual,	 collective	and	
institutional	 bodies	 into	 different	 forms	 of	 relationality	 (or	 indeed	 non-
relationality	–	see	Harrison,	2007).	
As	the	previous	chapter	also	alludes	to,	however,	these	moments	of	laughter	
are	not	completely	separated	from	the	circumstances	of	power	that	surround	
them.	Indeed,	they	often	work	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	mocking	resistance	
mentioned	above	in	that	they	can	create	spaces	that	are	in	many	ways	beyond	
the	structures	of	disciplined	care	home	life.	Where	this	laughter	differs	from	
these	moments	of	humour,	however,	is	in	its	relationship	with	‘intentionality’	
(Hughes,	 2016),	 specifically	 its	 capacities	 to	 exceed,	 and	 thus	 work	 on	 a	
different	plane	or	terrain,	to	normative	modes	of	governance.	Indeed,	laughter	
in	instances	such	as	these	exudes	a	something	of	‘vital	impetus’:	a	pragmatic	
liveliness	that	is	not	necessarily	couched	in	one	political	stance	(e.g.	discipline)	
or	another	(e.g.	resistance).	
The	second	kind	of	vivacious	event	centres	around	unexpected	situations	such	
as	 the	 breaking	 down	of	 equipment;	 the	 sudden	 arrival	 of	 families	 or	 new	
residents;	staff	members	being	off	sick,	causing	short	staffing;	or	perhaps	most	
commonly	through	the	actions	of	the	residents	themselves,	who	often	do	or	
say	 unexpected	 things.	 In	 these	 cases,	 ordinary	 procedures	 become	
inappropriate	for	the	provision	of	care	in	the	moment	and	so	staff	members	
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alter	and	 improvise	prescribed	procedures	and	routines:	 improvising	 lifting	
techniques;	 offering	 alternate	 activities;	 or	 reordering	 tasks,	 for	 example.	
These	examples	thus	relay	an	ethic	of	care	that	is	driven	by	a	pragmatic	desire	
to	“maintain,	continue,	and	repair	our	‘world’	so	that	we	can	live	in	it	as	well	as	
possible”	(Tronto,	1993:	103,	emphasis	mine)	even	if	that	as	well	as	possible	
does	not	quite	match	the	ideal.	
These	two	kinds	of	event	–	 laughter	and	pragmatic	 improvisation	–	are	not	
mutually	exclusive,	however,	but	rather	can	become	entangled	together	within	
care	home	life	in	various	ways.	As	we	have	seen,	often	laughter	emerges	during	
moments	in	which	carers	are	being	forced	to	compromise	and	adapt.	Although	
not	always	the	case,	I	repeatedly	noticed	more	laughter	in	both	care	homes	on	
days	where	we	were	short	staffed	and	postulated	at	one	point	that	“perhaps	
this	 laughter	 becomes	 a	 way	 of	 re-centring	 the	 world	 –	 of	 facing	 two	
incongruous	 realities”	 (Field	 Diary	 Notes,	 Summerview	 Care	 Home,	
27/06/2016).	In	this	sense,	if	care	is	about	generating	a	world	that	can	be	lived	
in	as	well	as	possible	(Tronto,	1993),	laughter	can	be	seen	as	a	means	of	both	
recognising	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 ideal	 scenario	 and	 the	 limits	 of	
possibility,	and	therefore	as	a	way	of	enabling	the	continuation	of	life	‘as	well	
as	possible’.	Whilst	this	idea	is	visible	throughout	care	home	life,	it	is	perhaps	
most	pertinent	through	encounters	with	death	specifically.	
7.5	|	Laughing	with	death	
Death	is	a	relatively	frequent	occurrence	in	care	home	spaces	and	therefore	
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also	 becomes	 folded	 into	 the	matters,	 practices	 and	 affects	of	 ordinary	 life.	
Indeed,	many	of	the	observation	strategies	outlined	previously	are	designed	
to	manage/delay	the	event	of	death,	but	other	practices	also	emerge	around	it:	
attending	 funerals,	 telephoning	 coroners,	 thank	 you	 cards	 from	 families,	
packing	up	belongings,	deep	cleaning	rooms,	moments	of	sadness,	moments	of	
quietness	 and	moments	 of	 tears.	 Despite	 these	 emotional	 aspects	 of	 death,	
however,	ordinary	life	in	care	homes	cannot	cease	to	continue.	As	the	manager	
in	Summerview	care	home	told	me:	
We	don’t	hide	from	death	here.	We	can’t.	It’s	sometimes	really	emotional	
and	that	shows.	We	don't	hide	that	from	the	service	users	either,	sometimes	
we	are	sad,	and	we	explain	to	them	why,	in	the	same	way	we	would	if	we	
were	happy.	But	at	the	end	of	the	day,	I	can't	sit	in	here	and	talk	my	staff	
through	 each	 death	 either,	 wrap	 them	 up,	 and	 make	 them	 feel	 better	
because	in	the	end	they	will	just	have	to	go	out	there	again	and	it	will	all	
be	the	same.	You	sometimes	just	have	to	have	a	laugh	and	get	on	with	it.			
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	02/06/2016)	
Through	her	recognition	of	death	as	an	unavoidable	feature	of	care	home	life	
the	manager	here	is	pointing	towards	a	need	for	staff	members	to	confront	it	
head-on	 rather	 than	 try	 to	 hide	 from	 it,	 and	 thus	 that	 the	 emotions	
surrounding	death	are	not	necessarily	needing	to	be	pushed	away	but	can	be	
maintained	alongside	the	provision	of	care.	 In	doing	this	she	seems	to	echo	
much	of	the	literature	on	death	and	dying	discussed	above	which	have	sought	
to	recognise	that	“death	is	implacable	in	its	presence	and	immanent	to	every	
human	life”	(Braidotti,	2011:	343)	rather	than	something	that	is	‘beyond’	life.	
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Interestingly	her	openness	with	the	residents	starkly	contrasts	Winterbourne	
Care	Home,	where	there	was	an	unofficial	rule	about	not	mentioning	death	in	
front	of	the	residents,	and	whenever	bodies	were	removed	from	the	home	the	
curtains	were	drawn	so	the	ambulance	could	not	be	seen.	This	attempt	to	hide	
death	from	the	residents	sits	somewhat	incongruously	with	many	of	their	own	
actions,	 however.	 They	 would	 often	 provide	 recognition	 of	 their	 own	
mortality,	often	alongside	a	moment	of	laughter:	
“I	will	be	105	in	December,”	said	Mr	W	with	a	slight	wheeze,	“I	will	get	a	
second	card	from	the	Queen!”	he	pauses	for	a	second,	carefully	adding,	“If	I	
make	it	that	far.”	He	laughed	playfully.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	12/10/2015)	
“I’m	ready	to	die.	I	feel	useless	attached	to	all	these	machines	and	unable	
to	get	out	of	bed,	I	just	want	it	to	be	over	really	…	[chuckling]	…	I	mean,	if	I	
was	a	dog	they	would	just	put	me	down,	wouldn’t	they?”		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	03/08/2016)	
Drawing	on	theories	of	humour	here,	we	might	read	both	of	these	events	of	
laughter	as	moments	of	release	through	which	the	individual	can	let	go	of	their	
fears	of	death	and	replace	them	with	moments	of	joy,	an	opening	of	oneself	up	
to	 the	 possibility	 of	 death	 (Parvulescu,	 2010).	 Yet,	 there	 is	 a	 necessity	 to	
remain	critical	of	these	readings,	particularly	given	the	“assumptions	that	old	
people	 ‘know	how	 to	die’”	which	 can	perpetuate	ageist	 attitudes	and	social	
injustices	(Lloyd,	2004:	237).	As	such,	it	becomes	important	to	pay	attention	
to	 the	 capacities	 of	 laughter	 itself	 in	 these	 instances,	 rather	 than	 assuming	
their	workings	based	on	humour	or	stereotypical	ideas	about	the	meanings	of	
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different	people’s	laughter,	such	as	older	people	evoking	a	‘Dunkirk	Spirit’.	We	
might	 return	 instead	 to	 the	 idea	 above,	 recognising	 that	 these	moments	of	
laughter	 do	 not	 necessarily	 push	 away	 emotions	 such	 as	 fear	 of	 death,	 but	
rework	them	so	that	 life	can	be	 lived	as	well	as	possible	–	albeit	 in	a	world	
where	 this	 possibility	 is	 somewhat	 constrained	 within	 the	 particular	
emotional/affective,	 practical	 and	 ethical	 circumstances	 of	 each	 person	 in	
question.	
The	imminence	of	death	is	also	made	materially	present	in	care	homes	through	
the	presence	of	corpses	which	become	‘normalised’	in	a	variety	of	ways.	At	the	
point	of	death	it	is	customary	for	care	staff	to	wash	and	dress	the	body	before	
it	is	removed.	In	some	instances,	new	members	of	staff	or	those	undertaking	
work	 experience	 were	 taken	 to	 see	 a	 corpse	 as	 an	 unofficial	 part	 of	 their	
training.	Possibly	because	of	 this	normalising	effect,	 corpses	 too	 sometimes	
become	the	locus	for	moments	of	laughter:	
The	four	of	us	sat	chatting	over	a	cup	of	tea.	The	conversation	eventually	
settling	 on	 a	 resident	who	 had	 passed	 away	 a	 day	 or	 two	 before	 I	 had	
arrived.	“Mike	played	a	trick	on	me	that	day,”	said	Karen,	“he	asked	me	to	
go	and	give	Mr	J	his	morning	tea,	I	didn’t	know	he	had	passed	away	so	I	
went	in	and	tried	to	wake	him	up.	When	I	came	out,	Mike	was	just	stood	
there	laughing	at	me.”	
“He’s	very	naughty,”	said	another	of	the	carers.	
Karen	replied	“Yeah…	but	 it’s	 fine,	 I	got	him	back.	 I	rang	the	emergency	
alarm	 in	 the	 room	 later	 on	and	 then	hid	 in	 the	next	 room	and	he	 came	
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running”		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	28/06/2016)	
We	might	well	question	the	tastefulness	of	this	enactment	of	laughter,	yet	it	
displays	an	interesting	moment	where	the	corpse	becomes	entangled	within	a	
playfully	vital	moment	of	 life.	Most	people	would	probably	conceive	of	 it	 in	
terms	of	 transgression	(Foucault,	1998)	–	moving	past	what	 is	 traditionally	
seen	as	‘acceptable’	behaviour	around	the	dead.	Yet	this	moment	might	equally	
be	understood	 in	 terms	of	non-positive	affirmation:	 ‘making	present’	death	
within	 the	 life	of	 the	 care	home	 (Harrison,	2015)	and	 thus	of	 exploring	 the	
‘limits’	 of	 living	with	 and	 through	 death	 (Foucault,	 1998).	My	sense	 is	 that	
neither	 of	 these	 positions	 quite	 captures	 the	 banality	 of	 this	 particular	
encounter,	 in	which	 the	deceased	body	 features	within	 the	 laughter,	 rather	
than	necessarily	being	its	target.	Indeed,	this	kind	of	practical	joke	is	in	many	
ways	not	that	different	from	the	other	kinds	of	pranks	played	by	care	home	
staff	 such	 as	 the	 water	 fight	 described	 above.	 As	 such,	 it	 again	 prompts	
questions	 about	 the	 agencies	 involved	 in	 the	 various	 forms	 of	
relationality/non-relationality	between	bodies	(living	and	deceased)	and	thus	
about	whose	life	is	enlivened	by	it	–	although,	in	this	instance,	these	questions	
are	 very	 difficult	 to	 answer	with	 certainty.	 That	 said,	 the	 example	 is	 again	
suggestive	 of	 a	 capacity	 for	 care	 workers	 to	 adopt	 pragmatic	 (if	 crude)	
strategies	for	continuing	with	their	work	and	lives	in	as	ordinary	a	manner	as	
possible,	and	thus	reflects	the	manager’s	sentiment	about	life	needing	to	carry	
on	in	care	homes	regardless	of	death.	
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7.6	|	From	coping	to	carrying	on	
As	noted	already,	most	 literature	on	 laughter	and	death	 focusses	on	 coping	
through	 ‘gallows	 humour’:	 a	 means	 of	 ‘making	 light’	 of	 situations	 that	 are	
potentially	serious/life-threatening,	or	of	death	itself.	As	Watson	(2011)	notes,	
this	kind	of	laughter	is	neither	light-hearted	per	se	or	necessarily	cruel,	but	is	
instead	often	self-derogatory:	
“Mr	K’s	family	wrote	such	a	nice	card	to	us,”	said	Laura,	“it	made	me	well	
up	reading	it	…”	she	sat	up	a	little	straighter	“just	what	I	needed	today,	to	
feel	more	depressed	in	this	place”	and	she	let	out	a	short	laugh.	“Here	you	
go	Rach,”	she	said	handing	it	over,	“I	haven’t	seen	you	cry	for	a	while.”	She	
laughs	again.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	13/06/2016)	
Crawley	(2004:	419)	argues	that	 through	moments	of	laughter,	such	as	 this	
one,	 “emotional	 experiences	 which	 are	 hard	 to	 express	 verbally	 are	 made	
collective,	and	communicative;	cognitive	and	emotional	dissonances	are	lifted,	
and	 reality	 is	 restored.”	Whilst	 I	 agree	with	the	 thrust	of	 this	 assessment,	 I	
remain	critical	of	the	idea	of	‘restoring	reality’	which	both	suggests	that	there	
is	 an	 underlying	 reality	which	 is	 somehow	 separate	 from	 ‘hard	 to	 express’	
emotional	 or	 affective	 experiences	 –	 an	 idea	 that	 feminist	 and	 non-
representational	 geographies	 have	 resolutely	 disavowed	 (see	 notably	 K	
Anderson	and	Smith,	2001;	McCormack,	2003)	–	and	that	these	experiences	
can	be	easily	pushed	aside.	Indeed,	as	we	have	seen	already,	care	homes	are	
places	in	which	emotional	experiences	are	not	easily	pushed	aside	and	so	must	
be	folded	into	the	ongoing	constitution	of	life.	
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Following	the	previous	sections,	we	might	again	understand	this	laughter	as	
bringing	 together	 two	 incongruous	 realities	 and	 thus	 enacting	 different	
futures	 in	 which	 life	 can	 be	 lived	 as	 well	 as	 possible.	 The	 laughter	 in	 the	
example	 above	 becomes	 exemplary	 of	 times	where	 the	 emotional	 relations	
between	 bodies	 are	 affirmed	 and	 then	 re-worked,	 rather	 than	 removed.	
Through	 this	 laughter	 they	 are,	 therefore,	 rendered	 productive,	 forming	 a	
means	through	which	workers	can	continue	living	on	and	crucially	continue	to	
care.	 As	 such	 I	 would	 argue	 for	 a	 subtle	 move	 in	 language	 away	 from	
understanding	 laughter	 as	 ‘coping’	 towards	 understanding	 it	 in	 terms	 of	
‘carrying	 on’	 –	 in	 turn	 shifting	 the	 emphasis	 away	 from	 ‘restoring	 reality’	
towards	enacting	a	different	reality	(see	Mol,	1999):	
“Where	 is	 Mrs	 M?”	 I	 asked.	 “She	 is	 in	 room	 21,”	 said	 Anna.	 In	 the	
background,	Rhoda’s	mouth	dropped	open.	“Mrs	M	passed	away	on	Friday,”	
she	said.	Neither	Anna	nor	I	knew	quite	how	to	react;	there	was	a	moment	
of	tense	silence	as	we	were	forced	to	contemplate	the	recent	death.	I	felt	
uncomfortable.	 I	 looked	 at	 my	 hands	 where	 I	 was	 holding	 the	 tray	 of	
Weetabix	that	I	had	been	sent	to	give	to	Mrs	M.	I	looked	up	again	and	said	
with	a	cautious	laughter	in	my	voice	“I	guess	she	won’t	want	her	breakfast	
then”.	Rhoda’s	face	creased	and	she	bent	slightly	at	the	waist	letting	out	a	
wheeze	of	a	laugh.	“Probably	not,”	she	said	chuckling,	“Why	don’t	you	give	
it	 to	Mrs	 T	 instead.”	 I	 smiled,	 letting	 out	 a	 low	 chuckle	 and	walked	 off	
towards	Mrs	T’s	room.		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	30/11/2015)	
Examples	such	as	this	one,	clearly	invoke	a	sense	of	laughter	as	‘carrying	on’	
rather	than	as	‘coping’	through	showing	the	ways	in	which	it	enables	people	to	
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continue	 acting	 without	 negating	 the	 emotionality/affectivity	 of	 an	
uncomfortable	 encounter	 with	 death.	 Indeed,	 thinking	 about	 ‘carrying	 on’	
provides	a	metaphor	that	suggests	carers	taking	their	emotions	with	them	and	
folding	 them	 into	 their	 sense	 of	 self	 which	 in	 turn	 reconfigures	 the	 future	
towards	something	different.	The	laughter	in	these	instances	also	foregrounds	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 emotional	 encounters	 take	 place	 as	 modes	 of	
relationally	and	non-relationality	between	bodies	(Ahmed,	2004):	an	affective	
circulation	between	the	bodies	of	the	two	care	staff,	myself,	as	well	as	the	tray	
of	 food	and	perhaps	most	pressingly	the	absence	of	Mrs	M’s	body	from	her	
room.	
As	such,	we	can	start	to	see	the	importance	of	movements	not	only	between	
bodies	that	are	present,	but	also	those	that	are	absent	(Maddrell,	2013),	as	well	
as	 modes	 of	 relationality/non-relationality	 (Harrison,	 2007)	 in	 the	 taking	
place	of	emotions	around	death.	Following	the	death	of	a	resident	 in	a	care	
home,	for	instance,	their	body	and	belongings	are	removed	from	their	room;	
the	room	is	made	empty;	inscribed	with	‘absence’.	As	Maddrell	(2013)	notes,	
however,	this	absence	does	not	mean	that	residents	cease	to	be	present	within	
the	social,	vital,	affective	and	political	life	of	the	home	and	instead	they	often	
enact	an	absence-presence	–	‘haunting’	the	home	at	moments	through	often	
highly	tangible	memories	such	as	“voices	which	seem	to	be	engrained	in	my	
head”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	10/10/2015).	Similarly,	
material	 objects	 serve	 as	 markers	 and	 reminders	 of	 the	 shifting	 forms	 of	
relationality/non-relationality.	In	one	instance,	it	was	an	encounter	with	a	big	
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TV	 in	 an	 otherwise	 empty	 room	 that	 became	 the	 locus	 for	 this	 changing	
relationship	between	myself	and	the	(now	deceased)	resident	which	in	turn	
manifested	as	a	highly	visceral	emotional/affective	response:	“I	held	back	the	
tears,	biting	my	lip	as	my	throat	tightened	up	with	a	sickly	feeling.	It	still	makes	
me	feel	sick	now”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	26/10/2015).		
Through	these	moments,	we	can	thus	begin	to	see	the	ways	in	which	moments	
of	absence-presence	generated	by	death	in	care	homes	emerge	and	are	felt	in	
many	ways.	This	 can	be	 feelings	and	emotions	 such	as	sadness,	 loss,	 anger,	
sickness	and	 tears;	but	 it	 also	 can	generate	moments	of	 joy	which	manifest	
through	a	shared	laughter.	Perhaps	the	most	prevalent	way	that	this	laughter	
emerges	is	through	the	telling	of	stories	about	residents	who	have	died,	which	
serve	to	animate	and	dramatize	the	deceased	person’s	life	in	much	the	same	
way	as	other	forms	of	memorial	might	do	(Maddrell,	2013).	These	stories	and	
the	laughter	within	and	around	them	have	the	potential	to	enable	the	deceased	
person’s	 life	 to	 continue,	 albeit	 in	 a	 different	 form,	 through	 their	 ability	 to	
invoke	 actions	 and	 affections	 in	 bodies	 (Grosz,	 2004).	 As	 one	 of	 the	 care	
workers	in	Winterbourne	Care	Home	told	me:	
Yeah,	 it’s	 sometimes	 hard	 thinking	 about	 residents	 who	 have	 died	 …	
Though	 it’s	 often	 the	 funny	 things	 they	 did	 that	 I	 remember.	 Like	 each	
resident	has	their	good	days	and	bad	days,	they	are	sometimes	horrible	to	
you	and	sometimes	you	laugh	loads	with	them.	It	seems	to	be	those	funny	
moments	you	remember	though	…	and	it	helps	you	with	new	residents;	it’s	
part	of	your	experience	of	working	in	care	for	a	long	time		
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	Home,	19/11/2015)	
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This	statement	foregrounds	the	relationship	between	laughter,	life,	and	death	
as	one	that	is	spatiotemporally	dynamic	(Braidotti,	2011).	Laughter	(real	or	
remembered)	can	be	seen	to	transcend	the	boundary	between	life	and	death	
and	forms	a	‘conduit’	through	which	the	deceased	can	be	made	immanent	to,	
and	 thus	 continue	 to	 act	 in	 the	 present	 (Maddrell,	 2013).	 The	 concept	 of	
‘carrying	on’	can	once	again	be	utilised	here,	whereby,	through	laughter,	the	
dead	can	be	seen	to	carry	on	acting,	and	therefore	carry	on	‘living’,	potentially	
ad	infinitum	(Grosz,	2004).	The	temptation	is	perhaps	to	frame	this	example	
as	a	form	of	continuing	rather	than	broken	bonds	here,	in	much	the	same	way	
as	Maddrell	(2013).	However,	I	would	argue	that	the	idea	of	continuing	bonds	
perhaps	 does	 not	 quite	 capture	 what	 is	 actually	 happening	 within	 this	
statement.	
Indeed,	 the	 care	 worker	 highlights	 a	 nostalgic	 (and	 pragmatic)	 form	 of	
remembrance	in	which	some	bonds	get	broken	whilst	others	are	maintained,	
continued	 and	 repaired:	 a	 ‘forgetting’	 of	 the	 horrible	 moments	 and	
remembering	instead	moments	of	laughter.	In	other	words,	he	is	pointing	here	
towards	an	active	re-composition	of	relationality/non-relationality	between	
himself	and	the	residents	which	in	turn	shapes	his	capacities	to	provide	future	
care.	Drawing	inspiration	from	Grosz’s	(2004)	vitalist	reading	of	Darwin	and	
Bergson	here,	we	might	thus	argue	that	relationships	between	living	and	dead	
do	not	occur	through	bonds	that	are	either	broken	or	continuous,	but	rather	
as	 a	 kind	 of	 evolution:	 a	 re-composition	 of	 these	 bonds	 to	 generate	 a	
relationship	that	is	qualitatively	different	from	that	which	existed	before.	
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My	claim	about	moving	from	understanding	encounters	with	death	in	terms	of	
coping	 towards	 carrying	 on	 thus	 hinges	 on	 two	 facets.	 Firstly,	 it	 involves	
recognising	 that	 emotional	 encounters	 with	 death	 are	 constructed	 as	 a	
composition	of	various	entities,	absence-presences	and	forms	of	relationality	
occurring	 at	 differing	 intensities	 (Stewart,	 2007).	 Secondly,	 it	 involves	
examining	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 compositions	 are	 folded	 into	 the	
production,	generation	and	emergence	of	ongoing	life	so	that	it	can	be	lived	as	
well	as	possible	(Tronto,	1993).	The	 ‘as	well	as	possible’	 therefore	not	only	
frames	laughter’s	dual	role	within	this	process:	both	as	a	means	through	which	
these	 compositions	 can	 be	 reworked;	 and	 as	 a	 means	 of	 exploring	 and	
negotiating	 the	 limits	 of	 possibility	 and	 the	 constraints	 of	 circumstance	
(McCormack,	2017),	but	also	frames	this	movement	within	a	wider	and	more	
pragmatic	understanding	of	care.	
7.7	 |	 Rethinking	 the	 relationship	 between	 laughter,	 life	 and	
death	
The	 idea	of	 laughter	as	a	 form	of	 coping	 is	well	 established:	 epitomised	by	
references	to	relief	theory,	gallows	humour	and	emotional	distancing.	Whilst	
it	may	be	appropriate	for	some	situations,	‘coping’	is	neither	the	way	that	all	
cultures	 engage	 with	 death	 (Galvany,	 2009)	 nor	 indeed	 a	 politico-ethical	
possibility	for	all	(Mbembe,	2001)	and	so	people	also	generate	other	ways	of	
laughing	around	death.	Indeed,	for	care	workers,	encounters	with	death	are	
relatively	 banal	 and	 so	 become	 entangled	 with	 the	 practices,	 matters	 and	
affections	 of	 ordinary	 life	 and	 work.	 This	 sets	 up	 a	 specific	 mandate	 for	
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encounters	with	death;	to	paraphrase	the	manager	quoted	above:	there	is	no	
hiding	from	it	or	pushing	it	away,	so	you	just	have	to	get	on	with	it	in	the	best	
way	possible.	
Returning	to	the	story	that	opens	this	chapter,	I	wrote	in	my	field	diary	of	that	
moment	 that	 it	was	a	 “laugh	out	of	hopelessness”	but	 crucially	 followed	up	
with	“I	was	enjoying	the	hopelessness”	(Field	Diary	Notes,	Winterbourne	Care	
Home,	 8/10/2015).	 I	 have	 often	 reflected	 on	 that	 moment,	 particularly	 in	
trying	to	understand	many	of	the	other	events	that	have	been	presented	in	this	
chapter.	I	suspect	my	vocabulary	failed	me	at	that	time.	On	reflection,	I	would	
argue	that	the	laughter	in	that	moment	was	not	one	of	simple	hopelessness,	
but	 rather	 something	 more	 affirmative	 –	 an	 event	 through	 which	 I	 could	
imagine,	explore	and	think	a	different	kind	of	relationship	with	both	past	and	
future.	 Significantly,	 laughing	 at	 this	 moment	 did	 not	 mean	 the	 encounter	
becomes	devoid	of	all	emotion	(Bergson,	1980);	it	was	a	sad	time	(and	still	is)	
and	 therefore	 remains	a	moment	of	political	 and	ethical	 attunement	 that	 is	
framed	by	complex	emotional	and	affective	encounter	(Madge,	2016).	Yet	the	
laughter	brings	 these	various	 incongruous	emotional,	 affective,	 imaginative,	
hopeful,	 hopeless,	 affirmative	 and	 negating	 modes	 together	 to	 animate	 or	
dramatize	 “the	 intricacies,	 intimacies	 and	 hesitancies	 involved	 in	 facing	
finitude”	 in	 some	 way	 (Madge,	 2018:	 246).	 Neither	 does	 laughter	 mark	 a	
forgetting	of	 finitude	(Harrison,	2015).	The	 imminence	of	death	remains	–	 I	
know	that	Mrs	B	is	going	to	die	(and	my	suspicion	is	that	she	does	too)	–	yet	
the	laughter	allows	the	emotional	meanings	of	this	death	to	be	reworked	and	
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rendered	less	painful:	enabling	these	emotions	to	be	more	productively	folded	
into	my	ongoing	life.	
This	is	clearly	only	my	own,	situated,	account	of	the	event.	There	is	much	we	
cannot	 know	 from	 it	 –	 particularly	 about	 Mrs	 B’s,	 or	 other	 residents’	
experiences,	thoughts	and	feelings	of	their	own	encounters	with	death	and	the	
laughter	that	surrounds	it.	There	is	thus	a	clear	need	to	extend	geographical	
engagements	to	this	constituency,	also.	Nevertheless,	engagements	with	care	
workers’	 laughter	 provide	 key	 insights	 and	 advancements	 into	 both	 the	
geographies	of	laughter,	and	of	death	and	dying	in	three	interconnected	ways.	
The	first	contribution	of	the	chapter	is	to	position	laughter	as	an	exemplary	
means	 through	 which	 geographers	 can	 empirically	 engage	 with	 the	
paradoxical	nature	of	death	(Romanillos,	2015)	by	demonstrating	laughter	as	
operating	across	apparently	 incongruous	 conceptual	 schema.	Laughter	 thus	
proves	 a	 useful	 methodological	 prompt	 through	 which	 geographers	 can	
engage	 with	 the	 visceral,	 embodied	 and	 emotional	 aspects	 of	 livingdying	
(Madge,	 2016),	 although	 it’s	 important	 to	 remain	 aware	 of	 falling	 into	 pre-
existing	 assumptions	 of	 laughter’s	 functions,	 rather	 than	 engaging	 with	 its	
(multiple)	emergent	meanings	in	each	present	moment.	
The	second	key	contribution	is	a	reframing	of	the	 function	of	care	workers’	
laughter	around	death	as	one	of	‘carrying	on’	rather	than	‘coping’.	Through	this	
laughter	 can	be	 seen	 to	both	affirm	emotional	 experiences	of	death	and	 re-
compose	their	meanings	rather	than	simply	negating	them	or	pushing	them	
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away	(see	Harrison,	2015).	This	reframing,	and	the	examples	used	to	explain	
it,	also	advance	existing	approaches	to	thinking	about	death	through	forcing	a	
blurring	 of	 the	 boundaries	 between	 broken/continuing	 bonds,	
relationality/non-relationality	 and	 affirmation/negation.	 Instead	 of	 staying	
within	 one	 or	 other	 of	 these	 positions,	 the	 capacity	 to	 carry	 on	 relies	 on	
emergent	 and	 shifting	 mixtures	 of	 both	 broken	 bonds,	 continuing	 bonds,	
relationality,	 non-relationality,	 affirmation	 and	 negation;	 which	 together	
transform	the	kinds	of	relationships	that	people	have	with	the	future,	enabling	
them	to	carry	on	living	and	working	as	well	as	they	possibly	can.	
The	third	key	contribution	emerges	 from	attention	to	this	ethos	of	living	as	
well	as	possible	or	in	the	best	way	possible	and	sets	up	the	wider	context	for	
this	 reframing:	 the	 role	 of	 (vitalist)	 pragmatics	within	 care	 home	workers’	
actions,	politics	and	ethics.	Indeed,	often	the	capacities	for	care	workers	to	act	
are	bounded	within	the	 limits	of	possibility	which	more	often	than	not	 falls	
short	 of	 an	 ideal	 situation.	 Here	 laughter	 plays	 another,	 connected	 role	 in	
dramatizing	 the	 incongruities	 between	 idealised	 and	 actually	 lived	
circumstances	 and	 space-times	 (Bataille,	 2001).	 Although	 discussed	 most	
explicitly	 through	 encounters	with	 death,	 the	 section	 on	 laughter	 and	 care	
home	life	serves	as	a	reminder	that	this	function	of	laughter	can	also	emerge	
throughout	 care	 home	 life	more	 generally.	 This	 recognition	 is	 important	 in	
paying	heed	to	an	implied	pragmatics	within	Tronto’s	(1993:	103)	reference	
to	living	“as	well	as	possible”	or	within	the	realistic	bounds	of	possibility	which	
sets	up	a	politico-ethic	of	 care	as	 limited	 in	 some	way	by	 the	nature	of	 the	
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spatiotemporal	circumstances	in	which	it	is	enacted.	
In	bringing	this	all	together,	therefore,	I	propose	that	closer	attention	to	the	
role	 of	 pragmatic	 vital	 impulses	 (such	 as	 laughter)	 can	 facilitate	 more	
generous	geographic	understandings	of	the	micro-politics	of	caring	for	life	and	
death,	both	within	but	also	crucially	beyond	nursing	care	homes	–	as	we	shall	
touch	 upon	 in	 the	 next,	 concluding	 chapter.	 Whilst	 biopolitical	 structures	
clearly	 have	 significant	 influence	 over	 how	 life	 and	 death	 are	 politically	
mapped	out,	 these	 frameworks	do	not	necessarily	match	the	experiences	of	
those	navigating	these	spaces	on	the	ground;	where	life	and	death	are	often	
negotiated	through	an	ethic	of	‘doing	the	best	one	can’	to	ensure	life	can	carry	
on	being	lived	in	the	best	way	possible	in	each	situation,	even	if	that	ultimately	
involves	 a	 series	 of	 compromises	 that	 end	 up	 perpetuating	 the	 systematic	
structures	themselves.	As	Judith	Butler	(2012:	18)	notes,	in	bringing	the	same	
lecture	from	which	the	opening	quote	to	this	chapter	is	taken,	to	its	conclusion:	
“Such	 movements	 do	 not	 seek	 to	 overcome	 interdependency	 or	 even	
vulnerability	as	they	struggle	against	precarity;	rather,	they	seek	to	produce	
the	 conditions	 under	 which	 vulnerability	 and	 interdependency	 become	
liveable”.	
It	is	thus	through	drawing	on	non-representational	approaches,	as	I	have	done	
both	 in	 this	 chapter	 and	 throughout	 this	 thesis,	 that	 I	would	 argue	we	 can	
recognise	the	plurality	of	ways	in	which	these	kinds	of	minor	politico-ethical	
events	emerge	and	come	to	matter.	As	such,	in	moving	forwards	and	thinking	
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beyond	this	thesis,	I	would	argue	that	it	is	imperative	for	geographers	to	both	
recognise	and	engage	with	this	pragmatic	force	in	order	to	expand	the	terrain	
through	which	we	come	to	understand	and	assess	the	multiplicity	of	ways	in	
which	ordinary	people	care	for	life	and	death	in	complex,	messy	and	imperfect	
worlds.		
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Chapter	8:	Conclusions	
Vive	le	multiple!’;	le	multiple,	il	faut	le	faire.	
Proclaiming	“Long	live	the	multiple”	is	not	yet	doing	it,	one	must	do	the	
multiple	
(Deleuze	and	Parnet,	1987:	16)	
8.1	|	Extending	scenes	
I	opened	 this	 thesis	with	a	scene	 that	 enabled	a	movement	 into	 the	 specific	
terrain	that	it	has	discussed	and	posed	some	of	the	questions	that	the	thesis	
has	looked	to	address.	It	was	a	scene	presented	from	a	position	‘outside’	of	the	
specificity	of	the	care	home	looking	in;	a	scene	with	political	significance:	being	
situated	within	an	official	report	and	therefore	offering	an	official	judgement	
about	 the	 ethics	 of	 laughter	 with	 care.	 In	 bringing	 this	 thesis	 to	 its	 close,	
therefore,	I	wish	to	pose	one	further	scene:	a	scene	that	similarly	has	political	
significance	albeit	 in	a	different	way;	a	scene	that	can	be	seen	as	presented	
from	the	position	of	an	‘insider’	looking	out;	a	scene	that	I	hope	will	help	to	
enable	 a	 movement	 beyond	 the	 specific	 empirical	 terrain	 discussed	 in	 this	
thesis,	and	of	the	questions	it	has	looked	to	address,	and	therefore	might	help	
to	not	only	bring	together	the	approaches	to	laughter	with	care	discussed	in	
this	 thesis,	 but	 also	 open	 up	wider	 trajectories	 in	which	 both	 approaching	
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laughter	with	 care,	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 ethical	 refrains	 for	worlds	 of	multiplicity	
might	become	significant	in	new	and	productive	ways.	
*	
I	woke	up,	groggy	from	a	disrupted	night.	Hauled	myself	from	bed.	Dressed	
silently.	 Left	 the	 house.	 Walked	 down	 the	 road.	 Thinking.	 Questioning.	
Hoping.	I	was	somehow	numbed	by	the	weight	of	it	all.		
Arriving	at	the	train,	I	picked	up	the	paper,	knowing	exactly	what	the	cover	
will	say.	I	threw	it	back	down	on	the	seat	next	to	me	and	tried	to	read	my	
book.	 At	 the	 other	 end,	 I	 wandered	 from	 the	 train,	 up	 to	 Summerview	
slowly,	still	thinking,	or	perhaps	not	knowing	quite	what	to	think.	When	I	
saw	the	building,	I	knew	what	I	must	do.	I	forced	a	smile	and	quickened	my	
step,	headed	through	the	door,	signed	in,	and	then	straight	downstairs	to	
drop	my	bag	off.	
Two	carers	were	sat	in	the	sun	outside	the	staff	room	having	a	cigarette,	I	
headed	out	to	join	them	for	a	moment	before	starting	work.	When	they	see	
me,	 one	 jubilantly	 calls	 over	 “We’re	 out!”	 following	 this	with	 a	 burst	 of	
laughter.	It	unnerved	me	a	little.	A	direct	encounter	with	the	other	52%	–	
people	that	I	knew	existed,	but	never	knew	were	so	numerous	or	so	close.	
We	 spoke	 for	a	while	down	 there,	 it	 became	 a	memorable	 encounter	 in	
many	ways	–	 forcing	me	to	 face	up	to	the	realities	not	only	of	what	had	
happened	 but	 also	 why	 –	 the	 disenfranchisement,	 but	 perhaps	 more	
strongly,	the	hope,	excitement	and	joy	that	came	with	a	chance	for	change;	
a	chance	for	something	different,	something	better.	
Heading	 back	 upstairs	 I	 quickly	 encountered	 another	 sense,	 not	 one	 of	
jubilation	or	laughter,	but	rather	of	uncertainty	and	fear.	A	Polish	carer	
stood,	 feeding	 a	 resident	 and	 staring	 at	 the	 rolling	 news	 on	 the	 TV.	He	
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looked	exactly	how	I	felt,	somehow	numb.		
“You	happy	about	this?”	he	asked.		
“Not	at	all,”	I	replied,		
“What	 are	 people	 thinking?	 Do	 they	 no	 know	 their	 food	 will	 get	 more	
expensive,	their	rights	won’t	be	protected,	that	it’s	all	going	to	change	…	
for	worse?”	
All	in	all,	there	was	a	confusing	and	deadening	atmosphere	in	the	home	this	
morning.	The	change	in	TV	schedule	unsettled	some	of	the	residents,	and	
the	staff	kept	stopping	to	watch.	Perhaps	needless	to	say,	I	didn’t	feel	much	
like	laughing.	I	did	easy	jobs,	painting	some	of	the	ladies’	nails	and	spent	
some	time	coming	to	terms	with	the	whole	thing.	Towards	the	end	of	the	
morning,	 once	 the	 news	 had	 run	 out	 of	 new	 things	 to	 say	 and	 the	 TV	
schedule	 switched	 back	 to	 normal	 programming,	 bits	 of	 laughter	 crept	
back	 in.	Each	one	 in	 some	way	 started	 to	deflate	 the	 thick	atmospheric	
bubble	and	lifted	the	mood	slightly.	Slowly	something	like	the	ordinary	feel	
of	the	home	emerged.		
The	world	had	changed,	however,	possibly	forever.	
(Field	Diary	Notes,	Summerview	Care	Home,	24/06/2016)	
*	
Although	this	scene	takes	place	within	the	specific	location	of	a	care	home,	just	
outside	of	Birmingham,	UK,	my	suspicion	is	that	it	will	resonate	more	widely.	
Indeed,	the	event	of	‘Brexit’,	the	decision	made	by	the	people	of	the	UK	to	leave	
the	European	Union	through	a	referendum	on	the	23rd	of	June	2016,	which	it	
describes,	has	become	an	unavoidable	feature	of	life	in	the	UK	for	almost	all	of	
its	inhabitants.	As	Ben	Anderson	and	Helen	Wilson	(2018:	292)	argue,	Brexit	
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has	been	animated	“through	a	turbulent	mix	of	dramatic	scenes	of	jubilation	
and	devastation,	joys	and	despairs,	which	punctuated	more	familiar	moods	of	
resignation,	apathy,	or	indifference”	a	sense	of	which	emerges	from	this	scene	
as	it	is	described	here.	In	drawing	out	this	final	scene,	therefore,	my	intention	
is	not	to	offer	a	comprehensive	account	of	Brexit,	but	rather	to	make	a	final	set	
of	“tactical	suggestions”	(Dewsbury	et	al.,	2002:	439;	also	Colls	2012)	for	how	
we	might	use	the	ideas	in	this	thesis	in	order	to	think	through	the	potentials	
and	problematics	around	being	in-common	that	the	scene	itself	exemplifies:	a	
way	of	de-	and	re-territorialising	the	trajectories	that	have	been	explored	in	
this	thesis,	and	posing	some	of	what	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1988)	might	call	
their	‘lines	of	flight’.	
As	such,	this	final	chapter	works	through	the	tones	and	textures	afforded	by	
this	specific	encounter	with	Brexit	in	order	to	both	draw	together	the	themes	
and	arguments	posed	within	this	thesis	and	think	about	new	ways	of	taking	
them	forward.	In	this	sense,	it	traverses	terrain	that	has	already	been	mapped	
out	 in	 this	 thesis,	 but	 also	 speculatively	 explores	 terrain	 that	 is	 somewhat	
uncharted	(in	this	thesis	at	least).	The	scene,	for	instance,	contains	moments	
of	 laughter,	each	containing	a	multiplicity	of	ethical	potentials	(McCormack,	
2003)	which	can	be	engaged	with	in	different	ways	through	drawing	on	the	
different	approaches	outlined	in	this	thesis.	Alongside	this,	however,	the	scene	
also	poses	a	broader	set	of	potential	questions	about	Brexit	as	a	politico-ethical	
event.	 In	engaging	with	 these	questions,	 therefore,	we	can	 start	 to	draw	on	
some	of	the	other,	subtler	arguments	of	this	thesis	in	order	to	suggest	ways	in	
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which	we	might	approach	Brexit	with	care,	and	as	a	refrain,	and	thus	speculate	
as	 to	 how	 these	 ways	 of	 thinking	 and	 moving	 might	 allow	 us	 to	 “wander	
beyond	the	familiar”	(McCormack,	2013:	8).	
8.2	|	Approaching	laughter	with	care	
Before	 embarking	 on	 the	 more	 speculative	 elements	 of	 this	 conclusion,	
however,	it	seems	important	to	first	outline	the	themes	it	has	addressed	and	
the	arguments	it	has	posed.	Indeed,	as	stated	at	the	outset,	the	primary	aim	of	
this	thesis	has	been	to	re-imagine	the	ways	in	which	we	might	think	about	the	
ethics	of	laughter	and	care.	Crucially,	this	project	has	never	been	about	simply	
applying	‘ethics	of	care’	to	laughter,	nor	about	attempt	to	create	a	prescriptive	
set	of	rules	or	norms	through	which	we	might	promote	‘good’	laughter	in	care	
settings,	 and	 reduce	 ‘bad’	 laughter.	 Similarly,	 it	has	not	been	an	 attempt	 to	
generate	a	Panglossian	account	of	laughter	as	either	morally	dubious	(Billig,	
2005;	 Gantar,	 2005)	 or	 an	 inherent	 social	 good	 (Bergson,	 1980;	 Buckley,	
2005).	Rather,	the	thesis	has	sought	to	stage	an	encounter	that	holds	the	two	
in	relation	to,	or	‘with’	one	another,	and	thus	generate	an	ethical	approach	that	
builds	out	of	 the	specificities	of	 this	particular	gathering.	 I	have	 framed	this	
renewed	approach	within	a	multitude	of	concepts	and	ideas	that	emerge	from	
non-representational	theories	(Thrift,	2008),	and	particularly	the	concept	of	
‘the	refrain’	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	1988;	McCormack,	2013),	which,	I	argue,	
enables	engagements	with	non-normative	thinking-spaces	through	which	we	
can	 grapple	 with	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 laughter	 and	 care	 can	
emerge	and	affect	bodies,	space	and	one	another	in	a	given	moment,	and	thus	
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the	multiplicity	of	ethical	potentials	that	are	held	within	them.		
This	re-imagining	of	the	ethics	of	laughter	with	care	thus	starts	in	Chapter	2,	
which	draws	together	various	literatures	and	theories	around	laughter,	care	
and	ethics	in	order	to	set	out	the	expanded	ethical	terrain	through	which	the	
thesis	 moves.	 In	 doing	 this,	 I	 looked	 to	 unsettle	 many	 of	 the	 normative	
assumptions	that	surround	laughter,	care	and	ethics,	offering	a	looser,	more	
fragmented	 and	 more	 multiple	 conception	 of	 the	 possible	 relations,	 social	
formations	and	corporeal-affective	transformations	they	can	engender.	More	
specifically,	 the	 chapter	 offers	 a	 critique	 of	 normative	 theories	 as	 a	way	 of	
thinking	 about	 laughter	 and	 instead	 poses	 both	 engagements	 with	 non-
representational	theories	and	ideas	of	care	in	turn	as	a	means	of	mediating	the	
problematics,	and	multiplying	the	possibilities,	of	the	ethical.	Finally,	it	turns	
to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 refrain,	 posing	 this	 as	 a	 key	 conceptual/methodological	
vehicle	 through	which	we	might	 approach	 the	 plurality	 and	multiplicity	 of	
ethical	forms	that	can	emerge	from	singular	interactions	between	laughter	and	
care	 without	 foreclosing	 the	 possibilities	 that	 these	 outcomes	 might	 be	
different,	uncanny	or	unfamiliar	in	different	spacetimes	and	under	different	
circumstances.	
Having	situated	the	empirical	work	of	the	thesis	in	Chapter	3	–	both	in	terms	
of	its	specific	engagement	with	care	homes	in	the	UK,	and	in	terms	of	(non-
representational)	 ethnography	 as	 a	 methodology	 –	 I	 then	 forwarded	 four	
different,	 yet	 entangled,	 ways	 of	 approaching	 laughter	 with	 care:	 through	
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multiple	modes	of	 listening;	 in	 terms	of	 the	multiplicity	of	 folded	subjective	
positions	through	which	laughter	is	practised;	in	terms	of	its	diffuse	affective	
spatialities;	and	as	a	pragmatic	 force	through	which	often	 imperfect	worlds	
and	relations	can	be	recomposed	and	made	productive.	Although	overlapping,	
each	 approach	 offers	 a	 different	way	 of	 imagining	 laughter	 and,	 therefore,	
offering	a	significantly	expanded	conception	of	what	laughter	can	do.	
In	Chapter	4,	I	experimented	with	the	multiplicity	of	ways	in	which	we	might	
listen	to	laughter	with	care.	In	particular,	I	highlighted	three	different	ways	of	
listening	 to	 laughter:	 as	 a	 representation	 of	 something	 else;	 as	 an	 affective	
force;	and	as	a	circumstantial	encounter.	The	first	draws	on	more	traditional	
approaches	and	humour	theories	in	order	to	suggest	laughter	as	expressing	
something	 about	 a	 person’s	 subjectivity.	 The	 second	 draws	 on	 Jean-Luc	
Nancy’s	(2007)	distinction	between	listening	and	hearing	in	order	to	attend	to	
the	affective	capacities	of	laughter’s	sounds.	The	third	augments	these	first	two	
approaches	 through	 situating	 them	 in	 relation	 to	 the	wider	 subjective	 and	
spatial	 contexts	within	which	 laughter	 takes	 place.	 Each	mode	 of	 listening,	
therefore,	imbues	laughter	with	a	different	set	of	meanings,	and	crucially	also	
changes	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	laughter’s	relations	with	care.	
In	Chapter	5	 I	 explored	ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 laughter	with	 care	 as	 it	 is	
practised.	In	doing	this	I	deployed	Deleuze’s	notion	of	the	fold	(see	Nixon	2017)	
in	order	to	pose	laughter	and	care	as	emerging	from	three	subjective	contexts	
–	the	individual,	the	collective	and	the	institutional	subject	–	each	with	their	
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own	meanings	and	functions.	In	this	sense,	I	noted	the	ways	in	which	laughter	
both	 folds	 into	 and	 out	 of	 particular	 relational	 configurations,	 as	 well	 as	
serving	 to	 fold	 subjects	 into	 and	 out	 these	 same	 relational	 configurations	
primarily	 through	modes	of	 inclusion	and	exclusion.	This	recognition	of	 the	
multiplicity	of	 subject	positions	within	which	each	 laugher	 is	 enfolded	 thus	
serves	to	break	down	the	idea	of	the	individual	moral	subject	who	practices	
laughter	with	care	and	instead	distributes	this	across	much	wider	relational	
lines.	
In	Chapter	6	I	drew	on	literatures	around	affective	atmospheres	(Anderson	
2014)	in	order	to	pose	laughter	as	a	spatial	thing	that	occurs	beyond	subjective	
intentionality	and,	therefore,	as	having	a	nascent	creative	force	in	its	own	right.	
In	particular,	I	noted	the	ways	in	which	this	creative	force	can	reshape	affective	
spacetimes	 and	 can,	 therefore,	 generate	 new	 forms	 of	 affective	 relations	
between	bodies	and	the	spaces	they	inhabit,	often	in	ways	that	promote	closer	
relations	between	people	or	in	ways	that	enable	fractured	relationships	to	be	
repaired.	 Crucially,	 however,	 the	 spatially	 dispersed	 nature	 of	 laughter’s	
atmospheres	mean	 that	 it	 can	 also	 be	 encountered	 from	 other	 spaces	 and	
contexts,	sometimes	generating	very	different	affects.	In	this	way,	positioning	
laughter	in	atmospheric	terms	serves	to	open	up	questions	about	cause	and	
effect,	further	distributing	its	ethics	away	from	the	idea	of	the	laugher	as	an	
individual	moral-subject.	
Finally,	in	Chapter	7,	I	turned	to	think	about	the	political	force	behind	laughter	
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with	 care,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 ideas	 of	 life	 and	 death.	 Where	 most	
scholars	position	the	relation	between	laughter	and	death	in	terms	of	coping	–	
laughter	as	a	means	of	pushing	away	emotions	during	encounters	with	death	
–	 I	 looked	 to	 offer	 an	 alternative	 and	 more	 affirmative	 account	 whereby	
laughter	can	be	seen	as	a	‘carrying	on’:	a	taking	of	our	emotions	forward	with	
us	and	folding	them	into	our	sense	of	self	rather	than	pushing	them	away.	I	
thus	 argued	 that	 the	ways	 in	which	 laughter	 is	 deployed	 around	death	 are	
suggestive	of	a	wider	vitally	pragmatic	politico-ethic	for	care,	whereby	carers	
often	work	towards	the	“as	well	as	possible”	(Tronto	1993:	103)	rather	than	
grand,	idealistic	political	visions.	
Although	in	this	sense	each	chapter	makes	its	own	specific	contribution	to	the	
thesis	and	to	understandings	of	laughter,	care	and	ethics,	perhaps	the	biggest	
contribution	of	the	thesis	emerges	from	the	assemblage	formed	through	their	
being	gathered	together.	 Indeed,	 in	 thinking	through	the	refrain	once	more:	
each	chapter	can	be	seen	as	a	particular	territorialisation	of	the	wider	refrain	
that	is	‘approaching	laughter	with	care’.	That	is	to	say,	that	whilst	each	chapter	
to	some	respects	addresses	similar	situations,	scenes,	events	and	happenings	
–	moments	 in	which	 laughter	 and/or	 care	 actualise	 –	 in	 approaching	 these	
situations	repeatedly	through	different	conceptual	frameworks	and	different	
locations	and	orientations,	we	can	 start	 to	generate	a	much	more	 complex,	
multiple	 and	 fragmented	 understanding	 of	 the	 various	 different	 ethical	
potentials	afforded	by	moments	of	laughter	with	care:	accounts	that	“don’t	add	
up	but	are	always	threatening	to”	(Stewart,	2008:	72).	
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Given	 this	 uncertainty,	 an	 obvious	 critique	 would	 be	 that	 this	 ‘ethical’	
approach	contains	a	‘normative	deficit’	(e.g.	Olson	and	Sayer,	2009),	and	thus	
offers	no	way	of	fostering	transformative	politics	and	relations	(Harvey,	1989).	
Yet,	as	I	hope	I	have	shown,	it	is	an	approach	that	fosters	a	different	style	of	
ethical	engagement:	one	that	both	requires,	and	inspires,	a	mode	of	generosity	
which	seeks	less	to	judge,	and	more	to	understand,	sympathise	with	and	affirm	
the	multitude	of	practices,	affects	and	politics,	that	people	seek	(and	indeed	
are	forced)	to	adopt,	in	order	to	maintain,	continue	and	repair	our	worlds	so	
that	we	can	collectively	live	in	them	as	well	as	possible	(Tronto,	1993).	Put	in	
another	way,	it	is	an	ethos	of	generosity	that	allows	us	to	affirm,	promote	and	
indeed	celebrate	the	ontological	necessities	and	responsibilities	of	‘being-in-
common’	 (Popke,	 2007,	 2009)	 through	 both	 laughter	 and	 care,	 without	
necessarily	requiring	us	to	be	in	agreement	about	exactly	how	these	could	or	
should	take	place	(see	Thrift,	2005).		
8.3	|	Concluding	in	the	middle:	laughter,	care,	ethics	
It	is	thus	through	the	‘generous’	ethos	that	emerges	from	the	thesis	as	a	whole	
that	 I	 wish	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 scene	 presented	 above	 –	 drawing	 out	 the	
multiplicities	within	 it	and	seeking	to	offer	suggestions	as	 to	how	we	might	
approach	 it.	 In	 this	sense,	 I	 approach	 the	 scene	 (and	Brexit	 itself)	here	 in	a	
manner	that	is	not	so	much	‘analytical’	as	it	is	speculative.	In	other	words,	this	
is	not	a	section	that	aims	to	map	out	a	specific	understanding	of	the	entangled	
relations	between	Brexit,	laughter,	care	and	ethics,	but	rather	positions	itself	
in	the	middle	of	this	scene,	questioning,	and	to	some	respects	suggesting,	how	
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we	might	begin	to	think	and	move	through	it.	In	doing	this,	I	begin	with	the	
elements	of	the	scene	that	are	closest	to	the	themes	of	the	thesis,	namely	the	
moments	of	 laughter,	drawing	directly	on	 its	arguments.	 I	 then	move	on	 to	
think	 beyond	 the	 laughter	 directly,	 drawing	 on	 the	 thesis’	more	 peripheral	
arguments	to	suggest	how	we	might	approach	Brexit,	both	with	care	and	as	an	
‘ethical	refrain’	currently	taking	place	in	worlds	of	multiplicity.	This	style	of	
engagement	thus	serves	to	subtly	pull	out	and	emphasise	the	ways	in	which	
this	thesis	has	sought	to	push	and	pull	at	the	various	literatures,	concepts	and	
theories	it	has	engaged	with,	and	the	ways	in	which	it	has	served	to	contribute	
to	them.		
The	 scene	 presented	 above	 is	 punctuated	 by	 two	 kinds	 of	 laughter:	 the	
laughter	from	the	carer	as	she	greats	me	outside	of	the	staff	room	and	the	‘bits	
of	laughter’	that	crept	back	in	towards	the	end	of	the	morning.	Each	of	these	
moments	of	laughter	can	be	analysed	using	‘traditional’	theories	of	humour,	as	
set	out	in	Chapters	2	and	4.	The	first	can	be	seen	as	a	moment	of	‘superiority’	
–	 ‘jubilant’	 in	 its	 proclaiming,	 “we’re	 out!”	 –	 and	 therefore	 as	 somewhat	
exemplary	of	what	Colin	Flint	 (2001:	6-7)	describes	as	 “the	 laughter	of	 the	
winners	who	are	arrogant	about	their	position	in	the	world.”	We	might	see	it	
as	demonstrating	feelings	of	‘moral	worth’	having	been	on	the	winning	side	of	
the	 referendum,	 and	 indeed	 also	 somewhat	 unjust	 in	 its	 negation	 of	 the	
position	held	by	those	who	voted	to	remain	–	the	‘losers’	in	Flint’s	analysis.	The	
second	moments	 of	 laughter,	 those	 that	 pepper	 the	 home	 as	 it	 returns	 to	
normal,	suggests	laughter	as	a	kind	of	release,	diffusing	the	emotional	tensions	
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of	the	morning	(Ridanpää,	2014a)	and	therefore	providing	a	crucial	function	
in	restoring	social	and	moral	order	(Bergson,	1980;	Buckley,	2005).	Despite	
the	apparent	clarity	in	this	style	of	analysis,	however,	we	might	again	note	that	
these	 kinds	 of	 approaches	 to	 laughter’s	 ethics	 remain	 somewhat	 lacking	 in	
their	 attention	 to	 laughter	 itself,	 framing	 it	 simply	 as	 a	 consequence	 or	
representation	of	 something	else	 (Parvulescu,	2010),	 and	 therefore	missing	
many	 of	 the	 other	 kinds	 of	 socio-ethical	 relations	 and	 functions	 that	 it	 can	
generate	–	often	in	ways	that	are	somewhat	occluded	at	first.	In	this	sense,	we	
might	offer	a	little	more	generosity	in	our	approach	through	engaging	more	
broadly	with	the	multiplicity	of	circumstances,	spaces,	bodies	and	affects	that	
emerge	around,	alongside	and	within	these	moments	of	laughter,	thus	seeking	
to	understand	and	sympathise	with	how	and	why	 they	happen	 rather	 than	
make	explicit	moral/ethical	judgements	about	them.		
In	one	sense,	therefore,	this	generosity	can	be	 found	through	engaging	with	
laughter’s	non-representational	elements,	particularly	in	terms	of	its	material-
affective	 capacities	 (Macpherson,	 2008)	 and	 in	 recognising	 the	 ‘nomadic’	
relation	 that	 laughter	 has	 with	 body-subjects	 (Braidotti,	 2011;	 Simpson,	
2017):	as	an	embodied	practice	(something	we	do)	and	an	affective	force	in	its	
own	 right	 –	 capable	 of	 affecting	 us	 and	 others	 in	 ways	 that	 we	might	 not	
necessarily	have	intended	(J	Katz,	1999;	Nancy,	1993).	In	this	sense,	we	might	
question	the	ways	in	which	laughter’s	affects	emerge,	register	and	circulate	in	
the	scene	above:	its	‘jubilance’	in	the	carer	who	calls	to	greet	me	and	the	ways	
in	which	that	registers	in	my	body	as	‘unsettling’;	the	ways	in	which	this	initial	
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encounter	juxtaposes	itself	against	the	Polish	carer’s	and	my	own	reluctance	
to	laugh;	and	the	ways	in	which	laughter	creeps	back	in,	later	on,	feeling	and	
functioning	at	a	somewhat	different	register.	Similarly,	we	might	think	about	
how	 these	 circulations	 of	 laughter’s	 affects	 exceed,	 create	 and	 reshape	 the	
affective	 atmospheres	 of	 the	 home	 –	 generating	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 different	
inter/intra-actions	and	experiences:	
We	stare	at	the	TV,	
And,	do	easy	jobs	
And,	have	conversations	about	politics,	
And	hope,	wonder,	and	question	
Alongside	 this,	we	might	wonder	what	else	might	be	going	on	during	 these	
encounters	 if	 we	 view	 them	 from	 a	 different	 angle	 or	 orientation	 (Ahmed,	
2006):	what	 other	 affects	 register	 and	what	 capacities	 do	 they	 enhance	 or	
destroy	 in	 bodies	 that	 are	 differently	 situated?	 What	 else	 might	 possibly	
emerge	 from	 these	moments	of	 laughter	 (McCormack,	2003)?	Crucially,	 it’s	
worth	 noting	 that	 the	 scene,	 as	 presented	 here,	 lacks	 the	 details	 needed	 to	
definitively	answer	these	questions,	and	therefore	precludes	any	attempts	to	
make	 ‘universal’	 or	 ‘objective’	 judgements	 about	 laughter’s	 ethics	 in	 any	
meaningful	way.	
Connected	to	this	latter	point,	in	generating	yet	more	generous	engagements	
with	laughter,	we	need	to	recognise	the	tensions	that	emerge	around	its	taking	
place	within	worlds	of	singular-plurality	 (Nancy,	2000)	where	being	 is	 also	
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always	 being-in-common	 (Popke,	 2010)	 with	 different	 others.	 Following	
Donna	Haraway,	Maria	Puig	de	la	Bellacasa	(2017:	70)	describes	this	as	“the	
inescapable	 troubles	of	 interdependent	existences”,	 arguing	 that	because	of	
these	troubles,	we	need	to	engage	with	ethics	through	thinking	with	care.	In	
terms	 of	 the	 scene	 above,	 thinking	 laughter	with	 care	 is	 thus	 partly	 about	
affirming	laughter’s	capacities	to	“maintain,	continue,	and	repair	our	‘world’	
so	that	we	can	live	in	it	as	well	as	possible”	(Tronto,	1993:	103).	In	other	words,	
it	is	about	seeking	out	the	vital	roles	that	the	presence	or	absence	of	laughter’s	
affects	play	in	celebrating	the	situation	(as	with	the	first	carer),	repairing	it	and	
returning	it	to	normal	(as	with	the	moments	of	laughter	in	the	late	morning),	
and	 indeed	more	 generally	 in	making	 the	 imperfect	 nature	 of	 the	 situation	
‘liveable’	 (Butler,	 2012)	 –	 something	 that	 the	 shared	 absence	 of	 laughter	
between	myself	 and	 the	 Polish	 carer	 could	 be	 suggestive	 of.	 Holding	 these	
together	thus	allows	a	complex	and	fragmented	picture	of	the	multiple	forms	
of	‘caring’	works,	affects	and	politics	that	laughter	can	generate,	but	also	the	
ways	in	which	“they	are	held	together	and	sometimes	challenge	each	other	in	
the	idea	of	care”	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017:	5).		
Through	 this,	 thinking	 with	 care	 can	 thus	 also	 become	 a	 broader	 (non-
representational)	 ethos	 which	 demands	 the	 speculative	 extension	 of	 our	
ethical/moral	 imagination	beyond	the	current	situated	position	of	 the	 ‘self’,	
and	the	placing	of	it	in	sympathetic	relation	with	the	positions	of	others.	We	
might,	for	instance,	imagine	what	else	could	possibly	be	happening	during	the	
laughter	in	these	scenes	in	order	to	question	whether	the	presence,	or	perhaps	
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absence,	of	laughter	in	these	cases	might	be	affecting	the	care	home	in	ways	
that	are	occluded	from	its	telling.	Might	my	slightly	dour	and	unsettled	mood	
emerging	from	the	first	moment	of	laughter	have	subconsciously	caused	me	to	
be	less	attentive	to	the	residents’	needs	wants	and	desires?	Similarly,	we	might	
extend	 this	 generosity	 and	 sympathy	 towards	 those	 who	 are	 laughing	
themselves.	Though	engaging	with	the	multiplicity	of	folded	subject	positions	
that	surround	the	first	moment	of	laughter,	for	instance,	we	might	suggest	that	
it	probably	wasn’t	‘arrogant’	(cf.	Flint,	2001),	but	rather	an	attempt	to	include	
me	 in	 the	 moment	 of	 celebration,	 based	 on	 an	 assumption	 that	 I	 was	 in	
agreement	about	the	result	of	the	vote.	Similarly,	we	might	extend	this	further	
through	also	 recognising	 the	multitude	of	 structural	 foldings	 (Nixon,	2017)	
that,	 for	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 white,	 working-class	 people,	 seemingly	
imbued	 a	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	with	 a	 series	 of	 somewhat	 hopeful	 and	
optimistic	affective	capacities	(Anderson	and	Wilson,	2018).	
Whilst	there	is	an	element	of	continuity	with	the	rest	of	the	thesis	in	this	last	
statement,	through	engaging	with	the	performative	nature	of	‘structural	folds’	
(Nixon,	2017),	it	also	begins	to	move	beyond	the	‘boundaries’	of	the	care	home	
as	an	‘institution’	in	a	way	that	the	rest	of	the	thesis	has	not.	Doing	so	thus,	
allows	us	to	start	speculatively	prizing	open	a	series	of	‘wider’	spaces	within	
which	the	ideas	of	this	thesis	might	also	find	some	resonance,	particularly	in	
relation	to	thinking	ethics	across	political	differences	such	as	these.	
Indeed,	Brexit	and	the	(everyday)	events	that	have	happened	in	the	UK	since	
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the	 vote	 have	 been	 argued	 to	 leave	Britain	 as	 an	 inherently	 divided	 nation	
(Dorling,	2016).	These	divisions	have	manifested	 in	a	number	of	ways.	The	
actual	result	was	a	52:48	split,	meaning	that	in	the	loosest	terms	the	UK	has	a	
relatively	 even	 divide	 of	 ‘leavers’	 and	 ‘remainers’	 (although	 the	 actual	
‘evenness’	of	this	remains	a	point	of	contention	–	see	Kenny,	2016).	Yet	this	
relatively	 simple	 political	 division	 has	 in	 turn	 been	 multiplied:	 invariably	
posed	as	a	series	of	social,	cultural,	economic,	generational,	educational,	racial,	
class	and	geographic	divisions	in	turn	(Goodwin	and	Heath,	2016;	Hozić	and	
True,	2017;	Kenny	and	Sheldon,	2018;	Noxolo,	forthcoming).	Moreover,	these	
divisions	 have	 also	 played	 out	 in	 both	 grand	 political	 terms	 (e.g.	 through	
debates,	 speeches,	 policy	 papers,	 and	 negotiations)	 and	 everyday	 terms	
(Anderson	 and	 Wilson,	 2018),	 through	 the	 “billions	 of	 happy	 or	 unhappy	
encounters”	 (Thrift,	 1999:	 302)	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 between	 ‘leavers’,	
‘remainers’	and	‘leavers’	and	‘remainers’	since	that	moment.	Crucially,	these	
divisions	can	generate	a	multitude	of	practical,	affective	and	ethico-political	
movements	in	individual,	collective,	institutional	and	structural	bodies	of	all	
kinds,	as	indeed	the	scene	that	animates	this	chapter	alludes	to:	silence;	hope;	
numbing	sensations;	a	desire	to	throw	a	newspaper	back	on	a	train	seat;	forced	
smiles;	quickened	steps;	laughter;	lack	of	laughter;	confusing	and	deadening	
atmospheres;	altered	TV	schedules;	disruption;	continuity;	and	so	on	–	each	of	
which	resonate	in,	and	affect,	different	bodies	differently	at	different	moments.	
Given	these	divisions	and	the	affects	they	can	generate,	therefore,	we	might	
well	extend	the	manner	of	approach	developed	in	this	thesis	towards	Brexit	
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itself:	framing	it	too	as	a	matter	of	care	(Puig	de	la	Bellacasa,	2017).	This	once	
again	 requires	 a	 multiple,	 fragmented	 and	 somewhat	 speculative	 mode	 of	
address	 which	 sees	 Brexit	 not	 just	 as	 a	 matter	 affecting	 care	 –	 through	
potential	reductions	in	 the	number	of	EU	workers	available	 to	provide	care	
(Jarrett,	 2017)	 or	 through	 the	 potential	 economic	 downturn	 and	 any	
subsequent	government	spending	cuts	(Competitions	and	Markets	Authority,	
2017)	–	but	also	as	one	 that	might	be	 seen	as	an	act	of	 care	 itself.	 In	other	
words,	 particularly	 for	 those	 of	 us	 whose	 politics	 do	 not	 align	 with	 the	
decision,	 it’s	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 despite	 the	 often	 contentious,	
uncomfortable	and	even	violent	ways	in	which	it	manifested,	for	many	people	
voting	to	leave	the	EU	was	very	much	an	attempt	to	maintain,	continue	and	
repair	our	world	so	that	we	can	live	in	it	as	well	as	possible	(see	Bartos,	2018).	
Furthermore,	 engaging	 with	 these	 tensions	 is	 also	 something	 that	 itself	
requires	 a	 care-full	 ethical	 disposition:	 one	 that	 affirms	 positive	 affections,	
relations,	 collectives	 and	 being-in-common,	 encouraging	 ‘kinder’,	 more	
sympathetic	and	more	generous	encounters	across	difference	(Thrift,	2005),	
through	which	new	possibilities	and	potentials	for	living-together	(as	well	as	
possible)	might	emerge.	Indeed,	as	Noxolo	(forthcoming:	np)	notes,	Brexit	can	
already	be	seen	to	have	produced	an	increased	engagement	with	politics	from	
previously	marginalised	BME	voters	in	the	2017	general	election,	as	well	as	
helping	to	catalyse	a	series	of	wider	and	more	progressive	moves	“to	imagine	
a	more	inclusive	view	of	the	making	of	Britain	as	a	shared	place”	by	these	same	
groups.	
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Beyond	the	specificities	of	laughter	and	care	what	I	hope	this	speculative	foray	
has	begun	to	demonstrate	are	the	ways	in	which	we	might	adopt	and	adapt	the	
approaches	 outlined	 in	 this	 thesis	 in	 order	 to	 think	 beyond	 “analysis	 that	
approaches	Brexit	 as	 a	 symptom	 to	 be	 understood	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 set	of	
already	 known	 causes	 and	 conditions”	 and	 instead	 engage	 with	 the	
multiplicity	of	 ethical	potentials	 that	 emerge	 from	 in	 the	midst	of	 “people’s	
ordinary	ways	of	encountering,	relating	to,	and	living	with,	Brexit”	(Anderson	
and	Wilson,	 2018:	 294).	 In	 this	 regard,	 Brexit	must	 be	 addressed,	 not	 as	 a	
singular	moral	issue	but	rather	as	an	ethical	refrain,	capable	of	territorialising,	
deterritorialising	 and	 reterritorialising	 in	 different	 ways,	 at	 different	
moments,	under	different	circumstances	and	for	different	people.	As	with	my	
approach	to	laughter	with	care,	therefore,	I	might	speculatively	suggest	that	
we	need	approach	Brexit	in	multiple	ways,	from	multiple	angles,	positions	and	
orientations	 and	 multiple	 times	 –	 with	 all	 of	 these	 different	 approaches	
generating	 a	 more	 complex	 and	 fragmented	 ethical	 space	 within	 which	 to	
move	and	think,	and	through	which	we	might	be	able	to	“wander	beyond	the	
familiar”	(McCormack,	2013:	8)	and	find	innovative	ways	of	being-in-common,	
even	if	that	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	we	are	always	in	agreement.			
8.4	|	Final	conclusions	
I	 have	 chosen	 to	 conclude	 this	 thesis	 through	 engaging	with	Brexit	 in	 part	
because	 it	 serves	 to	highlight	some	of	what	 is	at	 stake	within	 the	relatively	
banal	 occurrences	 of	 laughter	 and	 care	 that	 have	 been	 discussed.	 Indeed,	
moving	 from	 the	 untimely	 ways	 in	 which	 care	 home	 spaces	 have	 been	
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presented	 into	 a	 moment	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 timely	 present	 that	 has	
surrounded	its	emergence	serves	to	trace	some	of	the	ways	in	which	laughter	
might	help	us	to	both	animate	and	understand	the	world.	Indeed,	Brexit	is	just	
one	 territorialisation	 of	 a	 wider	 refrain	 that	 characterises	 the	 worlds	 that	
many	people	of	my	particular	age	(and	it	must	be	said	levels	of	privilege)	have	
grown	 up	 in.	 These	 worlds	 are	 not	 just	 post-Foucault,	 post-Derrida,	 post-
Deleuze	 and	 Postmodern	 (Thrift,	 2000);	 they	 are	 also	 post-human,	 post-
relational,	 post-political,	 post-truth,	 post-Thatcher,	 post-Blair,	 post-9/11,	
post-financial-crash,	post-Postmodern	worlds.	They	are	worlds	of	seemingly	
infinite	 multiplicity,	 fragmentation,	 paradox,	 precarity	 and	 variation.	 The	
thesis	has	thus	sought	to	highlight	the	ways	in	which	thinking	through	laughter	
might	help	to	guide	our	thinking	about	the	worlds	in	which	we	live.		
Indeed,	 laughter,	 like	 the	 contemporary	 world,	 is	 also	 a	 mutable	 and	
paradoxical	multiplicity:	simultaneously	celebrated	and	criticised;	caring	and	
callous;	 inclusive	 and	 divisive;	 individual	 and	 collective;	 normative	 and	
transgressive;	human	and	more-than-human;	loved	and	hated;	productive	and	
destructive;	 creative	 and	 stifling.	 In	 this	 sense,	 engaging	with	 laughter	 as	 a	
multiplicity	 might	 generate	 “a	 more	 sensitive,	 more	 effective	 and	 more	
creative	means	to	make	human	bodies	sensible	to	the	material	traces	of	other	
bodies	 archived	 around	 them”	 (Noxolo,	 forthcoming:	 np).	 My	 own	
engagements	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 cut	 at	 one	 small	 slice	 of	 this	 potential:	
focussing	in	particular	on	how	we	might	imagine	new	ways	of	understanding	
the	 ethical	 refrains	 that	 constitute	 these	 worlds.	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 remain	
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optimistic	–	affirming	laughter	as	a	somewhat	vital	means	of	negotiating	“the	
inescapable	 troubles	 of	 interdependent	 coexistences”	 (Puig	 de	 la	 Bellacasa,	
2017:	72)	–	yet	 I	have	made	no	attempt	to	deny	that	 it	 is	also	a	potentially	
harmful	element	of	the	world,	whether	we	intend	it	to	be	or	not.		
Through	happenstance,	whilst	I	was	preparing	the	final	version	of	this	thesis,	
my	friend	Colin	sent	me	a	link	to	an	article	in	the	Guardian	newspaper	that	was	
being	shared	on	social	media.	In	it	the	novelist	Charlotte	Wood	(2018)	makes	
an	impassioned	argument	that	laughter	is	vital	to	the	continued	survival	of	the	
human	 condition.	 Her	 argument,	 although	 largely	 couched	 within	
conventional	 understandings	 of	 laughter,	 is	 one	 that	 draws	 a	 number	 of	
parallels	with	my	own	in	this	thesis:	she	talks	about	laughter’s	capacities	to	
connect	people,	build	optimism,	resist	the	insipid	pressing	down	of	the	world	
and	to	imagine	and	create	something	new.	Crucially,	she	argues	that,	given	the	
relatively	 ‘dark’	nature	of	 the	worlds	 in	which	we	 live	 in,	 “[t]he	embrace	of	
laughter	in	our	art	and	in	ourselves	is	an	ethical	choice	that	we	can	and	must	
make”.	Perhaps,	unsurprisingly,	I	read	her	piece	with	a	mixture	of	excitement,	
interest	 and	 critique	 (as	well	 as	 a	 small	 bit	 of	 trepidation	 in	 case	my	 own	
arguments	might	 not	 seem	 so	 novel).	 Ultimately,	 broadly	 speaking,	 I	 agree	
with	her	–	embracing,	or	affirming,	laughter	is	an	ethical	choice.	Where	this	
thesis	might	add	to	her	argument,	however,	is	that	in	making	this	choice,	we	
always	also	need	to	remain	resolutely	aware	of	the	multiple	ethical	potentials	
afforded	 by	 laughter:	 ‘good’	 and	 ‘bad’,	 intentional	 and	 unintentional,	 to	 be	
expected	or	completely	surprising	–	and	thus	maintain	our	response-ability	to	
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it	when	it	emerges	(Thrift,	2005).		
Simply	put:	yes,	embracing	laughter	is	an	ethical	choice	(Wood,	2018),	but	not	
one	 we	 should	 make	 without	 reserve.	 Instead,	 let	 us	 always	 endeavour	 to	
approach	laughter	with	care.		
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